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Vincent Buskens, Rense Corten and Chris Snijders
1 Complementary Studies on Trust
and Cooperation in Social Settings:
An Introduction
Rigorous sociologists should develop sound theoretical predictions to be tested with high-quality
empirical research rather than produce ‘teutonischer Tiefsinn’ devoid of empirical content.
Werner Raub
1.1 Background
The issue of cooperation has been a core topic in the social sciences for a long time,
and for good reasons. Many societal matters share that everyone involved knows
what they would prefer to see happening, but the incentives are such that this is
hard or even impossible to achieve. Examples are abundant, and play at different
levels of granularity. At the societal level, one could think of (trying to prevent) the
depletion of collective resources or transitioning to a more sustainable society. At
the level of organizations, one could think of trying to overcome the impulse to ben-
efit in a business relation at the expense of the other party, or of the tendency for
businesses to use legal constructs to evade taxes. Regardless of the grandiosity of
these cooperation problems, similar arguments play a role in the provision of col-
lective goods in neighborhoods or households, and even within a single person
there can be friction between the current and the future self.
The academic literature has coined the term “social dilemmas” for these kinds
of interactions in which sensible decisions by individual actors lead to an outcome
that is inferior for all (see Raub, Corten, and Buskens 2015 for a more technical defi-
nition). For those unacquainted with the general topic, this sounds hard to imagine.
How can it be that we end up in a situation where everybody agrees that an alterna-
tive outcome was possible that is better for everybody? Nevertheless, many well-
known cooperation problems share this feature. The canonical example of such a
problem is the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma (Luce and Raiffa 1957: 94–95; Axelrod
1984). In this game for two actors, the two actors simultaneously choose between
two actions, Cooperate or Defect, and the four outcomes that can result from these
choices have benefits for both actors as in the left panel of Figure 1.1. Both actors,
considering the potential choices of the other player, will conclude that to defect
benefits them more than to cooperate, irrespective of what the other actor does,
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and hence to defect is the rational course of action for each of them. Two actors
who think this way will end up with the payoffs that go with mutual defection,
even though mutual cooperation would have yielded a better outcome to both.
Another type of exchange that differs from the Prisoner’s Dilemma in important
aspects but nevertheless shares its social dilemma nature is the Trust Game (Dasgupta
1988), illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1.1. In this game, the moves are sequential
rather than simultaneous. In the first move, the “trustor” chooses whether or not
to place trust in the “trustee.” If the trustor indeed decides to place trust, the
trustee decides whether to honor or abuse it. The outcomes of the Trust Game are
such that after trust is placed, abusing trust is more beneficial for the trustee
than honoring trust. The trustor, anticipating that the trustee will abuse trust if
it is placed, will reasonably decide not to trust the trustee. As in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, both actors end up in a situation that is suboptimal as mutual coopera-
tion (the trustor placing trust and the trustee honoring trust) would be a better
outcome for both.
The explanation of these, already very well-known, abstract interactions imme-
diately suggests both how theoretical arguments about cooperation problems can
take shape and how scholars have tried to tackle the analysis of cooperation and
trust problems. For one, these games make clear that not all social dilemmas are
equal. Some fit better with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where choice is simultaneous,
whereas others resemble a Trust Game, where choice is sequential. Other types of
games are often natural extensions of these archetypical ones. It can be sensible to
assume more than two actors, more than just two behavioral choices, different
kinds of payoffs, uncertainty about choices or payoffs or the type of other players,
to assume repetition of interactions, embeddedness of the interactions in a larger
setting, or different rules about behavior or outcomes.
Theoretical social scientists have covered a variety of such models, trying to
identify the conditions under which cooperation may emerge. Such explanations
may take place at several levels (cf. Kollock 1998). At an individual level, alternative
psychological assumptions on preferences or rationality may be introduced to ex-
plain why individuals cooperate (see Gächter 2013). Another approach is to maintain
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Figure 1.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma (left) and Trust Game (right) (Si < Pi < Ri < Ti, i = 1,2).
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the standard assumptions that actors are rational and selfish, and instead look
for features of social conditions that make the emergence of cooperation possible
(see Buskens and Raub 2013). This is the approach typically taken by sociologists,
following Coleman’s (1987) suggestion that sociological theory ought to keep as-
sumptions on individual behavior as simple as possible, in order to be able to
study complex mechanisms on the social level in more detail. Nevertheless, also
theoretical work that is primarily interested in social mechanisms often requires
careful consideration of micro-level assumptions. Several well-known conditions
that can facilitate cooperation included individual actors being involved in repeated
interactions (Axelrod 1984), actors organized in social networks (Raub and Weesie
1990), and institutional arrangements that facilitate trust or cooperation (Greif 2006).
Many authors in this volume build on one of these lines of research for explaining
cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.
Part I of this book collects advancements in theoretical work in this area. In this
part, some authors focus more on the essence of the trust or cooperation problems,
while others concentrate more on the psychological assumptions and social condi-
tions that can foster trust and cooperation. In addition to and in synergy with this
theoretical work, researchers have invited people to the social science laboratory and
have had them actually play these and similar kinds of games, trying to figure out
whether or not the predictions that theoretical social science has come up with, fit
with the behavior of people under strict laboratory conditions. We showcase work
that fits this tradition in Part II. Finally, some research ventures outside the lab and
confronts the predictions of cooperation theory, especially the ones that seem to hold
under controlled conditions, with the empirical reality of everyday life. We show this
kind of work in Part III.
The combination of, on the one hand, careful consideration of micro-assumptions
using formal theoretical reasoning, and, on the other hand, testing of hypotheses
under controlled laboratory conditions and under blurry real life conditions, is both a
strength of the research on cooperation problems and a source of further complexity.
Using mixed-methods with different strengths and weaknesses offers a potentially
more robust set of explanations for societal phenomena (see Levitt and List 2007;
Buskens and Raub 2013; Jackson and Cox 2013; Raub 2017). Rigorous or even formal
theory ensures that assumptions are made explicit and concrete. Experimental test-
ing can, as much as reasonably possible, try to fix characteristics of the interaction so
that the observed behavior can be tested relatively independent of interfering factors.
Field studies then assess whether the ideas about which conditions govern behavior
are strong enough to survive in a noisy setting. The connection between these levels,
however, is not always obvious. Ideas about individual preferences or behavior do
not necessarily automatically translate to obvious or desired consequences at the col-
lective level (Coleman 1987). The assumptions underlying the formal theory can be
easily contended to be too strong abstractions and unsupported tests of predictions
in both experimental and field studies leave open where to improve. Should theory
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be improved, perhaps using more realistic assumptions? Is the empirical test not war-
ranted under these conditions, or did the prediction simply massively fail? It is this
interplay of individual-level modeling combined with more and less rigorous testing
that we seek to demonstrate in this volume.
1.2 Theoretical contributions
The theoretical contributions in this volume all fit within the general theoretical
framework of methodological individualism and follow Coleman’s (1987) theoretical
approach that emphasizes the importance of specifying micro-macro transitions in
sociological theory. Within this general theoretical framework, the theoretical elab-
orations can roughly be divided into three categories.
The first category could, with a nod to Coleman’s (1990) seminal work, be de-
scribed as being concerned with the foundations of sociological theory on cooperation
problems. The first two contributions focus on the non-trivial and much-debated
question of selecting the appropriate model for individual decision making, repre-
senting the micro level of Coleman’s (1987) celebrated meta-theoretical scheme. Voss
evaluates the use of assumptions of rational egoism (related to the Hume-Buchanan
doctrine) in institutional design and argues that, while non-standard assumptions
(such as assumptions on bounded rationality) may be useful in institutional analysis,
institutional design is still better served by the standard assumptions of rational ego-
ism. Opp discusses the extent to which micro-level models of human decision mak-
ing known as dual-process theories – in particular the MODE model (Fazio and Olson
2014) and the Model of Frame Selection (Esser 1990) challenge more conventional ra-
tional choice theory, and concludes that such theories complement rather than con-
tradict rational choice theory. While the selection of micro-level models has received
much attention in the literature, Van Assen and Dijkstra draw, in the last chapter of
this first category, attention to the macro side of Coleman’s famous advice that socio-
logical theory should simplify mostly at the micro level but as little as possible at the
macro level. Using the case of exchange theory as an illustration, they argue that the
issue of “sufficient complexity” is too often neglected in sociological theorizing, lead-
ing to models that are oversimplified at the macro level and therefore lack ecological
validity.
The second category of theoretical contributions focuses on a specific way of
trying to solve the social dilemma structure: the role of reputation in the emergence
of cooperation and trust. This topic has been central to rational choice-oriented so-
ciology ever since Granovetter’s (1985) programmatic paper on the “problem of em-
beddedness” and Raub and Weesie’s (1990) first game-theoretic elaboration of that
program. Flache builds on the seminal work by Raub and Weesie (1990) on embedd-
edness effects on cooperation, extending the analysis to “large number dilemmas”
(Raub 1988), in particular collective good production under uncertainty. Focusing
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on core-periphery networks, the theoretical analysis suggests that in such networks
situations may emerge in which the core is exploited by the periphery. Lindenberg,
Wittek and Giardini challenge the view that human cooperation can be explained
by reputation effects based on rational choice and selfishness assumptions alone
(“Granovetter’s error”), and argue that reputation effects cannot be studied without
also considering the dynamics of normative embeddedness. Van de Rijt and Frey
build on their earlier work on reputation cascades, a previously overlooked dynamic
of reputation systems (for instance occurring in online markets) by causing arbitrary
inequality in payoffs between trustees (Frey and Van de Rijt 2016). They show by
means of computational methods that their initial findings are robust against the re-
laxation of two restrictive assumptions of the earlier model, namely, that information
is transferred automatically and reliably and that interaction sequences are relatively
short. Flap and Ultee reflect upon the effectiveness of “organized distrust”, or the
extent to which actors in powerful positions are systematically scrutinized to prevent
them from exhibiting opportunistic behavior.
The third category contains theoretical contributions that deal with cooperation
more broadly and model effects of information exchange and networks based on well-
specified micro-assumptions. Hegselmann studies two currently much-debated social
phenomena – polarization and radicalization of opinions – as extensions of the
bounded confidence model. Using agent-based modeling, he shows that for both
types of phenomena bridges are of crucial importance, but also that results may de-
pend strongly on small differences in parameters, highlighting the complexity of
micro-macro transitions in these phenomena. Bojanowski considers individual ben-
efits of network positions, building on Burt’s (1992) structural holes model. Using an
agent-based model as well, he shows that informational properties of collaborative
relations should be analyzed not only at the node or tie level, but also at the triadic
level to appreciate the full spectrum of possible redundancies in information. He
ends with suggestions for empirical work to test his theoretical conjectures. Gautschi
proposes a new theoretical model in the domain of network exchange that, contrary
to existing sociological models of network exchange, systematically takes into ac-
count that negotiation partners pursue their self-interest and thereby specifies the ac-
tors’ optimization problem more explicitly.
The consistency among the theoretical chapters, despite the broad range of sub-
stantive topics addressed, illustrates the usefulness of a common meta-theoretical
approach. In particular, it shows the ability of Coleman’s macro-micro-macro
framework to force researchers to be explicit about what the individual-level as-
sumptions are and to take the often complex link between the micro and macro
level seriously. Any categorization of chapters is to some extent artificial, but the
underlying consistency of the theoretical chapters is also illustrated by the fact
that one could easily arrive at alternative categorizations. For example, besides
the more foundational chapters, most of the chapters are in one way or the other
concerned with micro-level assumptions in the theories discussed, with the chapter
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by Lindenberg et al. providing the most obvious bridge between the “foundations”
and “reputation” categories. Similarly, the chapter by Gautschi not only relates to
Van Assen and Dijkstra’s chapter by criticizing existing theories of network exchange
(although from a different angle), but also makes an explicit effort to draw network
exchange theory closer to the theories typically applied in the literature on coopera-
tion and reputation by incorporating elements of non-cooperative game theory. Also,
the contributions by Flap and Ultee on the one hand and Voss on the other are con-
cerned with issues of institutional design. Finally, and perhaps most obviously, in
many of the theoretical contributions the notions of social networks and embedded-
ness play an explicit or implicit role.
1.3 Experimental tests
Part II consists of chapters that consider experimental tests related to social dilemma
problems. All chapters can once again be linked to Coleman’s macro-micro-macro
framework. A first category of chapters focus more on the micro level, studying the
role of individual preferences, identities and priming. The second category of chap-
ters zooms in on how framing of the individual choice situation can affect behavior
in social dilemmas such as the previously mentioned Prisoner’s Dilemma and its
multi-player variant, the Public Goods Game. The last category of chapters in this
part uses experiments to test how social and institutional embeddedness might solve
cooperation problems.
Two chapters fall in the first category. Aksoy studies an extension of social
value orientation theory for the situation in which there are ingroup and outgroup
others, as opposed to the more standard assumption that preferences are such that
all others are considered equivalent. He finds, using an experimental test based on
the Decomposed Game, that many subjects show ingroup bias in the sense that
they add an extra negative weight to outcomes of the outgroup when the outgroup
is better off than the ingroup. Winter and Diekmann replicate and extend an ex-
periment by Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) in which it was argued and shown that
framing individual decisions explicitly in terms of a money frame matters for deci-
sions of participants. However, the same kind of priming does not lead to differen-
ces in behavior in several strategic situations, such as the Ultimatum Game, Trust
Game, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Volunteer’s Dilemma. This contrasts with results
that are observed using other priming manipulations (Liberman, Samuels, and Ross
2004), highlighting the theoretical puzzle we alluded to above: under which cir-
cumstances are more psychological additions to standard game-theoretic argu-
ments needed to understand behavior in strategic situations?
Abraham, Lorek and Prosch is the first chapter that focuses on micro-level as-
sumptions in social dilemma games. They study how a frame of being a member of a
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group affects behavior in Public Goods Games and Chicken Games. They distinguish
between treatments in which the frame is without any further obligations and treat-
ments in which the frame implies a minimum contribution or a cost to enter. They
show that, in both games and under different experimental circumstances, framing is
effective and increases cooperation. When the cooperative frame comes at a cost the
effects tend to be smaller, but only in one experiment this difference is significant.
Esser provides an insightful comparison of the application of different versions of ra-
tional choice theory as well as of the model of frame selection in explaining behavior
in Public Goods Games with a punishment option. He argues that the micro-level as-
sumptions related to frame selection are superior in understanding these behaviors
compared to different versions of rational choice assumptions, especially given the
behavioral patterns when actors change between conditions with or without punish-
ment. This is another chapter that illustrates the challenge of including psychological
aspects for understanding cooperative behavior, but at the same time shows its po-
tential for further steps in this direction given careful reconstruction of existing ex-
perimental work.
The last three chapters in this part discuss different forms of institutions in rela-
tion to different types of cooperation problems. Engel and Ockenfels evaluate an
interesting instrument to prevent cooperative behavior in a situation in which this
is societally undesirable, namely, collusion between suppliers in a market with few
suppliers. Using an experiment resembling a Cournot market, they contend that in
markets in which collusion between competitors is likely, the introduction or exis-
tence of an actor with competitive social preferences (a “maverick”) puts the collu-
sion between firms under pressure. Therefore, it seems a good strategy to protect
mavericks in markets in which cartels are easily formed, but undesirable from a so-
cietal view point. Corten, Buskens, and Rosenkranz start from a more standard
rational choice perspective and test experimentally in which scenarios conditions
for cooperation seem to be more beneficial, crossing conditions in which reputa-
tional information about behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemmas can be exchanged with
conditions in which subjects can choose with whom to play these dilemmas. They
cannot confirm that the availability of networks through which reputation can
spread promotes cooperation in this case. However, they do find that learning ef-
fects play a role in the sense that initial cooperation levels affect cooperation in the
long run. They also find that partner choice alone, without possibilities for reputa-
tional information spread, jeopardizes cooperation. These findings suggest that
standard rational choice models do not suffice to understand how network related
mechanisms affect cooperation in exogenous and endogenous networks. Barrera,
Buskens, and De Rover study the effects of positive and negative sanctions in re-
peated Public Goods Games. They show that punishments have a stronger effect on
cooperation than rewards. They also show that group solidarity is not lower in
groups in which punishments could be given compared to groups in which rewards
could be given. Apparently, the level of cooperation that is reached in a group is
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more important for group solidarity than whether the sanctions to reach this are
positive or negative.
The results of this last chapter in Part II again illustrate links between the chap-
ters in this book. The findings of the last chapter suggesting that standard rational
choice assumptions do not suffice to understand cooperation in dynamic networks
illustrate that the efforts of the earlier chapters in Part II, on which individual-level
assumptions seem more empirically valid, are also important for the more complex
networked games. The chapter links as well to some of the theoretical contributions
in Part I studying the effects of more complex assumptions in networked social sit-
uations on micro and macro-level outcomes.
1.4 Field studies
Part III considers a variety of contexts in which the mechanisms related to trust and
cooperation are empirically tested in the field, underscoring that these mechanisms
are applicable in areas as diverse as organizations, households, neighborhoods and
networks of adolescents (cf. Raub and Weesie 2000). The first three chapters focus
on the organization of bilateral relations, between firms and within households.
The last two chapters in this part inquire into networked settings such as neighbor-
hoods and classrooms and the consequences of these networks.
Rooks, Snijders, and Tazelaar consider how organizations create the rules
that govern their (contractual) interactions. They contrast the view that rules are
rational adaptations to the given circumstances with the view that rules are merely
irrational coincidences. Their empirical analyses suggest that existing rules tend to
lead to more elaborate ex ante investments, and do not necessarily improve even-
tual exchange performance. Apparently, the classical Weberian view that rules and
rule-following are crucial elements to be able to reap the benefits of specialization
through division of work needs additional argumentation about the emergence of
these rules, as organizational evolution does not seem to automatically converge to
the optimal sets of rules. This once again highlights the potential of incorporating
micro-assumptions that are descriptively more accurate into frameworks that are
based on rational profit maximization. Koster continues the search for empirical
evidence on how organizations solve problems of trust and cooperation by consid-
ering whether organizations that collaborate on Human Resource issues are more
innovative than those who do not. It turns out that organizations that do collabo-
rate are more innovative. This reveals that, next to more standard approaches that
emphasize compatibility of resources, shared cooperative endeavors can have posi-
tive consequences on organizational innovativeness as well. Roeters, De Ruijter,
and Van der Lippe turn our attention to households, where similar trust and coop-
eration arguments play a role as between firms, albeit at the interpersonal rather
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than interorganizational level. Their analysis on the provision of informal care
shows that, even though the content and subjective experience of human relations
are completely different from those in organizational interaction, theories of trust
and cooperation are usefully applicable and can shed light on the conditions under
which collective goods problems are solved. Informal care is less extensive when
there are more coordination problems, through for instance the combination of
busy day-jobs with many other roles. An interesting puzzle remains, however, as
those with more general skills spend less rather than more time in informal care,
highlighting the complicated issue of how to link the micro-level behavior of hu-
mans to the outcomes at the aggregate level.
Volker shifts attention to a level in between that of personal and organizational
relations: the collective efficacy of neighborhoods. Similar to organizations, neigh-
borhood members choose, given a certain level of trust between them, the rules
that define the formal and informal control on behavior in neighborhoods. This
in turn determines how well the neighborhood is dealing with the provision of its
collective goods, such as the availability of mutual help and a lack of unwanted
behavior. In this sense, there is an obvious parallel between this chapter and that
of Rooks et al. Although the relation between trust, control, and collective effi-
cacy is theoretically demanding, the results suggest that trust and control are
only moderately related across Dutch neighborhoods. Moreover, trust seems to
be related to collective efficacy more than control is. Especially the fact that trust
and control do not seem to reinforce each other, is an interesting avenue for fu-
ture theorizing and empirical research. Snijders and Kalter switch back and
forth between micro-foundations and macro testing in a study on cooperative
ties and social cohesion in classrooms. Making use of the Stochastic Actor-
Oriented Model (Snijders and Steglich 2015), they tackle the empirical puzzle
that the number of mutual within-classroom friendships is declining as a func-
tion of the proportion of Muslims in a class, whenever Muslims are a minority.
Successive iterations of increasingly realistic models hint at an explanation that
is based on the idea that friendship ties between ethnically diverse students are
more sticky, although the models cannot completely explain the phenomenon
away. We see here that slight variations in micro assumptions matter, as well as
that the transition from micro behavior to macro-phenomena, once again, is far
from trivial.
Summarizing, Part III shows that field studies can illustrate which theoretical
predictions consistently replicate in different contexts. In addition, most studies
also produce new puzzles that require further theorizing using alternative as-
sumptions about micro-level decision making and more elaborate inclusion of
macro-level conditions. This requires further theoretical studies and different
types of empirical tests of the new theories to establish whether the new explana-
tions are more encompassing than the earlier ones.
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1.5 Conclusion
This collection of chapters not only shows a way in which research on trust and
cooperation problems can and perhaps even should progress, but also how rigorous
sociology in general could progress more consistently. It is a combination of careful
theorizing, when necessary at the individual level, to figure out how individual
preferences can lead to behavior under different circumstances, combined with a
core of rigorous model building that can help ensure that theorizing is consistent
and extendable. We then see that the link from micro to macro level often requires
explicit theoretical arguments to include the necessary interdependencies between
individuals and reveal unintended consequences of individual behavior. In addi-
tion, the meticulous testing of arguments under first ideal, but progressively realis-
tic circumstances to compare the predictions with actual behavior, and finally the
tests of general insights at the intricate level of reality where everything is related
to everything else. If predictions fail, theory needs to be updated, ideas amended,
and conditions become more specific. This mix of methods can help to overcome a
tendency of getting tied up into prohibitively local problems and to keep an open
mind for the struggles, solutions, and victories of researchers in seemingly other,
but actually related areas.
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Part I: Theoretical Contributions

Thomas Voss
2 Institutional Design and Human
Motivation: The Role of Homo Economicus
Assumptions
Abstract: What kinds of behavioral or motivational assumptions are appropriate if
“legislators” want to design “good” social institutions or constitutions? David
Hume’s famous advice has been to follow the maxim “that every man must be sup-
posed a knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a
maxim should be true in politics, which is false in fact.” Notice that Hume as well
as Adam Smith both argued that humans sometimes and under certain conditions
empirically act in accordance with a principle of “sympathy”, that is, they are able
and willing to take the roles of their interaction partners and identify with their re-
spective interests. Nevertheless, legislators who try to construct efficient social in-
stitutions should not assume that such pro-social motives prevail. In contemporary
constitutional economics James Buchanan has endorsed Hume’s maxim with regard
to the design of basic societal institutions: “Homo economicus, the rational, self-
oriented maximizer of contemporary economic theory, is, we believe, the appropriate
model of human behavior for use in evaluating the workings of different institutional
orders” (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 61). The paper evaluates the Hume-Buchanan
doctrine in the light of empirical evidence and theoretical insights with respect to so-
cial preferences and intrinsic motivations.
2.1 Introduction: Explaining institutions versus.
designing institutions
Institutions are “rules” which affect outcomes of various social interactions. The set
of institutions which regulate interactions in modern societies comprises a variety
of rules on different levels. There are informal and formal rules like conventions
which regulate every-day interactions in traffic situations. Other rules refer to infor-
mal norms which call for contributions to public goods (“avoid leaving refusals
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when having a picnic on the green”). More formalized rules are laws and constitu-
tions which have been designed consciously. Online auction platforms like eBay
use rules which refer to the auction procedure (e.g., variants of a second-price auc-
tion) and to improve incentives to cooperation (e.g., reputation mechanisms) which
have been designed and which are continuously monitored and improved. At the
multi-national level core actors from different states (e.g., from the European
Union) currently design, evaluate, interpret and change rules which are intended to
solve severe collective action problems with respect to financial and monetary pol-
icy, international migration and others.
Social science and sociology in particular aim to explain the workings, the
emergence and effects of institutions. There has been and still is of course a lot of
controversy about the theoretical tools and methodology which is appropriate in
this context. Durkheim (1895) who defined sociology as the science that has to de-
scribe and explain social institutions and other social facts claimed that social facts
should be explained by empirical laws on the level of social facts. In this paper, I
will adopt, in contrast, the methodological individualistic idea that explaining insti-
tutions (that is, social facts on the “collective” or “macro” level) requires micro
level assumptions about individual behavior or choices. In some contexts it may be
useful to model individual actions by applying ideas which resemble Popper’s
“logic of the situation” (Popper 1966) or in some other “everyday sense” of rational-
ity and not in the technical sense of axiomatic rational choice theory (Simon 1978).
In economics, political science and sociology, however, more technical rational
actor assumptions and models were employed with considerable success. The
micro model of man until the 1990’s has predominantly and more specifically been
a version of the homo economicus or rational egoism (RE) conception. There are
many variants of this conception but as the two basic ingredients I consider the as-
sumptions of rationality (R) and self-interestedness or “egoism” (E). These ingre-
dients are conceptually and logically independent: R basically means consistency
of preferences (and beliefs) and E means that a particular subset from the extensive
set of (logically consistent) preferences is empirically relevant. In other words, so-
cial preferences (e.g., altruism, fairness, spitefulness) can be and are in fact pres-
ently used in a rational actor model but not in the homo economicus or RE concept.
The RE model is the core explanatory component in Coleman’s (1990) opus mag-
num as well as in much of Gary Becker’s (1976) seminal economic approach to social
behavior. The RE approach is considerably strong in demonstrating the collective ef-
fects of social structural and institutional variables. In sociology, there has been an
extensive research program based on game-theoretic principles about the structural
factors which foster trust and cooperation in “problematic” social dilemma situa-
tions. In much of this work, individual behavior is modeled as driven by self-
interested motives and by instrumental rationality which means that behavioral
choices are assumed to be consistent with (possibly subgame perfect) Nash equi-
libria. In social dilemmas there is a contrast between rationality and efficiency
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(in the Pareto sense) among rational egoists. It has been shown by Werner Raub
and members of his Utrecht research group that certain social conditions (like re-
peated interaction with a large “shadow of the future”, multiplexity, multilateral
reputation and others) may contribute to efficiency gains in social dilemmas (see
Raub and Weesie 1990, Raub et al. 2013, Raub 2017; other closely related work in a
similar vein is described in Greif 2006; for experimental work that demonstrates
fairly good empirical predictions of RE assumptions in the repeated prisoner’s di-
lemma see, for example, Dal Bó 2005). However, as is well known, there has been
something akin a scientific revolution within economics and several related fields
which casts serious doubts on the empirical and explanatory status of RE assump-
tions. Early attacks on the RE model focused on the rationality assumption (e.g.,
transitivity and independence axioms in expected utility theory). In more recent
decades laboratory experiments and behavioral game theory apparently demon-
strated that (many or some) subjects are motivated by social preferences and not
exclusively by self-regarding preferences. For the time being, there seems to be a
consensus that empirically valid explanations of institutions must be based on or
at least be complemented by behavioral and motivational assumptions which are
psychologically more “realistic” than the RE model in that they employ bounded
rationality and social (and possibly also intrinsic) motivations (see Ostrom 2005a:
Chapter 4; Bowles 2016). However, there is less of a consensus about which partic-
ular version of bounded rationality or of social preference functions should be
used.
This very rough sketch of the state of the art refers to empirical explanations.
The situation may look different if normative questions of institutional design are
considered. In his well-known Presidential Address to the American Sociological
Association Coleman argued in favor of sociology as a science of design and ratio-
nal construction of society:
What does this (. . .) mean for sociology and sociologists? It implies a future in the design of
organizations, institutions, and social environments – design intended to optimize relevant
outcomes. (. . .) It is the task of sociologist to aid in that construction, to bring to it the under-
standing of social processes, to ensure that this reconstruction of society is not naive, but so-
phisticated, to ensure, one might say, that it is indeed a rational reconstruction of society.
(Coleman 1993: 14)
Many social scientists still accept Max Weber’s postulate of a value-free social sci-
ence (“Werturteilsfreiheit”). According to Weber’s postulate social science cannot
legitimately give an ultimate justification for value judgments or normative recom-
mendations. But scientific methods can help to investigate whether two or more
normative statements are mutually consistent. Social science can also, and this is a
task of eminent practical importance, demonstrate whether and by which means
certain normative goals can be realized. With respect to designing institutions, nor-
mative social theory may have the legitimate task to provide what has been called
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“hypothetical imperatives” (Harsanyi 1958). In contrast to unconditional categorical
imperatives, they contain conditional statements of the form “If you accept certain
rationality axioms or if you want to realize certain goals then you should choose
alternative X”.
In fact, the basic idea of some prominent neo-contractarian approaches to nor-
mative social theory is to use Gedankenexperimente of a “moral decision situation”
(Harsanyi) or an “original position” (Rawls) behind a “veil of ignorance” to argue
which rules or which principles of justice rational individuals will choose. In addi-
tion to such “constitutional” decisions, normative theory might also (and in fact:
must) analyze the expected effects of those principles or rules given they will be
implemented in a future society or group. Such analyses must be based on assump-
tions about the social conditions which prevail in the situation as well as the behav-
ioral principles which are at work among the (future) participants of the society. It
seems likely that the theory of action which is employed in analyses of constitu-
tional decisions and in analyses of agents’ behaviors in a future society will not nec-
essarily be identical. To be more specific, with respect to constitutional decisions
one may arguably use rationality principles of the RE type, whereas with regard to
post-constitutional decisions behavioral principles of the bounded rationality type
can be appropriate.
In this paper, I will discuss the theoretical role of RE assumptions in the context
of normative social theory. The main task will be an evaluation of what may be
called Hume-Buchanan doctrine of using homo economicus or RE assumptions in
institutional design. Prior analyses of the doctrine (Schüssler 1988, Hausman 1998)
mainly focus on different critical aspects which will not be covered in the present
paper.
2.2 The RE model and the Hume-Buchanan doctrine
2.2.1 Three levels of decisions in institutional design
In referring to normative social theory, I will confine myself to subjectivist and conse-
quentialist approaches in the following sense. In the tradition of David Hume’s moral
philosophy or in accordance with Max Weber’s idea of a “Verantwortungsethik” nor-
mative problems are necessarily explicated by pointing to the subjective interests of
the individuals who are the target actors and the beneficiaries of normative or moral
imperatives. In the light of this tradition it must be demonstrated that the choice of
and the conformity to normative principles is in fact possible and will have conse-
quences which are consistent with the long-term subjective interests of the involved
agents.
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It is convenient to distinguish between three levels of decision problems in
normative social theory. First, (level 1) there are first order decisions with respect
to the criteria institutions should fulfill: Efficiency, maximizing “social welfare”,
“wealth”, just redistribution, profit maximization etc. Secondly, (level 2) there
are second order decisions with respect to the choice of specific rules or institu-
tions which are consistent with the criteria (constitutional choice). These rules are
designed such that they provide incentives and constraints for the involved (future)
agents to realize first order goals. Thirdly, (level 3) one has to deal with third order
decisions under the constraints of the level 2 rules. In this case, the “social planner”
has the task to analyze individual decisions and collective outcomes of the (fictitious)
agents who (in the future) will live under the rules which are implemented in accor-
dance with first and second order decisions (if so). Notice that decisions on levels 1
and level 2 are, so to speak, decisions on a “meta level” which are due to the actors
who want to design an institution. Level 3 decisions are on the “object level” which
are, however, dependent on the “planner’s” selection among models of man.
2.2.2 Example: Institutional design in migration policy
To illustrate with a concrete case, consider the example of institutions which regu-
late refugee and migration policy in the European context. To regulate immigration
into the European Community, Betts and Collier (2017) evaluate various institu-
tional solutions (see also Collier 2013). They argue (level 1) in favor of the normative
criterion of welfare maximization as a principle that is consistent with utilitarian-
ism. (The set of individuals whose utility levels are to be maximized contains not
only prospective migrants but also the people who remain in African or Asian coun-
tries [“stayers”] and European citizens. This is a kind of cosmopolitan normative
criterion because the welfare (or the utility levels or “happiness”) of people from
foreign countries is included – not only Europeans’ welfare). Evaluating alternative
rules (level 2) requires the demonstration of how the rules will affect the dominant
actors’ incentives (level 3). These agents are (i) political leaders who are faced with
collective action problems and incentives to free ride on the supra national level
(“let other countries contribute to the costs”), (ii) refugees searching for individu-
ally optimal options and (iii) agents (“entrepreneurs”) who are interested to engage
in smuggling as an (illegal) commercial enterprise.
As another example, I mention reflections on institutional design of immigra-
tion from an US American perspective (Posner 2013). As the maximand on level 1
Posner argues in favor of the well-being of Americans. The welfare of American citi-
zens (workers, employers, other citizens) depends on the individual characteristics
of the migrants who are selected and who possibly enter the labor market. Social
welfare may also be positively affected by migrants whose presence permits family
reunification. Furthermore migrants who are willing to integrate or to assimilate
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the cultural and social norms and who thereby will increase (or at least not de-
crease) society’s social capital may be preferred to migrants who are not willing or
able to integrate. Migrants of the “good” type contribute to an increase of American
welfare, “bad” types do not bring valuable human capital or other good character-
istics. In the extreme, bad types, once they have been admitted to stay, may look
for a career as beneficiaries of public welfare or even for a criminal career. There
are various institutional solutions to screen potential migrants in order to select
those persons who are “good” types. The screening methods have to account for
asymmetric information problems and reduce the adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems which can arise if migrants are better informed about their own type
than the government agencies that are deciding about admission of migrants. In ad-
dition to screening potential migrants, there must also be, as argued by Posner,
rules and procedures to control the behavior and rights of migrants. As will be clear
to anyone who has thought about the design of institutions in this realm, the ratio-
nal construction of efficient rules which serve the selected normative goals is ex-
tremely complex and cannot be discussed in detail in the present paper. It is,
however, clear that analyses on level 2 and level 3 (second and third order deci-
sions) are critically interconnected. To base screening predominantly on educa-
tional credentials and other desirable qualifications (language proficiency etc.) that
can be easily observed (as is done in the Canadian points system) can have the ad-
verse effect to deny admission to migrants who may be potentially highly motivated
unskilled laborers – provided that the country would profit from admissions of
some migrants who are unskilled workers. Another problem is that a points system
does not help to cope with the control or moral hazard problems after admission
has been permitted (see Posner 2013: 303–304). Posner’s analysis is based on the
assumption that potential migrants are heterogeneous with respect to the distribu-
tion of desirable characteristics and that their behavior is rational and motivated by
self-interest under the constraints of the rules which regulate admission to the
United States. The line of reasoning that is sketched in Posner’s contribution is
completely consistent with a standard economic (RE) model of man.
2.2.3 Designing “just” or morally “good” institutions
Given that the outcomes of institutions should meet certain (normative) criteria, so-
cial theory can define its task as the specification and evaluation of institutions.
There are of course well-known attempts to address this task with respect to the
basic constitutional institutions such that these institutions meet criteria of moral
reasoning. In moral theory, Harsanyi and Rawls, among others, asked which kinds
of general principles and rules meet moral standards of fairness or impartiality.
This problem refers to first order and second order decisions. Harsanyi and Rawls
both adopted a rational actor approach, albeit in slightly different ways. The actors
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are envisioned in a Gedankenexperiment as agents behind a “veil of ignorance”
such that they choose rules as if they did not knew which social position they will
occupy within the (future) society that will realize concrete institutions under the
constraints of the chosen universal principles. Harsanyi (1976, 1977, 1978) argued in
favor of Bayesian rationality (expected utility maximization) and demonstrates that
rational agents in a “moral decision situation” will necessarily choose institutions
which maximize the aggregate welfare as measured by the sum (or arithmetic
mean) of the cardinal utilities of the individuals. This approach of course requires
that there are theoretically sound methods to interpersonally compare individual
utility levels. The normative principle which emerges as an outcome of Harsanyi’s
moral decision situation is consistent with utilitarian ethics, in particular “rule util-
itarianism”. Harsanyi’s approach is silent about the concrete institutions which
help maximize utilitarian welfare functions. Rawls (1971), in contrast, argued that
agents will be extremely risk averse in the “original position” of this constitutional
choice situation. They will therefore, according to Rawls, use the maximin criterion
of decision theory. This line of reasoning and some additional arguments build a
justification for Rawls’ so-called “difference principle” which implies that just insti-
tutions should guarantee that – if social inequalities cannot be prevented or would
be inefficient in the Pareto sense – society allocates primary goods such that the
welfare level of incumbents of the most disadvantaged positions is maximized
(compared to the elements of the set of alternative institutions). Rawls’ approach
consequently is less abstract than Harsanyi’s in that it points to more concrete insti-
tutions (like equal opportunity in education) of modern societies which work in the
direction of realizing the goals which are expressed in the principles of justice.
This, however, comes at the cost that it is doubtful whether the relevant agents on
level 3 of third order decisions in fact will want to or will be able to enforce the re-
quired policy recommendations (for instance with respect to the organization of ed-
ucational systems) (see Coleman 1974 for an elaboration of this critique).
In a similar vein, constitutional economics as developed in the Public Choice
School asks which basic constitutional rules rational agents behind a “veil of uncer-
tainty” would choose. The rules which are chosen refer to situations of collective
action and rules of collective decision-making in some future situation. As a case in
point think about individuals who decide about whether to allocate economic re-
sources by markets or by bureaucratic organizations. Persons who presently are
successful entrepreneurs may of course have different personal interests than mem-
bers of a public organization that is developing or enforcing laws to regulate market
behavior. The latter expect better career prospects if the amount of bureaucratic
regulation is strengthened. The rationale of a veil of uncertainty is to secure a cer-
tain degree of impartiality such that the decision is devoid of immediate self-
interest. In Buchanan’s approach “persons are modeled as though they were faced
with choices among rules of social order that are generally applicable and guaran-
teed to be quasi-permanent. By comparison, the Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ is an
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idealized normative construction, the appropriate starting point for persons when
they consider making choices among basic principles of justice” (Brennan and
Buchanan 1985: 35). Choosing among rules behind a veil of uncertainty means that
“the interest of any person or group is much less easily identified” than in the
choice within the set of rules (in the post-constitutional decisions). This is so because
“rules are, almost by definition, applicable to a number of instances or cases” and
because rules “embody an extended time dimension. The very notion of a rule im-
plies existence through a sequence of time periods” (Brennan and Buchanan 1985:
35). As an example, Buchanan considers balanced-budget rules which restrict demo-
cratic governments’ discretion with respect to public debt. Buchanan argues that the
amount of conflict of interest among agents choosing among basic constitutional
rules (level 1 and level 2) will be much lower than in decisions within the set of rules
(level 3). Agreement will therefore be reached more easily and often unanimously.
2.2.4 Three levels of decisions in designing “just” or morally
“good” institutions
To reiterate, there are three analytically distinct levels of decision problems which
are involved in institutional design. On all three levels the choices of possibly mul-
tiple heterogeneous agents must be modeled (members of a constitutional assem-
bly, directors of an enterprise, members of a political party etc.). In contractarian
approaches to morality and in constitutional economics, the multiplicity of per-
sonal interests and their potential conflicts are reduced by imposing the fiction of a
veil of ignorance or uncertainty. It may be argued that the veil will potentially (em-
pirically or in light of abstract rationality) generate a consensus or a unanimous de-
cision of different agents. The decisions on this level may then be analyzed by
treating the decision-making body as a single representative individual. Given the
restrictions of a veil, the decisions are considered in these approaches as consistent
with rationality axioms of Bayesian decision theory and game theory (Harsanyi) or
neoclassical economic theory (Buchanan) or a particular non-Bayesian conception
of individual rationality (maximin) with extreme uncertainty (Rawls). In Harsanyi’s
work (1977) which contains a precise explication of the concept of a moral decision,
each involved agent (on level 1) is uncertain about her future social status or posi-
tion in society and assigns an equal probability to each outcome (in terms of status
positions). She then chooses the set of rules that maximizes her expected utility (in
terms of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions). There is no need to assume
altruism or other social preferences at this point because even perfectly selfish indi-
viduals under the constraints of the veil will choose rules which maximize the social
welfare as defined by utilitarian criteria (sum of personal utilities of all involved in-
dividual positions).
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It is, however, debatable whether and under which conditions rational self-
interested individuals will want to enter a decision situation behind a veil of ignorance
or uncertainty and will want to commit themselves to accept the set of rules which
have been selected before in the constitutional stage. As many critics have empha-
sized it may even be debatable whether or not real humans will in fact attain a con-
sensual decision on this level (see, for example, Coleman 1974, 1990). Thus, on level
1 it is assumed that behavior (behind a veil) is governed by principles of rationality
in the RE sense (or homo economicus sense). Referring to second and particularly
third order decisions Buchanan’s constitutional political economy is most explicit.
Arguments on level 3 require that the social scientist has to compare the empirical
effects of various institutional arrangements with respect to the desired outcomes.
This means that appropriate assumptions with respect to actors who choose within
the set of rules must be employed. It is important to note that decision-making on
level 1 has to take into account second and third order decisions. Table 2.1 gives an
overview on the three levels and some illustrations.
To illustrate, designing rules with respect to immigration policy not only requires
decisions about the normative criteria and goals which should be reached but must
also include predictions about the likely effects of these rules given the cognitive
Table 2.1: Three levels of choices in institutional design.
Decision-making agent(s) Constraints Set of alternatives
First order
(level )
decisions
Subject(s) who design institutions:
– general citizenship
– constitutional assembly
– political decision-making body
“Moral situations”: veil
of ignorance (Harsanyi,
Rawls)
“Constitutional
choices”: veil of
uncertainty (Buchanan);
Collective decision-
making rules;
Other physical or social
constraints and
resources
Universal principles
of justice;
Maximands of
individual and or
social welfare
Second
order
(level )
decisions
Subjects who design or implement
institutions
Universal principles and
criteria which
institutions should fulfill
Concrete
realizations of first
order choices:
institutions
Third order
(level )
decisions
Subjects who live under the
constraints of institutions
Institutions as realized
outcomes of first
and second order
choices
Opportunity set
under the
constraints of
institutions
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and motivational capacities of the various involved agents who will act under the
institutions. Thus all three decision levels are interconnected.
2.2.5 The Hume-Buchanan doctrine
Referring to institutional design Buchanan and Brennan approvingly quote David
Hume’s famous advice to follow the maxim “that every man must be supposed a
knave: Though at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should
be true in politics, which is false in fact” (Hume 1741: 42–43). Notice that Hume as
well as Adam Smith both argued that humans sometimes and under certain condi-
tions empirically act in accordance with a principle of “sympathy”, that is, they are
able and willing to take the roles of their interaction partners and identify with
their respective interests. Nevertheless, legislators who try to construct efficient so-
cial institutions should not assume that such pro-social motives prevail. In contem-
porary constitutional economics Buchanan and Brennan endorsed Hume’s maxim
with regard to the design of basic societal institutions as follows: “Homo economicus,
the rational, self-oriented maximizer of contemporary economic theory, is, we be-
lieve, the appropriate model of human behavior for use in evaluating the workings of
different institutional orders” (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 61). Interestingly, this
doctrine is justified not primarily by the empirical “realism” or adequacy of the
model of man but by using rationality behind the veil: Since we are uncertain with
respect to properties (in particular preferences and information) of the relevant actors
who in future instances will act under the restrictions of the constitutional rules we
should use the decision rule of a “quasi risk aversion” when deciding among various
models of man: “Our claim is that because of the nature of what is to be evaluated,
the gains attached to an ‘improvement’ secured by departures of behavior from the
modeled are less than the losses imposed by corresponding departures of behavior in
the opposing direction, that is, toward behavior worse than that represented in the
model itself” (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 63). The rationale for this normative
maxim is not that human behavior is empirically governed by rational egoism under
all circumstances but that even in populations with a majority of actors who are en-
dowed with pro-social motivations these motives may be driven out: “the narrow pur-
suit of self-interest by a subset will induce all persons to behave similarly, simply in
order to protect themselves against members of the subset” (Brennan and Buchanan
1985: 68). In other words, if institutional rules are designed under the premise of pro-
social behavior of the target actors (who are supposed to follow the rules) there is a
risk to trigger a crowding out process with respect to these motivations (“Gresham’s
law of politics”).
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2.3 Anomalies and the Hume-Buchanan doctrine
2.3.1 The RE model of man and its anomalies
It may be useful to classify models of man along two dimensions: Rationality and moti-
vation (preferences). The homo economicus or RE model is first characterized by (1)
selfish motivation. This means that actors are outcome-oriented and self-regarding.
Outcomes of behavior may be non-material such as units of social approval and status
received in social exchanges. (2) The second dimension is (the degree of) rationality.
Neoclassical price theory assumes complete and consistent preferences and perfect in-
formation-processing abilities. In Bayesian game theory many other capacities are built
into the model: behavior in accordance with subjective expected utility maximization
axioms (of Savage), common knowledge of rationality, backward induction.
To be more specific, rationality means that agents choose among alternative
courses of action in accordance with certain basic assumptions and more specific
criteria (rationality axioms). The most general background assumptions are conse-
quentialism and invariance. Consequentialism (in the descriptive sense) in this
context means that actions are selected in accordance with (expected) future con-
sequences. This rules out the consideration of “sunk costs” or other features re-
lated to investments in the past as far as they are irrelevant for future outcomes.
Invariance means that alternatives are evaluated and selected irrespective of how
these alternatives are presented (“framing”).
Standard rational choice theory, and homo economicus assumptions in particu-
lar, have of course been targets of severe criticism for being empirically inadequate.
Behavioral economics and cognitive psychology have produced a great deal of empir-
ical evidence, mostly laboratory experiments, which seem to demonstrate limitations
of RE assumptions, at least on the micro-level of individual choice behavior. It has
been questioned that this evidence is consequential for the analysis of real-world
problems outside the laboratory (Levitt and List 2007, 2008). However, some evi-
dence from field experiments and case studies suggests that the set of behavioral as-
sumptions which are useful in empirical explanations of institutions must be more
comprehensive than the standard homo economicus concept (see Ostrom 2005a, b).
According to prospect theory, preferences (as represented by a “value function”)
are situation dependent. Alternative amounts of wealth are evaluated as changes of
wealth. If the change is “framed” as a “gain” compared to a reference point (status
quo), the curvature of the value function is concave (“risk aversive”); “losses” are
evaluated by means of a convex function (“risk-seeking”). In addition to framing,
prospect theory also deals with other anomalies, e.g. problems related to a basic
axiom of expected utility theory, viz. the independence assumption. The famous
Allais paradox demonstrates that preferences over risky prospects are not linear in
probabilities (Machina 1987); prospect theory postulates preferences and probability
functions which cope with this problem (see Kahneman and Tversky 1986).
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Behavioral economics pointed to several further problems of the RE model.
Consequentialism has been shown to be violated by evidence on sunk cost effects
(see Thaler 1980, 2015). There are also some other behavioral anomalies, some of
which can be explained by prospect theory (e.g., endowment effect).
With regard to motivational assumptions, behavioral game theory seems to dem-
onstrate that the assumption of self-regarding preferences is empirically questionable,
at least a considerable proportion of participants in game experiments are acting as if
they had social preferences. Numerous experiments on ultimatums, prisoner’s dilem-
mas and linear public goods reveal that many subjects do not choose actions or strate-
gies such that they maximize monetary payoffs (as homo economicus would).
In addition to social preferences which, for example, depend on outcomes of
members of ego’s reference group (like altruism, inequity aversion or envy) and not
only on ego’s own material payoffs, there is an extensive body of work on “intrinsic”
motivation. Humans may be motivated to perform certain actions because these ac-
tions are valuable per se. Under certain conditions intrinsic preferences (for example,
to cooperate) will be crowded out if external interventions provide material rewards
or punishments. There is anecdotal and experimental evidence from psychology and
also, but less so, from experimental economics which demonstrates such crowding
out effects. One can argue that in cases of intrinsic preferences a central assumption
of neoclassical economics is violated, namely additive separability (Bowles 2016). In
the context of intrinsic preferences this means that externally provided incentives
and intrinsic motives to perform an action do not work additively but there may be
interferences such that external incentives on the one hand increase the tendency to
choose the relevant action and on the other hand reduce the strength of intrinsic mo-
tives. The total effect may be in the extreme such that the propensity to perform the
desired action is reduced due to the incentives – contrary to the goals which the “so-
cial planner” wants to accomplish. As a case in point consider the effects of intensive
external monitoring or variable rewards (piece-rate payments) on workers who have
been, prior to the intervention, intrinsically motivated to perform their tasks. In such
cases, it may well be that interventions decrease the quality and quantity of workers’
outputs because they undermine intrinsic motivations.
An overview on selected anomalies is given in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Empirical anomalies of the RE model of man.
RE Assumptions Anomalous effects References (sample)
I. Rationality (R)
Consequentialism
(Outcome-orientation)
Sunk cost effects Thaler ; Thaler :
Chapter 
Invariance Situation dependent preferences: Framing Kahneman & Tversky ;
Kahneman 
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2.3.2 The RE model is not the “worst case”
2.3.2.1 Anti-social motives
With respect to motivational assumptions is the RE model in fact, as the Hume-
Buchanan doctrine supposed, the “worst case” assumption? The idea is that different
social institutions which regulate peculiar “problematic” social situations can be ana-
lytically matched with various distributions of individual preferences (self-regarding
vs. social preferences of various kinds). Then various combinations of preferences
with institutions generate different outcomes which can be evaluated normatively.
Now, not every logically possible combination of individual preferences is empirically
relevant. Some authors indeed have argued that the set of individual preferences can
analytically be reduced to those utility arguments which are shared by every human
being and related to a stable subset of basic commodities (see Becker 1976). However,
some experiments reveal that indeed altruism, fairness but also anti-social prefer-
ences are effective. Yet, for the time being, we do know next to nothing about the
empirical distribution of preferences in various situations. In some social contexts
laboratory experiments have evoked an emotional reaction of spitefulness and
costly punishment against target actors who contributed to public goods (Herrmann
et al. 2008). If those motives prevail, the opportunity to punish free riders (and possi-
bly also cooperators) in a public goods situation yields inefficient outcomes. It thus
seems that self-interestedness is not always the worst case.
2.3.2.2 Choice anomalies
With respect to behavioral anomalies which reflect limits of rationality it is tempting
to ask whether the complete rationality assumption is indeed a worst case. Consider
Table 2.2 (continued)
RE Assumptions Anomalous effects References (sample)
Independence Axiom Allais paradox Machina 
II. Motivation (E)
Selfish Preferences Behavioral Game Theory: Social preferences
(Ultimatum, Public Goods with Punishments
experiments)
Camerer 
Separability of
extrinsic and intrinsic
rewards
Intrinsic Motivation: Crowding out- effects
of material incentives
Frey ; Bowles and
Polania-Rayes ; Bowles

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an anomaly like the sunk cost effect. An agent who knows that she is not immune to
such effects when she deals with everyday operational decisions but who wants to
maximize her personal welfare will want to commit herself to rules which prevent
her from trapping into sunk cost fallacies. These institutions would serve to improve
outcomes of RE’s in terms of their material interests. This means the homo economi-
cus model is not the most pessimistic (“worst case”) model because anomalies can
yield individually and/or collectively suboptimal outcomes. The general point thus is
as follows: Homo economicus is not the kind of person whose behavior is prone to
behavioral anomalies. However, ordinary people who want to realize self-regarding
preferences will want to live under the constraints of rules which cope with their lim-
its of rationality. In fact, the very idea of “liberal paternalism” and “nudging” (Thaler
and Sunstein 2008) is to improve everyday decisions (the criterion of improvement is
the realization of RE preferences). But this implies first and second order decisions
which are by and large consistent with the RE model. Thus, the nudging approach is
a conception of institutional design which rests on the idea that rules should be
superimposed on boundedly rational agents who want to attain better outcomes in
terms of self-interested preferences.
2.3.3 Crowding out effects: Gresham’s law of politics versus
other crowding out effects
A central argument that is used to support the Hume-Buchanan doctrine is based
on what Brennan and Buchanan (1985: 68) call Gresham’s law of politics. Suppose
a set of rules produces “good” or efficient outcomes provided a large fraction of the
population of actors who act under the constraints of these rules are endowed with
pro-social preferences. Then it is likely that a crowding out process takes place
such that pro-social motives gradually disappear from the setting provided self re-
garding actors are more successful in this situation. This being the case, it seems
that rationality requires as a “quasi risk averse” choice of the model of man to use
the RE model in analyses of third order decisions. Though there is some supporting
evidence for this kind of social dynamics (see, however, Schüssler 1990 for some
caveats) other types of crowding out processes have been studied extensively.
In addition to crowding out processes, it may also be the case that crowding in-
processes take place. For instance, if a critical mass of pro-social agents is clustered
within a population of RE agents and if the pro-social agents (much) more fre-
quently interact with one another than with the remaining population, they may in
long term drive out the self-regarding agents because they are more successful.
This process has been described in various contributions to evolutionary dynamics,
for example group selection approaches (see Gintis 2017: Chapter 9 for a discussion
of these mechanisms based on a debatable adoption of group selection ideas).
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Psychological mechanisms which lead to driving out processes are another im-
portant case in point. Given that an agent is intrinsically motivated to perform cer-
tain desirable actions, it may well happen that external interventions via the
provision of extrinsic material rewards or threats of punishments will drive out the
motivation to a considerable degree. External interventions perceived as controlling
can reduce intrinsic motivation. There are also crowding in effects: In some cases
intrinsic motivations may be fostered by interventions which are perceived as sup-
portive. Effects of this kind have been studied by psychologists experimentally with
children who reduced their effort to perform certain tasks after ostensive observa-
tion and or material incentives had been introduced. More recently, some evidence
from experimental games seems to support these effects (for a review and explica-
tion of some experimental results see Bowles 2016: 39–77). It seems safe to say that
institutional design based on the provision of material incentives has to account
for such crowding out processes (for an extensive overview of the literature see
Underhill 2016). Depending on the particular parameters of the situation the provi-
sion of extrinsic incentives can result in an absolute reduction of intrinsic motives
within the individual. In cases of severe reductions of intrinsic motivation, the total
effect of both, intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, may be such that the desirable be-
havior is repressed. In other words, the imposition of rules via external incentives
can be counterproductive provided that a significant proportion of the population
is endowed with intrinsic preferences which favor the desired behavioral outcomes.
2.3.4 Social preferences and institutional design
There is some evidence that social preferences exist even in market contexts.
Online auction platforms are certainly products of conscious institutional design.
The online transaction company eBay uses not only auction mechanisms which
have been adopted from mechanism design theory which is based on the RE model
of man. But in addition, eBay created and implemented institutions to cope with
trust and cooperation problems that arise in online transactions between partners
who in general cannot rely on the shadow of the future or a shadow of the past be-
cause exchange is not repeated. The use of multilateral reputation is of course not
new but has been standard in commercial relations in economic history since a
long time (Greif 2006). eBay uses a feedback system such that buyers can evaluate
their partner after the transaction is completed and that this evaluation diffuses
throughout the system. The whole community of market participants can in princi-
ple use the reputation scores attached to a prospective partner before deciding to
interact with that partner. As far as we know, eBay modified its institution several
times in order to make it immune against fraud. Until 2008 it was not only possible
for buyers to evaluate the seller’s trustworthiness but sellers could also evaluate
buyers. This led to some problems due to a kind of negative reciprocity: Sellers
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responded to negative feedback by retaliating and giving a negative evaluation
even in cases that the buyer’s behavior had been exemplary correct. This problem
was mitigated via institutional reform but the feedback system still relies on mo-
tives which cannot be assumed as prevailing among RE agents. Why should an RE
buyer evaluate her partner at all? Giving a feedback is profitable only for the com-
munity of future (potential) transaction partners of the focal seller. It is not valu-
able to the evaluator (assuming that he will not repeat a transaction with the
same partner) who has to bear a low cost if thinking about and in fact giving feed-
back. In other words, to evaluate is comparable to contributing to a public good.
Since there are in general no material incentives for giving a feedback, the work-
ings of the reputation system depend to a certain degree on the pervasiveness of
social preferences among the users of the platform. There is evidence that in fact a
majority of eBay users gives feedback (Bolton et al. 2013, Diekmann et al. 2014).
The general point is this: Some institutions depend on voluntary contributions to
public goods and work fairly well even though there is no material compensation
for cooperation. There apparently is a critical mass, if not a large majority, of par-
ticipants who display behavior that is based on social preferences. Another insti-
tution that heavily depends on voluntary cooperation is of course democratic
voting. Still another is participation as a respondent in survey research interviews
or questionnaires.
2.4 Why RE assumptions are useful in institutional
design
2.4.1 First order and second order decisions and rationality
Choice anomalies due to limited rationality and non-standard motivations are relevant
and must be considered in designing institutions. This does, however, not imply that
the RE model is obsolete. Consider first choice anomalies like sunk cost effects. As has
been argued, these anomalies create a demand for rules that serve to help overcome
the resulting individual or collective inefficiencies. The “nudging” program’s aim is
indeed to supply those rules: “A nudge is some small feature in the environment that
attracts our attention and influences behavior. Nudges are effective for humans, but
not for Econs [RE agents, T.V.], since Econs are already doing the right thing. Nudges
are supposedly irrelevant factors that influence our choices in ways that make us bet-
ter off”(Thaler 2015: 326). Evaluating the suboptimality of anomalous behavior is thus,
according to the nudging approach, based on the RE model. Nudging therefore rests
on the assumption that third order decisions are boundedly rational. The goals of in-
stitutional design (first and second order decisions) are, on the other hand, deter-
mined by applications of the homo economicus model.
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2.4.2 Unclear effects of intrinsic motivation
According to the RE model agents systematically react on external incentives. Rules
which change relative prices of alternatives are powerful tools for behavioral
change (“power of incentives”). This is, in essence, the basic idea of the law of de-
mand of standard neoclassical microeconomics. Assuming institutional design is
based on this idea and that there are (also or entirely) agents who are (without
being provided with external incentives) motivated to perform the desired action
per se, there will be a chance that crowding out takes place. The effects of interven-
tions via rules or regulation must, however, be analyzed with care: The total effect
can be decomposed into the direct effects of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives plus
an indirect effect (possibly crowding out). It is obvious that the direction (sign) and
strength of the total effect depends on the values of each of the three parameters. It
may be that an indirect effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motives is strong
enough to offset the direct effect which results in a negative total effect. This is the
most severe crowding out effect. Other cases are logically possible, for instance,
crowding in effects such that incentives reinforce the effects of intrinsic motivation.
This may occur if incentives are perceived as supportive. The central questions are:
Is there any reliable ex-ante information about whether social and intrinsic preferen-
ces will exist and persist at all? If so, what can be known about the exact distribution
and strength of these motivations for different social settings? Since laboratory and
field experiments have, for the time being, generated results which are somehow in-
conclusive or context-dependent, these questions have no clear answer.
It has been argued that evidence from laboratory studies is far more supportive
for the impact of non-standard motivational factors than field experiments (Levitt
and List 2008). In the latter context, the power of material incentives seems more
effective. A particularly well researched area has been employment relationships
and the impact of pay-for-performance or piece-rate payments. In certain contexts
where one may conjecture that a significant proportion of laborers is intrinsically
motivated to supply high levels of effort (e.g., teaching or research and develop-
ment) pay for performance may indeed be counterproductive in that it elicits poor
“quality” and yields an increase in cheating behavior (Jacob and Levitt 2003).
Besides crowding out, these counterproductive effects have been mostly attributed
to difficulties in measuring work quality and in providing inappropriate indicators
for performance.
On the other hand, there exists supportive empirical evidence on the power of
incentives in this particular context. From a famous natural experiment clear evi-
dence emerged on increases in effort (without loss of work quality) which could be
attributed to the introduction of piece-rate payment (Lazear 2000). The study popu-
lation was employees of an auto glass repair corporation who prior to the interven-
tion received hourly wages for delivering an acceptable level of output. Quality of
work seemed not to be relevant because insufficient quality would be detected
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immediately. There was no indication of intrinsic motivation on the side of the
workers. Increases in average output per worker resulted from two mechanisms:
First, individual effort was enhanced. Secondly, there was a sorting of high-effort
workers who preferred to stay with the firm or were hired, whereas other workers
looked for jobs at different firms.
2.4.3 Institutional domains: Market competition and corporate
actors
There are thus situations where the assumption that the agents are to a significant
degree endowed with social or intrinsic preferences which are related to the desired
outcome (productivity, cooperation, etc.) does not seem likely. To argue more system-
atically, there are certain institutional domains where the relevant actors’ motivation
functions obviously do not depend on other-regarding or intrinsic preferences. The
mechanisms which are at work in these domains are market competition, learning
and the formalization of standard operating procedures which constrain agents’ be-
havior. Consider anonymous markets without trust problems. In certain areas of the
financial industry, and in financial markets in general, the RE assumption is likely a
plausible and empirically fruitful first approximation to manage problems of institu-
tional design. In recent years many commentators from the financial press com-
plained about certain adverse phenomena and social dilemmas: With respect to
computerized high speed trading of stocks and derivatives there is obviously a severe
arms race analogous to a Prisoner’s dilemma. Trading firms compete with each other
about the fastest connection to Wall Street or other stock exchanges and invest sub-
stantial resources to become some fraction of a second faster than their competitors.
This gives rise to extra profits by “sniping”, that is, by exploiting informational
advantages. For example, if a trader gets the information that Apple stock prices
increase in New York, her automated ordering system can place orders in Chicago
within milliseconds where the prices will similarly rise with a small time lag.
However, this competitive advantage vanishes if other traders use similarly quick
connections and automated trading software. Another problem is criminal behav-
ior called “spoofing” which is not easily detected and punished by legal sanctions
(Ford 2016). This means to place (so to speak fake) buying or selling orders which
change the price of some stock. Some milliseconds before the order is scheduled
to become executed the spoofer cancels the order and can collect an extra profit
by simultaneously selling or buying mirror stock that he previously has acquired.
Possible interventions are the imposition of a small fee on all cancelled trades
above a certain limit or to require a minimum rest time before orders to remain
open. These new rules would probably not completely reduce opportunism or waste-
ful investments into rat races but mitigate the problems to some degree. Regulations
of this kind would change the behavior of traders by the power of relative prices or
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opportunity costs. Other instruments which rest on attempts to change traders’ pref-
erences, moralizing, or appeals to some code of honorable trading behavior (or the
attempt to change the “culture” of the financial or investment banking sector) will as
far as we know not work. There is also probably no risk that some “intrinsic motiva-
tion” to act honorable will be crowded out by such interventions.
In social theory, James Coleman (1982, 1990) has advanced the concept of “cor-
porate actors” and of an “asymmetric society”. Modern societies are increasingly
dominated by corporate actors like capitalist organizations. There is an asymmetry in
power in relations between natural persons and these corporate actors. Interestingly,
Coleman explains corporate action by means of the RE model. However, natural per-
sons’ inferior power position is in part due to the fact that they are, according to
Coleman, subject to choice anomalies, for example weakness of will and time inconsis-
tency. These anomalies are systematically exploited by corporate actors. To illustrate,
in certain business relationships corporate actors supply their customers with contracts
which contain default options with respect to quitting the relation, payment or protec-
tion of data privacy. As is well known from behavioral research, opting out from a de-
fault option is chosen much less frequently than simply to accept the default option (a
prominent example is rules of organ donation). This may be explained by choice be-
havior on the side of natural persons that is largely consistent with the RE model (costs
of switching to an alternative) or, which is somewhat more intuitive, by weakness of
will or other types of choice anomalies. One might say that many corporate actors have
tacitly or intentionally employed some of the rules and recommendations of the nudg-
ing approach in order to further profit interests. In other words, corporate actors have
rationally designed institutional rules and contracts with the goal to maximize corpo-
rate profits (first and second order decisions) under the assumption that natural per-
sons’ behavior is subject to certain choice anomalies (third order decisions).
In the spirit of Coleman’s approach, it may be a legitimate goal of normative
social theory to provide the public with recommendations on how to improve the
power of natural persons in their relations with corporate actors. It would be beside
the point to create rules on the assumption that the behavior of capitalist corporate
actors (or Weberian bureaucratic organizations more generally) is governed to a sig-
nificant degree by social or intrinsic preferences. There is indeed some empirical
evidence that natural persons are inclined to act more opportunistically vis-à-vis
corporations. Individuals tend to frame their interactions (e.g., contracts) with cor-
porate actors much less in terms of morally neutral exchanges than interactions
with other natural persons (Rai and Diermeier 2015).
2.4.4 An excursus on low cost effects
One might argue that the power of relative price changes is confined to the domain
of markets and capitalist corporate actors. However, there is an intensive discussion
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in rational choice sociology about the so-called low cost hypothesis in everyday envi-
ronmental behavior. The debate set off from papers by Diekmann and Preisendörfer
(2003). Though the focus has predominantly been on environmental behavior
(by natural persons), the low cost phenomenon occurs in other contexts too
where moral or other normative attitudes interact with material interests.
Starting point have been empirical findings based on survey research data:
1. Normative standards have a positive effect on pro-environmental behavior
2. Costs of pro-environmental behavior negatively affect behavior
3. Interaction effects: The positive effect of norms declines with increasing costs
Crediting Douglass North and other economists, Diekmann and Preisendörfer pro-
posed the so-called low cost hypothesis to explain the observation of a discrepancy
between normative attitudes (as measured by interview responses) and factual be-
havior: Words are cheap, but deeds can be very costly. Besides papers by Diekmann
and Preisendörfer, many other contributors proposed theoretical explanations of the
low cost hypothesis (for an overview and discussion see Best and Kroneberg 2012;
Tutic et al. 2017). Some of them have used rather complicated variants of rational
choice or of framing reasoning (Best and Kroneberg 2012). Tutic et al. (2017) present a
parsimonious explanation based on a simple application of classical demand theory
which is a slightly modified variant of a RE-model. The idea is to use a Cobb-Douglas
utility function (a tool which was, by the way, also used in Coleman’s [1990] analyses
of the linear system of action).The utility arguments comprise two normal goods,
namely a composite good measuring the amount (quantity) of pro-environmental or
other activities related to some normative standard, xa ≥0, and another good x:a ≥0
which is unrelated to the attitude or normative standard:
u xa, x:að Þ= xαa · x1− α:a
Exponents α 2 0, 1ð Þ measure the strength of the attitude. It is easily shown that by
maximizing this function under the conventional linear budget equation that is
used in neoclassical demand theory one can derive the three empirical regularities.
One of them is of course the classical law of demand: The larger the relative prices
of behavior that is related to the attitude or normative standard the lower the de-
mand for this behavior. Notice that the low cost hypothesis is not identical to the
law of demand but also contains a hypothesis postulating an interaction effect.
This interaction is also easily derived from the Cobb-Douglas-function approach.
Empirical evidence indicates that the low cost hypothesis is not universally valid
(see Best and Kroneberg 2012 for references). The Cobb-Douglas approach of course
depends on preferences which are related to some normative standard. Given that
parameter α is very low or even equals zero, there will not be any effects of normative
standards at all. It is an empirical question whether or not there are conditions
such that extremely high costs do not suppress “moral” behavior. In cases like
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these alternative explanatory approaches based on “framing” may be appropriate
(see Esser and Kroneberg 2015).
Some further insights are implied by this kind of comparative statics. Interventions
which reduce the relative price of desired moral behavior will increase the amount of
that behavior and vice versa. (This may be considered as a kind of crowding in effect.)
One may of course use the whole technical apparatus of the Slutsky equation to de-
scribe other effects in more detail. It is furthermore possible to make the model more
“realistic”, for example by introducing a full income constraint in terms of costs of
time (which makes sense because many pro-environmental activities will yield direct
costs in terms of time and opportunity costs in terms of reduced wages or leisure time).
It is in general not necessary to introduce some more or less complicated framing
model to explain the stylized low cost effects. In other words, institutional design
may be based on a slightly modified RE model that accounts for specific normative or
pro-social attitudes without eliciting crowding out effects.
2.4.5 The power of incentives
With respect to institutional design, the homo economicus model suggests interven-
tions which change the relative prices of alternatives such that in the aggregate a
socially desirable outcome will be realized. Economics appeals to the so-called gen-
eralized law of demand in this case: If the relative price of a good increases, the
demand for this good will decrease. In other words: Individual demand functions
are negatively inclined. The implementation of these interventions is, in principle,
simple because restrictions can be much better manipulated than preferences.
From the analysis of the low cost hypothesis, which has been sketched, it follows
that relative price effects can work even in cases where the affected individuals
hold certain pro-social or moral attitudes. The analysis was comprised to a single
(representative) individual agent. It is, however, easily demonstrated that in the ag-
gregate the same qualitative effects can be predicted: Aggregate demand functions
which are simply derived by a summation of individual demand curves will show
the same qualitative property of a negative slope. The negative slope of the aggre-
gate demand function does not depend on specific preferences.
An important result in this context has been proved in a seminal paper by Becker
(1962, reprinted in 1976). If there are n agents who are restricted to choose a bundle
of goods which is on their budget line, the negative slope of the aggregate demand
function even follows for “irrational” behavior of the participants. Irrationality means
that choices are selected at random (impulsively) or inertial (routinely). In other
words, on the macro level of aggregate behavior the power of incentives is still pre-
served if agents are irrational. Even when dealing with “irrational” agents, the RE
model can be an appropriate instrument (for the analysis of third order decisions) in
designing institutions.
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Developing this point further, notice that in contrast to RE models of third
order decisions the macro consequences of limited rationality models or of social
preferences utility functions are by no means clear. Many critics have noted that
virtually any empirical observation on the individual level can be “explained” ex
post by an ad hoc behavioral model. On the other hand, for many if not most “psy-
chological” theories of individual behavior the aggregate consequences are far from
clear. It is in many instances not possible to generate inferences on the level of
collective effects via applying behavioral theories. Take for example the Kahneman-
Tversky prospect theory. Though this theory is explicated with relatively great preci-
sion, it is not yet possible to systematically generate insights for strategic interaction
situations. The reason is that prospect theory is not easily linked to game theoretic
equilibrium concepts and therefore does not contain a heuristic for micro-macro tran-
sitions. What can be done is to translate specific theoretical components of prospect
theory, for example assumptions about framing on the curvature of the value func-
tion (gain frames induce concave utility functions), into a game-theoretic context
(see Raub and Snijders 1997 for such an approach). Alternatives to RE models have
not yet evolved into a coherent, unified and parsimonious theoretical instrument
to accomplish micro-macro-aggregations. Even proponents of behavioral theory
have to concede that “for comparative static predictions of aggregate behavior,
self-interest models may make empirically correct predictions because models
with more complex motivational assumptions predict the same outcome” (Falk and
Fischbacher 2005: 183).
2.5 Conclusion: The role of RE assumptions
in institutional design
When dealing with problems of institutional design, it is important to distinguish
three interconnected levels of decisions. First and second order decisions comprise
the selection of (normative) criteria and goals of design and the specific rules that
are appropriate to meet or realize these criteria. Third order decisions refer to the
“object level” of behavioral choices selected by the (future) target actors and benefi-
ciaries of the rules. It has been argued that with regard to first and second order
decisions (sometimes called “constitutional decisions”), assumptions of rationality
and self-regarding preferences, possibly behind a “veil” in certain moral contexts,
can be appropriate even though with respect to third order decisions other models
of man may be justifiably used. Behavioral economics and cognitive psychology
have produced empirical evidence and also some theoretical insight that limits
of rationality and social or intrinsic preferences may affect institutional design in
important ways. Individually or socially suboptimal effects which result from bound-
edly rational behavior (for example, sunk cost effects) create a demand for institutions
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which reduce these inefficiences. This demand arises if the outcomes are evaluated
(first order) by RE assumptions.
With respect to non-standard preferences, it is necessary to generate some ex-
ante information on the specific distribution of preferences or other characteristics
of the (future) target actors whose third order decisions are extrapolated. The acqui-
sition of this knowledge is more likely in cases of small and stable social situations
with a fixed population of interacting individuals whose characteristics are well-
known and homogenous. In populations with heterogenous individuals from differ-
ent cultural contexts and with considerable migration between social contexts,
“legislators” will in general not be able to gather much ex-ante-information with
regard to the specific mixture of preferences. This information, however, is neces-
sary to estimate whether or not pro-social motives will be undermined to a signifi-
cant degree by incentives which are provided by the constitutional rules. With
regard to normative constitutional theory, the Hume-Buchanan approach towards
the construction of universal rules which are valid for an extended time horizon
and possibly for a population with a high degree of diversity seems still warranted.
Since such constitutional choices will necessarily be made under conditions of high
uncertainty with regard to the properties of the affected agents and the specific dis-
tribution of social preferences it may be a “quasi-risk aversive” choice (Brennan
and Buchanan 1985) to use the standard homo economicus assumptions as a first
approximation.
Some additional points which favor the use of RE assumption in analyses of
third order decisions are as follows:
1. There is a large set of bounded rationality- and non-selfish motive-models with
partially contradictory predictions. It seems impossible to select one element
from this set as a theoretical tool suitable for every problem of institutional de-
sign. In other words, given that ex-ante knowledge about the properties of the
target population is lacking, the use of standard homo economicus assump-
tions is an obvious alternative.
2. In large-scale aggregate behavior it seems, in general, that homo economicus
models and many more complicated alternative theories yield very similar, if
not the same, predictions. In this case: Why not use standard RE model?
3. There are institutional domains which require design principles consistent with
homo economicus assumptions:
– Competitive, anonymous markets (highspeed trading in financial markets),
auctions
– Profit-oriented corporate actors’ behavior (in relations with natural persons)
4. Non-standard models are appropriate in special situations involving decisions
at the margin, e.g. certain “low cost” situations. However, non-standard models
offer no clear predictions about structural variables which affect outcomes of
institutional design (e.g. repeated interactions, network effects) and must there-
fore be combined with standard models.
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Institutional design is, in general, a complex task with considerable uncertainty
about its possible effects. Many, if not all, attempts of conscious design are prone to
generate non-intended consequences. One should keep in mind that a trial-and-error
process of “piecemeal-engineering”(Popper 1966) – albeit guided by theoretical prin-
ciples – will in general be needed. Starting with RE assumptions, this process of
piecemeal-engineering will possibly adopt different behavioral principles referring to
third order problems depending on the concrete boundary conditions of the situation.
A note of caution has been expressed by celebrated institutional design expert Elinor
Ostrom with these words:
The policy of assigning all authority to a central agency to design rules is based on a false
conception that there are only a few rules that need to be considered and that only experts
know these options and can design optimal policies. Our empirical research strongly chal-
lenges this assumption. There are thousands of individual rules that can be used to manage
resources. No one, including a scientifically trained professional staff, can do a complete anal-
ysis of any particular situation. (Elinor Ostrom 2005b: 269)
Finally, let me conclude with two false propositions:
1. The RE model represents the uniquely optimal model for institutional analysis.
2. The RE model is useless in institutional analysis.
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3 Rational Choice Theory, the Model of
Frame Selection and Other Dual-Process
Theories. A Critical Comparison
Abstract: Dual-process theories explain behavior as well as cognitive processes.
They thus compete with other theories which explain, at least in part, the same phe-
nomena. The question then is how the theories differ and which theory is to be pre-
ferred. This article focuses on the comparison of two dual-process theories with a
wide version of rational choice theory. The dual-process theories are the MODE
model and the model of frame selection. The wide version of rational choice theory
assumes, among other things, that all kinds of motives must be considered when a
behavior is explained, that beliefs matter and that individuals do what they think is
best for them (subjective utility maximization). One major result of the analyses is
that basic assumptions of dual-process theories in general and the two dual-
process theories discussed, namely the MODE model and the model of frame selec-
tion, do not contradict RCT but complement it.
3.1 Introduction
The rise of dual-process theories in the last few decades is a challenge for other the-
ories in the social sciences. One of those other theories is rational choice theory
(RCT). This article focuses on a particular version of RCT that includes all kinds of
preferences and beliefs (which may be wrong) and assumes that actors do what
they consider to be best for them in the specific situation. This is the assumption of
subjective utility maximization. This wide version of RCT (for details see below) is
increasingly applied in the social sciences. Therefore, a comparison with other the-
ories such as dual-process theories seems useful.
These theories come in different versions as well. The MODE model has been
confirmed very well and is thus worth to be compared with RCT. In contrast to the
MODE model, advocates of the model of frame selection (MFS) claim that it contra-
dicts and is superior to RCT. It is thus useful to select this model for comparison as
well.
Providing a comparison of theories is only the first step of the following analy-
ses. It is not useful to know only differences between theories. It is further impor-
tant to know how differences between theories are to be assessed. This is the major
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goal of the present paper: the question is which of the theories is superior or, to
formulate it more modestly, which of the theories seems more plausible. Therefore,
the title of the paper is a “critical” comparison.
This article is organized as follows. We will first expose RCT and its wide ver-
sion. Proponents of the MFS raise various objections that are then discussed. Next
the MODE model is exposed, and its relationship to RCT is analyzed. The exposition
of the MFS, its critique and comparison with RCT follows. We end with general con-
clusions and suggestions for further research.
Those readers who are familiar with the different versions of RCT might skip
the respective sections. RCT has been outlined because there are still numerous
misunderstandings about its assumptions. Furthermore, for many readers the ob-
jections discussed are so obviously wrong that they might be skipped as well. The
comparative analyses of RCT and dual-process theory begin with the section “Dual-
Process Theories.”
3.2 Rational choice theory
There are some hypotheses that are shared by all versions of RCT. These basic as-
sumptions are called the “general version” of RCT which is first outlined. Then the
wide version is briefly described and a special version of it, value expectancy theory.
3.2.1 The general version of rational choice theory
This version makes three assumptions.1 (1) Human behavior is influenced by prefer-
ences. These are goals or objectives, not attitudes. This is particularly clear in the
theory of consumer behavior in economics (see any textbook in economics such
Salvatore 2003). Indifference curves depict which combinations of two goods pro-
vide equal “satisfaction” (Salvatore 2003: 62). If people are “satisfied” with some
good then this means that certain goals are achieved with these goods. The first hy-
pothesis thus asserts that a behavior is chosen that is conducive to goal realization.
(2) Constraints or behavioral opportunities influence behavior. These are factors
that more or less limit the realization of the actor’s goals. These two assumptions
1 For expositions of RCT see textbooks of economics, game theory and public choice theory such as
Frey 1992; Kirchgässner 2008; Gilboa 2010 or Sandler 2001. What follows is based on Opp 1999,
2019b. These articles provide a detailed discussion of the different versions of RCT and their cri-
tique. There is a large body of literature that applies RCT to explain crime, beginning with Gary
Becker‛s seminal article (1968). See in particular Cornish and Clarke 2017 whose version of RCT is
very similar to the wide version. See also Opp 2020.
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are shared by almost all social science schools. Actually they mean that human be-
havior is goal oriented and influenced by the social and physical environment.
The two assumptions do not yet specify how people act when there are several
behavioral alternatives. This question is answered by assumption (3): Actors maxi-
mize their utility. That is to say, actors choose the action that is best for them and,
thus, provides the highest satisfaction. This is compatible with consumer theory in
economics: the highest indifference curve is chosen that can be achieved, given the
constraints (see again Salvatore 2003: 74–79). Utility thus refers to satisfaction.
3.2.2 The narrow and the wide version of rational choice theory
The general version does not impose any restrictions on the kind of goals that are
admitted in an explanation of behavior. There is a narrow version in which only ma-
terial goals and egoism (only one‛s own well-being is of interest) are included. In a
wide version all possible goals are admitted. People may strive for non-material sat-
isfactions: they may like arts or poetry; they may be interested in the welfare of
others (that is to say, goals may be altruistic); they may pursue normative goals
(that is to say, heed internalized norms).
This implies that RCT does not assume only instrumental behavior. This is often
defined as behavior that is only influenced by non-normative goals (such as getting a
higher income). Since normative goals are included as possible motivations, one may
say that also non-instrumental behavior is explained by RCT (for details see Opp 2013).
In the narrow version of RCT the constraints or behavioral opportunities are
those that really exist. However, there might be misperception. For example, com-
mitting a crime depends, among other things, upon the perceived likelihood of pun-
ishment which may be at odds with the actual probability. The wide version of RCT
includes those perceived constraints. Furthermore, human cognitive limitations
(“bounded rationality”) are taken into account as behavioral constraints.
Another assumption of a narrow version is that actors behave so that they reach
the best possible outcomes, from the viewpoint of an omniscient observer. The wide
version assumes that individuals do what they think is best for them in the specific
situation. Thus, subjective and not objective utility maximization is assumed.
It is sometimes held that the wide version is circular: motives (especially non-
material goals) and beliefs are allegedly “inferred” from the behavior. This is a gross
misunderstanding. In every explanation, the empirically relevant conditions must be
determined empirically. For example, in a survey the respondents might be presented
with interview questions about their internalized norms or their beliefs (such as their
expectations of punishment when they commit a crime). Statistical analyses can then
determine to what extent the theory is confirmed.
This does not imply that an application of RCT to explain some phenomena
such as a changing crime rate always begins from scratch. There are usually many
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previous applications in the same field that have found incentives a researcher may
build upon. For example, in explaining voting it has been found that a norm to vote
and normative expectations of important others influence voting. The assumption
is that conformity to the expectation of important others is a positive incentive. In
criminology, perceived punishment or informal positive or negative rewards from
others matter for committing a crime. Whether those incentives are relevant in new
research, must nonetheless be empirically determined. Thus, RCT – as any other
theory in the social sciences – is “practically empty” in the sense that initial condi-
tions are not part of the theories. This is meaningful because the initial conditions
are different in different situations and can thus not be included in a theory which
consists of general statements. Nonetheless, researchers can use existing research
as heuristic guidelines for finding incentives.
The theory, be it the narrow or wide version, does not assume that individuals
perform only deliberate behavior (see already Becker 1976:7). The assumption is that
human behavior is governed by preferences and constraints. Individuals may act
spontaneously or they may consciously weigh advantages and disadvantages of be-
havioral alternatives. As will be seen below, RCT can be applied to explain when
which form of behavior is chosen.
3.2.3 Value expectancy theory as a variant of the wide version
of rational choice theory
A variant of the wide version is value expectancy theory (VET), also called SEU the-
ory (“SEU” for “subjective expected utility”) or simply utility theory. This theory is
originally formulated by social psychologists (and not by economists where VET is
called SEU or EU theory) and often applied by advocates of RCT to explain sociolog-
ical phenomena.2 The wide version of RCT just hypothesizes that preferences and
beliefs influence behavior. VET specifies in greater detail how preferences and con-
straints influence behavior and how individuals decide.
VET assumes that the behavior that is performed is one of the perceived be-
havioral alternatives. Which alternative is chosen depends on the utilities (U) and
subjective probabilities (p) of the perceived behavioral consequences. For each con-
sequence, the utilities and probabilities are multiplied. This means, that the effect
of one variable depends of the value of the other. If, for example, the subjective
probability that a consequence occurs is zero, the utility does not have an effect.
2 See, for example, Feather 1982, 1991. For the history of SEU theory see Stigler 1950a, 1950b. For
political science and an application to voting see Riker and Ordeshook 1968; 1973: 45–77. It is im-
portant that in the following a social-psychological version of SEU theory is described that is akin
to the wide version of RCT.
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To illustrate, assume a person considers at a certain time to vote or abstain
from voting. Let the person expect rewards from friends when he or she partici-
pates. Another reward may be that the preferred party wins: the individual consid-
ers the extent to which his or her vote influences (p) the winning of the preferred
party. Finally, assume that due to an internalized norm voting is regarded as an ob-
ligation. Two behavioral equations summarize these hypotheses. Each equation
models the SEU (subjective expected utility) of a behavioral alternative:
1. SEU(vote) = p • U(rewards from friends) + p • U(preferred party will win) +
+ p • U(conformity to the norm to vote)
2. SEU(not vote) = p • U(rewards from friends) + p • U(preferred party will win) +
+ p • U(conformity to the norm to vote)
Both equations list the same behavioral consequences. It is assumed that the utili-
ties U of the consequences are equal, regardless of the behavior chosen. But the
probabilities p may differ. For example, the likelihood of getting rewards from
friends may be high if the individual votes, it may be zero in case of abstaining.
So far the SEU of an action is only defined. Nothing is explained so far. The the-
ory posits: If the SEU of a behavioral alternative i is higher than the SEU of any other
alternative j, the behavioral alternative i is chosen.
VET is compatible with the wide version of RCT. The utilities are the preferen-
ces, the subjective probabilities refer to the (perceived) constraints or opportunities.
The hypothesis that the behavior with the highest SEU is chosen means that indi-
viduals do what they think is best for them in the specific situation, that is to say,
they maximize their subjective utility.
Our example indicates that the wide version is clearly falsifiable. The p’s and
U’s can be measured, and multivariate analyses can show whether the predictions
of the model are correct. In consumer theory (see any economics textbook such
Salvatore 2003: 57–86) the highest possible indifference curve is preferred that can
be realized with the given constraints. One can measure the satisfaction with goods
and the perceived constraints.
It is important that SEU theory does not assume deliberate behavior. Instead, a
behavior may be performed spontaneously. For example, a person will always buy
a certain product without deliberating.
3.2.4 A terminological note
The term incentives refers to the set of preferences and constraints (or utilities and
subjective probabilities of the behavioral consequences). In the voting example,
the incentives for voting are the terms of the right-hand side of equation 1 and 2.
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Benefits are the positive, costs the negative incentives. Sometimes “costs” also refer
to constraints only.
3.2.5 Some untenable objections – views from advocates
of the model of frame selection
Advocates of the MFS aim at showing the superiority of their theory by pointing out
weaknesses of RCT. It is often not clear what version of RCT their target is when
they criticize “the” theory of rational action. Their target seems to be the narrow
version because their major criticisms do not hold for a wide version. If the wide
version is mentioned, its assumptions are sometimes not described correctly. This
procedure comes close to a straw man strategy: a questionable version of a theory –
a narrow or misrepresented wide version – is criticized, instead of a wide version
that is largely accepted by the scientific community.3 In what follows it is argued
that the major objections against “the” theory of rational action are not valid for a
wide version. Since some of these objections are held not only by proponents of the
MFS, the following discussion is of general interest. Furthermore, it is claimed that
the MFS is not contradictory to the wide version, but complements it.
(1) The transition from the narrow to the wide version is a “degenerative problem
shift” (Esser 2017: 506). The original version of RCT, as it is used by Adam Smith and
the Scottish moral philosophers, does not include any restriction on the kinds of
preferences and constraints that may explain behavior. Only later such restrictions
were introduced (especially in neo-classical economics). Removing such restrictions
and using RCT again as a general behavioral theory (as the wide version does) in-
creases the validity of the theory and allows a wider application (for example, to sit-
uation where non-material incentives matter). If empirical research indicates that in
general a wide range of preferences and that perceived constraints (beliefs) matter,
then this is logically consistent with the general theory. There is therefore no “de-
generative” problem shift. Dropping narrow assumptions (that the original version
does not include) to increase the validity of the theory is rather a “progressive” prob-
lem shift: the theory is improved.
3 For example, in discussing research findings by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) Esser (2017) at-
tacks rational choice theory without mentioning that a wide version does not make the assumptions
he criticizes. See further Esser’s (2018) account of “the” theory of rational action which raises the
question who the advocates of such a version are. See my detailed discussion of this paper in Opp
(2019c). In particular, it is shown that Esser’s devastating critique of “the” theory of rational action
does definitely not apply to the wide version. Esser’s major argument that RCT cannot explain cer-
tain experimental findings by Fehr and Gächter (2000) is clearly untenable for the wide version.
Esser’s application of the model of frame selection illustrates the major flaws of this model.
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It is ironic that the MFS includes the wide range of incentives admitted in the
wide version as well and applies SEU (see below). The MFS might thus also be re-
garded as a “degenerative problem shift.”
(2) RCT is false because it does not explain the origin or activation of preferences and
constraints and neglects the “definition of the situation.” Every theory consists of in-
dependent variables that are regarded as given. Explaining these independent vari-
ables is an extension of the theory. Such an extended theory has again independent
variables that are regarded as given. Claiming that independent variables should
always be explained would amount to an infinite regress. Nonetheless, one might
regard it as an important task to explain certain independent variables, that is to
say, to address the causes of the causes.
This implies that hypotheses about misperception or about activation of beliefs
or goals do not falsify RCT. Those hypotheses explain which incentives have an im-
pact on the behavior. For example, if a situation leads to activating wrong beliefs,
then these wrong beliefs determine behavior. Thus, whatever the definition of the
situation is, this does not contradict RCT. The situation only influences the values
of the incentives.
(3) Any factor can be included in a rational choice explanation. Hedström and Ylikoski
(2014: 6) hold: “Finding a rational choice model that fits a particular phenomenon
becomes almost trivially easy as there are no real constraints on preferences and be-
liefs that can be attributed to the individuals in question.” According to Kroneberg
and Kalter (2012: 82), the wide version of RCT “is able to assimilate almost any psy-
chological concept or theory and translate it into more or less ‘soft’ incentives or a
more or less inaccurate belief.” Kroneberg (2014: 111) adds that the wide version is
“therefore of little explanatory power and heuristic value.” It is striking that none of
the authors provides a detailed argument that justifies their critique. The following
analysis shows that this critique is clearly mistaken. Let subject S have two preferen-
ces or goals:
G1: The goal of flying to the moon,
G2: The goal of not getting wet.
Let S further have two beliefs:
B1: Apples are healthy,
B2: An umbrella protects against rain.
Now assume that we want to explain why S performed U, that is to say, brought his
umbrella to his office at a certain day (this example is taken from Hedström 2005:
99–100). Is it compatible with RCT, that G1 and B2 can arbitrarily be selected to ex-
plain U? If S is patient of a mental hospital, this could be a valid explanation: S
might perceive that bringing the umbrella (B2) would lead to the realization of the
3 Rational Choice Theory and Dual-Process Theories 47
goal to fly to the moon (G1). But our “normal” actor S will perform U in order to
reach his goal G2 (not to get wet), and the belief that putting up an umbrella will
protect against rain (B2) is perceived to be instrumental for goal realization. The
general assumption that underlies this argument and RCT is that human behavior is
goal oriented. In other words, behavior is enacted that is perceived by the actor to
reach certain goals.
It is thus definitely not arbitrary which goals and beliefs are to be selected to
explain a behavior. RCT has clear rules specifying how action, preferences and be-
liefs are related. These are relational hypotheses that are usually not formulated ex-
plicitly because they are so obvious.
These relational hypotheses can be formulated in the following way: (1) The
action is chosen that leads, in the perception of the actor, to the realization of the
actor‛s goals. (2) The action is chosen for which the actor believes that it realizes
his or her goals most likely. There is thus no danger that the wide version is “im-
munized against empirical criticism by adding ever more utility components”
(Diekmann and Voss 2004: 20, translation by KDO). The major reason why immu-
nization is not possible is that it is to be determined empirically which incentives
exist in the situation when the behavior is carried out.
These are the assumptions that are also implicitly applied by Hedström (2005:
99–100) in his example. It is particularly ironic that proponents of the MFS also use
a wide version of RCT when they apply SEU theory (see below).
(4) RCT assumes only additive effects of costs and benefits (for example, Kroneberg,
Yaish and Stocké 2010: 23). An interaction effect of incentives means that the effect of
some incentives depends on the value of other incentives. Such interaction effects are
clearly consistent with RCT. One would expect them if certain value combinations of
incentives (that is to say, of multiplicative terms of independent variables) are particu-
larly beneficial or costly. For example, assume there are strong general (“structural”)
deprivations (for example, there is a high inflation rate). Now let some “incidental”
grievances (Hechter, Pfaff and Underwood 2016) occur such as a brutal police ac-
tion. The effect of the general grievances on protest may depend on the degree of
the structural grievances. People may in general already be so frustrated that a small
additional grievance elicits strong protest. That is to say, the effect of one grievance
(a kind of goal that is not realized) depends on the extent to which another (inciden-
tal) grievance occurs.
Another example is that a very strong norm (for example, not to steal) prompts
the actor to disregard the non-normative goal (being in need of money). Thus, the
extent to which a norm is followed depends on the intensity of non-normative goals
and vice versa (for details see Opp 2017, also 2010). In regard to the explanation of
protest with a wide version of RCT various interaction effects of incentives are theo-
retically derived and empirically confirmed (Kittel and Opp 2019).
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RCT is thus clearly compatible with multiplicative effects of incentives. Whether
such multiplicative effects occur has to be determined empirically.
(5) Explanatory content of the wide version is not higher than of the narrow version. I
have argued that the wide version has a higher explanatory value than the narrow
version (Opp 1999: 182). This is denied by Esser (2017:516–518). This argument is
based on another formalization of the two versions (which does not convince me).
The major argument in favor the higher explanatory content of the wide version is
that it implies conditions for the validity of the narrow version. For example, let a
person be in need of money and find a wallet with a high amount of money.
Assume there is no likelihood of being detected if the wallet is not returned. A nar-
row version that only addresses egoistic motives will predict that the person will
keep the wallet. This will not hold, according to the wide version, if the person has
internalized a strong norm not to steal and has pity with the owner (that is to say,
has a strong altruistic motivation). The wide version thus explains why the narrow
version makes a wrong prediction. The example indicates that a theory T1 (wide ver-
sion) shows the conditions for the validity of a theory T2 (narrow version). T1 can
therefore not have a lower explanatory content than T2.
But even if this is denied one would nevertheless choose the wide version be-
cause it has a higher validity (which Esser admits). There is thus a trade-off: does
one prefer a valid theory with a relatively low explanatory content, or an invalid
theory with a high explanatory content? Usually one would prefer the valid theory.
(6) Other objections. There are other objections against RCT by advocates of the MFS
that are definitely not tenable for a wide version. An especially extreme example
is a recent attack by Esser (2018) against “the” theory of rational action (see the
summary in Table 1: 16) which does definitely not hold for a wide version. To illus-
trate, it is asserted that in RCT empirical reference (“Bezug”) is only formal about axi-
oms and measurement is not required; preferences and expectations are “not
observable,” and short-term changes are only possible in regard to expectations (13).
Numerous empirical applications of the wide version of RCT (in particular of VET)
clearly contradict these allegations: utilities and subjective probabilities are (and,
obviously, should be) measured and, thus, are observable, and they may change
in the short as well as in the long run. Again, such changes must be measured. They
are the initial conditions of the theory.
Another example for an untenable critique is that symbolic cues are “cheap talk,”
as Esser argues (Esser 2018: 13).4 This means in game theory that communications
4 This article is based on a gross misrepresentation of RCT, at least of a wide version. I have written
a detailed critique of this article and submitted it to the journal where Esser’s article has been pub-
lished (Zeitschrift für Soziologie). I will be glad to send the manuscript (which is in German) to in-
terested readers (Opp 2019c).
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cannot change payoffs. In a wide version of RCT, communications are stimuli of the
environment and it is by no means excluded that they change incentives.
Such a characterization of “the” theory of rational choice raises the question
why not its best available version is used to compare it with the MFS. Taking the
best version is a stronger test than using a heavily flawed theory. The consequence
of such a comparison is obviously that the MFS fares better. For example, it is easy
to generate a contradiction by simply claiming that RCT assumes stable preferences.
Of course, this makes RCT contradictory to almost every sociological theory because
changing preferences are always admitted. The remainder of this essay compares,
among other things, the MFS with a wide RCT and argues that the MFS is by no
means superior and is burdened with serious shortcomings.
3.3 Dual-process theories
In this section we will first present some basic theoretical ideas of dual-process the-
ories (DPTs). Next their compatibility with RCT will be discussed.
3.3.1 Some basic ideas
The name of this group of theories refers to the distinction between two “qualita-
tively different mental systems” which are labeled in different ways (Keren and
Schul 2009: 533–534). There is an affective system and a deliberate system or,
equivalently, system 1 and system 2. Accordingly, there are two mental processes:
behavior may be spontaneous (or, equivalently, automatic) or deliberate.5
These processes have “typically” (Gawronski and Creighton 2013: 283) four charac-
teristics in common (Table 3.1). Note that the processes and their features are all dichot-
omous. There are other descriptions of the two processes (see, for example, Evans and
Frankish 2009, Table 1.1; Evans 2008: Table 2). The dichotomies are, for example, fast/
slow, parallel/sequential, associative/rule based.
The two-system dichotomy and the related hypotheses have been criticized by sev-
eral authors. Keren and Schul (2009) assert that they “lack conceptual clarity” and “rely
on insufficient (and often inadequate) empirical evidence” (534). It is further an open
question whether the mind consists of “one, two, or perhaps multiple systems” (534).
5 There is a vast literature on DPTs. A historical overview is provided by Frankish and Evans 2009.
For general overviews see Evans 2008; Evans and Frankish 2009; Gawronski & Creighton 2013;
Kahneman 2011:19–108. See further Chaiken and Trope 1999 and the successor volume by
Sherman, Gawronski and Trope 2014; Evans and Frankish 2009. For a theoretical integration and
the suggestion of a new model, see Mayerl (2009), summarized in Mayerl (2010).
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In the present contribution our focus is on the explanation of behavior. Dual-
process theories claim that there are two kinds of behavior: spontaneous and de-
liberate. Most behaviors are, however, more or less spontaneous or deliberate.6 A
behavioral sequence such as going to a supermarket consists partly of spontane-
ous behavior (such as the walking) and partly of deliberate behavior (such as
choosing among several foods). The question addressed in the present article is
how these different behaviors can be explained.
The literature on dual-process theories suggests various ideas that should be
included in such explanations. One basic idea is that before a behavior is performed
there are situational cues that activate attitudes, goals or beliefs that are stored in
memory. These cues are of different kinds. They may be a letter of invitation for a
conference or a traffic light. The cues elicit (or activate) cognitive elements. Which
elements are activated depends, for example, on the accessibility of cognitive ele-
ments (see below). An important task is to specify which cues trigger which cogni-
tive elements and which behavior.
These ideas can be applied to the voting example that was used to illustrate
VET. Cues are newspaper reports about election dates, and information saved in
memory when elections take place. The respective dates then activate various cog-
nitive elements about voting.
3.3.2 On the compatibility of dual-process theories with rational
choice theory
To what extent do the previous hypotheses contradict the wide version of RCT? In
explaining more or less deliberate behavior RCT implies that the choice depends
on the differential incentives of the behavior. This is a basic hypothesis of DPTs:
Table 3.1: Distinguishing characteristics of spontaneous and deliberate
cognitive systems.
System  (automatic processing) System  (deliberate processing)
Unintentional Intentional
Low cognitive resources High cognitive resources
Cannot be stopped voluntarily Can be stopped voluntarily
Unconscious Conscious
Source: Based on Gawronski and Creighton (2013: 283)
6 See in particular the review by Bargh et al. 2012, further Bargh and Ferguson 2000; Bodenhausen
and Todd 2010; Deutsch and Strack 2010. Hassin, Uleman, and Bargh 2005; Wilson 2002.
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“Deliberative processing is characterized by considerable cognitive work. It in-
volves the scrutiny of available information and an analysis of positive and nega-
tive features, of costs and benefits” (Fazio 1990:89–90). Deliberation is thus costlier
than spontaneous behavior.
DPTs further assume that individuals want to avoid costly situations. This im-
plies that “considerable cognitive work” in the “deliberate mode” is unpleasant.
Actors are characterized by “laziness, a reluctance to invest more effort than is
strictly necessary” (Kahneman 2011: 31). A “‘law of least effort’ applies to cognitive
as well a physical exertion. The law asserts that if there are several ways of achiev-
ing the same goal, people will eventually gravitate to the least demanding course of
action” (Kahneman 2011: 35). This means that individuals subjectively maximize
their utility which is exactly the assumption of the wide RCT.
This applies not only to deliberate behavior but to habits, routines or spontane-
ous behavior as well (for reviews of theory and research see Betsch, Haberstroh and
Höhle 2002; Betsch and Haberstroh 2005). Often routines are adopted if a behavior
is first chosen, based on calculation. If the actor has performed the behavior several
times in certain situations and realizes that this is always the best he or she could
do until important changes occur, a decision is made not to calculate anymore.
Adopting a routine is thus a cost-saving device. This mechanism holds for many,
perhaps most everyday behaviors.
The “law of least effort” suggests that not only overt behavior such as voting is
influenced by costs and benefits, but various activities (in a wide sense) involved in
cognitive processes. For example, if the goal of an actor is to cross a street as
quickly as possible and wants to obey the law, he or she will focus attention on the
red traffic light and not on other objects. If someone wants to rent an apartment
that best satisfies his or her needs one will think about which features different
apartments have, will compare these features, weigh the advantages and disadvan-
tages and decide (that is to say, form an intention) to rent one of the apartments.
The words printed in italics refer to “internal” actions. It is plausible that they are
chosen because this is in the best interest of the actors.
Many other social psychological theories suggest as well that psychic processes
are governed by costs and benefits. Dissonance theory implies, for example, that
certain configurations of cognitive elements are unpleasant or dissonant, that is to
say, costly, and that individuals prefer consonance. The “heuristics and biases” re-
search program (Tversky and Kahneman 1974) assumes that at least some processes
such as thinking are related to the economic model of man.
However, there are dissenting voices. For example, Boudon holds that accept-
ing beliefs is not governed by costs and benefits. A detailed analysis of Boudon’s
arguments suggests that his position seems unacceptable (Opp 2014, 2019a).
The previous propositions of DPTs are relatively unspecific: they point to cer-
tain factors and do not specify in detail, under what conditions which effects are to
be expected. There are two models that are more informative. One is the MODE
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model, the other the MFS. The former has been developed by social psychologists
and is well confirmed. The MFS has been developed by sociologists. As its advo-
cates claim, it is confirmed as well (see below). The proponents of the MFS claim
that it is an overarching new action theory the social sciences have tried to develop
for a long time. It thus seems useful to discuss this model in greater detail.
3.4 The MODE model
3.4.1 An outline of the model
The MODE model (MM) has been developed by Fazio and collaborators.7 “MODE”
means “Motivation and Opportunity as DEterminants” (Fazio 1995: 257). The model
specifies a process that consists of conditions that finally lead to more or less delib-
erate or spontaneous behavior. Figure 3.1 summarizes the model.
Situational cues and
Access to relevant pre-existing goals and cognitions
Motivation and
Opportunities weak
Motivation and
Opportunities strong
DeliberationSpontaneous action
(attention, categorization of
object, visual perception,
processing of information) Choice of
behavior
Activation of goals and
goal-related cognitions
Modification of the diagram in Opp 2017c: 126.
Perception and categorization
of goal-related objects
Key
propositions
of rational
choice 
theory
Figure 3.1: The MODE Model as a causal diagram.
Source: Modification of the diagram in Opp (2017c: 126)
7 See in particular Fazio 1986, 1990, 2001. For summaries see Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999 and
Fazio and Olson 2014. Basic measurements and tests of the model are described in Fazio 1995 and
in Fazio and Olson 2014. See also the discussion in Mayerl 2009: 46–52, 78–102. In my opinion, the
clearest exposition of the model is in Olson and Fazio (2009:19–27).
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One of the independent variables of the model are attitudes. Social psychological
research has shown that attitudes have only weak effects on behavior. There is
wide agreement that goals are the major determinants of behavior (see for a de-
tailed discussion Kruglanski et al. 2015; see already Srull and Wyer 1986). We there-
fore hypothesize that not attitudes but goals have effects on behavior.
In one of the first expositions of the model one might think that a sociological
theory is proposed. The model begins by positing “that behavior is largely a function
of the individual‛s definition of the situation” (Fazio 1986: 207). Fazio refers to sym-
bolic interactionism and to William I. Thomas. The starting point of the behavioral
process is that a subject gets into a situation and is thus faced with at least one atti-
tude object in a setting. The individual then “defines” the situation. That could mean
that the situation is categorized as, for example, a restaurant or a crosswalk.
Before a behavior toward an attitude object (such as a target person) can be
performed, the behaviorally relevant goals and cognitions “must be accessed from
memory upon observation of the attitude object” (212). Accessibility means that cog-
nitions are available in memory and come “easily to mind” (Fazio 2005: 49). Only
“relevant” cognitions need to be accessible, namely those that influence the behav-
ior to be explained. If the behavior toward a target person (for example, being hos-
tile or friendly) is to be explained, perceived attributes of the respective person are
relevant and not, for example, cognitions about the politics of the US president.
The MM specifies conditions for the accessibility (for example, Fazio 1986:
213–215). For example, the more intense attitudes or goals are, the higher is their ac-
cessibility. For very strong attitudes, goals or other cognitions there is chronic accessi-
bility (213). For limitations of space we will not deal with these effects further.
If the relevant cognitive elements are accessible they determine behavior if they
are activated (Fazio 1990: 81). For example, if a person perceives that a traffic light
is red – a certain situational cue – the object is first categorized as a traffic light.
Then various cognitions are activated such as a norm to follow traffic rules or be-
liefs about consequences of breaking the rule.
It is important that only those situational cues are activated that are related to
goals and other cognitions. In perceiving a red traffic light, the norm to stop and
the belief about negative sanctioning in case of breaking the rule are activated. If a
person ignores traffic lights and has the goal to cross a street if there is little traffic,
the person will focus attention on the traffic and categorize the amount of traffic as
more or less relevant for crossing the street. Such relational propositions avoid to
identify the relevant cognitive elements ad hoc.
There is selective perception, depending on the pre-existing goals and cogni-
tions. These perceptions influence the behavior (Bargh et al 1992: 89). If, for ex-
ample, a positive attitude toward an object is activated, “then I am likely to notice,
attend to, and process primarily the positive qualities of the object” (Fazio 1986: 212).
Thus, selective perception is “consistent with the attitude” (213). This holds for
goals as well: if the goal is, for example, to steal a wallet one will notice the
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relevant qualities of a wallet (more or less filled with money) and the behavior of
the owner.
Selective perception has two meanings. First, perception will be directed only
at a limited number of objects in a situation. One may speak of incomplete percep-
tion. If a person is waiting for a traffic light to turn green, she or he will focus atten-
tion on the light and not on the kind of people waiting at the crosswalk. Second,
selective perception may mean biased perception, that is to say, misperception.
This may be the effect of intense goal states (for detailed hypotheses see, for exam-
ple, Balcetis and Dunning 2006; Fazio 1986: 211; Fazio and Olson 2014: 155–157;
Houston and Fazio 1989). For example, a person who is in need of money and is
told that the return from an investment in Argentina is high will be more likely to
believe this (that is to say, what he or she favors) than a person who is not in need
of money. Ferguson and Porter (2010: 13) suggest, based on the experimental find-
ings of Balcetis and Dunning, “that our (conscious and intentional) wants can unin-
tentionally influence our lower level perceptions (for example, visual, auditory).”
This is consistent with the everyday proposition of wishful thinking.
How the person reacts in a situation first depends on the motivation of the indi-
vidual. This is defined as the extent to which the decision is important to an actor,
that is to say, the “fear of invalidity” (Kruglanski and Freund 1983: 450). This is the
costs of a “wrong” decision. For example, the decision to choose a certain college
may have costly consequences, in contrast to buying a yoghurt. A low motivation is
an incentive to engage in the “effortless luxury” to act without deliberation be-
cause, as is assumed, deliberating itself is costly. Actors want to avoid these costs
(Fazio 1990: 89–90). Thus, motivations are in general any desires or “concerns” of
an actor (Fazio and Olson 2014: 156).
A second condition for deliberation to occur is the extent to which an opportu-
nity to deliberate exists. This refers to the “resources and the time for the motivated
processing” (Fazio and Olson 2014: 156). “Resources” are, among other things, the
cognitive capacity to deliberate and time pressure. If there is “little opportunity to
engage in motivated deliberation, (. . .) judgment or behavior is likely to be influ-
enced by the automatically activated attitude, regardless of any relevant motivational
concerns” (Fazio and Olson 2014: 156). This is an interaction effect of motivation and
opportunity on behavior (see below).
Motivation and opportunity are quantitative variables. Depending on their val-
ues one would expect more or less deliberation and spontaneous action. These are
called mixed processes in the MM. For example, a behavior that is mainly deliberative
“may still involve some components that are influenced by automatically activated
attitudes” (Fazio and Towles-Schwen 1999; Fazio and Olson 2014). To illustrate, a
student may scrutinize in detail the features of different colleges and then make a
choice. This would be mainly deliberative. Alternatively, the student may have
heard from a friend that college X is good, then checks a few features only and
decides. Here less deliberation occurs. A spontaneous decision may be taken, if
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the student‛s father and a good friend recommended college X and the student
follows suit.
Both factors – motivation and opportunity – have an interaction effect (Fazio
and Olson 2014). If there is no motivation, opportunities are not utilized. Although
a retiree might have a lot of time he or she will not deliberate which yoghurt to buy.
The summary of the model in Figure 3.1 is simplified because motivation and
opportunity are dichotomized. Actually, as the previous account shows, the MM im-
plies that there may be different degrees of motivation and opportunities and,
therefore, more or less deliberation.
What can the model explain? The variables the arrow points to are explananda.
At the final stage of the diagram is behavior which may be more or less spontaneous
or deliberate. The MM does not explain the origin or change of beliefs and preferences.
The voting example illustrates the MODE model. Voting may be spontaneous (a
person always votes for the same party, without thinking about it) or deliberate (be-
fore the person casts his or her vote, he or she compares the party programs and
then decides). If the “fear of invalidity” (the costs of a “wrong” decision) are high,
there will be deliberating. This is the case if a voter thinks his or her voice matters
for the outcome of an election. The opportunities are in general given: there is
plenty of time for a decision, and basic mental skills for comparing parties are nor-
mally given as well. Therefore, the motivation (in the sense of the MODE model) is
the decisive factor.
3.4.2 The similarity of the MODE model and rational choice
theory
The MM contains the variables of RCT. Preferences of actors are determinants of be-
havior. “Motivation” refers to goals as well: it is the extent to which a decision or
action satisfies the actor‛s goals. In particular, actors “want” to avoid useless effort
of deliberating (see before).
Opportunities in the sense of time and resources limit or facilitate goal attain-
ment. These are, as in the wide version, perceived opportunities or constraints. As
the previous quotations indicate (Fazio 1990; Kahneman 2011), actors want to get
the highest possible benefits, that is to say, subjective utility maximization is as-
sumed (see the “law of least effort”, mentioned before).
There are, however, differences between the MM and RCT. The box in the
lower part of Figure 3.1 includes the part of the MM that is equivalent to RCT, as it
is usually formulated. The upper part of the figure is an extension of (not a contra-
diction to) RCT. But the general assumption that also cognitive processes are
based on subjective utility maximization implies that at all stages of the model
actors do what they think is best for them. For example, an actor who perceives
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that a traffic light is red will not activate cognitions about who will win the next
Wimbledon championships.
3.5 The model of frame selection
The MFS was proposed by Hartmut Esser (for example, 1990) and further developed
by Clemens Kroneberg (for example, 2006, 2014; Esser and Kroneberg 2015). This sec-
tion is based upon an article by Kroneberg (2014) because this is the most recent and
most extensive presentation in English. Page numbers in the text refer to this article.
The MFS has several features in common with the MM. Both models assume
that cognitive elements are stored in memory. These elements are, in terms of the
MFS, mental models or schemas (see below). In both models situational cues and
accessibility are conditions for activation. Instead of “activation” the MFS uses the
term “selection.” For example, frame “selection” means frame “activation” (for ex-
ample, 99).
Mental models of the situation are called frames in the MFS, whereas mental
models of “sequences of actions” (“behavioral predispositions or programs of ac-
tion”) are called scripts (99). They “can refer to moral norms, conventions, routines,
and emotional or cultural reaction schemes held by the actor” (99).
Now assume that an actor is exposed to a situation. Such a “situational object”
first activates (or, equivalently, selects) a frame (which is part of the mental model).
This frame then leads to the activation of a script (see, for example, Figure 4.1 and
101, see also the three formulas on p. 101). Next an action is selected. There is thus
a causal sequence (99).8
Each of the selections (or activations) – frame, script and action selection – occurs
in one of the following “modes”: a reflecting-calculating (rc) and an automatic-
spontaneous (as) mode. Activation may be more or less quick or automatic. If activa-
tion “falls below a certain threshold”, that is to say, if it is relatively slow, actors
“switch to the rc-mode and start to reflect about the choice in question” (101). At this
point the measure of an activation weight (AW) for frames, scripts and actions is intro-
duced (101). The frame, script or action with the highest AW is selected. We will only
discuss the AW for a frame Fi (101) and not for scripts and actions:
(1) AW(Fi) = mi = oi . li . ai
8 There is only one reference to intentions: frames and scripts “precede the building of a behavioral
intention or action selection” (99). Because “intention” is never mentioned again, I will omit this
variable.
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The AW refers to the “immediately experienced match to the objective situation”
(101).9 The higher the match, the more likely is the spontaneous mode. In the exam-
ple of the traffic light, the situational cue is clear, the person might have been in
the situation numerous times, and the situation immediately activates the relevant
cognitive elements, the behavioral program and then the action.
The three variables on the right-hand side of the equation then explain how
well a frame “fits to a situation.” This fit or match (empirically) depends on
its chronic accessibility (ai), the presence of situational objects that are significant for the
frame (oi), and the associative link between the frame and the situational objects (li).
In a similar way, the AW of a script selection is specified: the AW is high if the AW
of the underlying frame and the accessibility of the script is high. The AW for an
action selection depends on the AW of previous selections and on “the degree to
which the script Sj implies a certain action” (102). There is thus a “spreading acti-
vation,” that is to say, a hierarchical process of activation. High AWs trigger spon-
taneous activation and, thus, the as-mode for frames, scripts and actions. If this
“process of spreading activation becomes too weak . . . the actor starts to deliber-
ate over the perceived alternatives and makes a reflected choice” (102). The rc-
mode is thus chosen.
Assume now the AW is relatively low and the rc-mode occurs. In this case, the
actor chooses frame, script and action with the highest SEU (102, equations 4.4, 4.5
and 4.6).
Next only frame and script selections are discussed in the text. It is argued that
they (and not action selection) “usually follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (March
and Olsen 1989). That is to say, there is a search for good reasons (Boudon 1996) in
which actors aim at identifying the most appropriate alternative” (103).
Action selection “in the rc-mode is qualitatively different from” frame and script
selection (103). For action “the actor typically will explicitly consider, evaluate, and
weigh different and rather specific consequences” (103). Here “rational-choice theo-
ries are especially powerful” (103). We will return to this part of the MFS later. It is
one of its most problematic parts. This is the assumption of “variable rationality.”
Next the determinants of variable rationality are discussed (104 ff.). There are
four determinants for the “mode of information processing” (104) that “the majority
of dual-process theories agree on”: high opportunities, strong motivation, low effort
and low accessibility of cognitive elements make deliberation likely. The author ex-
plicitly refers to Fazio 1990. It is criticized that so far there is no formal model about
these processes. Note that for each selection – frame, script or action selection –
there is either an as- or a rc-mode chosen.
9 The author also writes that the activation of a frame is determined by the match. Because there is
no separate definition of the AW, we assume that AW of a frame is defined by the match.
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Again, SEU theory is applied. An equation for the SEU of the as-mode and one
for the SEU of the rc-mode are formulated (105–106). The independent variables are
the AWs of the alternatives (that is to say, frames, scripts or actions). We will not
present the equations, but only the summary: “an actor selects (in) the rc-mode if,
and only if, compared to an automatic – spontaneous selection, the additional util-
ity of this mental activity exceeds its additional costs” (105).
3.6 The model of frame selection and the MODE
model: Differences, similarities and their
evaluation
This section focuses on a comparison of the MM and the MFS in several respects. After
describing differences we discuss their plausibility. The MFS has come under attack by
several authors (Etzrodt 2008; Lüdemann 1996; Lindenberg 2009; Opp 2010, 2017,
2019c). For limitations of space it is not possible to analyze this critique in detail. In
this section, we will analyze those weaknesses which we consider most important.
(1) The distinction between frames and scripts in the MFS is not part of the MM. The
question is whether this distinction is needed. If actions are to be explained it
seems sufficient to identify only the factors that immediately influence the action.
Why are other cognitions relevant which are stored in a wider mental model?
The MM focuses on the cognitions directly relevant for the specific behavior. No
other cognitive elements have direct effects on the behavior to be explained.
(2) The assumption of the MFS that there is a causal (and hierarchical) sequence of
frames, scripts and actions is not included in the MM. The question is whether such a
sequence is plausible. The MFS assumes that frames are activated first, then scripts
and finally actions. Since scripts are included in frames, the sequence implies that
individuals first activate a large class of cognitive elements that are not related for
the actions. Only afterwards the action-related scripts are activated. The following ex-
ample illustrates that this is implausible. Let a person want to cross a street and sees
a traffic light. The individual will activate only information about what it means if the
light is red or green, and which costs and benefits are to be expected if the street is
crossed illegally. It is difficult to see why an individual will activate cognitive ele-
ments which are irrelevant in the specific situations. This effort can easily be saved.
(3) The MFS assumes that entire frames or scripts are activated according to the
“match” with the situation. The focus of the MM is on activation of single cognitive
elements that are relevant for the behavior to be explained. In the extreme case, an
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entire situation may fit with all the cognitive elements. There is thus a perfect
match. But in many other situations some elements might not fit. Assume a police-
man in Germany at a traffic light wears a turban. There is thus one cue that does
not fit to cognitions about policemen. This atypical element will probably be ignored
because the actor reasons that everything else is what characterizes a policeman.
This categorization will further activate expectations about the behavior of a po-
liceman if someone crosses the street if the traffic light is red. This example illus-
trates that it is meaningful to concentrate on single cognitions that are relevant for
performing an action and not on overall frames or scripts.
But if this is not accepted the question arises how such a general measure is
constructed. This is particularly problematic if single cognitions are more or less im-
portant to an actor, as the policeman with a turban illustrates.
(4) The MFS assumes that in the rc-mode, frame and script selection follow the “logic of
appropriateness”, whereas action selection is in accordance with rational choice theory.
This is the assumption of “variable rationality.” It is not included in the MM. The first
problem is that the rc- and as-mode are the extreme points of a quantitative variable,
as advocates of the MFS themselves point out. For example, in choosing an apartment
there will be most of the time some deliberation and some spontaneous decisions.
When are those actions classified as being in the rc- or in the as-mode? In other words,
where is the cutting point of the quantitative variable? As long as this is not clear, the
MFS can actually not be applied in natural situations. It can only be decided ad hoc
whether people are in the rc- or as-mode. But let us assume this problem is solved.
Another problem is the assumption that there is no subjective utility maximiza-
tion in the as-mode. This is inconsistent with the application of SEU theory which is
supposed to explain all three selections. Whatever the explanandum of the theory
is, it implies that the alternative – be it a frame, script or action – with the highest
SEU is chosen. This means that the actor engages in subjective utility maximization.
This is clearly implied in the Kroneberg paper (2014) when the different costs and
benefits of spontaneous and deliberate action are described (for example, 100–101).
“Variable rationality” means that there are two decision algorithms. Only one is
subjective utility maximization. The other is acting “appropriately” or on “good rea-
sons” (103). It is not clear what the difference is. Reference to Boudon‛s “good reasons”
does not help because his “cognitive rationality” suffers from the same weakness as
“variable rationality” (Opp 2014). The “logic of appropriateness” is as vague as acting
on “good reasons.”
In analyzing in detail the meanings of the different “rationalities” it is plausi-
ble that they all refer to enhancing the actors’ well-being. Compare the following
statements:
(1) P spends money for charity, because he thinks this is appropriate.
(2) P spends money for charity, because he thinks there are good reasons for this.
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(3) P spends money for charity, because he thinks this is best he can do in the pres-
ent situation.
(4) P spends money for charity, because he thinks this maximizes his subjective
utility.
Each of these statements has the same meaning. The statements are different ex-
pressions of statement (4). For example, if P has good reasons for doing something,
then this is subjectively the best course of action for him or her. Likewise, if P
thinks that behavior B is “appropriate” (statement 1), this means that P does what
in this situation is best for him.
The rejection of the assumption of subjective utility maximization in the MFS is
inconsistent with most of the social science literature. This assumption is at least im-
plicitly accepted by classical writers and used in numerous well confirmed social
psychological theories (for details see Opp 2019a). If such a universally accepted
hypothesis is rejected one would expect extensive evidence which is not provided.
The MM does not distinguish different “rationalities.” As was said before, sub-
jective utility maximization is assumed. According to the existing evidence, this
seems to be a valid assumption.
(5) The concept of “rationality” in the MFS needs clarification. This concept is used in
at least two meanings in the MFS. (1) “Rationality” refers to the extent to which peo-
ple deliberate (for example, 100). “Variable” rationality means that people deliberate
or do not deliberate.10 (2) “Rationality” also seems to mean that people maximize util-
ity (103). The question arises why the concept of rationality is useful at all (for a de-
tailed discussion see Opp 2018). The MM does not contain the concept. This suggests
that it is not needed.
(6) The determinants of spontaneous or deliberate action are similar in the MFS
and MM. The variables opportunities, motivation, effort and accessibility are com-
ponents of both models.
(7) The MFS does not provide clear guidelines to identify the relevant cognitive ele-
ments of entire frames and scripts that explain behavior. The MM, in contrast, formu-
lates hypotheses for single cognitive elements. If there are no clear rules that allow to
specify in detail the frames or scripts that are relevant for a behavior the application
and test of the theory is ad hoc and allows an immunization of the theory (see Opp
2010). For example, what are the cognitive elements, that make up the frame or
script for voting? The researcher might select those elements that have an effect
10 It is then strange if the author speaks of “rational” deliberation (100). It is not clear what a non-
rational deliberation refers to.
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and claim that this then confirms the MFS. It is not sufficient just to label frames as,
for example, a “business frame” or “friendship frame” (117). These names suggest a
clear definition, but what exactly the cognitive elements are these frames consist of is
left open. In explaining reactions to punishment in an experiment, Esser (2018:17) in-
troduces an altruism- and an egoism-frame. There is no specification of the cognitive
elements these frames consist of.
(8) The MFS does not explain misperception, in contrast to the MM. The MFS addresses
“selections” of frames, scripts and behavior. “Selection” means that something is cho-
sen from a given set of objects. For example, from the situation a person is confronted
with only certain elements or aspects are “selected” and more or less “matched” with
existing cognitive elements. It is not clear whether “selection” also refers to biased per-
ception. Even if this is meant it is not explained in the MFS when which misperception
is to be expected. The MM includes such hypotheses, as has been said before.
(9) Neither the MFS nor the MM explain the origins of beliefs in general and of prefer-
ences. Although misperception is explained in the MM, it is difficult to see how in
general the origin and change of beliefs can be explained. For example, how would
the models explain when people accept certain conspiracy theories?
3.7 A critical comparison of the model of frame
selection and rational choice theory
We saw that the basic assumptions of DPTs and the hypotheses of the MM in particular
are an extension of the wide version of RCT. Only advocates of the MFS claim that
parts of the model contradict RCT. For example, it is asserted that the MFS goes beyond
“the economic dictum that behavior always follows incentives” (106). Furthermore, it
is held that the MFS is the new overarching theory the social sciences have been look-
ing for since their beginning (Esser 2017, see also Essser 2018). Among other things, the
MFS allegedly explains when RCT fails (for example, Esser and Kroneberg 2010:84). In
this section it is argued that the MFS is not contradictory to the wide version of RCT
but only provides hypotheses that could extend RCT. It can thus not replace RCT.
3.7.1 Effects of the independent variables of the MFS
In order to determine whether the MFS contradicts RCT, a first step is to compare
the independent variables of the two theories. The previous analysis shows that all
the variables of the MFS have an impact on incentives. The framing of a situation
and the activation of a script may lead to the activation of specific beliefs (which
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may be wrong), preferences or of perceived behavioral alternatives. This is clearly
implied if it is argued: “Akin to more recent developments in economics (. . .) one
could specify how actors’ perceived choice set, preferences, and expectations vary de-
pending on the selected frame and script (103, italics added).” A clearer statement of
the fact that the MFS extends RCT by specifying effects of its independent variables
on independent variables of RCT is hardly possible. In a recent contribution Esser
(2017) discusses findings of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) where different formula-
tions (“framing”) of identical propositions lead to different reactions of respond-
ents. Esser tries to explain such effects by applying the MFS and argues that these
results are the deathblow for “the” theory of rational action. But then he asserts
that such framing effects (that is to say, effects of different formulations of the same
statements) lead to a “neutralization of incentives” (511). In other words, framing
effects change incentives, which, in turn, influence behavior.
3.7.2 Some applications of the model of frame selection
To determine whether the MFS and RCT are contradictory one could analyze applica-
tions of the MFS to specific explanatory problems (107–118). The question is to what
extent these applications deal with changes of incentives. It is not possible for space
limitations to discuss these applications in detail. Only a few notes must suffice.
(a) One hypothesis refers to the effects of a strong “internalization” of a script
(107–108).11 If a norm is relatively strong, individuals will not calculate, they follow
the norm. Other incentives are thus not relevant in the present situation. This does
not contradict a wide RCT because internalization of a norm is an incentive. RCT
would assume that following a strong norm saves the costs of calculation and will
thus be followed (for details see Opp 2017).
(b) The MFS has also been applied to explaining voter turnout (111–115). As is com-
mon in applications of the MFS, untested simplifying assumptions are made due to
the lack of data. It is assumed that the “only relevant script is the civic duty norm”
with a high accessibility of 1 which “clearly prescribes participation” (111). The inter-
nalized obligation to vote is a common variable in rational choice explanations of
voting and not something new implied by the MFS.
According to the MFS it is further relevant for participating in an election that in-
dividuals “define the situation as ‘election date’” (111). From a RCT perspective, one
would predict that people who have a goal to vote have also an incentive to collect
information about the time when an election takes place and about the location where
11 This is the first time that a script and not a norm is called “internalized.”
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one may cast his or her vote. Also in line with RCT is whether there is calculation or
spontaneous voting. We refer to the previous discussion of applying VET for explain-
ing participation. Note that “definition of the situation” activates incentives to go to
the voting place. Furthermore, in explaining voting by any theory it is obviously as-
sumed that people know the election date. Otherwise, people will not vote.
In explaining voting, it is first “necessary to identify the subset of measured in-
centives that have explanatory power” (113). This is exactly the procedure of RCT
(for details see Opp 2001).
The major achievement of the MFS then are interaction effects of incentives
“predicted by the MFS” (113). The idea is that “calculated incentives” interact with
a civic duty measure: a strong voting norm reduces the impact of these incentives
(that is to say, non-normative goals). RCT implies that actors with a strong norm do
not want to bear the costs of calculation because following the norm is best for
them anyway (Opp 2017). The interaction is thus also an implication of wide RCT.
It is striking that no effort is made to explore whether these interaction effects can
be derived from a wide RCT as well (115, where apparently a narrow version of RCT is
attacked). To conclude, the application of the MFS to explain voting is definitely not a
demonstration of its superiority to RCT, it confirms the wide version of RCT.
(c) Kroneberg‛s discussion of social movements and collective action is suffering
from major flaws. It is held that the MFS could provide a micro foundation for so-
cial movement research (116–117). The author notes similarities of the framing ideas
of social movement theory and the MFS. The former has severe weaknesses that are
not addressed (for details see Opp 2009). Again, a detailed analysis of the extent to
which a wide version of RCT can be applied in social movement research is missing.
There is further no analysis of the extent to which there are contradictions of the MFS
and the wide RCT.
(d) The author provides a list of applications of the MFS (109–110, Table 4.1). If these
examples are supposed to show the fruitfulness of the MFS, compared to other theo-
ries, one would expect a detailed discussion of alternative explanations. But this is
missing. Even a cursory look at Table 4.1 indicates that each example specifies incen-
tives that finally bring about the explanandum. Again, this list is not establishing any
contradiction to RCT.
(e) Another example for the application of the MFS is Esser’s analysis of research
findings by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Esser intends to show the failures of “the”
theory of rational choice. The authors find that different formulations (that is to say,
“framing”) of tasks or choice situations, that are actually identical, lead to different
reactions of the subjects in the experiment. In the following task (which is somewhat
simplified) there is a population of 600 individuals and there is some disease. There
are two programs to save people:
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Program A –> 200 (from 600) people are saved – strong approval by a sample of
respondents;
Program B –> 400 (from 600) people die – weak approval by a sample of
respondents.
The puzzle is why the reactions to the two programs are different although the pro-
grams have the same effects: “200 from 600 people are saved” means the same as
“400 from 600 people die.” An answer could be that the experimental situation
consists of different cues, in particular the words “saved” and “died.” These seem
to activate different cognitions. In explaining the reactions it needs to be specified
which pre-existing cognitions led to which effects of the cues. What these cogni-
tions are is to be determined empirically. One could conduct detailed in-depth inter-
views to find the reasoning of the subjects.
Whatever the reasoning of the subjects is: it influences incentives which, in
turn affect the behavior, in this case utterance of an opinion. Strangely enough,
this is what Esser himself asserts when he writes that the “framing effects” lead to
the “neutralization of incentives” (511).
The relevance of incentives in this situation can be shown in the following way.
The subjects in the experiment more or less approve the implementation of the pro-
grams. This means that they actually make a symbolic decision as if they had to
implement the programs themselves. Applying SEU theory suggests that the deci-
sion depends on the perceived consequences of each program. What these conse-
quences are should be determined empirically. It seems plausible that the subjects
wish to save as many lives as possible. They might think erroneously that this con-
sequence will be realized with program A to a higher extent than with program
B. Thus, as Esser asserts, erroneous reasoning changes the incentives. But the in-
centives are relevant for the decision. The MFS variables are “causes of the causes.”
There is a much easier – and more convincing – explanation of the different cate-
gorizations. In the MODE model, attitude or goal accessibility is a central variable, as
was shown before. A strong accessibility determines the kind of categorization, if
there are “multiple categorizable objects” (Fazio and Olson 2014: 157, where also sup-
porting evidence is cited). The categorization is chosen that most closely resembles
the accessible attitude. It is plausible that the attitude toward or the goal of “saving”
lives is relatively strong. We will thus expect the findings reported in the work of
Tversky and Kahneman. This is an explanation without applying the MFS.
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3.8 Should dual-process theories always
be applied?
Assume that DPTs consist of variables that influence incentives. Should DPTs then
be applied in every explanation of behavior? The answer depends on the interests
of the researcher. Most of the time scholars who apply RCT are only interested in
the existing perceived incentives that directly determine action. This holds even if
incentives may seem awkward from the perspective of the researcher. For example,
in explaining why people commit crimes one would measure, among other things,
beliefs of being punished. If it turns out that a group of individuals strongly under-
estimated punishment, researchers might be interested to explain misperceptions.
Other researchers might be content with the measured beliefs and leave their explana-
tion to further research. It is thus not meaningful to apply DPTs in every explanation.
Even one of the advocates of the MFS, Clemens Kroneberg, does not always
apply the MFS in his work. An example is an article about Nation Building which
presents a micro-macro model with an application of a wide version of RCT (Kroneberg
and Wimmer 2012). One finds no mentioning of framing.
This implies that an application of RCT is not problematic if extensions are not
addressed. It depends on the interest of the researcher whether, for example, biases
or preferences are to be explained.
Accordingly, it is not to be criticized if most applications of a wide RCT focus on
given incentives and not on their explanation. This holds, for example, for the liter-
ature on collective action in social movements research (Kittel and Opp 2018, with
further references). Similarly, in criminology it is difficult enough to find the incen-
tives that generate different kinds of crime. Therefore, most research in RCT concen-
trates on this task. There are, however, exceptions. Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga
(2006) apply Bayesian learning hypotheses.
3.9 General conclusion
The conclusion from our discussion is that DPTs and the wide version of RCT are
not contradictory, they complement each other. Figure 3.2 summarizes the relation-
ship between the theories. DPTs are the causes of causes in the sense that they specify
conditions that affect incentives for behavior. Note that this argument presupposes a
particular version of RCT that seems most fruitful: it is based on all kinds of preferen-
ces of the actors and on their beliefs; it takes account of the limited cognitive capabili-
ties of individuals and assumes that individuals try to reach, from their point of view,
the best possible satisfaction when a decision is made.
One implication of the previous discussion is that DPTs confirm the fruitfulness
of a wide version of RCT. In regard to the MODE model, it is clear that it is consistent
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with RCT. Advocates of the MFS actually show the fruitfulness of a wide version of RCT
as well, without being aware of it. SEU theory is applied for all explananda – see the
equations referred to above. The introduction of “variable rationality” needs to be
clarified and then empirically tested. This has not been done so far. At the present
state of the discussion, the application of SEU for each of the MFS explananda and
the denial of subjective utility maximization for the as-mode seem to be an internal
contradiction of theMFS. Applying VET means that the action, frame and script with
the highest SEU is chosen. Thismeans that people choose what is best for them.
The model of Figure 3.2 shows that there are several explanatory stages. Variables
of DPTs such as the MM and MFS consist of variables at the leftmost part of the model.
These variables then affect incentives. They affect behavior. The variables at the left
are a summary of several variables (see Figure 3.1). This part of the model could be
broken down into different stages, as Figure 3.1 shows.
3.10 Further theory and research
“Behavior” in Figure 3.2 is usually understood as directly observable, external action.
But it seems plausible to include also internal action such as thinking or focusing
attention on some objects. These processes are governed by costs and benefits and
subjective utility maximization as well, as has been said before. The application of
SEU theory in the MFS suggests that such an extension of RCT or SEU theory would
be useful. Systematic research is needed to test this claim.
Further research should also deal with integrating other social psychological the-
ories with RCT and DPTs. Some of these theories such as dissonance or balance the-
ory have the same or similar explananda as the MM and the MFS. Assume a person P
likes O and suddenly learns that O has sympathies for terrorism, which P hates. P
Situational stimuli,
accessibility of goals
and beliefs, activation
(e.g. MODE-Model)
Perception of
costs and
benefits
Behavior
Dual-process theories
Wide version of rational choice theory
Subjective utility maximization
Figure 3.2: The relationship between dual-process theories and rational choice theory.
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will probably change his attitude toward O.12 There should be a theoretical discus-
sion of how to integrate DPTs with social psychological theories such as balance or
dissonance theory which could even explain changes of preferences and beliefs.
As was said before, the MM originally includes attitudes as an independent var-
iable. This was replaced by goals. It would be important to examine to what extent
this replacement holds empirically.
A weakness of research in the tradition of the MFS is that it is based mainly on
survey research. The MM is largely based on experimental studies. Perhaps experi-
ments could supplement survey research to test hypotheses of the MFS.
An advantage of the MFS, compared to the MM, is that it has been applied to
explain many sociologically interesting phenomena (for example, Kroneberg 2014:
109–110). As has been shown in our discussion of Kroneberg‛s voting study, often
untested empirical assumptions referring to central propositions of the MFS are
made. As long as these assumptions are not tested in a rigorous way, these studies
can only be seen as exploratory research. A meta-analysis would be useful that ex-
plores which assumptions of the MFS have really been tested.
The MM, summarized in Figure 3.1, is actually a reconstruction. That is to say,
it was sometimes not clear what exactly the causal relationships between the varia-
bles are. It is, in particular, important to disentangle the causal relationships be-
tween cues, pre-existing cognitions, accessibility, activation, selective perception
(that is to say, incomplete and biased perception) and behavior. These relationships
are not clear in the MFS either.
Advocates of the MFS emphasize as a strength its formalization which stands in
contrast to other DPTs such as the MM. Although the formalization has been criti-
cized (see Tutić 2015, 2016; Linnebach 2016) it clarifies the structure of a system of
hypotheses and is therefore superior to a purely verbal formulation. However, preci-
sion of the structure of a theory is only one criterion of the quality of a theory.
Other criteria are the precision of its concepts and its validity. As has been argued,
many concepts are not clear, and rigorous tests without far-reaching untested as-
sumptions are still missing.
What is the general conclusion from the previous analyses in regard to the
question of what theory is to applied? In explaining behavior, the wide version of
RCT still seems the best choice. If the researcher is interested in the causes of
causes, the MM seems preferable. The previous analysis indicates that the MFS
needs considerable improvement.
12 According to balance theory, there is a positive link from P to O, a negative link from O to X (O
likes terrorism), and a negative link from P to X (P has a strong negative attitude toward terrorism).
Balance theory would predict that P changes some attitude.
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4 Too Simple Models in Sociology:
The Case of Exchange
Abstract: When examining a social phenomenon, theoretical and empirical sociolo-
gists require a model. Although models are by definition simplified representations
of theories of reality, sociologists typically argue that the micro-level model of indi-
vidual behavior should be simplified, but not the model of the macro-level system
(including macro-micro and micro-macro links) including the social interactions.
Using the example of research on exchange we theoretically and empirically dem-
onstrate the possibly disastrous consequences of overly simplifying the model of
the macro-level system. We show that by oversimplification, the mainstream model
of exchange (so-called split pool exchange) precludes explaining the macro-level
phenomenon. Consequently, we question the ecological validity of exchange re-
search for real-life exchanges. We conclude by listing advantages of a more com-
plex and realistic macro-level model of exchange (that is, pure exchange) for
research in the social sciences.
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler
(saying attributed to Albert Einstein)
4.1 Introduction
A central problem in sociology is that of accounting for the functioning of a social
system (Coleman 1990). Coleman (for example, 1987, 1990) proposed a scheme for
explaining macro-level relationships. This scheme contains three links, relating the
macro-level (that isthat is, the level of social phenomena) to the micro-level (that is,
the level of individuals): (i) the macro-micro link, representing how social condi-
tions affect (assumptions about or a theory of) conditions of individuals, (ii) the
micro-level model or theory transforming micro-conditions into micro-outcomes,
and (iii) the micro-macro link transforming the micro-outcomes into the macro-
outcomes of interest. Discussions of research in sociology focus on the shape and
detail of each of those links in sociological theory when attempting to explain macro-
level phenomena. For instance, Coleman (1987) argues that sociologists traditionally
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often use aggregation to transform individual outcomes to macro-level outcomes,
and convincingly shows that aggregation often does not qualify as a valid model for
this transformation.
A related fundamental discussion involves the detail and accuracy of the
micro-micro link or model of individual behavior. Whereas Coleman and many
other rational choice sociologists proposed to keep the micro-level model as simple
as possible and not necessarily realistic or accurate (see also Friedman, 1953, for a
defense of this position), others, including analytical sociologists such as Hedström
(2005: 34–38), contend that the micro-level model should be psychologically and
sociologically realistic. Without going into the specific details of this discussion,
Hedström (2005: 35) argues that (“within the restrictions imposed by psychological
and sociological plausibility”) “we should seek a theory that is as simple as possi-
ble”. Counterbalancing this KISS1 principle is the “but not too simple” addition in
the motto of this paper, adequately formulated in Lindenberg’s (2001) principle of
sufficient complexity. This principle entails that model assumptions should be real-
istic enough to allow a description and explanation of the social phenomenon,
without “assuming away” essential ingredients of that phenomenon.
In this paper we examine the (in)sufficient complexity of macro-level models of
the social phenomenon to be explained. We believe the issue of sufficiently complex
macro-level models has received too little attention in the literature. With ‘macro-level
models’ we mean the model of the social situation including social interactions, and
the macro-micro and micro-macro links, but excluding elements that solely reside at
the micro-level such as the model of actor preferences and actor behavior. We demon-
strate, using the case of exchange research, how simplifying the macro-level model
may preclude explaining the social phenomenon, by assuming away its essential in-
gredients. More specifically, we first demonstrate that the split pool exchange task that
is commonly used in research on exchange in economics, social psychology, and soci-
ology, assumes away essential characteristics of typical real-world exchange. In the
split pool exchange task actors split a constant common resource pool, whereas in typ-
ical real-world exchanges actors transfer units of goods they value differently (called
pure exchange). As such, the simplification of the macro-level in our demonstration
concerns the task or social interaction between individuals, and not the social struc-
ture (for instance. the network) in which these interactions are embedded.
We provide two empirical demonstrations of the consequences of simplifying
the model of exchange. The first demonstration concerns bilateral exchange and
shows that outcomes of the split pool exchange task are very different from out-
comes of pure exchange (Dijkstra and Van Assen 2008). The second demonstration,
concerning exchange in larger social structures such as groups by Dogan and Van
Assen (2009), additionally suggests that alternative types of profitable exchange
1 Originally referring to “Keep it simple, stupid”; see “KISS principle” (2019).
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opportunities exist that differ in how easily they are detected by actors. We be-
lieve this differential detectability to be an essential element of real-life exchange,
and show that the split pool exchange task assumes it away. We conclude with listing
other unfortunate consequences of simplifying pure exchange to the split pool task
when investigating exchange and related phenomena. Based on our theoretical analy-
sis and empirical demonstrations we argue that the ecological validity of exchange re-
search employing the split pool exchange task as a stand-in for real-life exchange is
questionable at best. By briefly discussing another example, the case of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game as a standard model of social dilemmas, we hope to convince the
reader that using too simplified macro-level models in the social sciences is a more
general issue. We therefore hope that our paper will increase sociologists’ sensitivity to
the applicability of the principle of sufficient complexity to the macro level (and not
just to the micro level), when modeling social phenomena.
4.2 Exchange
Exchange is intensively studied in economics as well as sociology and social psy-
chology. An exchange situation can be defined as a situation involving actors who
have the opportunity to collaborate for the benefits of all actors involved, which is
similar to Nash’s (1950: 155) definition of a bargaining situation. While bargaining
and exchange became the object of research of economists in the 19th century
(Edgeworth 1881), exchange was only beginning to be studied in social psychology
and sociology in the 1950s. For instance, Homans (1958: 606) stated that “social be-
havior is an exchange of goods, material goods but also non-material ones, such as
the symbols of approval and prestige”.
The prototypical example of an exchange situation is pure exchange, with ac-
tors holding bundles of goods they wish to exchange for other goods. We refer to
the goods held at the outset as initial endowments. Based on the preferences or utili-
ties of actors for these goods, actors may exchange their initial endowments to ob-
tain their final endowments. An example of a bilateral pure exchange situation is
where actor A has 18 units of good X and actor B has 30 units of good Y, and A
values X and Y equally, whereas B values each unit of X five times as much as a
unit of Y. See the last rows of Table 4.1 (Condition 5) for a representation of this
exchange situation in numbers. In economics two main approaches may be distin-
guished for predicting the final endowments after exchange (for instance, Hildenbrand
and Kirman 1998); the general equilibrium approach and Edgeworth’s (1881) approach
using the core. The core is that set of possible final endowments that cannot be im-
proved upon by any coalition of actors (Hildenbrand and Kirman 1998: 16). In the case
of our bilateral exchange example the only coalitions of actors to consider are the
{A, B} dyad and the {A} and {B} singletons.
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Figure 4.1 represents the payoff space of all outcomes of the example of bilateral
pure exchange, with the shaded area representing all mutually beneficial payoffs for A
and B, and the “frontier” representing the core or the set of Pareto-optimal payoffs.
The payoffs (U(a), U(b)) = (0, 72) are obtained if A transfers all of his 18 X to B in
Table 4.1: Endowments (E) and utilities (U) of goods X
and Y for the pure exchange conditions in Dijkstra and
Van Assen (2008).
Condition Actors A B
Goods X Y X Y
 E    
U    
 E    
U    
 E    
U    
 (typical pure
exchange; Fig.)
E    
U    
Source: Adapted from Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008: 27)
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Figure 4.1: Payoff space of the bilateral pure exchange example of condition 5 of Dijkstra and Van
Assen (2008).
Note: U(a) and U(b) represent actor A’s and B’s utility gain after the exchange. ED and ER indicate
equidependence and equiresistance, respectively.
Source: Reprinted from Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008: 20)
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exchange for 18 of B’s Y, yielding U að Þ= 18× 1− 18× 1=0 and U bð Þ= 18× 5−
18× 1= 72. The payoffs (U(a), U(b)) = (12, 60) are obtained if A still transfers all of
his X, but B now also transfers all of his 30Y, yielding U að Þ= 30× 1− 18× 1= 12
and U bð Þ= 18× 5− 30× 1= 60. The frontier connecting these two payoffs results
from A transferring all his X to B and B transferring from 18 to 30 of his Y to
A. Finally, payoffs (U(a), U(b)) = (24, 0) result from B transferring all his 30 Y to A,
with A compensating this by transferring 6 of his X, yielding U að Þ= 30× 1− 6× 1= 24
and U bð Þ= 6× 5− 30× 1=0. Hence, the payoff frontier connecting the last payoffs is
obtained by exchanges where B transfers all of his Y in exchange for 6 to 18 of A’s X.
In most experimental studies on exchange in social psychology and sociology
(see Social Networks, 14, and Van Assen, 2003, for an overview), and in behavioral
economics (for instance, Camerer 2003; Roth 1995), an abstraction of pure exchange
is used in which exchange is conceptualized as the opportunity of two actors to
split a resource pool, rather than to exchange actual units of goods. The intuition
underlying this split pool exchange is that since exchange creates surplus value for
both exchange partners, it might as well be represented by negotiations over that
surplus value, rather than over the transfer of actual goods. The actors’ task in split
pool exchange is thus to negotiate over the split of a pool of valuable points, typi-
cally 24, which have the same value for both exchange partners. If the two actors
agree on the division, the points are divided according to the agreement, whereas
they do not obtain any points if they fail to reach agreement. Importantly, the entire
pool of points must be divided in the agreement. Figure 4.2 represents the payoff
space of split pool exchange with a pool of 72 points.
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Figure 4.2: Payoff space of abstraction of bilateral pure exchange (split pool exchange) of
condition 1 of Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008).
Notes: U(a) and U(b) represent actor A’s and B’s utility gain after the exchange. ED and ER indicate
equidependence and equiresistance, respectively.
Source: Reprinted form Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008: 19)
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The use of split pool exchange to study exchange has commonly been justified by
stating (or often implicitly assuming) that split pool exchange is equivalent to pure
exchange (see Van Assen 2001, and Dijkstra and Van Assen 2008, for references
and citations). However, some doubts have been raised concerning the validity of
this equivalence statement. For instance, Bonachich (1992: 22) noted that “nothing
is actually exchanged in these experiments.” Indeed, pure exchange and split pool
exchange are different in four respects (Dijkstra and Van Assen 2008: 21):
(i) The task; in pure exchange actors exchange resources, whereas in split pool ex-
change actors split a fixed pool of points.
(ii) Pareto efficiency; in split pool exchange Pareto efficiency is enforced because
the entire pool must be divided, whereas Pareto efficiency is not guaranteed in
pure exchange, as indicated by the shaded area in Figure 4.2.
(iii) Constant-sum; split pool exchange entails a constant sum of payoffs of both ac-
tors, which is typically not true for pure exchange.
(iv) Equal maximum; in split pool exchange both actors’ maximum payoffs are
equal, which is generally not true in pure exchange.
In other words, aside from being two different tasks, split pool exchange is less
complex than pure bilateral exchange; whereas split pool exchange can be repre-
sented by one parameter (the size of the pool), bilateral exchange needs at least
eight parameters (for each actor, two parameters for initial endowments X and Y
and two more for the utilities of X and Y).
Note how representing pure exchange by split pool exchange entails a simplifi-
cation of the macro-model of social interaction. The fundamental question is,
whether this simplification yields outcomes and conclusions that can still be gener-
alized to pure exchange. We argue that this is not the case and that simplifying
pure exchange to split pool exchange violates the principle of sufficient complexity
(Lindenberg 2001), at the macro level. Thus, we argue that the assumptions under-
lying split pool exchange are not realistic enough to allow a description of the phe-
nomenon (that is, pure exchange) to be explained. More specifically, using split
pool exchange one cannot explain possible inefficiency of exchange outcomes as
inefficiency is “assumed away”, and one cannot explain how actors may deal with
inequality of exchange opportunities as it assumes constant-sum splits with equal
maxima to both actors.
These differences between split pool exchange and pure exchange have substan-
tial consequences for theory and predicted outcomes. Van Assen (2001: Chapter 7)
shows that well-known solutions to bilateral bargaining, such as Nash’s bargain-
ing solution (Nash 1950), the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (RKS) solution (Kalai and
Smorodinsky 1975) and the kernel solution (Shubik 1982) yield identical predictions
for split pool exchanges; the 12–12 split. These solutions are shown in Figure 4.2
using the labels equidependence (corresponding to the kernel) and equiresistance
(corresponding to the RKS) more familiar in the sociology literature. These solution
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concepts underlie two prominent theories of network exchange known as power-
dependence theory (Cook and Emerson 1978) and network exchange theory (for
instance, Willer 1999), respectively. Notwithstanding their equality in split pool
exchange, these solutions are typically (and sometimes very) different in pure ex-
change, as is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Consequently, split pool exchange precludes
testing basic principles of bargaining (as formalized in the alternative solutions) in
exchange. Finally, the change of task from a complex to a simple one may itself also
affect the outcomes of bargaining. Because of all the differences and their implica-
tions, we contend that outcomes and conclusions of research using split pool ex-
change are not ecologically valid for pure exchange.
4.3 Empirical demonstration: Bilateral exchange
A comparison of Figures 4.1 and 4.2 demonstrates that pure exchange and split pool
exchange are not equivalent in terms of the payoff possibilities. The remaining empir-
ical question then concerns the extent to which results and conclusions of split pool
exchange studies can be generalized to pure exchange. Dijkstra and Van Assen
(2008) set out to answer this fundamental question by comparing experimental bilat-
eral bargaining outcomes in split pool exchange and pure exchange situations.
Their study contains five conditions. The extremes, Condition 1 and Condition
5, are a bilateral split pool exchange with 72 points (Figure 4.2 shows its payoff
space), and the bilateral pure exchange introduced in our example above (see last
two rows of Table 4.1, and Figure 4.1), respectively. These two conditions differ in
all four respects listed above: experimental task, enforced Pareto efficiency, con-
stant-sum payoffs, and equal maxima for the exchange partners. The remaining 3
conditions systematically fill the interval between Condition 1 and Condition 5.
Condition 2 is a pure exchange situation that differs from Condition 1 only in ex-
perimental task. Thus, Pareto efficiency is enforced in Condition 2, the sum of pay-
offs of both partners is 72 for any agreement, and the maxima for both partners
are 72 (that is, what a partner can maximally obtain when at the same time the
other partner gains nothing). Condition 3 is a pure exchange situation that allows
Pareto inefficient agreements, but is otherwise identical to Condition 2. Thus, in
Condition 3 the sum of payoffs in all Pareto efficient agreement is 72, and so are
the maxima of both partners. In the pure exchange situation of Condition 4, pay-
offs of Pareto efficient agreements do not all sum to the same constant, but oth-
erwise Condition 4 is identical to Condition 3. Particularly, the maximum payoff
is 72 for both exchange partners. This latter characteristic is finally abandoned
in Condition 5, which has maximum payoffs of 24 and 72 for A and B, respec-
tively. The initial endowments and utilities for conditions 2 through 5 are given
in Table 4.1.
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In the experiment reported by Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008) 124 subjects par-
ticipated. The design was between-subjects, so each subject was active in only one
of the conditions. Subjects exchanged for at most six rounds, and did so with the
same partner throughout. Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008) used a full information de-
sign, meaning subjects had all information about their own and each other’s en-
dowments and payoffs. After each round the exchange situation was reset (the pool
was replenished in Condition 1, and all subjects were given new initial endowments
in the other conditions). Points earned in the experiment were converted to money
and paid at the end. The ExNet program developed by David Willer and colleagues
at University of South Carolina was used to run the experiments. See Dijkstra and
Van Assen (2008) for more details on design and procedure.
Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008) developed hypotheses on a number of outcome
variables, most notably average payoffs, variance in payoffs, and Pareto efficiency
of agreements. The first main result is that three prominent existing bargaining the-
ories (the Nash bargaining solution (1950), the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) so-
lution and the Kernel solution (Shubik 1982)) predict average payoffs accurately
only in constant-sum bilateral exchange (conditions 1 through 3). Given agreement,
the proportion of equal payoff agreements (predicted by the Kernel solution) is con-
siderable, ranging from a low of 0.41 in Condition 5 to a high of 0.67 in Condition 3.
The second main result is that variances in payoffs are much larger in pure ex-
change than in split pool exchange. Tellingly, the payoff variance in Condition 5 is
over 50 times larger (!) than the variance in Condition 1. The final main result is
that many agreements, when reached, are Pareto inefficient, from a low of 27% in
Condition 3 to a high of 61% in Condition 5. In this respect there is evidence of
learning: across the rounds of exchange, the probability of Pareto efficiency is
increasing.
These results show that the simplifications implicit in the move from pure ex-
change to split pool exchange ‘abstract away’ crucial aspects of the phenomenon to
be explained; bargaining behavior in (bilateral) exchange. Such bargaining behav-
ior in the real world very often involves the transfer of actual goods, that is, is best
conceptualized as pure exchange. The results of Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008)
show that such bargaining behavior (i) is much less accurately predicted by existing
bargaining theories than suggested by split pool exchange studies, (ii) seems much
less predictable (much more variable) than suggested by split pool exchange, in the
first place, and (iii) much more frequently leads to Pareto inefficient outcomes than
suggested by split pool exchange studies. Note how the second implication (related
to the higher variability of outcomes in pure exchange) points to the need of theo-
retically including covariates (such as bargaining skills, or mental models of the
bargaining situation) that have hitherto been neglected in many bargaining and ex-
change theories. This drives home the point that accurate macro-models are crucial
for fruitful theory development.
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The results also carry implications for network exchange theory. The vast ma-
jority of studies in this field have employed the split pool exchange paradigm. The
results found by Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008) strongly suggest that the relative
accuracy of theoretical predictions in exchange networks might be an artifact of
just this paradigm. How would theoretical predictions of existing network exchange
theories fare in networks of pure exchange? We currently do not know.
Finally, some theories and concepts of power in social networks (such as Burt’s
concept of brokerage, or Bonacich centrality) rely on notions of competitive advan-
tage of nodes due to their positions in the network. When motivating the concept of
brokerage, Burt (2005: 39) explicitly refers to the findings from experimental net-
work exchange research. Research that has consistently used an overly simplified
macro-model of the situation it tries to understand, thereby jeopardizing the valid-
ity of its claims.
4.4 Empirical demonstration: Exchange in groups
Most research on exchange in sociology focuses on network exchange, more specifi-
cally the effect of network structure (where ties represent restrictions on who can ex-
change with whom) on exchange outcomes of actors occupying nodes in the network.
Most of network exchange research uses the split pool exchange task, with both actors
in each tie of the network having the opportunity to split a resource pool of commonly
24 points, implying equally valuable exchange relations across the network. Usually,
each actor has the restriction to exchange only once (for instance, see Van Assen,
2003, for an overview of this network exchange research in sociology). Just like out-
comes of bilateral exchange are different from those of split pool exchange, one may
wonder if exchange in groups modelled with split pool exchange brings in additional
violations of sufficient complexity. That is, does split pool exchange ‘assume away’ in-
gredients of exchange in groups that are present in pure exchange in groups?
Dogan and Van Assen (2009) reanalyzed the experimental data of Michener,
Cohen, and Sørensen (1975, 1977) on pure exchange in small groups. Michener et al.
(1975) and Michener et al. (1977) examined pure exchange situations with three ac-
tors exchanging four goods, and with four actors exchanging five goods, respec-
tively. Table 4.2 presents an example of a pure exchange situation used in Michener
et al. (1975). At the start of the experimental session on that exchange situation
three actors (Alpha, Beta, Gamma) received initial endowments (to the right of the
table) of four goods (Red, White, Blue, Yellow) in multiples of 10 units. Additionally,
they were told what their payoffs (utilities; to the left of the table) would be a func-
tion of their final endowments. Payoffs were linear in endowments, such that Alpha’s
coefficient ‘0.8’ for Red means that at the end of the experimental session Alpha ob-
tains a payoff of 0.8 monetary units for each additional unit of Red he has.
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Each of Michener et al.’s studies examined three different pure exchange situa-
tions, with 16 groups of three persons and 12 groups of four persons for each configura-
tion, totaling 144 participants in each study. The experimental procedure was identical
in all exchange situations (see Michener et al. 1975, 1977, for details). Participants were
seated around the table and had complete information on all subjects’ endowments
and utilities. Only bilateral deals were allowed, and participants were free to talk dur-
ing the experiment. An experimental session stopped if participants decided they no
longer wanted to trade. Participants’ actual payoffs were determined by a show-up fee
and their final endowments multiplied by the utilities of their endowments.
When (re)analyzing the pure exchange situations of Michener et al. (1975, 1977)
two facts are observed almost instantly. First, potential profits vary wildly both
within and across exchange opportunities, in contrast with the constant-sum pay-
offs of exchange opportunities using split pool exchange. Equally profitable ex-
change opportunities can be expected to be exceedingly rare in pure exchange
situations (Van Assen 2001). Second, some profitable exchange opportunities seem
easier to detect than others. Dogan and Van Assen (2009) hypothesized exchange
opportunities that are more difficult to detect are less likely to be carried out. They
distinguished three heuristics to detect profitable bilateral exchange opportunities.
Increasing in sophistication, these heuristics are:
(i) Exchange a good you do not want yourself for some good you value (‘zero’).
(ii) Exchange a good you want for some good you like more (‘absolute’).
(iii) Exchange a good you want for some good you like relatively more (‘relative’).
That is, actor A may want to exchange good X for good Y of B because a unit of Y is
more valuable to A than a unit of X (heuristic (ii)), or because the ratio (value of unit
Y / value of unit X) is higher for A than for B (heuristic (iii)). For instance, if this ratio
is ½ for A and ¼ for B, an exchange is beneficial to both actors if A gives up some of
his most preferred good X in exchange for 2 to 4 times as much of good Y.
Table 4.2: One pure exchange situation used in the experiment of Michener et al. (1975).
Utilities Endowments
Alpha Beta Gamma Alpha Beta Gamma
Red . . . Red   
White . . . White   
Blue . . . Blue   
Yellow . . . Yellow   
Note: Names of colors and names of Greek characters represent endowments and
actors, respectively.
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On the basis of these three heuristics they identified four different exchange
opportunities:
D0: Actors have different preference orders; at least one has 0 interest in one good
S0: Actors have the same preference order, and one actor has 0 interest in one good
Db: Actors have different preference orders; both actors have interest in both goods
Sb: Actors have the same preference order; both actors have interest in both goods
They hypothesize that D0 and S0 are particularly easy to detect, as actors can be
expected to willingly give up a good they do not value in exchange for some other
good, and expect that Sb is particularly difficult to detect as both actors value the
same good the most.
Dogan and Van Assen (2009) tested their hypotheses by comparing the potential
exchange opportunities at the onset of the experimental sessions to those after the
sessions ended, based on the final endowments of the actors. The potential exchange
opportunities at the outset were derived from tables like Table 4.2. The opportunities
at the end were derived from the table with final endowments after the exchanges
(table(s) not shown here, see Dogan and Van Assen). Dogan and Van Assen com-
puted both the frequencies of opportunities (D0, S0, Db, Sb) as well as the potential
gains from these opportunities, for both the initial and final endowment tables. Both
the frequencies and potential gains were computed with a bilateral exchange model
assuming that both actors obtain an equal gain in their exchange, which seems a rea-
sonable assumption given the outcomes of Dijkstra and Van Assen (2008) discussed
previously. For instance, a frequency of 5 for Db means that five mutually beneficial
bilateral exchanges could be carried out of type Db (with actors having different
preference orders for both goods and having interest in both goods) given the en-
dowments, The ‘potential gain’ simply sums the gains of these five opportunities,
assuming the bilateral exchange model is used to determine the rate of exchange.
If actors are fully rational, actors should have no problem to detect exchange
opportunities of any type, including exchanges of type Sb. Consequently, no mutually
beneficial exchange opportunities would remain at the end of exchanging. However,
if some opportunities are more difficult to detect than others, we would expect that (i)
particularly ‘difficult’ exchange opportunities remain at the end of the experiment,
and (ii) the potential gain of ‘difficult’ exchange opportunities at the end of the experi-
ment is higher than for less ‘difficult’ opportunities. Dogan and Van Assen’s predic-
tions were confirmed. At the outset the frequency of opportunities (D0, S0, Db, Sb)
was (57, 27, 2, 2), and at the end (2, 9, 2, 7), meaning that both the relative and abso-
lute number of complex exchange opportunities increased.2 Similarly, comparing the
2 Three different statistical tests were conducted on the frequency of opportunities, all significant
at 0.01. The statistical test comparing potential gains of D0 and S0 on the one hand to Db and Sb
on the other hand resulted in p = 0.004.
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potential gains at the start (460.86, 107.9, 40, 3.5) to those at the end (0.17, 0.007,
1.17, 3.96) clearly demonstrated that actors did fully realize the potential of simpler
opportunities, but not of the complex ones, particularly Sb.
To conclude, Dogan and Van Assen (2009) convincingly showed that potential
exchange opportunities may be very different in two crucial respects. Some are nat-
urally more valuable than others, and importantly, some may be more difficult to
detect than others. Particularly profitable exchange opportunities where both actors
like the same good most were difficult to detect, suggesting that actors were reluctant
to give up the good that they liked most, thereby violating the fully rational afore-
mentioned ‘relative’ heuristic (iii). As split pool exchanges ‘assumes away’ these phe-
nomena, it provides an additional violation of the principle of sufficient complexity
in the context of group exchange. Note that the difficulty to detect an exchange op-
portunity may also interact with the effect of the network structure on the outcomes
of exchange. For example, consider an exchange network with one so-called power-
ful actor having many opportunities of a complex type, who can exclude others from
exchanging. If other more peripheral actors in the network who also have opportuni-
ties of a simple type, the central actor may not be able to realize his full potential.
4.5 Other advantages of sufficiently complex
macro-level models
Overly simplifying the model of the social phenomenon, or how it translates the
macro-conditions into the micro-conditions not only may have consequences for
modelling and understanding the phenomenon at hand. It also may reduce the gen-
erality and versatility of the macro-model to examine other closely related phenom-
ena. Van Assen (2001: 175–178) explains this in the context of exchange.
Individuals and their characteristics play no role in split pool exchange, as they
are assumed away too. But where then, does the exchange relation come from? The
network structure is exogenously determined. In pure exchange, as in the experi-
ments of Michener et al. (1975, 1977) potential exchange relations and the exchange
network are endogenously determined by individuals’ endowments and preferences
over these endowments. Consequently, effects of networks on exchange outcomes
may be naturally examined using the more complex model of pure exchange rather
than split pool exchange. Similarly, the evolution of exchange (networks) may natu-
rally be studied by providing a group of actors with endowments and preferences
and allow them to interact with each other repeatedly, without restrictions such as
in the Michener et al. experiments. Changes in endowments or preferences may in-
duce a change in the actual network of exchanges.
Characterizing actors by endowments (or characteristics) and preferences also al-
lows for naturally modelling generalized exchange, or other social interactions such
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as coercion and conflict. In generalized exchange the exchange occurs between three
of more actors and cannot be reduced to exchange between two actors. For instance,
A benefits form a transfer of goods by B, B profits from a transfer by C, and C profits
from a transfer by A. Some profitable exchanges in Michener et al.’s (1975, 1977) ex-
periments could only be realized using generalized exchange (see Dogan and Van
Assen, 2009), revealing that empirical research on generalized exchange can be
naturally conducted using pure exchange. Generalized exchange cannot be mod-
elled using split pool exchange. Similarly, it is not obvious how coercion and con-
flict can be researched using split pool exchange. In coercive relations one actor
has the potential to unilaterally transfer a resource that harms the other, whereas
in conflict relations both actors have this potential. Both coercive and conflict re-
lations are studied in sociology with pure exchange (Willer 1999).
Another example of an application of pure exchange that is not obvious
using split pool exchange is exchange with externalities. Externalities of ex-
change occur when an exchange between two actors also affects the utility of
one or more actors that or not involved in the exchange. Life is abundant with
examples of exchanges with externalities, for instance when an actor exchanges
on behalf of a group to which (s)he belongs (for instance, household, company,
political party). Using pure exchange, Dijkstra and Van Assen (2006, 2008b) dem-
onstrate that externalities greatly affect outcomes and behavior of actors embed-
ded in a simple exchange network. Additionally, pure exchange with externalities
is effectively used to predict bargaining and outcomes of collective decision
making (Dijkstra, Van Assen, and Stokman 2008; Van Assen, Stokman, and Van
Oosten 2003).
Pure exchange with externalities can also be naturally applied to examine social
dilemmas. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD) is one of the most frequently used
paradigms for studying cooperation between individuals. Dijkstra and Van Assen
(2016) argue that the PD is often an inadequate and too simple model of social dilem-
mas, violating the principle of sufficient complexity, just like split pool exchange is a
too simple model of exchange. That is, the PD assumes away third parties that gener-
ate the dilemma (for instance, consumers of fish who may offer more money to buy
fish, thereby tempting the fishermen to defect, that is, to sell fish), the fact that out-
comes of a social dilemma are usually variable and negotiable, and that behavior
and outcomes are sequential rather than simultaneous (see Dijkstra and Van Assen,
2016, for details). Modelling the social dilemma as an exchange dilemma (pure ex-
change with externalities) instead of a PD naturally incorporates these aspects of a
social dilemma. Interestingly, Dijkstra and Van Assen (2016) demonstrate empirically
that outcomes of a social dilemma modelled as an exchange dilemma may result in
very different outcomes than typically obtained with a PD; cooperation in the ex-
change dilemma was very rare, which is in contrast with cooperation rates typically
observed in research using the PD. Their results again induce the fundamental ques-
tion if outcomes of research using the PD are ecologically valid for real-life social
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dilemmas, or that the PD is a too simple model of the social dilemma assuming away
essential ingredients of the social dilemma.
We hope that our paper increases sociologists’ sensitivity to the principle of
sufficient complexity when modeling social phenomena. Using the case of ex-
change we showed that too simple a model (split pool exchange) assumes away
essential ingredients of exchange, making it impossible studying real-life ex-
change and these ingredients. Unsurprisingly, assuming away these ingredients
greatly affects both predictions and outcomes of exchange, unavoidably inducing
the question if outcomes of and conclusions based on research using the too sim-
ple model are valid for the phenomenon at hand. Applying the principle of suffi-
cient complexity may imply that the complexity of the model (micro, macro, or
both) depends on the social phenomenon one tries to understand. For instance,
although we argue that in many cases of exchange the pure exchange model is
superior to the more commonly used split pool exchange, there may be cases in
which the split-pool exchange model is preferred or an even more complex model
than pure exchange is warranted.
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Andreas Flache
5 Rational Exploitation of the Core by the
Periphery? On the Collective (In)efficiency
of Endogenous Enforcement of Universal
Conditional Cooperation in a Core-Periphery
Network
Abstract: Raub and Weesie (1990) proposed a game theoretical model addressing
effects of network embeddedness on conditional cooperation between two actors.
This work showed that network embeddedness can facilitate conditional coopera-
tion by reducing uncertainty, in line with a number of follow-up contributions and
consistently with results from other modelling approaches. This research focused
mainly on interactions between two parties embedded in a network. In the present
paper, I extend a closely related model towards N-person collective good problems,
combining conditional cooperation based on direct monitoring via network ties and
observation of group output in an uncertain environment. The focus is on a maxi-
mally simple yet empirically relevant case, a core-periphery network in which only
core-members can directly observe each other’s contributions to a collective effort,
whereas peripheral members only observe a noisy signal indicating aggregated con-
tributions. I propose the possibility of a ‘rational exploitation of the core by the pe-
riphery’. Strategy-profiles in which free-riding of peripheral members is tolerated
while core-members cooperate conditionally, are not only individually rational but
also payoff-superior to profiles with universal conditional cooperation if uncer-
tainty is sufficiently high and the number of peripheral members is sufficiently low.
5.1 Introduction
The question under which conditions cooperation can be achieved in the produc-
tion of collective goods is still prominently on the agenda of social scientists more
than five decades after Olson’s (1965) influential analysis of the problem of collec-
tive action. Especially for “large number dilemmas” (Raub 1988), Olson and many
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other authors (for example Hardin 1968) were pessimistic about the possibility of
an endogenous solution without hierarchical enforcement. However, game theoreti-
cal research has shown that reciprocity in the form of conditional cooperation can
be an individually rational endogenous solution of collective action problems
(Friedman 1971, 1986; Raub and Voss 1986; Raub 1988; Taylor 1976, 1987) in a col-
lective action situation that constitutes an infinitely or indefinitely repeated game.
Conditional cooperation in collective good production makes an actor’s contri-
bution to the common effort contingent upon others’ contributions in the past, sim-
ilar to the well-known strategy of “Tit-for-Tat” (Axelrod 1984) in 2-person social
dilemma games. An important problem that can limit the effectiveness of condi-
tional cooperation is that actors may not be able to observe precisely and reliably
others’ past contribution (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987; Green and Porter 1984). For
example, when a project team member in an organization fails to show up for a
project meeting, this may be intended free-riding and should thus trigger retaliation
from other team members to credibly deter future free-riding according to the logic
of conditional cooperation. But possibly the absent team member was delayed by
an incident he cannot be held accountable for, like unexpected sickness of a child.
What makes things worse, it is often hard to verify for other actors involved what
the true reasons were if someone failed to contribute, or who in a team was respon-
sible when the team’s results failed to meet expectations. The dilemma here is that
sanctions are needed in such a situation to deter free-riding behavior. But such
sanctions also bear the danger of putting successful cooperation under pressure,
for example when the target of a sanction feels treated unfairly and responds with a
counter-sanction (Nikiforakis 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann 2011) potentially
evoking cycles of mutual recrimination (Bendor, Kramer and Stout 1991; Kollock
1993; Wu and Axelrod 1995) disrupting ongoing cooperation more than necessary.
Network embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) can mitigate the difficulties that
arise from information problems in ongoing collective action. Network ties connect-
ing some of the participants of the collective action more closely than others, such
as friendship relations between some team members, or close physical proximity of
workplaces or homes, give some the opportunity to observe more reliably whether
their network contacts contributed to a joint effort or for which reasons they failed
to do so. Moreover, network ties allow to communicate this information to further
participants of the collective action. As a result, a network of interpersonal ties may
stabilize conditional cooperation in a situation where contributions are hard to ob-
serve without direct network connections, because either through direct observa-
tion or communication via network relations participants know better why failures
to contribute occurred and sanctions can thus be more effectively directed at free
riders.
Raub and Weesie (1990) developed a game-theoretical model formalizing this ar-
gument and showed how and under which conditions social networks facilitate trust
in cooperation problems faced in two-party relations (see also Raub and Weesie,
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2000), as they occur for example in business relations or between partners in a
household. A range of follow-up studies extended this analysis and tested the argu-
ment empirically (Batenburg, Raub and Snijders 2003; Buskens 2002; Buskens and
Raub 2002; Raub 2017; Raub and Buskens 2008; Rooks, Raub, and Tazelaar 2006).
This work contributed to a wider literature of models that link network ties to cooper-
ation. Most of that literature focuses on mechanisms other than conditional coopera-
tion. Some examples are imitation (Gould 1993), threshold dynamics (Chwe 1999;
Macy 1991), mobilization via network ties (Marwell and Oliver 1993), sanctions im-
posed via social ties (Coleman 1990; Flache 1996; Flache, Macy, and Raub 2000), or
information on others’ preferences acquired via network relations (Dijkstra and van
Assen 2013). Some authors also modelled conditional cooperation in repeated collec-
tive good games (Bednar 2006; Bendor and Mookherjee 1990; Flache 2002; Flache
et al. 2000; Spagnolo 1999; Wolitzky 2013). Especially Fatas and co-authors (for ex-
ample Fatas, Meléndez-Jiménez, and Solaz 2010; Fatas et al. 2015) developed a line of
papers combining theoretical modelling and experimental tests of effects of networks
on conditional cooperation in collective good settings.
Despite some exceptions, the problem of cooperation in collective goods has re-
ceived relatively little attention in the research that links network embeddedness to
the feasibility of conditional cooperation under uncertainty, compared to the prob-
lem of cooperation in two-party relations. One possible reason is that models of
conditional cooperation in collective action typically assume that in addition to net-
works there is another source of information actors can rely upon to condition their
own contribution behavior on others’ cooperation. This is the level of the good pro-
vided, indicating how many group members made a contribution to bring it about.
A number of theoretical studies (Friedman 1971; Raub 1988; Raub and Voss 1986;
Taylor 1987) highlighted that this information is under certain conditions sufficient
to render it an individually rational endogenous outcome of the game if everyone
cooperates conditionally upon sufficient group-output. But imperfect information
provides an important problem also for this endogenous solution. Observed levels
of provision of a collective good are rarely a perfect or reliable indicator of how
much effort group members really have invested to bring the good about. Bendor
and Mookherjee (1987; see also Bendor, Kramer and Stout 1991; Kollock 1993) prom-
inently showed how this can make conditional cooperation highly inefficient. If the
condition for cooperation is sufficient group-output, this implies that under uncer-
tainty sometimes the condition may not be met for reasons which are unrelated to
deliberate free-riding by some group members – like the unintended failure of a
team member to turn up for a project meeting. Rational actors face the dilemma
that therefore sanctioning strategies must be lenient to some extent to avoid too
much ‘unnecessary’ mutual punishment, but that too much lenience invites delib-
erate defection because deviants can hope to ‘get away’ with occasional free-riding.
In other words, the social costs of enforcing cooperation by sufficiently severe sanc-
tion threats may become prohibitively high if there is too much uncertainty about
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the link between efforts actors make to contribute to a collective good and the ob-
servable results in terms of the level of provision.
Work on the effect of uncertainty for conditional cooperation suggests that
monitoring in social networks can be an important factor that stabilizes conditional
cooperation in collective action. Yet, hitherto only few studies address the role of
monitoring via network ties in a setting where actors simultaneously observe a
group-output that is an unreliably indicator of actual contributions. In this paper, I
try to take a step in that direction by proposing a game-theoretical model of collec-
tive action under uncertainty, aiming to integrate effects of monitoring via social
network ties albeit with a maximally simple network structure.
In modelling the network structure in a maximally simple way, I want to ex-
plore a structural problem that occurs in many situations where collective action is
needed. Often, networks are heterogeneous in the extent to which their members
are connected among each other.
One particular case of heterogeneity are core-periphery structures, in which
some members of an interest group form a densely connected core and others are in
peripheral positions with only sparse links to members in the core. Consider as an
extremely simple case the situation in which core members can monitor each
other’s contributions to the collective effort very closely and accurately, while the
effects of the contributions of peripheral members are only visible via their impact
on the group-output, while their real efforts to contribute to the collective good are
private information. Empirical settings for which this could be seen as an ideal-
typical model of a collective good situation might be (a) a company that works with
staff located in headquarters and local representatives dispersed across different re-
gions or countries, (b) a semi-virtual organization, working with a local core team
of members physically located in an office, and a number of workers who are only
connected online with each other and the core-members (Flache 2004), or (c) a
local renewable energy initiative largely driven by a core-team of densely connected
‘front-runners’ but in need of contributions from a larger number of members of the
community who are much less connected with the front-runners than they are con-
nected with each other (Goedkoop, Flache, and Dijkstra 2017).
Core-periphery structures can impose a dilemma for endogenous conditional co-
operation. Under uncertainty, sanctioning regimes that provide sufficient incentives
for all members to cooperate in equilibrium cannot avoid that some punishment
must be imposed even when only ‘erroneous’ defections occur, because with imper-
fectly observed input of the peripheral members their free riding can otherwise not
be credibly deterred. In this situation the closer embeddedness of the core-members
can make an alternative regime more attractive, a sanctioning regime in which core-
members ignore the unreliable and noisy information about collective output, but
condition their behavior instead on the reliably observed inputs of only the other
core-members. Obviously, the problem with that alternative solution is that periph-
eral members can no longer be credibly deterred from free riding. They are effectively
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allowed to take a free-ride, an outcome that I call here exploitation of the core by the
periphery, mirroring Olson’s (1965) ‘exploitation of the big by the small’. What makes
this possibility nevertheless worth to investigate is that it may under certain conditions
be collectively more efficient than a conditional cooperation regime in which sanctions
can be triggered by everyone’s failure to contribute. Intuitively, the reason is that credi-
ble enforcement of the cooperation of those group members whose actions are difficult
to observe is not possible without risking a considerable amount of sanctions that are
triggered by unintended failures to generate effective contributions. Imposing such a
sanction is damaging and potentially disruptive in itself for the collective effort.
Tolerating some free riding from peripheral members avoids these costs, potentially
rendering such tolerance a collectively more desirable solution. As an example, con-
sider the renewable energy initiative discussed above. If every time when not enough
community members show up for an information meeting about the initiative, the
core-team of front-runners would stop its activities for some time to sanction ‘free-
riders’ in the community, the initiative may suffer more damage from those sanctions
than was caused by the lack of contribution of peripheral community members in the
first place. Accepting relatively low turn-out at information meetings may thus be a col-
lectively more efficient strategy of the front-runners than trying to enforce contribu-
tions from all community members all the time.
In what follows I investigate the conditions under which the outcome in which
peripheral members free ride and core-members contribute can be both individually
rational as well as socially more efficient than universal conditional cooperation.
The model I use for this will be described in Section 5.2, results for specific scenar-
ios are presented in Section 5.3 and the paper closes with a discussion of possible
implications and limitations in Section 5.4.
5.2 Model
In section 5.2.1. the repeated game is presented, section 5.2.2. describes the ap-
proach for analysis of the conditions for individual rationality and social efficiency
of the alternative outcomes of universal conditional cooperation on the one hand,
and “core-only” conditional cooperation on the other hand.
5.2.1 The repeated game
Group interaction is modelled as a repeated N-person game that is equivalent to the
“work game” in Flache (2002), except for the assumption that monitoring of contri-
bution behavior is possible via direct network-ties. The constituent-game strategy
of player i in iteration t of the repeated game is represented by the decision wit
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whether to “work” or “shirk”, where wit = 0 for defectors and wit = 1 for contribu-
tors. In the stage game, actors take decisions simultaneously and independently.
Following Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) uncertainty is modelled with a com-
monly known universal probability ε that due to some mishap an individual’s con-
tribution fails to be effective (0 ≤ ε ≤ 1). It is assumed that all players know after
every iteration t the group-output in terms of the number of effective contributions
group members made in t, but players are not necessarily aware of the actual input
wjt of other individual members.
Modelling the core-periphery structure, I assume a maximally simple social net-
work S. The group consists of Nc core-members and Ni isolates (N = Nc + Ni). Core-
members are connected to all other core-members in the network, whereas isolates
are not connected to anyone else. If there is a connection between individuals i and j
(sij = 1), i is at time t, before taking her own decision, fully and perfectly informed on
the actual contribution decision wjt her network contact j made in all previous itera-
tions t’ < t. This is a rather extreme simplification, but it greatly facilitates model anal-
ysis, while it still captures the substantive assumption that monitoring contributions
via network relations is more reliable than between unconnected actors.
The expected payoff of actor i in iteration t of the game, uit, results from both
expected benefits from output and expected costs of i’s own contribution-effort.
Output is simply modelled as a linear function of the sum of individual outputs.
Notice that output may be lower than the number of actual contributions made,
due to uncertainty. The expected output generated by an individual contribution is
(1 ‒ ε) wit. The amount of the collective good produced is shared equally among all
group members, whereas costs of making a contribution are private. Equation (5.1)
formalizes the expected payoff an individual derives from the outcome of the con-
stituent game in iteration t:
uit =
XN
j= 1
α
N
1− εð Þwjt − cwit
 
. (5:1)
The parameter α scales the benefit a group member receives from consuming a unit
of the collective good. The costs of investing a unit of effort into its production are
indicated by the parameter c. Modelling a problematic collective action situation,
the constituent game has a N-person Prisoner’s dilemma structure given by α / N < c
< α.
To model conditional cooperation in the repeated game, I use the standard as-
sumption of infinite repetition of the game with exponential discounting of future
payoffs. The accumulated payoff ui of actor i in the repeated game sums discounted
payoffs over all iterations t, uit. Formally,
ui =
X∞
t =0
τtuit, 0< τ< 1. (5:2)
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where τ is the discount parameter, defining the value of players’ interest in future
payoffs. For simplicity, τ as well all the parameters α, ε and c are assumed equal for
all members of the group.
5.2.2 Model analysis
5.2.2.1 Strategy types
Main aim of the model analysis is comparison of the conditions for individual ratio-
nality and social efficiency of two types of strategy profiles for the repeated game,
modelling two different types of reciprocity norms. In this game, the only ‘weapon’
group members have to impose a sanction on defectors is response with own defec-
tion. Conditional cooperation thus implies reciprocal behavior in the sense that all
players cooperate as long as there has been sufficient cooperation by others in the
past, but resort to defection otherwise. The first type of strategy profile analyzed here
meets the additional requirement of symmetry. The stage-game behavior expected
from players, the attached conditions for triggering a sanction and the severity of the
sanction are universally shared in this profile. I call the corresponding strategy-type
“universal conditional cooperation” in what follows. Especially, both core-members
and isolates follow the same reciprocity norm under universal conditional coopera-
tion. This can be seen as a property that ensures ‘procedural fairness’, a key ingredi-
ent for sustainable cooperation according to many authors. The second type of
strategy profile relaxes the ‘procedural fairness’ requirement of symmetry for the
sake of potential gains in social efficiency. This type differentiates between the norm
imposed upon core-members and a maximally lenient norm imposed upon isolates,
effectively allowing them to free-ride. I call this type “core-only” conditional coopera-
tion. Both strategy-types as well as their analysis are discussed in more detail below.
5.2.2.2 Individual rationality and social efficiency of universal conditional
cooperation
A key principle for the selection of strategy profiles as solutions of the game is indi-
vidual rationality. Technically, this implies that the solution of the game is a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium (s.p.e.) (Selten 1965; see also Kreps 1990). Another
key principle is social efficiency in terms of payoff dominance. Payoff dominance
eliminates those s.p.e.’s from the set of possible solutions of a game to which all
players would unanimously prefer other s.p.e.’s (for more details, see Harsanyi
1977:116–119). Among the set of individually rational and symmetric reciprocity strat-
egy profiles, those will be selected as candidate-solution of the game that yield a
higher payoff to all members of the group compared to other strategy-profiles in
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this set. Given symmetry, this means the s.p.e. will be selected that maximizes ui as
defined by (5.2) for all players.
The analysis uses a generalized form of trigger strategies (Friedman 1971, 1986),
following Bendor and Mookherjee (1987; see also Flache 2002). Trigger strategies
under imperfect information generate cooperative behavior in a normal period of
the game, but as soon as the corresponding group-output norm has been violated,
the trigger strategy reverts to a punishment behavior for a subsequent sanctioning
period. After the sanctioning period, cooperation is restored but only as long as
there is sufficient group-output. Two parameters of a trigger strategy model the
tradeoff between lenience and deterrence, the cutoff level l and the sanction time s.
In the strategy-profile σ(s,l) all players cooperate in all rounds in a normal period,
but they revert to a sanctioning period of exactly s rounds, as soon as in the normal
period the group-output falls below the cut-off level l. After the sanctioning period,
a new normal period starts with an initial round of unconditional cooperation.
To guarantee individual rationality of adhering to σ(s, l), the profile needs to
ensure that optimal unilateral deviations from it do not pay. To also optimize effi-
ciency, the strategy profile σ(s*, l*) is sought that maximizes the related expected
payoff ui(σ(s*, l*)), subject to the constraint that the corresponding trigger strategy
constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium.1
For calculation of expected payoffs of trigger-strategies and for evaluation of
the constraint that unilateral deviations do not pay, I adapted an efficient numerical
algorithm from Bendor and Mookherjee (1987) that solves the optimization problem
for a given set of conditions. (α, c, N, Nc, ε, τ). The algorithm will here only be
sketched in broad strokes, more details can be found in Flache (2002). The analysis
of the trigger strategy profile “task-cooperation” in Flache (2002:199) is equivalent
to the analysis of σ(s,l) here.
The algorithm finds the payoff-dominant s.p.e. in the set of σ(s,l) profiles in two
steps. In the first step, it is established for which cut-off levels l’ individually ratio-
nal profiles σ(s,l’) can exist. Such a profile exists if and only if the condition is satis-
fied that the trigger strategy σ(∞,l’) with eternal punishment and cut-off level l’ is
1 Due to symmetry, trigger strategies always constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium, if and only
if they satisfy the conditions for Nash-equilibrium. The proof is given by Friedman (1986). For the
game at hand here a possible complication is that core-members have more information about pos-
sible deviations than isolates have. Off the equilibrium path, a core-member can observe deviations
by other core-members even if those deviations do not lead to a sufficient drop in output to trigger
a subsequent punishment phase under σ(s*, l*). The core-member might thus have an incentive to
deviate from the profile σ(s*, l*) in the subgame that ensues, because the observed deviation
changes the probability that there will be a punishment phase in the next round. To avoid such
complications I assume that both group-output and individual inputs become known only after all
stage-game decisions were taken and before the next round begins. This makes it public knowledge
for all group-members whether in the subsequent round a punishment phase will start, aligning
the conditions for deviation in the subgame with those for deviation in the overall game.
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individually rational. Intuitively, the reason is that eternal punishment maximizes
the expected loss from the sanction that a deviant faces. If eternal damnation is not
sufficient to deter deviation at l’, no finite sanction time s is. Theorem 1 in Flache
(2002) gives the condition that follows, which in turn is efficiently tested with the
numerical algorithm for all feasible cut-off levels l’, 1 ≤ l’ ≤ N.
The second step of the numerical procedure is to calculate and compare the op-
timal expected payoffs from universal conditional cooperation that can be obtained
for those cut-off levels l’ that satisfy the condition that σ(∞,l’) is s.p.e. The optimal
profiles σ(s’,l’) can be found by inspection of only one trigger strategy per cut-off
level l’, the one that minimizes sanction time s, subject to the constraint of individ-
ual rationality ui ‒ u‒i under l = l’,where ui and u‒i denote the payoffs for universal
cooperation and the optimal unilateral deviation from that profile for i, respectively.
Shorter sanctioning periods ensure higher payoffs for all under universal condi-
tional cooperation. But there is also a critical lowest sanction time s*, below which
the individual rationality constraint ui ≥ u‒i can no longer be satisfied because sanc-
tions become too lenient. Theorem 2 in Flache (2002) specifies how this sanction-
time s* is efficiently computed by the numerical algorithm.
Given a vector of parameters (α, c, N, Nc, ε, τ) of the game, the algorithm finds
the payoff-dominant s.p.e. σ(s*(l’),l’) for every cut-off level l’ for which an individu-
ally rational profile σ(s,l’) exists. Among these payoff-dominant profiles σ(s*(l’),l’),
the algorithm then selects the cut-off level l* that maximizes the related expected
payoff. If no other s.p.e. exists for the given set of parameters, the unique symmetric
solution of the game is universal and full defection.
5.2.2.3 Individual rationality of core-only conditional cooperation
The core-only strategy-profile σco implies unconditional contribution to the collec-
tive good in the first round of the game for core-members. Thereafter, core-
members contribute if and only if all other core-members have contributed in all
previous rounds of the game. That is, as soon as a core-member detects defection by
another core-member, all core-members revert to eternal defection. Core-members con-
dition their behavior exclusively upon the observed actions of other core-members. In
what follows, the analysis will be restricted to the most extreme form of a “core-only”
strategy-profile, the form in which all isolates choose full defection. The conditions
under which such a profile is individually rational for core-members can be seen as the
most restrictive conditions under which individually rational profiles exist at all that
demand less cooperation from isolates than from core-members. If core-members are
willing to adopt this core-only strategy, strategy profiles with higher levels of coopera-
tion by isolates would yield higher payoffs for all core members and thus also be indi-
vidually rational for them. Alternatively, isolates could adopt a σ(s,l) profile in which
they would enforce some level of conditional cooperation from each other with the
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threat of sanctioning if group-output drops too low. Yet, at least as long as isolates are
in the minority, this would impose only a relatively weak sanction because group-
output drops only by (1 ‒ ε)Ni. in sanctioning periods. This suggests that conditions
under which such a profile is individually rational also for isolates are rather restrictive
and demand very long sanctioning periods, which diminishes possible efficiency gains
compared to the extreme case of full defection by isolates.
The condition for individual rationality of cooperation among only the core-
members in the strategy-profile σco follows from Friedman’s theorem (1971; 1986:
88–89) for indefinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring of past behavior.
σco constitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium, if and only if core-members are suffi-
ciently interested in future payoffs. This the condition given by equation (5.3).
τ> τ* = T̂co − R̂co
T̂co −P
. (5:3)
The symbol T̂co denotes the expected stage-game payoff from unilateral deviation
by a core-member, T̂co = 1− εð Þα Nc − 1ð Þ=N. The symbol R̂co refers to the stage-game
payoff for a core-member of universal cooperation by only core-members,
R̂co = 1− εð ÞαNc=N − c. P, finally, is the stage-game payoff of universal defection for
a core-member, which is zero.
5.2.2.4 Solution of the game
The solution of the game that is selected for a given parameter-vector (α, c, N, Nc, ε, τ)
is full defection by all players if neither any σ(s, l) nor σco constitute an s.p.e. If only
σco constitutes an s.p.e. this is the solution, if only σ(s,l) profiles are s.p.e. then the
payoff-dominant solution σ(s*, l*) is the solution. Finally, if both σ(s,l) profiles and σco
constitute s.p.e.’s, then the payoff dominant one among the set of all these s.p.e.’s is
selected as solution. Notice that for σco this requires in particular that the accumu-
lated payoff is higher both for core-members and for isolates compared to the payoff
all members receive in σ(s*, l*). Accumulated payoff as well as the incentive to
deviate, ui – u-i for σco can be obtained from uit = R̂co, u− it = T̂co and equation (5.2).
Accumulated payoff ui and incentive to deviate, ui – u-i for σ(s,l) profiles are com-
puted as given in Flache (2002).
5.3 Results
First, it will be explored for an illustrative scenario how changes in the ‘shadow of
the future’ τ, the number of isolates Ni, and the degree of uncertainty ε affect the con-
ditions for individual rationality and efficiency of a specific trigger-profile σ(s*,l*)
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compared to σco. Second, comparative statics will be reported about the effects of
these variables on the distribution of optimal solutions across the entire range of pos-
sible values of τ.
5.3.1 Illustrative scenario
The scenario inspected here represents a relatively small work-team with a minority
of isolates, facing a moderately severe cooperation problem under considerable
uncertainty, formalized as N = 10; ε = 0.2; α = 1; c = 0.33; Ni = 2. I choose the trigger-
profile σ(s*, l*) that under these conditions is payoff-dominant among all σ(s, l) pro-
files at τ = 0.95. This is s* = 6 and l* = 33.
5.3.1.1 Effects of shadow of the future (τ)
The feasibility of conditional cooperation depends crucially upon sufficient interest of
actors in future outcomes, τ. In the following, it will be analyzed how changes in τ
affect the individual rationality and the payoffs core-members obtain for the profile
σ(s*,l*) and for σco. Figure 5.1a shows how changes in τ affect the payoff-difference ui –
u-i for core-members between universal adherence to the trigger strategy and the opti-
mal unilateral deviation for both σ(s*, l*) and σco. Only when this difference is above
the zero line, the corresponding profile is an s.p.e. Figure 5.1b shows corresponding
changes in the accumulated payoff ui of core-members in the two strategy-profiles.
For a significant range of τ (between approximately τ = 0.45 and τ = 0.95) core-only
cooperation is found to be payoff inferior to universal cooperation under σ(s*,l*),
yet universal cooperation is not individually rational in this range while core-only
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Figure 5.1: (a): Effect of τ on payoff difference universal trigger vs. unilateral deviation ui – u-i.
(b): Effect of τ on payoff ui for core-members. Inset: range where payoff curves intersect.
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cooperation is. Only when τ exceeds a critical threshold of about τ = 0.95 both pro-
files are individually rational and universal conditional cooperation becomes the
payoff superior solution. However, as τ further increases, a point is reached where
core-only cooperation becomes payoff-superior to universal cooperation (see inset
Figure 5.1b). This reflects that if interest in the future is sufficiently strong, the loss
of output caused by free riding of two isolates is outweighed by the gain from avoid-
ing frequent punishment periods.
5.3.1.2 Effects of number of isolates (Ni) and of noise (ε) in baseline-scenario
The baseline scenario suggests that core-only cooperation is the only sustainable so-
lution for a considerable range of conditions and even becomes the most efficient so-
lution when τ is high enough. The main advantage of the core-only solution is the
avoidance of frequent punishment phases caused by uncertainty, while its main dis-
advantage is the loss of the contributions of peripheral members. Intuitively, a larger
share of isolates should then reduce the relative attractiveness of a core-only solu-
tion, while more uncertainty should increase it. In the following it will be demon-
strated that the game-theoretical model is consistent with these intuitions for the
baseline scenario. Figure 5.2 shows how the number of isolates Ni affects the individ-
ual rationality and efficiency of σ(s*,l*) and of σco at the level of τ = 0.95 and how this
effect interacts with a change in the degree of uncertainty from ε = 0.2 to ε = 0.25. As
σ(33, 6) is s.p.e. throughout in Figure 5.2, the figures show only the accumulated pay-
off ui for this profile. For σco both the payoff-difference ui – u-i and the corresponding
accumulated payoff ui for core-members are shown. Only when ui – u-i is above zero,
σco is an s.p.e., only when ui for σco is above ui for σ(s*, l*) in figure 5.2, core-only
conditional cooperation is also payoff-superior to universal conditional cooperation.
Figure 5.2 demonstrates how core-only conditional cooperation can be both individ-
ually rational and payoff-superior to universal conditional cooperation, but only as
long as the number of isolates is sufficiently small. For ε = 0.2, σco is individually
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Figure 5.2: Effect of Ni on accumulated payoff for both σ(s*, l*) and σco, and effect on ui – u-i for σco.
Baseline scenario N = 10; α = 1; c = 0.33; τ = 0.95, s = 33, l = 6. (a) ε = 0.2, (b): ε = 0.25.
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rational for Ni ≤ 5, and it is payoff-superior to σ(s*, l*) for Ni ≤ 1. If the level of uncer-
tainty increases to ε = 0.25, core-members benefit less from cooperation in σco, but
also efficiency-losses of σ(s*, l*) become higher. As a consequence, the range within
which σco is the solution of the game widens considerably. The range within which
σco is both individually rational and payoff-superior increases from Ni ≤ 1 for ε = 0.2
to Ni ≤ 3 for ε = 0.25. Notice that based on condition (5.3) it is straightforward to
prove analytically for all feasible parameter vectors that s.p.e. conditions for σco be-
come more restrictive both for increasing Ni as well as for increasing ε. I cannot
offer a corresponding analytical result for the payoff-superiority of σco over σ(s*,l*)
but numerical analyses suggest that the results shown here for the baseline sce-
nario generalize to a much wider range of conditions.
5.3.2 Comparative statics
5.3.2.1 Overview
In this section comparative statics will be reported about the effects of uncertainty,
ε, and the number of isolates, Ni, on the range of possible values of τ for which ei-
ther the optimal σ(s,l) profile σ(s*, l*), or σco or full defection is the solution of the
game. The parameters that are fixed are again taken from the baseline scenario,
that is N = 10, α = 1, c = 0.33. Other than in the analysis of illustrative scenarios, the
optimal profile σ(s*, l*) is now computed separately for every point in the parameter
space, including for different levels of τ. Both sanctioning time s and cut-off level l
can therefore differ across conditions, reflecting the adaptation of the optimal sanc-
tioning profile to the changing requirements for deterrence and lenience as uncer-
tainty and number of isolates change.
The share of the interval [0,1] of possible values of τ for which a particular type
of strategy-profile is the solution of the game will also be used to obtain a coarse-
grained indicator of the level of expected group-output o per round at a particular
point in the parameter space. More precisely, for every level of τ, the corresponding
solution of the game is identified and the related expected group-output o(τ) per
round is computed. Overall expected group-output o at (α, c, N, Nc, ε) is then com-
puted as average across the entire range of τ. For convenience the expected output
is linearly rescaled to [0,1]. Details of the method how o(τ) is computed for a given
profile σ(s,l) can be found in Flache (2002). When the solution is the optimal σ(s,l)
profile, expected output is obtained as the probability that a particular round of the
game falls within a normal period, multiplied with the rescaled expected group-
output (1 ‒ ε) in a normal round. Finally, if the solution is σco, expected output is
taken as (1 ‒ ε)Nc/N.
To distinguish between output based on universal conditional cooperation and
output based on core-only conditional cooperation, I also adapt the method described
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above to obtain two additional output indicators. These indicate expected outputs sep-
arately computed for the fraction of the range of τ in which σ(s,l) is s.p.e., and in which
σco is s.p.e. These indicators are denoted oσ and oco, respectively.
5.3.2.2 Comparative statics for the effects of uncertainty ε
Figure 5.3 shows how the output indicators as well as the distribution of solutions in
the τ-space change when uncertainty increases from ε = 0 to ε = 0.5, given N = 10,
α = 1, c = 0.33 and Ni = 2. More precisely, for this analysis both ε and τ are varied
across 100 equidistant steps.
Figure 5.3b shows that at all levels of ε, any form of conditional cooperation is sustain-
able only when τ exceeds a critical threshold that becomes increasingly restrictive as ε
increases. The figure also shows that except for very low levels of uncertainty, the con-
ditions under which σco is the solution of the game are less restrictive than are the con-
ditions for σ(s,l). For approximately 0.02 < ε < 0.3, σ(s, l) is s.p.e. in an intermediate
range of τ, but in parts of this region it is still payoff-dominated by σco. The erratic
shape of those areas in Figure 5.3b is due to the discrete structure of the strategy space
for σ(s,l). For the uncertainty range of 0.02 < ε < 0.3, the profile σ(s, l) becomes the pay-
off-dominant solution only when τ exceeds an even higher threshold. From about
ε = 0.3 on, σ(s,l) can no longer be sustained for any level of τ, while this is still possible
for σco. These results confirm the intuition that universal conditional cooperation is
σ(s,l) payoff-dominates σco 
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Figure 5.3: Effect of uncertainty ε on indicators of expected output and distribution of solutions in
ε ‒ τ parameter space. Baseline scenario: N = 10; α = 1; c = 0.33; Ni = 2.
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less robust against uncertainty than core-only conditional cooperation. Figure 5.3a
charts how this affects expected outputs o, oσ and oco. As uncertainty increases, ex-
pected output drops both overall and for oσ. The output indicator oco shows a different
pattern. It first increases, then decreases in uncertainty. The reason is that starting
from zero uncertainty, more uncertainty quickly widens the range of conditions under
which core-only cooperation is the only individually rational strategy profile. Only be-
yond approximately ε = 0.2, efficiency losses from uncertainty also noticeably affect
the expected output oco that is sustained by the core-only profile.
5.3.2.3 Comparative statics for the effects of the number of isolates Ni
Figure 5.4 shows how changes in the number of isolates between Ni = 0 and Ni = 8
affect the distribution of solutions and expected output for the baseline-scenario
N = 10, α = 1, c = 0.33 and ε = 0.2. Both Ni and τ are varied across 100 equidistant
steps in this analysis. While the number of isolates is conceptually a variable with
only integer values, mathematically the corresponding indicators can also be com-
puted for non-integer Ni . Quasi-continuous Ni was therefore used here to obtain a
smooth representation of results.
Figure 5.4b shows that the range of conditions under which universal conditional
cooperation σ(s,l) yields an individually rational strategy-profile is not affected by
Ni. In the baseline-scenario, τ needs to exceed approximately τ = 0.86 to sustain
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Figure 5.4: Effect of number of isolates Ni on indicators of expected output and distribution of
solutions in Ni ‒ τ parameter space. Baseline scenario: N = 10; α = 1; c = 0.33; ε = 0.2.
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cooperation based on σ(s,l), regardless of the value of Ni. The number of isolates
has no effect on the rationality condition for σ(s,l). In this profile, group members
condition sanctioning only on the observed group-output. This implies that the
sanctioning profile needed to keep a group member in line is the same for both
core-members and isolates. Moreover, as long as the group contains at least one iso-
late there is also no other symmetric as well as efficient profile that guarantees that
all group members including the isolate cooperate conditionally. Figure 5.4b dem-
onstrates furthermore that the conditions under which σco is individually rational
are less restrictive than those for σ(s,l) as long as Ni ≤ 5, but unlike for σ(s,l) this
range shrinks if a group contains more isolates. This happens because more free-
riding isolates reduce the long-term benefits core-members can obtain under σco rel-
ative to the short-term gains from unilateral defection. Beyond Ni = 6, core-only
conditional cooperation becomes unsustainable at all levels of τ. The figure further
shows a region of conditions under which universal conditional cooperation pay-
off-dominates core-only cooperation, while both are individually rational. This hap-
pens when Ni is in an intermediate range (between about 2 and 6) and τ exceeds
approximately τ = 0.86. Above this level of τ it can be observed that the payoff-
dominance relation between the two profiles is reversed for lower levels of Ni, be-
cause here efficiency losses under σco are relatively small compared to efficiency
losses from sanctioning periods under σ(s,l). At higher levels of Ni, σco is no longer
sustainable and σ(s,l) becomes the unique conditionally cooperative profile that is
individually rational.
Figure 5.4a shows how the negative impact of Ni on core-only cooperation trans-
lates into a negative impact on the expected output a group with a core-periphery
structure can achieve. While larger Ni comes with higher oσ from about Ni = 1.5 on,
the contribution that universal conditional cooperation can make to group-output is
too small to compensate for the output-losses that core-only cooperation suffers from
an increasing number of free-riding isolates.
All in all, Figure 5.4 confirms the intuition that a larger number of isolates
makes core-only cooperation harder to attain and less efficient, such that universal
conditional cooperation can become the superior solution given that group mem-
bers are sufficiently interested in future outcomes.
5.4 Discussion and conclusion
Conditional cooperation can be a powerful endogenous solution to the problem of col-
lective action if interactions within a group are “temporally embedded” (Batenburg
et al. 2003). However, as several authors have pointed out, the level of provision of a
collective good that can be sustained by endogenous conditional cooperation may be
severely reduced if uncertainty blurs the link between the observed provision level of
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a collective good and the underlying individual contribution decisions. Moreover,
such uncertainty may also considerably reduce the range of conditions under which
endogenous conditional cooperation is feasible at all for individually rational actors.
In this case embeddedness in social networks can be an important condition that sta-
bilizes conditional cooperation. Following up on Raub & Weesie’s (1990) analysis, a
large number of theoretical and empirical papers demonstrated that monitoring and
control via social network relations can safeguard conditional cooperation especially
for two-party cooperation problems, even when information about the degree of coop-
eration at the collective level is unreliable or not available.
In this paper I have proposed a first step towards integrating monitoring via di-
rect social ties into a model of conditional cooperation in collective-good produc-
tion under uncertainty. The model proposed here points to a dilemma that may
occur especially in groups with a core-periphery structure. Members embedded in
the densely connected core of a wider network face closer monitoring and can be
more effectively sanctioned under conditional cooperation than members in periph-
eral positions in the network. To keep the latter in line, harsher sanctioning regimes
must be imposed but these entail under uncertainty the possible cost of frequent
‘erroneous sanctioning’ which is detrimental for all group members. Thus, even for
core-members themselves it can be a more attractive rational solution to adopt a
cooperation norm that enforces contributions from core-members only and tolerates
free-riding from peripheral members of the group. Yet, such an outcome can be
deemed unfair, which imposes another social cost on the group.
The analysis presented here may point to testable hypotheses for empirical
studies that aim to explain differences in cooperation in collective action between
otherwise comparable groups that are different in their network structures. One ex-
ample are organizations, like university departments, which can differ from each
other in the relative number of full-time and part-time employees. Another are vol-
untary community-based initiatives, like local renewable energy initiatives, some of
which operate in cohesive rural communities and some in more sparsely connected
urban neighborhoods. A complication in formulating such hypotheses is that in a
concrete collective good problem there are many other characteristics of actors that
may affect contribution to a collective effort and are correlated at the same time
with actors’ position in a network. For example, members of a team of frontrunners
in a community-energy initiative are likely to attach more value to the collective
good of protection of the environment than community members who do not belong
to this core-team, which by itself may explain why they would be more willing to
contribute. However, the model proposed here also points to potentially unique
testable implications. For example, it suggests that front-runners in a community
energy initiative might be more willing to accept low levels of contributions from
other community members without trying to respond with sanctions, the larger the
core-team is relative to the community as a whole and the less easy it is for mem-
bers of the core team to observe the reasons why others fail to contribute. At the
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same time, their own level of contribution should not be reduced by those condi-
tions. However, before empirical applications can be seriously addressed, a number
of strong simplifications and potential limitations of the analysis presented here re-
quire careful inspection.
A first possible limitation is that I have focused only on a limited set of possible
conditionally cooperative strategies. Obviously other and more complex condition-
ally cooperative strategy-profiles can be constructed. Especially profiles are of inter-
est that combine the sanctioning-threat that core-only cooperation imposes on
core-members with more lenient yet demanding norms for contributions by isolates.
Such profiles could be more efficient than σco as well as less vulnerable to uncer-
tainty than σ(s, l). However, while this possibility cannot be excluded it should also
be pointed out that such profiles can lead to prohibitively complex coordination
problems as they involve different s and l levels for the different types of actors, as
well as different degrees of contribution and sanctioning from core-members and
isolates. This higher coordination complexity reduces the empirical plausibility of
such solutions.
A second strong simplification I have adopted is the maximally simple network
structure that distinguishes only two types of network positions, core-members and
isolates. In real groups facing collective good problems networks are more hetero-
geneous. The analysis proposed here could be extended to such settings with the
assumption that core-members will always defect if they observe in their personal
network at least one verifiable defection. In this case, a defection of a core-member
would trigger off a ‘wave’ of defection spreading through the network. Intuitively,
this implies that members who are more closely connected also face stronger incen-
tives to cooperate conditionally, because their defection leads to a faster and possi-
bly more comprehensive breakdown of cooperation than the defection of more
peripheral or even isolated network-members. On a qualitative level this retains the
prediction of my simpler model that conditions for universal conditional coopera-
tion are more restrictive in less densely connected networks, similar to results ob-
tained in the research on effects of network embeddedness on cooperation in two-
party interactions.
A third simplification is that my model abstracts from other differences between
group members than their position in the network. For many settings it is plausible
that that the network position is correlated with other differences between group
members. One example is an organization in which members with longer tenure
both face a darker shadow of the future and hold more central network positions
than temporary workers. Another is a voluntary association, in which members
with a larger interest in the collective good are also more active and therefore form
part of the core of a network of activists. Moreover, mutual sanctioning and control
among core-members can be expected to be even more effective if it is taken into
account that network ties serve not only as channels for monitoring but also for im-
posing direct positive or negative sanctions upon other network-members (Coleman
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1990; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Flache 1996; Flache et al. 2017). As long as more cen-
tral network positions come with stronger incentives to contribute to the collective
good (as in these examples), additional heterogeneity would not alter the proposition
of a rational exploitation of the core by the periphery. However, more central network
positions may also help core-members to enforce peripheral members’ contributions
more effectively. One possibility is that core-members hold positions with more formal
sanctioning power in an organization, another that they use their social ties to coordi-
nate effective monitoring and sanctioning efforts directed towards peripheral mem-
bers (Coleman 1990). In addition, especially in organizations peripheral workers with
temporary or part-time contracts may have strong incentives to contribute to collective
organizational goods because this can enhance their prospect of acquiring tenure or
other future rewards from the employer (cf. Lambooij, Flache, and Siegers 2009).
Fourth, a strong simplification of the model developed here is that networks
are assumed to be static. In several of the examples discussed above, it would be
possible that members of a group strategically change their network ties, for exam-
ple in order to increase their possibility to observe others’ contributions. Or, a prin-
cipal could change organizational structures to reduce the isolation of peripheral
members aiming to thereby facilitate endogenous cooperation. The very structures
that inhibit conditional cooperation according to the model proposed here, could
also be the outcome of processes of endogenous strategic network formation in
which cooperators try to evade interactions with defectors (Sohn, Choi and Ahn
2019), or in which defectors try to insulate themselves from outside pressures to
contribute (Takács, Janky and Flache 2008).
A last complication worth considering is the possibility of ostracizing isolates
who free-ride (Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 1989). After all, under a core-only norm
these members add nothing to the group-output. While this may be a readily avail-
able solution in a group that focuses only on one collective good to produce, in many
empirical situations peripheral group members may make other valuable contribu-
tions that are unrelated to a specific collective good. Think for example of a university
department that desperately needs temporarily employed teachers to offer all the
courses needed, but also would like all employees to contribute to more-or-less vol-
untary collective activities such as organizing departmental colloquia or attending
staff-meetings. It is quite plausible that in such cases norms emerge that demand per-
petual contribution from tenured staff but tolerate some level of free-riding from less
well connected temporary members of the organization.
Despite the limitations of the simple model I have proposed here, I hope to
have demonstrated that studying how networks may sustain conditional coopera-
tion through improved possibilities for monitoring is potentially a fruitful source of
inspiration not only for the area of trust in two-party relations, but also for the
study of cooperation in the production of collective goods.
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6 Reputation Effects, Embeddedness,
and Granovetter’s Error
Abstract: Reputation effects are crucial for social life. There has been important
work done in the social sciences on this topic and Raub’s contribution has been
widely recognized. It builds on Granovetter’s seminal work on embeddedness.
However, Raub’s contribution is unnecessarily limited by the fact that he copied
Granovetter’s error by assuming that all we need for dealing with reputation effects
is attention to social structure (in the sense of networks) and to rational choice as a
theory about actors. In our contribution, we argue that if reputation effects in the
moral domain (compared to reputation effects in the domain of competence) work
properly they inform people about the salience of overarching goals, including the
very goal to follow normative obligations. To understand the conditions under
which this happens necessitates attention to normative embeddedness, to norma-
tive heterogeneity, to structural features beyond networks (ingroup/outgroup dy-
namics and power differences), and to the mechanisms that govern the dynamics of
overarching goals. This requires a serious correction of Granovetter’s error, by ap-
proaching reputation effects in the moral domain on the basis of microfoundations
that can deal with the interdependence between psychological processes and social
structure.
6.1 Introduction
Reputation effects (especially those in the moral domain) have been heralded as one
of the pillars of human cooperation. Milinksi (2016) even calls reputation “a universal
currency for human cooperation.” Reputation effects can make individually costly
but socially beneficial behaviors more likely. Yet, it is by no means clear how reputa-
tion effects work and when they might fail to occur. For example, according witness
testimony, Harvey Weinstein was sexually abusing women for years, without reputa-
tion effects. And then, all of a sudden, it was a scandal. Rebecca Traister (Traister
2017) asked in an article in The Cut in October 2017 why the Weinstein allegations did
not make a stir much earlier. “The history of allegations has been an almost wholly
open secret [. . .] and yet somehow ignored, allowed to pass, unconsidered.” Why
did similar allegations hit the press about Trump and yet, nothing much happed?
Why did the reputation effect not work properly in either of these cases? Journalists
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have good guesses, but our scientific grasp of these dynamics clearly needs help, by
considering more closely the conditions under which reputation effects are likely and
conditions under which they are unlikely to occur.
Seemingly, the widespread and simple idea about reputation effects is that be-
cause people care about what is said about them by others, they will behave in such
a way that nothing bad is said about them. In addition, they base decisions about
their own behavior on what they have seen or heard about the other’s behavior in the
past (for example, they do or don’t trust the other’s promise). In the literature, the
behaviors that are allegedly regulated by reputation effects are often lumped together
under the term “cooperation,” meaning basically what Granovetter (1985) called “or-
derly transactions,” including trustworthiness and prosocial behavior. Gintis and
Fehr (2012: 28) remark that this approach to cooperation is by now quite standard in
economics and game theory, with the famous combination of rational choice and as-
sumed self-interest: People engage in orderly transactions not because they have a
feeling of obligation to do so, but because they want to avoid getting a bad reputa-
tion. The dynamics of social obligation and shared social norms plays no role in this
approach, leaving an open goal for sociologists to at least try to kick in the ball. Yet,
counter to what one might expect, the sociological research that picked up reputation
effects ever since Granovetter’s (1985) work on embeddedness of human transactions
in dyadic relationships and social networks, more or less ignored the importance of
being embedded in shared norms and the mechanisms involved in their workings
(for example how norms influence behavior differently in when ingroup/outgroup
dynamics are at play or when there are great power asymmetries).
Werner Raub is one of the sociologists who, following Granovetter, have promi-
nently contributed to the reputation and embeddedness research. But he followed
Granovetter and saw the embeddedness effects based on the assumption of rational
choice and self-interest as more parsimonious (and thus preferable) explanations of
cooperation and trust than explanations that are based on moral commitment (that is
a feeling of obligation to follow social norms). This pitting of rational choice against
“normative” or “moral” explanations of cooperation and trust is in our view based on
an erroneous contrast between rational choice and normative explanations, and it
unnecessarily limits what can be learned from research on reputation effects. But be-
fore we expound on the reasons why we consider this position flawed, we will briefly
explain the considerable role Granovetter himself played in this development.
6.2 Granovetter’s error
In 1985, Granovetter published a by now much cited article about “embeddedness”.
The general message was that two prominent views on how “orderly transactions”
(in business transactions and life in general) are brought about, are fundamentally
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flawed. The classical view in sociology of orderly transaction as being brought
about by internalized norms and values, and the classical and neoclassical view in
economics of orderly transaction as being brought about by clever institutions and
self-interest are both atomistic, neglecting the impact of social structure. Dyadic re-
lations are embedded in relations with others and between others and this embed-
ding has great influence on behavior, including behavior in business transactions.
“Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere
slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories
that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded
in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter, 1985:487). The socio-
logical program to be pursued thus should be to study the influence of embeddedness
on the likelihood that transactions are orderly. For sure, Granovetter pointed to an im-
portant shortcoming of economic explanations of orderly transactions, and Werner
Raub followed Granovetter’s program, made it his own and pursued it in a very sys-
tematic way. He focused particularly on trust problems, that is, on situations in which
lack of trust or abuse of trust would imply results that are inferior to the social benefi-
cial outcome (Raub and Buskens 2008).1 He studied various kinds of embeddedness
that affect trust: dyadic (that is the same dyad embedded by shared past or future),
network, and institutional. In the course of realizing this program with colleagues and
students, he investigated relational and structural control effects (based on the ability
to sanction and reward via future interactions or via spreading information) and
learning effects (based on experience or information from others). In addition, he in-
vestigated how institutions (for example contract law or an eBay feedback forum) pos-
itively or negatively affect relational and/or network embeddedness.2 Yet, with all this
positive development, there is also a highly problematic carry-over from Granovetter’s
embeddedness program. It can be called “Granovetter’s error”.
Granovetter (1985) introduced his embeddedness argument together with a heu-
ristic that indicated in what direction progress may be possible: focus on the effects
of structure and assume rational choice as a working hypothesis to deduce that peo-
ple rationally consider structural effects (such as reputation effect) for their action.
He admits, that rational choice theory uses naïve psychology, but
the notion that rational choice is derailed by social influences has long discouraged detailed
sociological analysis of economic life and led revisionist economists to reform economic theory
by focusing on its naive psychology. My claim here is that however naive that psychology may
be, this is not where the main difficulty lies – it is rather in the neglect of social structure.
(Granovetter 1985: 506)
1 This too follows Granovetter’s (1985) lead, who focused on the effect of embeddedness on “trust
and malfeasance”.
2 Even though we maintain that too little can be learned from this approach about reputation ef-
fects “in the wild”, we have no space to go into a discussion of the achievements of Raub’s research
program.
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Granovetter (1985: 505) speaks of “psychological revisionism” which in his view is
something one should stay away from, “an attempt to reform economic theory by
abandoning an absolute assumption of rational decision making”. In the embedded-
ness approach, once we work with the behavioral “working hypothesis” of rational
choice, “the details of social structure will determine which is found.” (Granovetter
1985: 493).
Of course, Granovetter’s approach is much to be preferred over and above a
pure structuralist approach that does not even allow any theory of action to help
explain structural effects (see Lindenberg 1995 for a critique of the pure structuralist
approach). However, it is infected by a fundamental error: it makes the untenable
assumption that structural effects are independent of the working of norms and the
psychological mechanisms connected to the way they work. Yet, contrary to what
would be implied by Granovetter’s error (and often found in the economic litera-
ture, for example Fehr, Brown and Zehnder 2009), long-term business relationships
are not likely the result of the ongoing working of reputation effects. Granovetter in
fact does not keep to his own program and brings in norm-related psychological
mechanisms through the back door. For example, in a sequel to his 1985 article, he
explains why intimate relationships have different structural effects than relation-
ship with strangers, maintaining that
continuing economic relations become overlaid with social content that, apart from economic
self-interest, carries strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism. That is, I
may deal fairly with you not only because it is in my interest, or because I have assimilated
your interest to my own (the approach of interdependent utility functions), but because we
have been close for so long that we expect this of one another, and I would be mortified and
distressed to have cheated you even if you did not find out (though all the more so if you did).
(Granovetter 1992: 42)
It is difficult to see how the rational choice “working hypothesis” would explain how
“expecting fairness of each other” can lead to being “mortified and distressed to
have cheated” even if the other did not find out. Also, if it is difficult to judge whether
or not somebody cheated or was simply unable to keep a promise (as often happens),
what cues in the interaction would help indicate a mishap rather than willful cheat-
ing? How is sincerity socially communicated and accepted? (Lindenberg 2000).
Granovetter offers no hint on what the role of norms in all this might be. In order
to trace different effects of being embedded in different kinds of relationships,
Granovetter needs to make use of mechanisms he “officially” deemed to be irrelevant
and whose use belongs to “psychological revisionism.” There is a price to be paid for
this kind of “shadow methodology” because the “bootlegged” psychological mecha-
nisms cannot be analyzed, critically evaluated and possibly adapted or corrected.3
3 The use of such a shadow methodology has also been observed for Durkheim who officially re-
jected using psychology but in practice made ample use of psychological mechanisms in his
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They must remain ad hoc, in the vague sphere of “common knowledge”. Granovetter
explicitly appeals to common knowledge to bolster his ad hoc theory of intimate rela-
tions: “It would never occur to us to doubt this last point in more intimate relations,
which make behavior more predictable and thus close off some of the fears that cre-
ate difficulties among strangers.” (Granovetter 1985: 490). But to be on the safe side
with regard to the phenomena that can occur in intimate relationships, he insists
that “in personal relations it is common knowledge that ‘you always hurt the one you
love’; that person’s trust in you results in a position far more vulnerable than that of
a stranger.” (Granovetter 1985: 491). Now, he can use one “common knowledge” as-
sumption when he needs the positive effect of intimate relationships and the opposite
one, when he needs the negative effect. Too little is gained in terms of what we learn
about the dynamics of embeddedness by using these kinds of ad hoc assumptions.
To his credit, even though he followed Granovetter’s program, Raub steadfastly
refused to also follow his shadow methodology. To the contrary, he sharpened
Granovetter’s rational choice “working hypothesis” by keeping as strictly to the as-
sumptions of standard game theory as possible. “We assume a setting of strategi-
cally interdependent actors, which seems appropriate to the embeddedness
argument in general and to the modeling of reputation effects in particular. Thus,
to analyze rational behavior in such a setting, we have to use strong game-theoretic
rationality assumptions.” (Raub and Weesie 1990: 629). This has the advantage of
allowing rigorous model building and rigorous deductions. Yet, the price is that
ever more simplifying (and thus unrealistic) assumptions have to be made to allow
such rigor. For example, in 1990, Raub and Weesie published a by now much cited
article on reputation effects (Raub and Weesie 1990) in which they contrast three
game-theoretic models of reputation effects: one with no embedding, one with per-
fect embedding, and one with imperfect embedding. The models are rigorous but
require that structural embedding is always associated with actors costlessly getting
information on all interactions of their partners. In addition, there is no allowance
for mistakes or misunderstandings. If an act is taken to be a “defection”, it will trig-
ger retaliatory reactions throughout the network. While some game theorists make
this the basis for the generation of trust (others trust their transaction partner be-
cause they reckon with their partner’s fear of this retaliatory reaction, Guennif and
Revest 2005), Raub and Weesie admit that this lack of allowance for mistakes or
misunderstandings is an extremely unstable social system. They suggest a remedy
that keeps entirely to the inner logic of their models. Rather than internalizing peo-
ple’s fear of mistake and misunderstandings, they argue that, to avoid such insta-
bility “requires that actors be informed not only on the interactions of their partners
explanations (see Lindenberg 1983). Homans (1964: 818) said of shadow methodologists jokingly
“they keep psychological explanations under the table and bring them out furtively like a bottle of
whiskey, for use when they really need help.”
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but also on the interactions of the partners of their partner.” (Raub and Weesie
1990: 464). It is a nice example of how highly simplifying assumptions can drive
one progressively further away from social reality and from the necessity to deal
with the dynamics of norms. Following Granovetter’s error even without shadow
methodology and with mathematical rigor will thus also teach us too little about
the dynamics of reputation and embeddedness.4
6.2.1 Reputation and the importance of norms
The fateful and, in our view misguided, juxtaposition of rational choice versus “nor-
mative” explanations on which Granovetter’s error is based, is embraced by Raub
even more willingly, as it echoes an earlier and even more extreme statement by
Coleman (1964: 166f), that Raub frequently cites: “sociologists have characteristi-
cally taken as their starting point a social system in which norms exist, and individ-
uals are largely governed by those norms. Such a strategy views norms as the
governors of social behavior, and thus neatly bypasses the difficult problem that
Hobbes posed [. . .] I will proceed in precisely the opposite fashion [. . .] I will make
an opposite error, but one which may prove more fruitful [. . .] I will start with an
image of man as wholly free: unsocialized, entirely self-interested, not constrained
by norms of a system, but only rationally calculating to further his own self-
interest.” This leave little room indeed for considering the relevance of norms and
normative obligations for reputation effects.
Raub and Weesie (1990: 629) define reputation as “a characteristic or an attri-
bute ascribed to him by his partners.” However, they fail to add that it is not just
any characteristic or attribute. Reputation is a socially acquired evaluative opinion
about a social actor regarding a tendency to act in a particular way (be that an
individual, group, organization or country) (Giardini & Wittek, 2019; Weigelt and
Camerer 1988). Reputation is similar to direct social control (say, that one wants to
avoid disapproval) with regard to the importance of shared norms and standards.
However, reputation is more than direct social control. It is about a good/bad con-
tinuum, and that requires shared standards of evaluation and it is about a pre-
sumed behavioral tendency, even though this judgment may be based on just one
incident (“once a liar, always a liar”). Thus, reputation effects are about the as-
sumed likelihood that a social actor behaves dishonestly, is helpful, is better than
others in certain regards, keeps promises, is cooperative, is opportunistic, etc. It is
also useful to stress that unless one deals explicitly with dyadic reputation effects,
reputation refers to the evaluative opinions that are shared in a particular group. In
4 Incidentally, Corten et al. (2016), testing the Raub/Weesie model of reputation effects found that
its predictions did not hold up. Unfortunately, Corten et al. did not see Granovetter’s error at work.
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this sense, one can also speak of the reach of reputation, depending on how inclu-
sive the group is in which it is shared. In order to see the importance of the evalua-
tive aspect of reputation also for Granovetter and Raub, it is useful to observe the
language that is used by them when describing the behavior about which reputa-
tion effects emerge: In Granovetter’s (1985) article on embeddedness, the term “op-
portunism” appears 17 times, and “malfeasance” 25 times. In the Raub and Weesie
(1990) article, “opportunism” appears 15 times, “malfeasance” 11 times, and “defec-
tion” 62 times. It is not said but implied that there are shared standards and norms,
and that people who violate these standards or norms (that is defect, are opportu-
nistic, or knowingly commit a wrongful act) must fear for their reputation because
others may infer an action tendency on the basis of this violation. People anticipate
such loss of a good reputation and thus are more likely to behave “properly.”
Simply assuming clashing preferences or goals is not enough for reputation ef-
fects. If preferences and personal goals are important for reputation effects, their
influence derives from their link with norms. For example, if an overnight guest
squeezes my toothpaste in the middle and I happen to be somebody who gets irri-
tated by that, it makes no sense to say that this is an example of how a bad reputa-
tion is being built. Even in the case of a purely dyadic reputation effect, my friend
would have to know that squeezing the toothpaste in the middle is negatively eval-
uated by me, and I would have to know that he knows that, as he would have to
know that I know he knows. In short, for reputation effects to occur in this situa-
tion, I would have to be thought of by my friend as somebody who willfully irritates
a friend. What would be violated in this case is a friendship norm via my willing-
ness to let personal preferences (for squeezing the toothpaste in the middle) prevail
over behavior appropriate to a friendship relation.
People can have personal norms, but that is also not enough for reputation ef-
fects. It is the fact that standards and norms are shared that allows people to ab-
stain from a certain behavior for fear of losing their good reputation. For example,
if there is no shared norm about going to church on Sunday, people will neither
lose their good reputation by not going, nor would they go to church for fear of los-
ing their good reputation. Reputation effects thus necessitate normative embedded-
ness, that is shared standards and norms. The argument that norms cannot be
taken as given, that they must be “endogenized” and explained by equilibrium be-
havior in repeated games (see Buskens and Raub 2013), is misplaced in this context,
as reputation effects presuppose the existence of shared norms rather than the
other way around. Norms do not emerge to make reputation effects possible, but
reputation effects go piggyback on shared norms, that is they are made possible
and derive their usefulness on the basis of shared norms. When it comes to exam-
ples of how reputation effects work, Raub and Weesie (1990: 642) don’t hesitate to
cite as prime example the case of diamond merchants (also used by Granovetter)
that clearly presupposes shared norms: “Like other densely knit networks of actors,
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they generate clearly defined standards of behavior easily policed by the quick
spread of information on instances of malfeasance.”
The requirement that reputation effects necessitate normative embedding is
only half of the story. We also have to deal with the question why people would
make judgments about “behavioral tendencies” on the basis of observed behavior.
Is it simply that there are types of people and even one or a few behaviors signal a
type? Or are these judgments more complex? This too is a question that needs
answers.
Why is it important to make the dynamics of normative embeddedness and be-
havioral tendency judgments explicit? The quick answer to this question is: because
norms and judgments about behavioral tendencies in dealing with norms affect vir-
tually all aspects of the dynamics of reputation, be that the question what can be
subject to reputation effects, where reputation effects can be expected, why these
effects may vary in strength, when and why people would pass on reputation-
relevant information, or how power asymmetries affect what is and is not damaging
for one’s reputation. It is exactly because reputation effects are such an important
part of (self)controlling behavior that we need to be able to answer such questions.
For answering any one of these questions, one has to consider psychological as-
pects connected with the dynamics of normative embeddedness, the actor who may
or may not anticipate reputational effects, the observer who may or may not react
to transgressions, and the transmitter who may or may not pass on information that
could affects one’s reputation.5
6.3 The effects of heterogeneity on normative
embeddedness
Normative embeddedness that is needed for reputational effects depends on norma-
tive homogeneity and thus is not simply embeddedness in social relationships. This
is far from being trivial. Many of the examples used in the literature about reputa-
tion effects are from anthropological research on so-called traditional societies, or
from experiments with subjects from homogeneous populations (for example
Giardini and Conte 2012; Gintis, Smith and Bowles 2001). In these examples, shared
norms and standards are more or less taken for granted and not included in the
analysis. But can one simply ignore normative embeddedness in our societies as
well? As populations become more heterogeneous with regard to social norms, rep-
utation effects are likely to become more restricted to normatively homogeneous
5 Because of restrictions of space, we follow Granovetter as well as Raub in focusing mostly on the
dynamics concerning “bad” reputation.
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local “pockets”, and even friendship networks may be too heterogeneous for many
reputation effects (say with regard to tax evasion, or honesty in business deals, or
duties as a parent). As a result, reputation effects become less of a regulatory force
for interpersonal behavior, with some authors even complaining about an increase
in “cheating culture” (for example Callahan 2004). Instead, widespread reputation
effects become more restricted to useful but quite mundane forms of evaluation
(such as the quality of food in a restaurant, quality of online services, or
e-commerce rating systems that solve the very trust problems created by the inter-
net itself) because for them there is still a widespread consensus on standards. But
even these reputational mechanisms are quite complicated. “Strong reciprocity”
(that is the assumed predisposition to unconditionally reward or punish one’s inter-
action partner’s cooperation or defection, see Diekmann et al. 2014), is often in-
voked for such mechanisms. However, what is less often considered is that strong
reciprocity also works against reputation effects by blocking feedback. For example,
a study of reputation effects for eBay found that buyers are reluctant to give nega-
tive feedback for fear of counter punishment from the seller (Li 2010). In short, the
mundane forms of reputation effects require a good deal of psychological finesse to
work properly (see for example Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels 2013 and 2018). In
addition to the mundane effects, many reputation effects occur for the extreme
forms of deviant behavior (such as pedophilia, sexual abuse of women, downright
corruption). And even here, important psychological mechanisms are at work,
drawing our attention to the role of “publicizers” (see the section on “transmitters”
below). This leaves large gap of behavior that is not well covered. For example, for
businesses, so-called reputation effects are increasingly “managed effects” based
on corporate identity, certification contests, brand recognition, and quality percep-
tions realized more through public relations campaigns than observed past behav-
iors (see for example Gray Balmer 1998 or Balmer and Gray 1999). Alternatively, for
business transactions, care for establishing and maintaining long-term relation-
ships through bonding, relational contracting, and relational governance reduces
the reliance on “fear” factors such as hostages and reputational effects inside or-
ganizations (Birkinshaw, Foss and Lindenberg 2014) and between organizations
(Dyer and Singh 1998). Transgressions regarding the relevant norms involved (such
as breaking trust) then may be fatal for the bonding of the relationship. For exam-
ple, investigating interfirm networks in the apparel industry, Uzzi (1997: 59) found
that “if the strong assumptions of trust and cooperation are exploited in embedded
ties, vendettas and endless feuds can arise.” This is likely to help the transacting
parties from breaching trust. But it is not a reputation effect.
For shorter term relationships, a good part of what reputation effects could
have done is taken over by institutional sources of evaluative information (such as
information on creditworthiness, on certifications, on “good behavior” certificates,
on rankings, ratings and comparative sites). Not surprisingly, where reputation ef-
fects regarding more complex evaluation questions of products and practices in
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informal groupings are operative, we see explicit work on normative embeddedness
with shared norms and standards. Examples are occupational communities (for ex-
ample Lawrence 1998) and the increasing number of online communities with a
focus on community building, mutual support and the sharing and exchange of in-
formation (Preece, Maloney‐Krichmar and Abras, 2003).
Even when norms are widely shared, their ability to create reputational effects
is dampened in heterogeneous societies. For many groups, growing heterogeneity
(religious and ethnic) makes those norms that are shared more abstract. This was
already observed by Durkheim (1964 [1893]): Norms in heterogeneous societies
“rule only the most general forms of conduct and rule them in a very general man-
ner, saying what must be done, not how it must be done.” The consequence is that,
in any concrete action situation, the abstractness of norms leaves considerable
moral “wiggle room” (Dana et al. 2007; Lindenberg 2008; Mazar, Amir and Ariely
2008; Spiekermann and Weiss 2016), making it less obvious whether or not people
transgressed a norm. Given such wiggle room, the actor is less concerned about rep-
utational effects of many of her actions, and the observer is less likely to draw repu-
tational conclusions from observing these actions. In sum, heterogeneity creates
“wiggle room” with regard to norm conformity, which, in turn, weakens reputa-
tional effects. But there is much more to be considered than this wiggle room.
Psychological aspects need also to be explicitly considered for all major figures in-
volved in reputation effects: the actor, the observer, and the transmitter.
6.4 The actor
For reputation effects to occur, actors need to be concerned about them, but when is
this the case? The damaging effect of a reputation effect derives from the possible
inference that the “deviant” behavior reveals a behavioral tendency. Why would an
actor assume that others do not only judge his actions, but also infer a behavioral
tendency on the basis of first or second-hand experiences of his actions? To answer
this question, we have to have a closer look at the role goals play in this. People con-
form to norms and legitimate rules and standards for different reasons, depending on
their goals. It may be prudent to do so; or it may feel good to do so; or it may be the
right thing to do. Reasons for doing things cluster when they are generated by the
same goal. Particularly interesting in this regard are three overarching goals because
their salience can change from one situation to another (Lindenberg and Steg 2007,
2013). It is very likely that the actors know that their behavior says something about
the salience of their overarching goal. For example, Hilbe, Hoffman and Nowak
(2015) showed with cleverly designed experiments that people who deliberately ig-
nore cues that might tell them whether or not defection might be profitable are more
trusted. “Intuitively, by not looking at the payoffs, people indicate that they will not
122 Siegwart Lindenberg, Rafael Wittek and Francesca Giardini
be swayed by high temptations to defect, which makes them more attractive as inter-
action partners.” (Hilbe, Hoffman and Nowak 2015: 458). Behaviors are signals about
which overarching goal is salient (Lindenberg 2000).
There are three overarching goals: a gain goal (focused on increasing or main-
taining one’s resources, such as money); a hedonic goal (focused on improving or
maintaining the way one feels); and a normative goal (focused on acting as a mem-
ber of a collective, on acting appropriately with regard to the norms of this collec-
tive). For goals to become action-relevant, they have to be cognitively salient. At
any given moment, one of the three overarching goals is likely to be the most sa-
lient and have the strongest influence on reasons for doing things, which, in turn
are linked to cognitive and motivational processes such as what one pays attention
to and what one ignores, what concepts and chunks of knowledge are being acti-
vated, what alternatives one considers, what information one is most sensitive
about, and how one processes information. Social cues can greatly affect the sa-
lience of these overarching goals (Lindenberg 2012), so that social embeddedness
(structure) and normative embeddedness (shared norms with more or less salient
normative goals) interact. Let us make this more concrete by discussing each of the
three overarching goals from the point of view of the actor. Even though in real life,
all three goals are active to some degree at the same time (with one of them being
most salient), we will ignore this mixed motive aspects for reasons of simplicity of
exposition.
Gain goal. The gain goal becomes salient in situations in which there are clear
opportunities for increasing one’s resources, such as money or status, investment
opportunities, competitive conditions, and “golden” opportunities for profit. When
the gain goal is salient, the focus is on costs and benefits of a particular action in
the medium and longer term, and thus a person is likely to also consider whether
his or her action can have damaging reputational consequences. Most economists
(as well as Granovetter and Raub) assume that people only have this overarching
goal. With regard to reputation effects, the actor with a salient gain goal anticipates
some future interaction or some indirect effects via gossiping. If he assumes that
nobody would know about his action, the action would not be constrained by repu-
tational concerns and only focused on gain. Thus, people with a salient gain goal
act strategically, and for them reputational effects are part of the cost/benefit calcu-
lation. They will consider the likelihood that their actions will be observed or trace-
able, whether at least some of the potential observers will judge the actions
evaluatively, and whether the observers could gain from passing on evaluative in-
formation to third parties who do care about conformity to norms and standards.
Without it being mentioned that somebody has to care about norms and standards,
this is also as Granovetter and Raub would assume it happens. But reputation ef-
fects only contribute to orderly transactions if they are truly informative about
somebody’s behavioral tendency. Strategic self-interest (a salient gain goal) can un-
dermine reputation effects because actors with a salient gain goal are likely to also
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consider how they could appear to conform to norms and standards, even when
they don’t conform. In other words, when at least some relevant others are assumed
to care about this conformity, actors with a salient gain goal will put effort into
managing the impression they make on others even when they transgress norms
and standards with impunity (see for a vivid description Williams and Milton 2015).
The better they succeed in doing so, the less “orderly transactions” are brought
about by anticipated reputation effects.
What is the assumed naïve psychology of others in this regard? If observers as-
sume the gain goal to be salient where a salient normative goal was socially expected
(say, after observing the breach of a promise), they also assume that the gain goal
will easily dominate the normative goal on other such occasions. This is how one ob-
served behavior can lead to the inference of a behavioral tendency. In fact, the naïve
psychology associates a behavioral tendency with who you are, with an identity, and
it influences behavior. For example, “please don’t be a cheater” works much better in
preventing unethical behavior than “please don’t cheat” (Bryan et al. 2012). The infer-
ence process is based on incongruence of expected and inferred salience of an over-
arching goal. For example, a salient gain goal would be expected when somebody
negotiates a deal; a salient hedonic goal would be expected when celebrating a birth-
day; and a salient normative goal would be expected with regard to promises made.
If breaching the promise would be profitable, observing that it is breached without
excuse or explanation is taken as a sign that the gain goal becomes salient too easily
in this situation for this particular person or company, when it should not become
salient at all (Lindenberg 2000).6 Institutions actually encourage the salience of these
overarching goals in these different situations (Lindenberg 2017). This, then, is the
likely mechanism behind the link between behavior as a signal and the behavioral
tendency that is assumed on the basis of this signal. The identity inference is based
on the assumed ease with which one of the three overarching goals can become sa-
lient in a particular situation. Types (say a “cheater”, “a money-grabber”, a “saint”)
are of course not only identity labels people assign to others, but they do exist as
chronically salient hedonic, gain or normative goals in people. For understanding
reputation effects, however, it is also important to remember that, despite the chronic
salience, intrapersonal shifts in the salience of overarching goals are also possible for
such types, when the situation is strong enough (see for example Pulford et al. 2016).
In sum, it is the incongruence between expected and experienced salient goals in
others that is at the basis of reputations. Such incongruence is much less likely and
thus much more informative than congruence. For this reason, it is also said that “it
takes a long time to build a reputation and only an incident to ruin it.”
6 This would hold even if the deviance were not related to moral standards but to standards of
competence, but in the following, we will not go further into reputation effects for (in)competence,
because they are likely to depend also on conditions specific to standards of competence.
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As we discussed already, reputation effects are not about clashing “private”
preferences or goals. It is by now clear that reputation effects actually rest on the
fact that there are different overarching goals and that observed behavior is used to
form impressions about their salience. Could negative reputation effects occur if ev-
erybody assumed everybody else to have a salient gain goal (as in, say, highly cor-
rupt circles)? Our answer is: no. Even though everybody might prefer others to keep
promises, to help, to be honest etc., if nobody assumes others to have a salient nor-
mative goal, there would be no news value attached to not keeping one’s promises,
not helping, not being honest. At best, one could acquire a reputation for keeping
one’s promises, being honest, etc., but with the assumption by the researcher that
everybody has a salient gain goal, even this positive reputation effect would not be
possible. This points to the internal inconsistency of an approach that assumes a
gain goal for everybody (that is rational choice with self-interest and common
knowledge) and claims to explain reputational effects. In a world without different
overarching goals, reputational effects in the moral domain would play no impor-
tant role.
Hedonic goal. The hedonic goal becomes salient when people are exposed to
situations that contain strong visceral or arousing stimuli or when people are tired.
When the hedonic goal is salient (say, somebody is in a party mood, or feels very
anxious), the focus is on feelings (short term) and thus also on behavior that feels
good or improves the way one feels. One is sensitive to others’ proximal affective
reactions (such as anger or praise), but this is different from anticipated reputa-
tional effects, as the concern is with the impact of the others’ reactions on the way
one feels right now, rather than about other people’s inferences about one’s behav-
ioral tendencies. Thus, with a high concentration of people with a salient hedonic
goal (such as often in a beach resort), we would expect much mutual concern about
others’ affective reactions, but only a very limited occurrence of behavior that is
controlled by anticipated reputation effects.
The hedonic goal plays also an important role in reactions to observing a viola-
tion of norms by others, because such a violation often increases the salience of the
hedonic goal, that is, it increases the focus on how one feels. For example, moral
outrage after observing moral transgressions is often a hedonic reaction rather than
a normative one (O’Mara et al. 2011; Veldhuis et al. 2014). A focus on how one feels
makes reaction to observing norm violations very dependent on factors that have
little to do with the spread of veridical information about trustworthiness (Wetzer,
Zeelenberg, and Pieters 2007). Feeling victimized my lead to taking revenge and
telling others an exaggerated account of what happened, or it may heighten one’s
vigilance and fear of counter attacks, making one abstain from passing on negative
information (see for example Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels 2013). We will come
back to this issue then dealing with the observer and transmitter.
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Normative goal. When the normative goal is salient, the focus is on behaving
appropriately, with a feeling of obligation to do so. In this case, one would behave
appropriately even when one feels unobserved. The salience of the normative goal
is strongly influenced by institutions, such as the rule of law (Lindenberg 2017).
However, this does not mean that others play no role. There is an evolved sensitiv-
ity to social cues that affects the salience of the normative goal and creates what we
call “cued” reputation effects (in contrast to “calculated” reputation effects that can
occur with a salient gain goal).7 With calculated reputation effects, the presence of
others could make one conform to norms because one wants to avoid getting a bad
reputation. In contrast, even though cued reputation effects may have evolutionary
roots in calculated reputation effects (Hoffman, Yoeli, and Navarrete 2016), they are
by now governed more or less automatically by cues emanating from others. People
with a salient normative goal have been shown to be less calculating about reputa-
tion effects (Simpson and Willer 2008) and signaling that one is not calculative in-
creases trustworthiness in others (Jordan et al. 2016). In this way, others become
more calculative and less prosocial vis-à-vis somebody who has a bad reputation
(Schilke and Cook 2015; Wedekind and Milinksi 2000).
The physical and even the sheer psychological presence of others who stand for
shared norms increases the salience of the normative goal (that is of the collective
orientation) and it activates anticipated shame and/or guilt about not acting appro-
priately (Engelmann, Herrmann and Tomasello, 2012; Shaw 2003a, 2003b; Wu,
Balliet, and van Lange 2016). That this is not part of a cost/benefit calculation can
be gleaned from the fact that the salience of the normative goal is strengthened al-
ready by pictorial representations of eyes gazing at an individual (Manesi, van
Lange, and Pollet 2016). The salience of the normative goal is also very responsive
to the observed respect by others for norms and standards (Lindenberg, Six and
Keizer 2020). For example, in field experiments, it was shown that observed (dis)
respect for norm A greatly increased (decreased) conformity to norm B in the ob-
server (see Keizer, Lindenberg and Steg 2008, 2013). Normative and social embedd-
edness interact but cued reputation effects are not related to the anticipation of a
possible flow of information through specific networks. Rather, cued reputational
effects are linked to the presence (bodily or psychological) of generalized others
and signs of their respect or disrespect for norms and standards. Thus, even though
network structures may be important for cued reputation effects and for what infor-
mation (if any) people will circulate, other structural features, such as ingroup/out-
group differences and power asymmetries, maybe at least as important.
7 In the literature, these two ways in which reputation effects restrain behavior are often con-
founded (for example Jordan et al. 2016).
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6.5 Special effects for the actor: Ingroup/outgroup
and power-asymmetry effects
Ingroup/outgroup effects. Human beings have evolved to function in so-called fu-
sion/fission groups (Aureli et al. 2008). This means that they are cognitively and
motivationally equipped to function in changing group constellations, such that
being part of, say, a hunting party in the morning and part of an inclusive group
(comprising various subgroups) for arranging a safe camp for the night. The collec-
tive to which the normative goal refers thus can change flexibly, depending on the
circumstances. This ability also allows so-called ingroup/outgroup dynamics, in
which the relevant collective for the normative goal explicitly excludes some other
group (the outgroup). Intergroup conflict and competition will strengthen this “pa-
rochial” orientation of the normative goal (De Dreu et al., 2016; Wildschut and
Insko, 2006). Thus, ingroup members expect each other to have a salient normative
goal regarding the ingroup (and be rewarded with social approval and status for
actively “proving” these orientations to their ingroup fellows, see De Dreu, Balliet,
and Halevy 2014) and to have a salient gain goal or hedonic goal regarding the out-
group. Outgroup members are similarly expected to be parochial in their orienta-
tion. For an actor, this has important consequences regarding reputational effects:
strong cued reputational effects for most ingroup members, strong calculated repu-
tational effects for some ingroup members, and for all ingroup members no reputa-
tional effects vis-à-vis outgroup members. Thus, whatever makes groups more
parochial will strengthen constraints on behavior through reputational effects for
the ingroup and weaken these constraints for the outgroup. We will come back to
this point when discussing the observer.
Power asymmetries. Power asymmetries are likely to generate strong effects of sa-
lient hedonic goals (sexual abuse, fear) and to change the working of the normative
goal. When people in one group differ much in terms of power, it is likely that the
more powerful will care less about reputational effects than the less powerful. This
is not just because power can neutralize the negative consequences of reputational
effects, but also because power can be used to either prevent reputational effects
from occurring, or to exploit them. With relational asymmetries, the powerful are
also more likely to be less concerned about using unethical means (Brass,
Butterfield and Skaggs 1998). Importantly, the powerful can create fear in the less
powerful about spreading certain information about them, purposefully building up
a reputation for being fierce and unforgiving. This reigning by fear is made less effec-
tive though by the ability of the “weak” to use reputational effects as a weapon, by
spreading rumors that the powerful would rather not have spread. In this case, peo-
ple don’t spread first-hand information but rumors they say they heard from others.
Such hear-say has no identifiable source and no truth claim, and thus it is less likely
to be punishable (Giardini, 2012). This form of gossip can be a strong weapon of the
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weak against the powerful. The downside of this weapon is that it lacks some bite by
missing identifiable sources and truth claims.
The powerful can, in turn, neutralize much of the damaging effect of gossip by
interpreting behavior in such a way that the working of the normative goal is under-
mined. They can create moral ambiguity by reacting lukewarm or even with praise
to the blatant infractions of norms and standards they wish to undermine or the
applicability of which they wish to control. For example, president Trump reacted
to blatant white racial violence in Charlottesville in 2017 by saying “I think the
blame is on both sides [. . .] You had a group on one side that was bad. You had a
group on the other side that was also very violent. Nobody wants to say that. I’ll say
it right now.” (New York Times, Aug. 11th, 2017).
The powerful can also influence the interpretation of behavior in ways that allow
the direct manipulation of information, including gossip. One way has been de-
scribed by Orwell in his novel 1984 as the imposition of “doublethink” and “new-
speak”. He defines the former as “the act of holding, simultaneously, two opposite,
individually exclusive ideas or opinions and believes” and the latter as “an official or
semiofficial style of writing or saying one thing in the guise of its opposite”. There
are many present-day examples of these methods, such as the introduction of the
term “alternative facts” by the advisor to the White House.
Another (but related) way to influence the interpretation of behavior and create
moral ambiguity is to redefine the behavior as not falling under injunctive (that is
“obligatory”) norms but under descriptive norms (what people do) (Lindenberg
et al 2020). This is achieved by using one’s power to “persuade” what would other-
wise be victims of transgression of injunctive norms that they are in unfamiliar ter-
rain and thus have to learn how things are done around here (descriptive norms).
Descriptive norms can undermine injunctive norms or at least their applicability.
For example, a powerful film producer can persuade actresses looking for a role in
a movie that it is normal, for getting a chance of being considered for a part, to be
willing to play sexual games with the producer. Ironically, hearing that everybody
does it does not cumulatively add to the bad reputation of the producer but makes
it more likely that women submit to him. Thus, the power to refocus the interpreta-
tion of behavior from being subject to injunctive norms to being subject to manipu-
lated descriptive norms also diminishes whatever reputational effects might have
achieved. Evaluative judgments about descriptive norms refer to personal prefer-
ence, similar to what people might think about chewing gum (“I hate it, but seem-
ingly everybody does it”) rather than to moral condemnation. Thus, gossip about
personal preferences will not have much impact on reputations.8
8 Game-theoretic approaches that take norms as equilibrium behavior (that is what most people
do) treat all norms as though they were descriptive norms and thus cannot even describe such
shifts in evaluative judgments from moral condemnation to personal preference.
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6.6 The observer
Reputational effects, especially for actors with a salient gain goal, can restrain be-
havior because there are presumably observers who might react negatively or pass
on to others what they have experienced. Observers can be targets of actions that
trigger an evaluative response or they can be observers of such actions happening
to others. For both, it is not trivial whether or not some action or information is in-
terpreted positively or negatively. There may be sheer flaws in the system providing
information. For example, “likes” and positive evaluations for one’s services can be
freely bought on the internet. Observers of feedback on social media may or may
not be able to distinguish fake from genuine reviews. Up to now, we know too little
about the ability to pinpoint fake reviews. Government agencies, concerned about
the bad quality of the online reputations systems, have taken action against fake re-
views. For example, the Competition & Market Authority of the British Government
issued an open letter to marketing departments and agencies and their clients
warning about fake reviews, and reporting that it has taken enforcement action
against widespread fake online reviews (CMA 2016). But besides such faults in the
feedback systems, there are important psychological aspects that influence how an
observer interprets actions or information.
6.7 Special effects for the observer: Ingroup/
outgroup and power-asymmetry effects
Ingroup/outgroup effects. Reputation effects necessitate the interpretation of others’
behavior as transgression of norms. However, ingroup/outgroup dynamics bias the in-
terpretation of behavior as transgression, because cognition is affected by motivation
(Brewer 1979, Balcetis and Dunning 2006). Stronger parochialism will make it more
likely that actions by an outgroup member are interpreted as transgressions of the in-
group norms and standards. There is little room for granting outgroup members the
possibility of having made mistakes or of misunderstandings, a privilege that is often
granted to ingroup members. Even if one is not a target, observing of members of
one’s ingroup being badly treated by members of an outgroup is likely to trigger
moral outrage (Veldhuis et al. 2014). Conversely, the stronger parochialism, the less
likely an observer will interpret a norm transgression of an ingroup members as a
transgression (Hughes et al. 2017, Everett et al. 2015). More likely it will be interpreted
as an error, or an action caused by an outsider. For example, seemingly, people who
see Donald Trump as one of their ingroup members do not believe the accusations
about his sexual transgressions (“fake news”), or see it as a forgivable mistake (“ev-
erybody makes mistakes”). In this way transgressions fail to contribute to a bad repu-
tation among the ingroup members.
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If, however, an ingroup member must admit that the observed behavior by a
fellow ingroup member was a transgression, a likely reaction is that the “culprit” is
not, should not be, or never was a true member of the ingroup. The reputation effect
is then socially fatal. For example, in the wake of the Harvey Weinstein scandal and
the “me too” tweets, famous actors who were then also accused of sexual miscon-
duct were removed from television series, as if watching them would be unbear-
able. This taps into the purity dimension of morality (see Graham et al. 2011) and
shows that reputation effects often have much to do with increased salience of the
hedonic goal and little to do with a rational calculation of risk in dealing with a
particular person. It also reinforces that, contrary to what Granovetter and Raub as-
sume, reputation is not only about finding out whether somebody is or is not a
trustworthy type. There is also fear of contagion, fear that “badness” rubs off, that
one may be corrupted by being near or even just seeing such a person. In short, to
the degree that reputation effects depend on observers, parochialism dampens
these effects concerning the ingroup members, and distorts these effects concerning
outgroup members. In both cases, parochialism reduces the information value car-
ried by reputations or the lack of them.
Power asymmetry effects. Like ingroup/outgroup dynamics, power asymmetry af-
fects the perception of the transgressions of others. Being powerful goes with a
strong tendency to focus on achieving one’s goals (Guinote 2007). If the observer is
powerful, noticing others’ transgressions depends on their relation to the observer’s
goal-pursuit. If the transgression is deemed relevant, it is most likely observed and
remembered by the powerful, leading potentially to reputation effects. If the trans-
gressor is perceived as being low in power, the chance is small that the transgres-
sion touches the goal pursuit of the powerful person. Thus, as long as persons low
in power do not cross the goal pursuit of a person high in power, their transgres-
sions are likely not even noticed by the powerful, highly limiting reputation effects.
It is different if the observer is low in power. Then, observing transgressions of
a powerful person may be keenly noticed but is subject to reappraisal. “Did he just
insult me? Well, probably not. I think he has a bad day”. Individuals with low
power are more perceptive of context effects and threats emanating from contexts
than individuals with high power (Kraus et al. 2012). This makes them more likely
to interpret transgressions of more powerful others as being more harmless that
they were (that is they reappraise, see Hittner, Rim and Haase 2018). In this way,
people are on the safe side, because what they saw does not call for a reaction. But
then it also does not lead to a potential reputation affect.
In the business world, there is an additional way in which the powerful may
escape being subject to possible negative reputation effects. Big companies can af-
ford investing considerable amounts of resources in branding and high visibility,
gaining consumer’s trust with little help from reputational effects. By contrast,
small companies must rely on mechanisms of reputation building (such as online
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peer review systems) to gain consumer’s trust. The functioning of such reputation
systems thus has a strong impact on the power asymmetry of companies. For exam-
ple, Newberry & Zhou (2019) show that if the reputation system for small companies
would not be available, there would be a large shift in demand for goods from the
small to the big companies. This makes understanding the conditions under which
reputation systems work all the more important.
6.8 The transmitter
As Burt (2008) observed: “reputations emerge not form what we do, but from peo-
ple talking about what we do [. . .] What circulates depends on the interest of peo-
ple doing the circulation.” The transmitter deserves special attention with regard to
reputation effects.
An observer may or may not be also a transmitter, that is someone who passes
on what he or she has experienced. Transmitters may also be people who pass on
not what they have experienced but what they have heard or say they have heard.
The important question is why people would become transmitters. Obviously, they
may have a strategic goal in mind, to help or hurt somebody by doing so. For exam-
ple, a person with a salient normative goal may want to help the authorities by
passing on information on a criminal act he has seen somebody commit (Feinberg
et al. 2012). A person with a salient gain goal may want to hurt the competition by
passing on negative information about the competitor. A person with a salient he-
donic goal may want to take revenge on somebody by disclosing negative confiden-
tial information.
Targets, especially victims, are likely to react emotionally to infractions and thus
have an increased salience of the hedonic goal, which means that they have less stra-
tegic restraint, and that they are likely to choose actions that promise to improve the
way they feel (such as retaliation, aggression in case of victims, and the pleasure of
being nasty to people they don’t like) (Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh, 2005). Because
of their salient hedonic goal, they are potentially very important transmitters. Taking
revenge makes people feel better (Chester and De Wall 2017), and telling the world is
often part of taking revenge. It is these kinds of hedonic responses to having become
a victim that are dangerous for actors. However, hedonic reactions can be curbed by
hedonic means. Thus, instilling fear or shame in victims is a powerful way to keep
victims from becoming transmitters. We mentioned already the example of buyers on
eBay who fear negative counter punishment (Li 2010). Harassment in the workplace
(prominently including sexual harassment) is also a good example of this. A recent
study by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Feldblum and Lipnic
2016), reported that about 75% of employees who experienced harassment never
even talked to a supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassing
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conduct. “Employees who experience harassment fail to report the harassing behav-
ior or to file a complaint because they fear disbelief of their claim, inaction on their
claim, blame, or social or professional retaliation.” (Feldblum and Lipnic 2016: v).
Gossip. Even though fear will have a smaller impact on gossipers than on vic-
tims because hear-say has no identifiable source and no truth claim (Giardini and
Conte 2012), gossipers are also likely to have a salient hedonic goal and are thus
sensitive to cues that instill fear.
People like to make conversation, small talk, and have something interesting to
say or hear in the process. Importantly, when people are in a situation that invites
behavior that is pleasant or fun, such as gossiping, their hedonic goal becomes more
salient, making it also a pleasant experience to feel virtuous by judging others with-
out having to sacrifice for being virtuous oneself (Lindenberg et al. 2018). In such a
situation, people tend to feel more virtuous than others (Epley and Dunning 2000).
In addition, it is likely that people gladly take any opportunity to engage in this be-
havior because gossip is able to satisfy all five fundamental needs (Nieboer et al.
2005), often at the same time: a need for stimulation; a need for comfort, a need for
affection (belonging); a need for behavioral confirmation; and a need for status. For
example, by telling someone confidentially about how bad somebody behaved, the
gossiper provides stimulation for the other, some status for himself for being in the
know, some behavioral confirmation for himself and the other as they exchange dis-
approval of a disgusting act “they would never do”; some bonding by sharing infor-
mation others don’t have, and some comfort by mutually feeling the other’s support.
Gossip does not have to be about information that affects somebody’s reputation.
For example, it could be about the incredible bad luck for somebody else, rather than
bad deeds. This is what De Backer et al. (2019) call “strategy learning gossip” (see
also Baumeister, Zhang and Vohs 2004), as opposed to “reputation gossip” which is
about people known to the gossiper, directly or indirectly. Still, gossip is potentially a
major vehicle by which reputationally relevant information and rumors circulate.
Gossip flows. The motivational force of gossip that is based on the satisfaction of fun-
damental needs is quite independent of the wish to help or hurt specific others, and
it is largest when the gossip is about negative behavior of others, because that serves
best the needs for stimulation, behavioral confirmation, and status (Baumeister et al.
2001). Yet, this high potential of gossip is often not realized, because it is likely to be
only about outsiders and kept local by the boundaries of an inner circle.
6.9 Special effects for the transmitter:
Ingroup/outgroup effects
Even though gossip is potentially a most important vehicle for reputation effects, it
is likely to remain very local and thus without much bite. For example, it has been
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shown that within the ingroup in organizations, positive and negative gossip is
shared, whereas with outgroup members, only positive gossip is shared (Grosser,
Lopez-Kidwell, and Labianca, 2010). This restriction of gossip has been generally
overlooked by those who praise the importance of gossip for reputations effects and
general human cooperation (for a review on gossip, reputation and cooperation see
Giardini and Wittek, 2019). Why is gossip likely to be highly restricted in its reach?
True to the fission/fusion dynamics of human group formation, there are vari-
ous ingroups to which one may flexibly belong, ranging from categorical groups
(“we women”) to countries, to ever smaller social units, and finally to “inner
circles” of people who confide in each other. These inner circles play an important
role with regard to negative gossip. To badmouth somebody can be dangerous, if
one is not sure that the other shares one’s evaluations. This is danger that may not
come from fear of a powerful third party but from being rebuffed, from losing be-
havioral confirmation and affection (Cole and Scriverner 2013). This is one reason
why negative gossip, especially that about people not belonging to the one’s own
circle, circulates mainly in circles of close ties (Travis et al. 2010; McAndrew and
Milenkovic 2002; Milliken, Morrison and Hewlin 2003). Another reason for keeping
negative gossip about outgroup members to the ingroup is the bonding function of
gossip (Dunbar, 1996; Foster 2004). By exchanging negative gossip about an out-
sider, the bond between the gossipers is strengthened, mutually reinforcing the
membership in the same inner circle. By exchanging negative gossip with outsiders,
this function is not fulfilled.
6.10 Power asymmetry effects: Broken by a special
transmitter, the publicizer
This close circle restriction of gossip is broken when a person that is negatively gos-
siped about is already widely seen in a negative light. Then negative gossip is no lon-
ger dangerous and flows freely. It is then that it may lead to socially fatal reputation
effects. This is likely to happen in cases where power asymmetries strengthened the
ingroup/outgroup dynamics of gossip and where a publicizer was able to spread nega-
tive news about the powerful. For example, in case of Harvey Weinstein, all hell broke
loose, once he was branded negatively and it was safe to negatively gossip anywhere
about him, creating a cascade of negative news in the “me too” movement. In this
case, the ingroup of the inner circle expanded to the world-wide good guys against the
bad guys. Another example is Gorbachev’s televised speech on November 3rd 1987, in
which he attacked Stalin, saying that continued neglect of Stalin’s crimes was unac-
ceptable. Stalin was guilty of “enormous and unforgivable’’ crimes. ‘‘Many thousands
of people inside and outside the party were subjected to wholesale repressive meas-
ures.’’ (New York Times Nov. 3rd, 1987). Now that a publicizer made Stalin stand
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publicly in a negative light, masses of people began to speak out in public about the
horrible acts they had experienced under Stalin.
Publicizers have a special role. They are more than normal whistleblowers. They
may have to be powerful enough to withstand the counter pressure of those who sup-
pressed reputation effects in the first place. Publicizers expand the reach of reputa-
tion effects by breaking the inner circle restriction of gossip. But just how far they are
able to expand the reach depends on the kind of publicizer and the news value of the
revelation. Powerful politicians (such as Gorbachev) and powerful media (such as the
New York Times) are probably the publicizers who can achieve the largest reach and
also overcome people’s reluctance to believe bad things about a person previously in
good standing. The power to control the media is thus a mighty weapon against the
socially fatal effects of a bad reputation, as every dictator knows so well. But because
publicizers mostly focus on people with actual or potential fame and most likely on
extreme forms of deviant behavior (such as pedophilia, sexual abuse of women,
downright corruption), for “ordinary” people, reputation effects remain often con-
fined to what circulates in inner circles about outsiders, thereby being only loosely
related to what people actually did (Anderson and Shirako 2008).
6.11 Conclusion
The importance of reputation effects for social order makes it mandatory for re-
search on this terrain to use all the tools at the disposal of social and behavioral
sciences to come to understand their dynamics. This means paying close attention
to normative embeddedness (and normative heterogeneity), to structural features
beyond networks (ingroup/outgroup dynamics and power differences), and to the
dynamics of overarching goals that govern virtually all conditions under which repu-
tation effects are likely to occur. Granovetter (1985) insisted that for a full understand-
ing of reputation effects, we have to consider dyadic and structural embeddedness
and all we need as a behavioral theory is the assumption of rational choice. This, we
argued, was a grave error. Granovetter thought that structural embeddedness to-
gether with rational choice would finally sideline the atomistic explanations of social
order on the basis of internalized norms and would also sideline “psychological revi-
sionism” that behavioral economics had increasingly engaged in. He did not think of
normative embeddedness, nor did he think of structures beyond social networks, and
he completely neglected the importance of overarching goals. Werner Raub is one of
the major figures who embraced and advanced Granovetter’s embeddedness ap-
proach. However, he repeated Granovetter’s error, thereby limiting what can be
learned about reputation effects from his extended research program.
We show that reputation effects rest on normative embeddedness and that this
embeddedness does not just consist of shared norms but also of the dynamics of
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overarching goals that affect how and when norms guide behavior. A salient over-
arching goal governs what we pay attention to and what we ignore, what alterna-
tive we consider, what information we are sensitive to, what we like and dislike etc.
In short, overarching goals govern the cognitive and motivational processes that
are most important for behavior. Attention to these overarching goals is important
with regard to virtually every aspect of reputation effects, especially for answering
the question how it is possible that people make negative judgments about other
people’s behavioral tendencies on the basis of one or a few observations.
The “normative” goal to act appropriately, follow norms, be oriented to the col-
lective, is an overarching goal the salience of which shifts with social and institu-
tional circumstances, including structural embeddedness. Even if people have
internalized norms, they will not act on the basis of these norms unless the norma-
tive goal is salient at the moment, and this saliency, in turn, depends on the struc-
tural embedding, so that normative and structural embeddedness interact. Next to
the normative overarching goal, there are two competing overarching goals: one fo-
cused on resources (gain), and one focused on feeling good (hedonic). If all people
permanently had a salient gain goal (that is be rational egoists), then being ob-
served acting egoistically by lying, cheating, not helping etc. would have no news
value, would not contribute to one’s reputation. A bad reputation is acquired by a
presumed tendency not to have a salient normative goal when this is socially ex-
pected. By contrast, one does not acquire a bad reputation by having a salient gain
goal in a price battle with a competitor. Reputation is based on an incongruence
between observed and expected salience of an overarching goal.
Normative embeddedness is not just sharing norms and standards, but also
being subject to the conditions that affect the salience of the normative goal, and
this also affects the actor, the observer of other people’s actions, as well as the
transmitter of information or rumors about these actions. Especially important are
heterogeneity with regard to norms, ingroup/outgroup dynamics, and power asym-
metries. All three affect the salience of overarching goals and thereby the likelihood
that people’s behavior is constrained by anticipated reputation effects, the likeli-
hood that negative behavior will be talked about, and the likelihood that what is
said about people is actually informative or highly distorted. In sum, the study of
reputation effects necessitate that we grant center stage to normative embedded-
ness and its interaction with structural embeddedness. Granovetter is exemplary in
much of his work, but his error should be seen as a strong obstacle for the analysis
of reputation effects.
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7 Robustness of Reputation Cascades
Abstract: Reputation systems facilitate global exchange by allowing perfect strangers
transacting across vast geographical distances to nonetheless trust one. However, a
recent contribution by Frey and van de Rijt (2016, Scientific Reports) shows that
reputation systems can produce “reputation cascades” whereby all trustors (e.g. all
buyers) choose to transact with a single trustee (e.g. one seller), reinforcing the lat-
ter’s monopoly on repute. This has the unintended consequence of generating win-
ner-take-all inequality of an arbitrary nature, that is, between equally trustworthy
trustees. The current study uses computer simulations to investigate the robust-
ness of reputation cascades to noise. Results show that the dynamics of reputation
formation continue to produce high levels of arbitrary inequality when information
about the past behavior of trustees’ is not always accurate and when trustors some-
times choose exchange partners randomly.
7.1 Introduction
Reputation systems are designed to mitigate trust problems. In a trust problem, mutu-
ally profitable exchange between two parties requires that one party – the trustor –
first expose herself to the risk of exploitation by the other party – the trustee (Coleman
1990; Dasgupta 1988; Kreps 1990). For example, in online trade where a buyer does
not know whether the seller will ship the product after receiving the payment. Game
theory offers useful tools to model trust problems (Buskens, Frey, and Raub 2018) and
we here use one of them – the standard Trust Game shown in Figure 7.1 – to make
precise what we mean by a trust problem. If the trustor were to place trust, then the
trustee would maximize profit by abusing trust, earning 100 instead of the 50 he would
earn when honoring trust. Anticipating this, the trustor withholds trust, securing a pay-
off of 30 instead of the 0 she would earn if trust were abused. The consequence of indi-
vidually rational behavior in the trust game is that trustor and trustee fail to exchange,
earning only 30 each, where they could have earned 50 each, had they somehow
achieved a ‘smooth’ exchange.
The trust problem may be overcome through use of a reputation system. In a
reputation system, the trustor before making a choice can observe past actions of
the trustee in interactions with other trustors, as reported by those trustors. The rep-
utation system thus makes it possible for the trustor to learn about the trustee’s in-
clination. The reputation system also gives the trustor some control over the trustee
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because the trustee has to take into account that the trustor could sanction bad be-
havior by leaving a negative rating, which would diminish the trustee’s opportunity
for future exchange. It may thus be rational for the trustee to honor trust, and
hence for the trustor to place trust (Buskens 2002; Buskens and Raub 2002; Corten
et al. 2016; Diekmann et al. 2014; Raub 1997).
Frey & van de Rijt (2016) identify an unintended consequence of reputation sys-
tems that has previously been overlooked. Unintended consequences result from
the intentional actions of individuals which jointly aggregate – outside of any sin-
gle actor’s control – into collective behaviors no one wished for (Raub 2017; Raub,
Buskens, and van Assen 2011; Raub and Voss 2016; Elster 1990; Boudon 1982).
Specifically, reputation systems exhibit cumulative advantage (DiPrete and Eirich
2006; Merton 1968). If multiple trustees vie for the business of multiple trustors,
then reputation systems will tend to produce extreme market concentration of an
arbitrary nature. Namely, trustors will choose whichever trustee was lucky enough
to be able to build up an initial reputation. As a result, this will set apart the chosen
trustee’s reputation even further, while other trustees are shunned. A reputation
cascade (Frey and van de Rijt 2016) unfolds, propelling a single market leader. The
market leader may not be any more trustworthy than many others who are never
trusted and may even offer a worse deal than untried competitors. The distinction is
largely random. This arbitrary inequality is the unintended consequence of a pro-
cess of cumulative advantage.
Here we probe the robustness of reputation cascades. Frey & van de Rijt (2016)
propose a game-theoretic model and demonstrate that in this model reputation cas-
cades are an equilibrium. The behavior of participants in their laboratory experi-
ment closely approximates this equilibrium, and – at the macro level – it does
indeed exhibit reputation cascades. However, the external validity is not beyond
doubt: the Frey & van de Rijt (2016) theoretic model makes some restrictive assump-
tions and their laboratory setting limits factors that could undermine cascading in
“real-world” reputation systems. In particular, two assumptions in their theory and
experiment are arguably often violated in real-world markets.
P1 = 30
P2 = 30
Withhold
trust
Place
trust
Abuse
trust
Honor
trust
S1 = 0
T2 = 100
R1 = 50
R2 = 50
Trustee (2)
Trustor (1)
Figure 7.1: The standard trust game (S1 < P1 < R1;
P2 < R2 < T2) with example values.
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First, Frey and van de Rijt’s (2016) experiment implemented automated, truth-
ful feedback. Yet real-world systems are noisy. Trustees might fail to deliver on time
for reasons out of their control. A timely shipped item might arrive late or even get
lost. Such errors will result in negative ratings, disgracing generally reliable trust-
ees. Some ratings may not reflect performance at all: Raters may err by giving a bad
score when they mean to give a good one, or trustees may deceptively award them-
selves positive or their competitors negative ratings (for example, Diekmann et al.
2014; Luca and Zervas 2016). Real world systems may also exhibit noise in the trust-
ors’ selection of trustees: trustors may not always trust the trustee with the best rep-
utation. The absence of search costs or other aspects of differentiation among
trustees probably minimized such noise in trustor behavior in the Frey and van de
Rijt (2016) experiment. Do reputation cascades continue to happen under such
noisy conditions?
Second, the original experiment cannot tell us about the sustainability of repu-
tation cascades, as it had relatively short interaction sequences. Empirical findings
suggest decreasing marginal effects of ratings on trust (Przepiorka, Norbutas, and
Corten 2017). If the marginal impact of positive ratings were decreasing, limiting
the advantage of highly reputable trustees over those lacking a reputation, would
reputation cascades break down as initially disadvantaged trustees catch up? In the
present article, we address these questions using computer simulations.
7.2 The model – A market with trust problems
and a reputation system
In this section, we describe the model that we subsequently analyze game-theoretically
(Section 7.3) and in computer simulations (Section 7.4). It is a modified version of the
model introduced by Frey & van de Rijt (2016).
We assume an indefinitely large population of trustors and N > 1 trustees. Each
round 1, 2, 3, . . ., one trustor is chosen to play, and no trustor plays more than
once. After every round, the next round is played with probability 0 < w < 1 while
the game ends with probability 1 − w.
Every round, the trustor i chosen to play decides whether to withhold trust or to
select one of the trustees and place trust in that trustee. If i does not place trust in
any trustee, i receives payoff P1. If i chooses to place trust in trustee j, then j can
honor or abuse trust. Honored trust earns i and j the payoffs R1 > P1 and R2 > P2,
respectively. If trust is abused, i’s and j’s payoffs are S1 < P1 and T2j > R2, respec-
tively. Any trustee who is not selected by i receives payoff P2. We do not need to
make an assumption on what the payoffs in a round are for trustors who are not at
play, and we assume no discounting of payoffs from future rounds (apart from the
weighting related to the continuation probability w).
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Trustees differ in the payoff T2j that they can earn when abusing trust. T2j is
drawn independently for each trustee j before round 1 from a probability distribution
with unbounded density F. While F is common knowledge, the actual manifestation
of T2j is private information of trustee j. As we will see later (Lemma 2), the assump-
tion of heterogeneity in T2 implies that one trustee may not be trustworthy under pre-
cisely the same circumstances that incentivize another trustee to honor trust, which
is empirically plausible and crucial in the formation of reputation cascades.
A reputation system makes the entire history of all trustees’ choices available to
all trustors. Our game-theoretic analysis assumes that this reputation information is
always truthful, and we will relax this assumption in the simulation analysis.
7.3 Game-theoretic analysis
In the game-theoretic analysis, we first postulate a strategy for trustors (Lemma 1).
Loosely speaking, this strategy is to place trust in any unknown trustees as long as
there is no trustee with a good reputation and otherwise to place trust in any trustee
with a good reputation. It can be shown that this strategy is a best-response strategy
for trustors – that is, a trustor cannot improve her expected payoff by playing a dif-
ferent strategy – if (i) each trustee either always honors trust or always abuses trust
and (ii) the portion of trustworthy trustees is “large enough”. Lemma 2 shows that if
trustors play that strategy, then indeed the best-response strategy for some trustees
is to always honor trust, while all other trustees always abuse trust (the prospect of
being trusted again makes trustees with a low T2j trustworthy but it is not a suffi-
cient incentive for trustees with a high T2j to honor trust). Finally, Proposition 1
states the condition for an equilibrium in which the trustors play the strategy defined
in Lemma 1 and some portion trustees honor trust, which includes the specification
of the critical “large enough” proportion of trustworthy trustees. We conclude by dis-
cussing the emergence of arbitrary inequality in this equilibrium. This small game-
theoretic analysis reproduces the analysis by Frey & van de Rijt (2016) for a simplified
scenario, and we refer the reader to that paper for the proofs of our Proposition and
Lemmas.1
If each trustee is either trustworthy or untrustworthy throughout, we can distin-
guish three sorts of trustees based on their history: (1) trustees who honored trust in
some past rounds, (2) trustees who abused trust in some past rounds, and (3) trust-
ees who were never trusted. Using this distinction and given the assumption that
1 For the proof of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, see the proof of Proposition 1 in Frey & van de Rijt
(2016). For the proof of Lemma 2 of the current paper, see the proof of Lemma 1 in Frey & van de
Rijt (2016).
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the portion of trustworthy trustees is large enough (in a sense to be specified in
Proposition 1), the best-response strategy of a trustor i selected to play is:
Lemma 1 – Strategy of a trustor i.
– If there are trustees who honored trust in some past rounds, i places trust in one
of them (randomly choosing one).
– If there are no trustees who honored trust in some past rounds but there are trust-
ees who were never trusted, i places trust in one of these trustees (randomly
choosing one).
– If there are no trustees who honored trust and also no trustees who were never
trusted, i withholds trust.
If trustors behave as specified in Lemma 1, game-theoretic rationality implies that a
trustee with a sufficiently low T2j always honors trust while trustees with a high T2j
always abuse trust:
Lemma 2 – Strategy of a trustee j. A trustee j’s best response to the strategy of
trustors defined in Lemma 1 is to honor trust when selected if and only if
w ≥
T2j −R2
T2j −P2
, T2j ≤
R2 −wP2
1−w
(7:1)
So a proportion ρ of trustees always honor trust when selected, where
ρ=
ðR2 −wP21−w
0
dT2j (7:2)
It is only rational for a trustor to play the strategy in Lemma 1 if the portion ρ of
trustworthy trustees is so large that compared to no trust, trustors prefer taking the
risk of placing trust in a trustee who does not yet have any reputation.
Proposition 1. There exists a Nash equilibrium in which all trustors play the strategy de-
fined in Lemma 1 and some portion ρ of trustees honor trust when selected if and only if
ρ≥
P1 −S1
R1 −S1
(7:3)
Consider now how this equilibrium implies the emergence of arbitrary inequality
among trustworthy trustees (trustees for which T2j ≤ ðR2 −wP2Þ= 1−wð Þ). The strat-
egy of trustors implies that the first of these trustees who gets the chance to honor
trust will be trusted in all future rounds. Intuitively, staying with the first estab-
lished trustee allows the trustors to avoid the risk of trust abuse. Thus, this small
game-theoretic analysis implies the emergence of extreme inequality among equally
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trustworthy trustees – one trustworthy trustee gets all the business while all other
trustworthy trustees walk empty-handed. In the next section we replicate this result
in a computational model and investigate its sensitivity to noise in trustor and
trustee behavior and to decreasing marginal returns of reputational information.
7.4 Simulation analysis
7.4.1 Simulation approach
In the simulations we introduce noise and decreasing marginal returns into the
model described in Section 7.2 as follows:
Trustee noise: We assume that – as in the game-theoretic equilibrium – some trustees
are trustworthy, always honoring trust, while all other trustees are untrustworthy, al-
ways abusing trust. However, these actions are subject to noise. With probability α a
trustworthy trustee’s action is reported as abuse (either because the trustee made a
mistake or because the trustee’s action was reported wrongly). Likewise, with proba-
bility α an untrustworthy trustee’s action is reported as honoring trust.
Trustor noise: We continue to assume that trustors behave as stated in Lemma 1 – ex-
hibiting a tendency to choose trustees with a good reputation, but do so probabilisti-
cally, following a logistic choice function:
p J =0ð Þ= 1
1+ Pk e β gks − 4bksð Þ (7:4)
p J = jð Þ= e
β gj
s − 4bj
sð Þ
1+
P
k e
β gks − 4bk
sð Þ (7:5)
Here, J = 0 represents the choice to withhold trust, J = j the choice to trust trustee j,
gj and bj the numbers of good respectively bad ratings given to trustee j, coefficient
β representing the degree to which trustee choice is guided by reputational informa-
tion instead of randomness. A larger β implies less randomness in the trustors’
choices of trustees.
Marginal returns of ratings: This is controlled by parameter s ∈ [0,1], with s = 1 im-
plying a constant impact of every additional rating on the chance of a trustee being
selected.
Throughout, model parameters that are not of interest are fixed at what we
judge to be reasonable values. A full exploration of the entire parameter space in-
cluding these parameters is beyond the scope of this chapter. Table 7.1 shows the
parameters that are fixed with their respective values. By fixing the number of
rounds to be equal to the number of trustors (N1 = 100,000) we ensure that each
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trustor moves only once. By keeping the number of trustees (N2 = 100) and the ratio
of trustors to trustees (1000:1) high, we ensure that a random distribution of trust
produces minimal inequality.
The parameters of interest that we vary are noise in trustee reputational infor-
mation (due to either trustors reporting wrongly, or trustee mistakes), α, sensitivity
to reputational info vs. noise, β, and the marginal impact of reputational informa-
tion, s.
We quantify the degree of arbitrary inequality as the Gini coefficient calculated
among trustworthy trustees. Any distinction made between trustworthy and un-
trustworthy trustees is justified and non-arbitrary, which is why untrustworthy
trustees’ market shares must be excluded from inequality assessment. The Gini co-
efficient equals half the average difference in market share and ranges from 2/N2
(equal market shares) to 1–2/N2 (monopoly).
7.4.2 Simulation results
Figure 7.2 shows the level of arbitrary inequality over rounds averaged across 100
simulation runs, for different noise levels. The marginal impact of ratings is as-
sumed to have a fixed level of s = 1. Trustee noise α and trustor noise β are simulta-
neously varied at a joint rate of r = 2α = 2 / (1 + eβ). When noise is absent (r = 0),
trustor behavior is similar to the strategy defined in Lemma 1: Initially, trustors
place trust in trustees who were never trusted and after the first trustworthy trustee
is found, all subsequent trustors place trust in this trustee (who keeps honoring
trust). This is reflected in the arbitrary inequality level shooting up to its maximum
and staying there, showing the predicted enduring monopoly situation. Thus, if
noise is absent, the simulation reproduces the result of the game-theoretic analysis.
Figure 7.2 further shows that when noise is introduced – trustors occasionally
deviate randomly and trustworthy trustees occasionally receive negative ratings –
arbitrary inequality continues to be high. At each noise level, arbitrary inequality
approaches a stable level. When noise is increased to 40%, this stable level of
Table 7.1: Parameters fixed in simulations.
Parameter Fixed at
Number of rounds in a game ,
Number of trustors (N) ,
Number of trustees (N) 
% trustworthy trustees %
Importance of negative vs. positive ratings x
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inequality is still near-maximal (Gini = 92%), demonstrating strong robustness of
the original result. When noise is increased further, inequality drops more rapidly.
At 60% noise (α = (1 + eβ)−1 = .3; i.e. r = .6) – when trustors act randomly more than
half the time when they choose between two trustees who differ by 1 positive rating,
and when trustees’ actions receive random ratings 60% of the time – arbitrary in-
equality has become moderate (Gini = 41%). Higher noise levels produce little to no
inequality.
Table 7.2 explores robustness of arbitrary inequality formation when trustor
noise and trustee noise are independently varied (while in Figure 7.2, trustor noise
and trustee noise were simultaneously varied). The values in Table 7.2 correspond
to the inequality levels in the last round, at the right vertical axis of Figure 7.2.
Table 7.2 shows that the emergence of arbitrary inequality is more sensitive to
trustee noise: When moving up in Table 7.2, inequality levels drop more quickly
than when moving left. Even at very high levels of trustor noise, inequality is near-
maximal, as long as trustee noise is modest (bottom left of Table 7.2). This happens
because with high trustor noise, even though a trustor’s choice between trustees
with mildly differing reputations is now practically a coin flip, a very obvious
choice such as between a market leader and a competitor who has never been
trusted before is still often made correctly. This allows emergent market leaders to
extend their lead even as other trustees are regularly given a chance. This suggests
that the assumption of constant returns – which we will relax later – is crucial for
the ability of market leaders to maintain their dominance at high noise levels.
Figure 7.2: Levels of arbitrary inequality under various levels of noise, averaged across 100
simulation runs.
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When instead trustor noise levels are kept low while trustee noise is increased
(top right of Table 7.2), levels of inequality do drop. At 100% trustee noise, when rep-
utation systems are entirely dysfunctional, inequality levels remain around 40%.
This happens because the first cohorts of trustors act on the useless information they
generate for one another, choosing popular trustees until they are reported to have
abused trust (50% of the time). Later generations gradually retreat to the choice not
to trust anyone, leaving inequality in this failed market at moderate levels.
Finally, in analysis summarized in Table 7.3, we relax the common assumption of
constant marginal returns of success (s = 1) in models of positive feedback
(Allison 1980; Barabási and Albert 1999; Coleman 1964; DiPrete and Eirich 2006;
Price 1976; Simon 1955), exploring reputation dynamics when additional ratings are
worth less and less (s = ¾, ½, ¼, 0). Strikingly, in the absence of noise, inequality
remains at its maximal level (Gini = 98%) even as s is decreased to very low levels
(¼), where the marginal value of extra ratings is sharply diminishing. As one may
expect, as we increase trustor and trustee noise simultaneously, inequality levels
drop more rapidly when s is also decreased. Still, even under these more stringent
conditions, significant market concentration obtains at modest noise levels.
Table 7.2: Arbitrary inequality (Gini) in final round, by trustor noise (hor.) and trustee noise (vert.),
under constant marginal impact of ratings (s = 1), averaged across 100 simulation runs.
Noise in trustors’ selection of trustees (/[+eβ])
% % % % % % % % % % %
Noise in trustee
reputation (α)
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
%           
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7.5 Discussion
In sum, reputation cascades exhibit reasonable robustness along the dimensions ex-
plored here. In markets with trust problems, reputation systems create market con-
centration. This happens because of positive feedback perpetuating the advantage of
established parties of good repute. We have shown that this theoretical mechanism is
not overly sensitive to behavioral deviations. A small number of arbitrarily selected
trustees continue to dominate in market share when these established trustees occa-
sionally get bad ratings, and also when buyers occasionally select unknown trustees
lacking a reputation. Reputation cascades also persist in settings with mildly decreas-
ing marginal benefits of additional ratings, but do cease to occur when marginal ben-
efits are strongly decreasing.
The paper does not exhaust all relevant dimensions along which robustness
could be assessed. One interesting extension of the model is one where outdated
ratings do not count as much. This is applicable in tumultuous scenarios where
businesses are frequently passed on from one owner to another, and the new man-
agement may differ in trustworthiness, or in settings where external factors change
trustworthiness motives. Under such regimes, it may be easier for someone lacking
a reputation to establish one, as long-established parties cannot indefinitely enjoy
their yesteryear advantages.
Another natural extension is the addition of a price mechanism: What if excluded
sellers could combat reputable sellers by undercutting their bids? We conjecture that
under these circumstances reputation cascades will continue to obtain. An equilibrium
should be possible in which the winning trustee asks a price that exceeds competitors’
prices by an amount – a “reputation premium” – (Diekmann et al. 2014; Przepiorka,
Norbutas, and Corten 2017; Snijders and Weesie 2009; Przepiorka & Aksoy 2020) that
is small enough to withhold most buyers from exploring other options, keeping
them loyal. Implementing such a price mechanism would, however, add considerable
Table 7.3: Arbitrary inequality in final round, by noise (r) and marginal impact of ratings
(s = 0, ¼, ½, ¾, 1), averaged across 100 simulation runs.
s r % % % % % % % % % % %
           
¼           
½           
¾           
           
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complexity to our simulation approach, requiring one to specify the trustees’ pricing
strategy as well as how trustors trade off prices against reputations. Consistent with
these predictions, empirical studies on reputation premiums document that many
sellers do indeed not manage to attract any customers. In Snijders & Weesie’s (2009:
175) study on an online programming market, 82% of the programmers who offered
their services were never selected by even a single customer while the remaining 18%
sold a total of 22,506 programming jobs in the observation period (see also Barwick
and Pathak 2015; Diekmann et al. 2014).
Finally, one may ask whether the tendency of reputation systems to induce
herding on a few established trustees has further negative implications, in addition
to creating baseless market concentration. Can lock-in on a trustee with an estab-
lished reputation prevent trustors from exchanging with an excluded trustee with a
better value proposition? In the present model, only trustworthy and untrustworthy
trustees exist, so that market concentration always exists around trustworthy trust-
ees. A possible extension of the model allows three or more types who differ in the
value they provide to trustors, allowing an exploration of the possibility of inferior
lock-in on a trustee who occasionally abuses trust or delivers less value when hon-
oring trust. Such lock-in may be likely when every trustor buys just once – as we
assumed in this chapter – and it may be less likely when the same trustors buy sev-
eral times – as assumed in the original model of Frey & van de Rijt (2016) – because
trustors can then benefit from their own exploration efforts.
All in all, the present investigation confirms the emergence of arbitrary inequal-
ity in markets as a robust phenomenon. As trustors flock to safe havens, untried
exchange alternatives that may be qualitatively equivalent, or even superior, are
left unexploited.
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8 Organized Distrust: If it is there and that
Effective, Why Three Recent Scandals?
Abstract: In the field of society and politics, Popper replaced the question of who
should rule by that of how to reduce damages rulers impose upon their subjects.
Popper’s answer was organized distrust, institutions like periodic elections for pub-
lic posts and the separation of powers. By detailing three scandals that played out
in the 2010s, this contribution asks to what extent organized distrust was effective
in these instances. The first case is that of fraud by the Dutch social psychologist
Stapel. Our conclusion is that serial offenders are not likely to be caught by the
much-praised double blind review system. The second scandal is deceptive soft-
ware in cars for monitoring emissions. It came about through three causes. First,
the European Union set emission standards, but left surveillance to national gov-
ernments, making for Hobbes’s covenants without swords. Second, national organ-
izations for applied research did find that emissions were too high, but were not
allowed to publicize this, making for Durkheimian fatalism. Third, executives of car
companies set impossible goals for engineers, making for Mertonian anomie in the
form of fiddling. The third scandal is sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy.
Catholic authorities settled cases behind closed doors, lowering the number of trials
because victims did not have models for complaints. All in all, Popper’s methodo-
logical individualism should allow for corporate actors next to individual actors, so
that Coleman’s proposition of increasing asymmetries in contemporary societies
may be tested.
8.1 Personal trust and organized distrust
Trust cements societies, confidence of people in each other lubricates life. For the
systematic study of societies, these avowals are a bit metaphorical. Yet an issue
lurks here, and it becomes visible by spelling out corollaries of the thesis that
peaceful coexistence is impossible without trust. To begin with: in societies rife with
distrust, life will be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short – that is the old quote
from Leviathan (Hobbes 1651). In addition: societies where doubts abound will
Collapse – to borrow a recent book title (Diamond 2005). All this amounts to a
major thesis in current sociology.
Yet there is a competing conjecture. In societies with the rule of law, free labor,
elected politicians, and similar arrangements, unanticipated developments will
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occur like Smith’s accumulation of stocks and rising real recompenses for labor,
and Millar’s less unequal balances of the rights of husbands and wives, fathers and
children, masters and servants, as well as rulers and subjects. These provisions also
promote processes like Durkheim’s bonding between a society’s members, and
Weber’s rationalization of economies, polities, and other areas of life. Societies with
these arrangements institutionalize criticism and organize distrust, occasioning
long-term trends studied by sociology’s Scottish ancestors and its Continental ini-
tiators. So, there is the issue of trust and distrust. In this contribution we seek to
deal with it, and we do so by way of a data driven essay.
8.1.1 A problem shift in studies of societies and politics
Popper argued – in The Open Society and Its Enemies from 1945, and more exten-
sively in its 1952 edition with an augmented chapter entitled “The principle of lead-
ership” – that theorizing about societies and their polities has been dominated
since two millennia by Plato’s ill-considered question of who shall come to rule a
society’s state. Rather, the pivotal question should be how to eliminate bad rulers
without bloodshed, and how to reduce damages rulers impose on their subjects
(Popper 1952: i, 121). This problem shift puts proposals for political reform in a dif-
ferent light, unifies them, and suggests additional amendments. Even if heads of
states are benevolent and wise upon ascension, they – following Acton – may be
corrupted by their exclusive rights to draft men as soldiers, tax households, convict
persons who trespass rules protecting life and property, and issue travel docu-
ments. By voting in elections, people express trust in persons running for office. If
leaders are elected for life, the impact of good ones who turn bad may be large.
However, if laws demand that heads of states periodically face re-election, people
may voice distrust by voting for their opponents in the next election. And if – as
Bentham proposed – every subject is entitled to vote, harm will be even smaller.
Other arrangements reduce the injurious impact of rulers by limiting their powers,
and by balancing the curbed powers against other powers. Montesquieu’s trias po-
litica does away with the concentration of powers in one office held by one person,
and amounts to another case of ‘organized distrust’. Popper did not use this expres-
sion, but it nicely sums up his argument.
Popper criticized his own theory that organized distrust lowers violence be-
tween rulers and subjects by maintaining that institutions are like fortresses. They
should be well-designed – organized distrust would improve an institution’s de-
sign. They should be well-staffed too – but Popper did not enter into that matter.
So, how to fill that hole? We try to do so in this contribution.
Given the problem shift proposed by Popper for research on societies and their
polities, the issue is not about the amount of trust of persons in one another, and
the many data around on the people’s trust in their government, the police, and the
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courts, are irrelevant for Popper’s new problem. This remains so if trust of persons
in – say – banks, multinationals, and universities is ascertained. Following Popper,
the consequential question is about non-personal entities distrusted or trusted by
people, and the extent to which they contain arrangements allowing for and invit-
ing comments, examination, and inspection. Some we mentioned, others include
reports on funds raised and spent, and their certification by auditors. A complete
list of provisions for criticism seems unattainable, as new stipulations may crop up
after scandals, and a world without scandals will stay far away. That is why we con-
clude our dissection of three recent scandals with proposals for more organized
distrust.
Accepting Popper’s problem shift, it is wise in sociology to distinguish between
on the one hand natural actors like you as a reader and the authors of this essay,
and on the other hand states, or more generally corporate actors. This is a common
distinction in jurisprudence. Of course, natural persons hold the political offices of
states, but these natural persons have, given their formal position, additional ca-
pacities to act. The present contribution will not deal with the amount of trust of
natural persons in corporate actors, but the way in which distrust of corporate ac-
tors is organized in contemporary societies like the Netherlands. This paper by-
passes questions about organized distrust within their polities, and seeks to answer
questions about organized distrust for three other corporate actors, to wit editorial
boards of scientific periodicals, car companies, as well as churches. If Popper’s the-
ory of organized distrust is to demonstrate its mettle, it does so by its application to
other types of corporate actors than states and their polities, for which it was
developed.
8.1.2 Institutional individualism as a theoretical method
for sociology?
In The Open Society Popper also argued in favor of theories with a specific content
for sociology in general. These arguments have created quite some confusion.
Popper asserted that sociology is autonomous, but rejected methodological collec-
tivism, backed methodological individualism, at the same time opposing psycholo-
gism. It does not seem easy to square these proposals. We sort things out, and the
outcome will be that the common distinction between hypotheses about collectivi-
ties and hypotheses about individuals – as featured in the debate in the United
Kingdom assembled by O’Neill (1973) in Modes of Individualism and Collectivism –
should be replaced by that between hypotheses about corporate actors and hypoth-
eses about natural persons, and supplemented by the recognition that sociology’s
questions involve a combination of natural and corporate actors, as well as by ex-
planations of societal phenomena that invoke corporate actors next to individual
actors.
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In “The autonomy of sociology”, a chapter of The Open Society, Popper pleaded
for a sociology bypassing explanations that invoke human nature and its instincts.
That would amount to sterile psychologism. According to Popper, it would be wrong
to argue that the conventions of social life are outcomes of motives springing from
the mind of individual persons. If motives are to explain societal phenomena, the
explanation also should refer to the environment in which people live, in particular
the institutions of their social setting. Popper then does not announce what should
be trumpeted (ii, 90): the outcomes of human actions not only depend on the mo-
tives, but also on the opportunities of persons. Anyway, the term methodological in-
dividualism is unfortunate, because explanations adducing solely the motives of
persons – or more generally human nature – are individualist too. This is perhaps
why some scholars came to favor the tag institutional individualism, such as the
philosopher Agassi in The British Journal of Sociology from 1974. We replace the
term psychologism by the expressions instinctual individualism and motivational
individualism.
What exactly is wrong, according to Popper, with instinctual and motivational
individualism? One of Popper’s examples involves wealth. John Stuart Mill had
maintained in 1843 that a finding to the effect of most goods being produced by
markets, in the end can be derived from the tendency residing in human beings to
pursue wealth. Popper disagrees by arguing almost – but not exactly and less
overtly – like Smith, the founder of economics. Nations differ in their standard of
living, how is this possible if all people had, have and will have the same propen-
sity to improve their life? To answer this question, Smith (1776) in The Wealth of
Nations did not coolly claim that this inclination differs in intensity from country to
country. In some areas of the world people live more closely together than in other
parts, and it is easier to transport goods on navigable rivers and seas than over hilly
and rugged lands. Markets differ in size, and when markets are larger, work in fac-
tories become more divided, and the division of labor, in its turn, makes for cheaper
products, higher profits, and an increase in a nation’s wealth. Some settings offer
definitely more chances for improving one’s living standard than other circumstan-
ces, and the freedom of enterprise heralded by Smith augments them. It now is
clear what the difference between Popper’s psychologism and individualism looks
like. Some explanations invoke motives only, other accounts adduce motives plus
opportunities. Later we discuss the methodological of Popper’s individualism.
Incest is Popper’s counterexample to instinctual individualism. To explain why
every society forbids incest, it would not help to note that every young man every-
where goes out of his head when asked how often he has sex with his sister. Rather,
the stronger a society’s sanctions against incest, the deeper its elders plant in juve-
niles the idea that incest is dead wrong, and as a consequence almost everyone ev-
erywhere is disgusted by it. Here it is a pity that Popper does not scrutinize the
debate around 1900 between Westermarck and Durkheim. Westermarck held the
first sociology chair in Europe, and postulated an instinct against incest, evolved by
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natural selection. Durkheim took avoidance of certain marriages as the other side of
rules promoting exogamy, and the taboo on incest in societies like his native
France as a survival of the injunction – still present among Australian and North
American aboriginals – to marry someone with a different totem. Durkheim hinted
that this rule would decrease hostility between totem groups, and fulfill a societal
need for peace.
But then – since persons may die of hunger and thirst – how is the societal
need for peace met? In “La Prohibition de l’Inceste et ses Origines”, Durkheim
(1898) held that among hunters and gatherers the men with one totem exchange
women of their own totem against women of another totem offered by men of that
totem, with peace as a byproduct. Lévi-Strauss (1949) developed this hint in Les
Structures Élémentaires de la Parenté into a full-fledged theory. Durkheim also
showed that among hunters and gatherers in Australia, adolescent men not only
eschew sex with women of their own totem. Men and women of the same totem do
not share meals, and as unmarried adults they avoid one another during leisure.
The question of why no incest was a sub-problem of that of avoidance between per-
sons of the same totem and different sex. O’Neill (1973) neglected Durkheim on
incest.
Now a case of purported instinctual individualism that boils down to a case of
budding institutional individualism, bringing out the issue of whether it is logically
possible to explain societal differences by human nature. Hume, the infidel and
friend of professor Smith (we allude to Rasmussen’s (2017) disappointing book
about a friendship between two Scots who shaped modern thought), raised in The
Natural History of Religion the question of the origin of religion, immediately turn-
ing it into that of its origin in human nature (Hume 1757). All the same, Hume had
misgivings about the question of religion’s roots in human nature. He accepts that
beliefs in several co-existing invisible and intelligent powers prevailed all over the
world until (then) 17 centuries ago. However, since that time the idea of one such
power spread all over Europe. In addition, no two nations with polytheism ever
fully agreed in religious matters. What is more, some nations do not have a religion.
All this does not square easily – so Hume notes – with the idea of human instincts
the same in all times at all places.
How does Hume pull off instinctual individualism? He does not, and spins in-
stinctual into institutional individualism. Hume winds up his History by stating that
‘(t)he universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power, if not an origi-
nal instinct, . . . at least (is) a general attendant of human nature’. Even if one were
to know what amounts to a general attendant of human nature, it does fall outside
the scope of instinctual individualism, and when the content of Hume’s specific hy-
potheses is considered, Hume strays even more from it. In his discussion of polythe-
ism Hume posits that if for persons visible factors do not do the job of explanation,
they will postulate invisible and intelligent powers: the vicissitudes of human lives –
in particular sickness, want, and adversity – suggest many powers influencing
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human weal and woe. Here – in our reading – Hume explains polytheism by appeal-
ing to the natural plus social environment. Also, the members of a society ‘reduce
heavenly objects to the model of things below’, and out of several gods they ‘may
represent one god as the prince or supreme magistrate of the rest, who . . . rules
them with an authority, like that which an earthly sovereign exercises over his sub-
jects and vassals’. In this account of monotheism – so we hold – Hume invokes an
institution, and notably a corporate actor absent among hunters and gatherers. It is
an earthly sovereign, and occasions in the mind of a sovereign’s subjects the idea of
a heavenly sovereign. Finally, Hume takes his hypothesis about life’s vicissitudes as
corroborated by noting that in his days gamblers and sailors are the most supersti-
tious persons in Scotland. So, the people most vulnerable to capricious fortune, ad-
duce the longest list of whimsical entities to account for how they fare. Two and a
half centuries ago the division of labor did not comprise sports super stars.
Of course, Hume was on the right track when explaining a society’s religion with
the hypothesis that its members take invisible factors as resembling visible entities
like human beings endowed with intelligence and will. All the same, Durkheim (1912)
paved a way forward with the thesis that religions draw on societal analogies. He
held in Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse that among Australian hunters
and gatherers such sociomorphism was common, and that only in later stages of
what now is called technological development, the tendency evolved to account for
phenomena by willful and wise invisible entities. This anthropomorphism therefore
cannot be an instinct and part of human nature, it is acquired under societal condi-
tions. Topitsch (1958) sorted things out in Vom Ursprung und Ende der Metaphysik:
people comprehend the faraway and unknown by analogy with the known and
nearby, implying that to the extent people live in different settings, their thoughts
about the distant and unfamiliar vary. With the cognitive and evolutionary turns in
psychology, this principle gained ground. In Pinker (2002) thinking in metaphors is a
human universal. However, for Pinker – ignoring Durkheim – anthropomorphization
is a human universal too.
Now, what exactly is wrong, according Popper, with collectivism? Popper con-
trasted individualism with collectivism, and took Durkheim (1895) – who pleaded in
Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique for an autonomous sociology – as a proponent
of collectivism. Durkheim definitely favors seeking causes of societal phenomena
among other societal phenomena, and he found them there too. According to
Popper, in a sentence added in 1952 to the chapter entitled “The open society and its
enemies” in his book with the same title, Durkheim’s methodological rule was that
societies must be analyzed in terms of concrete social groups (i, 175). Popper’s exam-
ples of concrete groups are persons related by blood, people who live at the same
place, human beings who shared a common effort, and persons who lived through
hardships or joys together (i, 173). Popper (1952: i, 175) added that Durkheim did not
appreciate that economic theories are concerned with abstract relations between peo-
ple, like exchange of goods and cooperation in the division of labor.
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These comments of Popper are largely off the mark. Durkheim (1893) did pub-
lish De la Division du Travail Social, pointing out that the division of labor makes
people dependent upon others, and invites strikes, and showed in Le Suicide
(Durkheim 1897) that a country’s suicide rate is higher, when its economy over-
heats – une crise heureuse, and an abstract relation to that. What is more, Smith did
not only envisage abstract relations. According to The Wealth of Nations, concrete
relations subvert free markets: when sellers of the same good meet for amusement,
they end up plotting a price hike. But it is true, Durkheim explained lower suicide
rates by more integration in churches and households, as well in the population at
large during times of war: three concrete groups.
Popper’s (1952) chapter “The autonomy of sociology” argued against an even
stronger form of collectivism. Popper just did not think much of explanations of so-
cietal phenomena involving factors like the general will, national spirits and group
minds (ii, 91). These collective hypotheses – we agree – are decidedly less testable
than hypotheses about group integration. However, with hindsight it was too easy
to be down on them. The mathematicians Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)
showed how interactive situations between rational persons can be analyzed using
game theory, which provided arguments why in a prisoner’s dilemma two rational
persons will not attain the common goal. It is difficult to escape the impression that
collectivists serving up hypotheses about the general will and group needs, were
getting at similar conditions for mutually detrimental interaction.
The call to practice methodological individualism has been taken as differing
from the declaration that in the end societies and groups do not exist, but only indi-
viduals. The latter is the thesis of ontological individualism. By postulating an auton-
omous sociology, Popper accepted the existence of societies. Now, if sociology is to
be autonomous, it is perhaps better not to talk about human environments encom-
passing institutions, but to accept that corporate actors are real. States are very tangi-
ble: they tax households, draft men, jail criminals, and refuse passports and visas.
Here a new issue crops up: why should sociology go after methodological individual-
ism, when it is accepted that societies and corporate actors exist? Durkheim’s quest
for properties of groups making up societies, may be quite challenging, while corpo-
rate actors may have more resources than natural persons, which gives some pri-
ority to testing hypotheses about corporate actors relative to those on natural persons.
Durkheim (1895) argued in Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique against the mindset
of answering societal questions by immediately bringing in individuals. He accepted
that societies consist of human beings, but at any one moment societies also comprise
concrete groups and institutions, adding that societies comprise material objects too,
like houses and roads.
Philosophers of the social sciences like Popper tend to plug rock-bottom ex-
planations, with persons being the fundamental elements of societies. All the same,
at least some explanations of societal factors by other societal factors have turned
out quite satisfactory, and no explanation ever reaches the lowest – or deepest –
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level. Some scholars now hold that sociology’s ultimate explanations should refer
to human genes, and one also may argue that questions about human societies,
should be sub-questions of questions about animal societies in general – how is it
possible that human societies have much larger populations, living in peace, than
societies of their close genetic relatives?
8.1.3 Multi-level modelling as a theoretical method
There is another argument against reducing sociology to propositions on motives
and opportunities of persons. It is implied by Popper’s (1935) Logik der Forschung,
which argues – in section 70 – the impossibility of deriving macro- from micro-
statements, since such a deduction requires assumptions about the frequency of
micro-entities at the macro-level. Popper’s argument – its example was from phys-
ics – implies that hypotheses on human societies cannot be derived from theories
on human beings: it also should be known how many persons of this and that type
make up societies. A national suicide rate cannot be derived from a statement with
the chances for Catholics and Protestants to commit suicide: the ratio of Catholics
to Protestants in this society should also be known.
Popper’s argument seems unbeatable – but backfires. The auxiliary assumption
to derive a guess on societies from an individual conjecture should refer to both so-
cieties and individuals. Such postulates are logically possible, which brings out
that the collectivism-versus-individualism controversy was marred by a false con-
trast. In addition, statements referring to entities at the macro and micro level, may
not only form a bridge between the macro-and micro-level. A higher-level proposi-
tion may refer to societies and their inhabitants, and so may a lower-level one.
What is more, sociology’s questions themselves may involve both individuals and
societies. Sociologists studying changes in the degree of income inequality between
the inhabitants of societies like the Netherlands, raise a question about two kinds
of units, and when they postulate effects of left-wing parties and trade unions, they
invoke two more entities. The questions raised are about persons-within-societies.
Ultee (1998) brought individuals back in sociology’s questions on societal features.
That was an attempt to improve by way of concrete cases upon Homans (1964).
To what extent does sociology feature persons-within-societies and societies-
comprising-persons? During the UK polemic about individualism or collectivism as
a theoretical method for sociology, the tradition of empirical social research –
firmly rooted in the USA – witnessed a hunt for ‘contextual’ effects. Lazarsfeld and
his students searched for contextual effects in data on voting and various opinions
for the USA in the 1940s and later. The expedition met a big success, when Butler
and Stokes (1969) found a contextual effect on voting for Britain: if the district of a
manual worker had a higher percent of manual workers, this person’s chances to
vote Labor were higher. In addition, Lazarsfeld’s pupil Coleman (1966) tested the
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proposition that grades of US pupils depend on their race, plus the racial composi-
tion of their school class. Race was an individual factor explaining individual
grades, composition a contextual property. Van Tubergen, Te Grotenhuis and Ultee
(2005) reported that for the Netherlands religious persons from a municipality with
a higher percent of religious (rather than non-religious) inhabitants, were less likely
to die of suicide.
Lazarsfeld and Menzel (1961) tried to codify the logic of research involving enti-
ties from various levels. Coleman, Etzioni, and Porter (1970) had a go too. These so-
ciologists took a closer look at sociology’s hypotheses than philosophers of the
social sciences – like Nagel (1961), who is up next. For two decades now, multi-
level statistical models are the rage, allowing for a proper estimation of individual
and contextual effects.
Whereas Aristotelian logic only deals with statements containing a subject,
copula and predicate, since 1900 relational logic is around, and it is known how to
formalize statements involving several kinds of units. It is a pity that Nagel (1961:
535), when commenting on the collectivism-versus-individualism controversy in so-
ciology held that expressions like ‘the current President of the United States’ only
refer to an individual. This depiction bypasses the shift from old to new logic: the
phrase refers to two kinds of units, a person and a country, and a relation between
them: presiding over. The possibility of formalizing statements involving various
kinds of units, has spread within the tradition of empirical social research through
Opp’s (1970) Methodologie der Sozialwissenschaften. If theoretical methods are to be
tagged, our merger of collectivism and institutional individualism may be called
multi-level modelling. The method advocated by us differs from the older ones by a
frank acknowledgment of the existence of corporate actors, and a rejection of the
rule to go immediately from the societal to the individual level, bypassing interme-
diate groups.
We wind up by addressing a question readers may have raised when we first men-
tioned institutional individualism as a theoretical method for sociology: what exactly is
an institution? It must be said, the collectivism-versus-individualism controversy was
unclear on what counts as an institution. Popper’s (1963: 125, 133) enumeration in
Conjectures and Refutations includes governments, grocery shops, insurance compa-
nies, police forces, schools, and stock exchanges, but counts states out. However, if a
state is not an institution, it is a bundle of institutions.
To improve theoretical methods, it is crucial to distinguish first methods refer-
ring to persons only, from those postulating natural plus corporate actors. Then
both types of methods should be divided by the properties of these entities. Some
are ‘inherent’ – like human instincts and group needs -, others ‘relational’ – like
the opportunities people have, including the walls states build around or in front of
them -, and the groups making up societies. In “The aim of science” from 1957, re-
printed in Objective Knowledge from 1972, Popper held that knowledge grows by
turning seemingly ‘inherent’ properties into ‘relational’ properties (1972: 195). He
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elucidated this thesis with cases from physics. In sociology, Lazarsfeld forged ex-
planations with ‘contextual’ properties of persons – relations between them and
their environment -, and hinted that apparently ‘global’ properties of societies –
like their coherence – may be recast as ‘structural’ ones – the links between the
groups part of these societies. Maritain (1923) had christened Aristotelian logic a
logic of inherence, setting it apart from Frege’s and Russell’s relational logic from
around 1900, and Barth (2018) inserted the distinction between inherent logic and
relational logic into interesting hypotheses about ways of thinking as tied to well-
known persons and societal movements.
For those interested in definitions, the Dutch sociology textbook by Ultee, Arts and
Flap (1992), named a group of persons, who maintain ties not only by face-to-face-
interaction, but also through an organization created for that purpose, for brevity’s
sake an institution. The authors of the present paper now would replace in that long
sentence the word organization by the expression corporate actor. But then, Popper
was not interested in definitions, nor are we. We just defined institutions by stipulation
as well as nominally, and avoided – like Popper – an essentialist definition.
8.1.4 Three scandals and organized distrust
In The Asymmetric Society Coleman (1982) argued – by borrowing a term from juris-
prudence, and findings from Ronald Burt (1975) – that contemporary technologically
more developed societies witness an increase in the number of corporate actors, not
only bureaus of the state, but also charitable foundations, other tax-exempt organiza-
tions like universities, as well as companies with limited liability. This would make
for a shift in the balance between natural persons and corporate actors, toward cor-
porate actors. Adam Winkler’s We the Corporations, How American Businesses Won
Their Civil Rights (2018), contains a chronology of corporate rights, corroborating
Coleman’s claim about increasing asymmetry in favor of corporate actors.
In contrast to the thesis of Coleman (1982) and Winkler (2018), it may be held
that some corporate actors work against other corporate actors, and tilt the balance
a bit – or more – towards natural persons. At least, this is how we read research by
Korpi and Palme (2003). These Swedish sociologists accounted for differences in
various social security benefits between industrialized democratic states by varia-
tions in the percent of votes for left-wing parties and membership rates of labor
unions. If in these countries left-wing political parties and labor unions were stron-
ger corporate actors, the floor in the distribution of income for the natural persons
of this country was placed at a higher level. Perhaps Korpi and Palme sinned
against institutional individualism, because they did not analyze ‘individual data’,
only data on states and other corporate actors. But then, so what? The power of
some corporations may be countered by other corporations, with natural persons as
winners.
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The theoretical shift from states to corporate actors hints that Popper’s theory
that organized distrust lowers cheating and violence, may be right for states and
their polities, but wrong for other corporate actors. Recent newspaper headlines as-
sert that scientific periodicals publish papers with fake data, carmakers fiddle with
emissions of harmful substances, and priests of the Roman-catholic church have
sex with minors, while its hierarchy lets things pass. How is distrust in these corpo-
rate actors organized, if anything was organized? Three threads will link our analy-
sis of these scandals.
To begin with, Popper admitted that institutions are only as strong as the per-
sons staffing them. We add that special arrangements strengthen the actions of
these persons. Knowledge and money for surveillance are obvious requirements,
since it is an old trick of un-politics to regulate without proper enforcement. We
will try to find out more in this respect for our three scandals, adding that penalties
deter society at large, but noting that complaints against those in charge of corpo-
rate actors have been settled in silence out of court. So, we vary upon Hobbes (1651)
that covenants without the sword are but words, and do not protect human life,
their prima facie goal.
Secondly, we wonder to what extent a theory of Merton (1938) applies. In socie-
ties like the USA since the 1930s, people would be exhorted to live up to the ideal to
get rich and attain that goal now rather than soon, but they lack the legitimate
means to do so, making for fraud and infraction of laws in general. We will deter-
mine whether the rank and file of corporate actors invent improper actions if the
goals held up by their supervisors vastly surpass older goals.
Thirdly – aiming to go beyond the idea that scandals result from ‘misfired two-
person games’ – we hold that scandals feature several actors. Precisely because
reviews by scientific journals involve several anonymous persons, fraudulent scien-
tists will not easily be found out, since reviewers may take their task lightly, count-
ing upon other reviewers, who do the same. Something similar may apply to the
division of labor within car companies, and the levels of authority in the Catholic
church.
A follow-up on the last point. Whereas the term institutional individualism got
accepted in Anglo-Saxon sociology around 1970, in Dutch sociology in the 1980s
the label structural individualism stuck. Are there structures which are not institu-
tions? Raub and his pupils deserve credit for the attention paid to the prisoner’s
dilemma – and general game theory – in later Dutch sociology (Raub and Voss
1986; Raub, Buskens, and Corten 2015). So, does the prisoner’s dilemma invoke a
structure which is not an institution? We hesitate to say: upon closer inspection,
not really. The sheriff holds an office, and tries to catch criminals because he faces
re-election, whereas his trick to make suspects confess, is under normal conditions
impermissible in a lot of present-day societies. Indeed, the prisoner’s dilemma has
8 Organized Distrust: If it is there and that Effective, Why Three Recent Scandals? 163
been taken as a two-person game, whereas its structure involves at least four actors,
the two suspects of a crime, each as natural actors, the sheriff as a corporate actor,
and a committee specified by law that determines electoral results.
8.2 Scandals in science
‘Is the scientific paper a fraud?’ That is the question Medawar (1963), Nobel-prize
winner and director of the UK National institute for medical research, raised in a
BBC lecture, printed in The Listener. He gave three answers, depending upon how
the question is taken. Firstly, the question may be understood as about misrepre-
sentation of facts. If so, the answer is ‘of course’ no. Secondly, if the question is
interpreted as about deliberately mistaken interpretations, the answer is no too.
Thirdly, the question may be comprehended as about the representation of thinking
in a scientific paper, Medawar’s actual target. The answer to the question of
whether scientific papers are a fraud in this sense is yes – according to Medawar.
Editors of learned journals insist – at least in 1963 biology – on the form a) intro-
duction, b) previous work, c) methods, d) results, e) discussion. That order betrays
the false idea that science starts with observation, with theories coming later.
Medawar then pays tribute to Popper: scientists should look out for refutations of
conjectures.
This section deals with Medawar’s first question, and asks how it came about
that Diederik Stapel from the Netherlands in the first decade of the 21st century pub-
lished a series of articles with fake data in refereed social psychology journals. Of
course, it may well be that scientists like Medawar would never call (social) psychol-
ogy a science. Stapel made the New York Times (NYT) on November 2, 2011, with
Carey’s “Fraud Case seen as a Red Flag for Psychological Research”, and on April 23,
2013, with Bhattacharjee’s “The Mind of a Con Man”. In 2012, the Dutch science re-
porter Van Kolfschooten discussed the Stapel case in Ontspoorde Wetenschappen
(Derailed Sciences).
A fourth reading of Medawar’s question – missed by him – is of interest for so-
ciology. Hume (1757) was too fast in specifying the question of the origin of religion
into the question of the origin of religion in human nature, and Durkheim (1912)
sought the origin of religion in human societies. So, when it comes to scientific pa-
pers, do they twist the social processes by which they come about? Of course, pa-
pers are not written with the goal of a correct representation of social processes, but
their aim is neither to tell how things happen in the minds of their authors. All the
same, because editors prefer papers applying a particular plan, they all follow one
format. The balance between the author as a natural person, and the academic peri-
odical as a corporate actor, tilts towards the latter, and makes the question of how
Stapel got his papers published more pressing. Stapel for umpteen publications
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dreamed up answers to questionnaires, as well as observations in various public
places, which may be taken as indicative of, and caused by, a larger mental distur-
bance, as yet to be identified. However, how did a long list of Stapel’s papers pass
the roster of referees for a succession of social-psychology periodicals? Why was or-
ganized distrust – in the form of reports by referees, who did not learn from a jour-
nal’s editors the name of a manuscript’s author, with that author not learning from
the editors the names of those reviewers -, why was this double-blind referee sys-
tem not effective in keeping out from these journals papers with faked data? Stapel
lost his chair at Tilburg University in the Netherlands.
8.2.1 Three older frauds in academia
Since quality newspapers nowadays employ science reporters, irregularities in aca-
demia receive publicity, and when Stapel’s data faking got out, journalists adduced
precedents. We here detail three underplayed scandals. The first one shows that
there is more to claims to priority in science than honor, and the second one is
about an earlier case in psychology of forged data. The third one is directly relevant
to Stapel’s case: just as Stapel’s students held that his data were ‘too good to be
true’, so the statistician Fisher once argued that the biologist Mendel ‘cooked’
results.
First the discovery in the 1980s of the retrovirus responsible for acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), a name coined in the USA in July 1982. We fol-
low findings reported in France (2016). The scientists involved are Robert Gallo
from the National cancer institute (NCI) in Bethesda, Maryland, USA, and Luc
Montagnier of the Institut Pasteur in Paris, France. On May 20, 1983 in separate pa-
pers in Science (France 2016: 104), Gallo and Montagnier described a retrovirus
causing AIDS, to be called HIV in 1986. Gallo, the mind driving the field of retrovi-
ruses, was competitive and claimed the discovery (p. 216), but had found the retro-
virus in a sample from Montagnier, who was branded by Gallo as ‘prone to error’
(p. 102). In February 1985 science journalists at a gathering in New York got it: here
was a case of laboratory intrigue, and low-down thievery (p. 172). The meeting had
been called by Mathilde Krim from the American Medical Foundation, a privately
funded research campaign against AIDS. The Institut Pasteur started a law suit
in August 1985, which became cantankerous (France 2016: 225). It concerned the
royalties for a patent on the HIV-test filed by Gallo and NCI, six months after
Montagnier and the Institut Pasteur had done so (p. 141). In June 1986 Salk, who
was the first to develop a vaccine against polio, and had been embroiled in a similar
dispute in the 1950s, mediated and failed. In March 1987 US President Reagan and
Prime minister Chirac of France declared – at a joint appearance in the White
House – that royalties were to be shared equally, with Gallo and Montagnier named
as co-discoverers. When in 2008 the Nobel prize committee singled out the
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discovery of HIV, the prize went to Montagnier and team member Françoise Barré-
Sinoussi: Gallo did not share in (p. 227). That was the outcome of what sociologist
Merton calls a priority dispute. A Bible-like battle of David versus Goliath ended
with the wise weakling winning.
The second almost forgotten scandal is the Burt affair, after Cyril Burt (1883–1971),
an English psychologist. Burt (1966) had published a correlation of 0.771 for the IQs of
53 identical twins reared apart, and of 0.994 for 95 identical twins reared together.
Princeton psychologist Leon Kamin (1974) pointed out in The Science and Politics of IQ
that Burt published a paper in 1955 with exactly the same correlations for 21 identical
twins reared apart, and 83 reared together. That coincidence was too strong. It was not
clear either how Burt (1955) found his identical twins reared apart, and the number
seemed high. The raw data – if they ever existed – were burned with Burt’s papers
after his death, in accordance with his will. The journalist Oliver Gillie in October 1976
in the London Sunday Times was the first to openly suggest that Burt had faked data.
From 1947 to 1968 Burt was assistant editor, sole editor, and again assistant editor of
The British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, and Burt often published
in this journal. We did not gather how the double-blind referee system – if it already
was in place – was applied to his papers.
The Mendel-paradox comes third. Gregor Johann Mendel (1866) published re-
sults of experiments on the inheritance of visible traits of garden pea plants – like
flower color, and seed shape -, as obtained by artificially fertilizing plants differing
in these traits. The statistician Fisher (1936) reworked Mendel’s data, concluding
that they were too close to theoretical expectations, and wrote that Mendel cooked
data. Since Mendel’s papers were not archived, and everybody accepts that
the Augustinian monk grew peas in the garden of the Abbey of Saint Thomas in
Brno, scholars have argued about what exactly Mendel did. We refer to Franklin
et al. (2008), Ending the Mendel-Fisher Controversy. Mendel redid calculations when
results differed too much, and lacked the statistical sophistication to redo them
when they agreed. Nowadays standard procedures take care of outliers. They were
not around in Mendel’s days, and Fisher contributed to their development.
8.2.2 A Dutch social psychologist found out
Stapel studied psychology, got his PhD from Amsterdam in 1997, became a profes-
sor in Groningen in 2000, moving to Tilburg in 2006. In August 2011 three young
researchers went to the chair of the department of social psychology, and voiced
the suspicion that their professor fiddled. The results obtained with data Stapel had
collected when – say – visiting schools, were ‘just too good to be true’.
When Stapel was confronted by university authorities, he gave in. He had pub-
lished in Science on his observations in the hall of Utrecht Centraal, the largest
Dutch railway station. According to the faked findings, in waiting areas with litter,
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white and black persons were less likely to sit next to each other than in clean
areas. By visiting Utrecht, Stapel saw that the location foreclosed such findings,
and it dawned on him that he would be found out. A militant vegetarian social psy-
chology professor from Nijmegen, joined up with Stapel for a fake-data paper – in
the end unpublished -, showing that people who eat meat are more likely to act self-
ishly. Suspicions were so concrete, that inquiries were started at every university
where Stapel held a job: the Levelt Committee for Tilburg, the Noort Committee for
Groningen, and the Drenth Committee for Amsterdam. They followed the same
schedule: where are the data for each publication now, what did the questionnaire
look like, what were Stapel’s hypotheses, and were emails exchanged? Of the 130
articles in Dutch or English, 55 drew on faked data. Of 24 chapters in books to
which Stapel contributed, 10 featured fraudulent figures. Another 10 articles proba-
bly resulted from deceit too. It is not clear whether Stapel initially altered scores in
datasets only, and later invented full datasets, or whether Stapel from early on
faked collecting data.
It is easy to criticize the final report of the Levelt-Noort-Drenth Committees from
November 28, 2012. However, manuscripts are reviewed, academic periodicals keep
author names away from referees, and do not give referee names to authors. So,
given the import attached in this report to ‘double-blind reviewing’, an in-depth study
of reviews on Stapel’s rejects(-and-resubmits) might have been telling. Unfortunately,
the committees performed no such analysis.
8.2.3 How did it come about that a social psychologist cooked
data for such a long period?
When entering into the question of how Stapel’s fraud was possible, newspapers
mentioned the pressure to publish, and turned Stapel into the tip of an iceberg.
That massive mountain would also comprise phenomena like spreading the content
of one big article over several smaller ones with a lot of overlap. However, Stapel
had tenure, and was rather relaxed. So, who was forcing him?
Of course, strong organizational demands may compromise objectivity. All the
same, it remains to be seen whether some coercion to publish is that bad. Taxpayers
deserve value for money, and what presses tenured professors to perform? Blau
(1973) studied productivity differences between US university departments. These not
only resulted from stronger or weaker selection among applicants. When the climate
in a department is more oriented toward research – indicated by the number of grad-
uate students and the import of publications for appointment -, the productivity of a
member of this department –measured by the number of publications over a period –
is higher. This contextual effect unearthed by Blau may be projected behind the re-
search schools nourished by the Dutch Minister of education since the 1980s. The
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Levelt-Noort-Drenth committees bypassed the question of whether Stapel’s faked data
would have come to light earlier within an active research school.
Merton (1973) assembled articles into The Sociology of Science. The ethos of sci-
ence covers several values, and originality conflicts with disinterestedness. This
would make for deviance, like fraud and plagiary (Merton 1973: 309–321). Scientists
also may abandon research, withdrawing in teaching or administration. By dissect-
ing case histories, Merton showed that priority disputes do not occur simply be-
cause of big ego’s, but mainly when bystanders take care that esteem for originality
goes to the deserving. New forms of deviance may arise: the France-USA HIV-fight
was also about royalties.
Merton (1973: 321) adds that any tendency toward fraud in science is curbed by
another of its values: the pursuit of truth. Here he bypasses an important aim of
science. Truth is, in Kant’s phrase, a regulative idea: after tests with negative re-
sults, theories will get thrown out. Yet, by which regulative idea are they ushered in
as worthy of testing? It is content, as discovered by Popper (1935) in Logik der
Forschung. (A seemingly silly but surely serious elucidation: Dutch weather fore-
casts for the summer, like ‘it may rain tomorrow, but it may be dry too’ are defi-
nitely true, but without content; the statement ‘it will rain tomorrow’ says at least
something, and the statement ’it will rain tomorrow and the day after’ conveys
more information.) Merton (1957) offered a content-rich theory: he generalized
Durkheim’s (1897) anomie theory for suicide to predict high US crime rates, and
with a generalization of that generalization Merton (1973) explained deviance in sci-
ence. Such multilayered and informative theories are rare in sociology.
We return from truth and content as regulative ideas in a science, to Stapel’s
sins. He succumbed to the temptation of presenting upbeat tests of theories from
social psychology. So, truth was out as a regulative idea. However, did Stapel also
commit crimes against content as a regulative idea? The answer to this question is a
definite no. When Bhattacharjee (2013) interviewed Stapel, Stapel insisted that he
loved social psychology – in our reading its grand questions and its quite informa-
tive theories – but had been frustrated by its messy experimental data. In his auto-
biography Stapel (2012) mentions as his favorite theories in social psychology –
among others – the theory of cognitive dissonance, the impersonal impact hypothe-
sis, the Laurel and Hardy principle, and terror management theory. These theories
are rich in content, and it may well be that Stapel sinned against truth as a regula-
tive idea, because of the many informative theories he not simply found in, but ar-
ticulated for social psychology. Perhaps he liked their high content so much, that
he could not stand their refutation. We leave it to others to counter this conjecture.
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8.2.4 The failure of double-blind reviewing as a form
of organized distrust in social psychology
Why Stapel faked data is one question, why his faked papers were not stopped an-
other. Of course, the double-blind referee system is not meant to keep out faked-
data papers, it is supposed to improve their quality. However, quite a few very bad
papers float down the hierarchy of journals, and vetting them is time consuming. In
addition, incentives for referees to be constructive are weak: they do not receive a
financial reward, and their reputation will not soar, since reports are anonymous –
although some journals nowadays list referees once a year. Yet, authors are ex-
pected to be honest, and referees are able to spot dishonesties: in claims to a new
research question, when presenting hypotheses from the literature, and as a part of
data collection and analysis. But such deficiencies of the double-blind referee sys-
tem, just do not explain how Stapel got a series of papers with faked data out of his
office and into academic journals.
The historian of science Thomas Kuhn (1961) has argued that physics textbooks
mislead when they present two columns of figures, one with expected results, and
one with experimental findings, accompanied by the comment that the figures
show reasonable agreement. According to Kuhn, no criterion to determine the de-
gree of agreement is given, nor a justification for the cut-off point. But students –
new to the scientific community – take home from the rows – made by reputable
scientists – a benchmark for saying that their own results agree well or less well.
Kuhn (1961) adds that physicists take a student lab report with overly close agree-
ment as presumptive evidence of data manipulation. So, when Stapel was sus-
pected by his students, their instinct was better than his. Stapel was stopped, but
why was he not caught earlier on? His researchers did not nail him right after start-
ing out, since the suspicion that results are too good to be true needs a parade of
papers.
Following the blurb of Stapel’s (2012) autobiography, Stapel now thinks that if
he had acted more cunningly, he regularly would have let research go astray. He
did not do so, since he got addicted to ever more beautiful results. Stapel (2012:
242) holds that the Levelt-Noort-Drenth Committees reported without speaking with
him, and accepted remarks on his personality from various persons in interviews.
According to Stapel it was unclear who said what, how interviews were conducted,
which questions were asked, whether interviews were taken down by an experi-
enced minutes secretary, and whether interviewed persons agreed with the way re-
marks appeared in the report.
With these bad jokes, Stapel miscasts the Levelt-Noort-Drenth Committees. They
studied all his publications, and it is fair to say that no one ever did that. By comb-
ing Stapel’s full output, his mode of operation could be traced. Indeed, that way
cannot show up in a double-blind review. A referee may have misgivings when
reading a published paper of Stapel, but when that person reviews a new paper by
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him, this person does not know that it is again a Stapel. Double-blind reviewing
does not catch serial offenders, since it hides series. An editor might have suspi-
cions, but these remain qualms, because a serial offender abuses different journals.
Although ‘the famous French sociologist’ Bourdieu filled his own journal Actes de
la Recherche en Sciences Sociales – from its inception in 1975 until right after his
death in 2002 -, we take it that Cyril Burt’s decades are over.
So, the answer to the question of how it is possible that Stapel’s fakes got
through the double-blind referee system, is that they passed precisely because re-
views are double-blind. In society at large, when it comes to transgressions of the
penal code, the frequency of deviance is supposed to be lower, when the chances to
be caught are higher and the punishment is more severe. The corporate actors in-
volved – from police, by way of courts, to prisons – share information with one an-
other, and some people have a longer criminal record than others, while first
offenders receive a lower penalty. Scientific periodicals until now – and rather
rightly so – do not provide referees with a list of an anonymous author’s earlier sins
and good works. In addition, social-psychology journals in the years before the
Stapel scandal, did not ask authors to make data available for re-analysis.
How now about Popper’s (1952: ii, 217) argument that objectivity in science is not
ensured by the impartiality of an individual scientist, but forms an outcome of give
and take between many scientists? Popper here asserts the import of organized dis-
trust: ‘objectivity is closely bound up with the social aspect of scientific method, with
the fact that science and scientific objectivity do not (and cannot) result from the at-
tempt of an individual scientist to be ‘objective’, but from the friendly-hostile co-
operation of many scientists.’ In the chapter on the institutional theory of progress in
The Poverty of Historicism, Popper (1957) goes further by arguing that scientific progress
is a matter of the free competition of thought, and political institutions that safeguard
freedom of thought.
Somewhat in contrast to Popper’s hypothesis that progress in an academic field
is attained by friendly-hostile cooperation between researchers, we hold that dou-
ble-blind reviewing is but one form of organized distrust, and a weak one. If manu-
scripts are presented at scientific congresses first, cons are more likely to be caught.
So, double-blind reviewing should be combined with a conference presentation, fol-
lowed by formal remarks from an assigned referee. Of course, organizing conferen-
ces and preparing comments are burdensome, but these activities are more visible
than handing in an anonymous review, so more praise for conference organizers
and commentators might be forthcoming, if they are mentioned in a published
paper. Indeed, departments might refuse money to attend conferences without
tough trappings. In addition, since young researchers brought Stapel down, the
probability of faked data may be limited by periodic meetings of research schools,
in which young researchers thrash work in progress of seniors by re-analyzing their
dataset.
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Merton held that multiple discoveries are common in science. Our analysis of
automobile emissions standards in the second decade of the 20th century will show
that they also occur in car research.
8.3 (Un)like Unsafe at Any Speed:
From the Volkswagen-scandal by way
of Dieselgate to “Das Kartell”
In 1965 Ralph Nader published Unsafe at Any Speed. The Designed-in Dangers of the
American Automobile. It was an immediate bestseller, and General Motors signed
up private detectives, who tapped the Harvard-educated lawyer’s telephone for sa-
lacious talk, and hired prostitutes to catch Nader in the act. Politicians picked up
Nader’s message, leading to air bag and seat belt requirements. In the long run, the
number of car-accident deaths dropped dramatically: in the USA in 1965 five deaths
occurred for every 100 million miles traveled in cars, and one death for every
100 million miles in 2015. According to our own back-of-the-envelope computa-
tions, in 1965 of every 1,000 persons who died in the USA about 26 died in a motor
vehicle accident, and 14 in 2015. This decline is not as strong – an increase in the
miles travelled in a year partly explains the difference.
On November 25, 2015, The New York Times (NYT) commemorated that “50
years ago, Unsafe at Any Speed Shook the Auto World”. The journalist Christopher
Jensen quoted Nader as saying that he not only aspired to the level of getting a law
through – the National Traffic and Motor and Vehicle Safety Act signed by President
Lyndon Johnson in September 1966. Nader told Jensen that he also went after a fed-
eral agency to implement that law. Why exactly Nader wanted such an agency –
nowadays known as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration -, the news-
paper does not intimate.
We like to think that Nader cherished two arguments. The first one is a deriva-
tion from Hobbes (1651): covenants without the sword are but words, and nowadays
weapons house in agencies. The second argument is an analogy, and involves a ca-
sual observation: just as the confederate states who lost the American Civil War in
1865 did not pass laws stipulating equal treatment of former slaves – with a century
passing before Federal troops escorted black pupils into all-white schools -, so it
could not be expected that safety laws accepted at the Federal level, will be imple-
mented by each of the four dozens of states making up the USA a century later.
After the murder of President Kennedy, Johnson pushed through various strong-
teethed federal laws implementing civil rights.
The NYT for its 2015 piece also interviewed a top executive at an automobile
company. He liked neither Nader nor his book, but admitted that governments have
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a role to play in automotive safety. Regulations level the playing field among auto-
makers, set ground rules where everybody has to do something, and no one has to
worry about competitive disadvantages. Safety laws are not only in the interest of
car buyers, carmakers on their own cannot limit the dangers of driving.
It so happened that right before the 2015 commemoration, a new cars-scandal
erupted. On September 18, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the US
Federal government issued a notice of violation accusing Volkswagen, the German
giant, of installing software to thwart tests for emissions of pollutants. NYT-reporter
Jack Ewing told in Faster, Higher, Farther (2017), the inside story of the Volkswagen-
scandal – as its subtitle goes. Dutch journalist Peter Teffer followed with Dieselgate,
detailing that more German car makers were involved, and pointing at inaction of the
European Union (EU) and its 28 member states. Yet Teffer’s diagnosis did not go far
enough. According to documents presented by Peter Dohmen and Diermar Haranek
(2017) in the German weekly Der Spiegel, all German carmakers in secret came to
agree on the design of diesel engines, producing “Das Kartell”. We now review these
studies to describe what exactly made for scandals, to determine to what extent they
came about by a lack of organized distrust, and to suggest ways of dealing with
them. We hunt for informative hypotheses, and sift out pertinent findings.
8.3.1 The Volkswagen-scandal in the USA: Discovering trick
devices, with a lawsuit as follow-up
The major sources of energy in pre-industrial societies – whether their inhabitants
subsist by hunting and gathering, cultivating gardens, or plowing fields – were
human exertion and the harnessing of animals, for instance cows for plowing.
Fossil fuels – coal, oil, and natural gas – are the major sources of energy in contem-
porary societies like the Netherlands. These sources at first made manufacturing
the largest employment sector, leading to the tag industrial societies. It remains to
be seen whether in future post-industrial societies, where modal persons earn their
living in banking, health care, insurance, research, teaching, tourism, and other
services, forms of renewable energy will predominate, like hydroelectricity, solar
energy, and wind power.
When car ownership spread, it turned out that (post)industrial countries did
not have enough oil in their soils – or under their seas -, and that a few other coun-
tries exported huge quantities of oil. The latter ones formed a cartel and hiked pri-
ces – so much for free markets dominating the contemporary globalized world -,
leading to the first world-wide oil crisis of 1973, and the second one of 1979. These
calamities in their turn prompted measures to lower oil consumption. Carmakers
replaced battleships by compacts, and gasoline by diesel. When it was discovered
that diesel engines emit less carbon dioxide – which contributes to global warming
and rising sea levels -, and when major European countries began to tax diesel at a
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lower rate than gasoline, diesel cars took off. However, they emit nitrogen oxides
and fine soot, contributing to smog, asthma, lung cancer, and early deaths. The en-
gineering problem was to cut down on these emissions, and German carmakers
claimed in the first decade of the 21st century to have designed diesel motors con-
nected with urea tanks, which scrubbed nitrogen out of the exhaust, and to have
installed filters to catch soot. In this way emissions would conform to EU-issued
norms. Because of rising euroscepticism, the EU left their enforcement up to each of
its member states.
As Ewing (2017) tells the Volkswagen-scandal, the claim of clean diesel rested
on laboratory tests ordered by carmakers. That they were suspicious, became public
when Volkswagen started to export its diesel cars to the USA – where diesel had
not caught on. The company aimed for higher exports of its diesel cars as part of a
strategy to become the world’s largest carmaker. Because of its corporate structure,
with labor unions in its board, and Germany’s federal state of Lower Saxony as a
major stock owner, it was impossible to cut costs by trimming the number of em-
ployees. However, emissions standards were tougher in the USA than in the EU,
and fines for violations higher.
In 2013 graduate students from the budget-poor Center for Alternative Fuels,
Engines and Emissions (CAFEE) of West Virginia University in the USA, conducted
research to honor a $70,000 grant. CAFEE had obtained that meager sum from the
International Council of Clean Transportation (ICCT), a non-governmental organiza-
tion that started out as a world-wide network for environmental officials. Its staff
comprised former employees of EPA, which hands out penalties for violations of
the USA Clean Air Act. It contained since 1990 much stronger emission standards,
and high penalties.
ICCT knew that Volkswagens had difficulties in meeting (quite low) EU emis-
sion standards in tests conducted in European laboratories, and that its makers op-
posed higher standards because their implementation would be costly. However,
they did pass higher US standards in US laboratories, and ICCT initially wanted to
check the hunch that Volkswagen installed in diesel cars exported to the USA spe-
cial parts to meet higher standards, components absent from dirty Volkswagens in
Germany. That guess did not bear out: software in US Volkswagens was better in
hiding out-of-bound emissions.
The West-Virginia students tested emissions from a Volkswagen Jetta, a Volkswagen
Passat, and a BMW, all German passenger diesel cars exported to the USA, and
did so in the laboratory, as well as on the road. It may shock experimental sociol-
ogists that these students also measured car emissions ‘in the real world’, but
then most people do not drive cars in laboratories. The results for the laboratory
tests agreed with those made available by the German car companies. However,
when tested on the road, the emissions of two of the three cars turned out to be a
multiple of those in the laboratory: the BMW emissions remained the same and
acceptable, the Jetta emissions were 15 to 35 times higher than the USA standard,
8 Organized Distrust: If it is there and that Effective, Why Three Recent Scandals? 173
the exhaust of the Passat 5 to 18 times. The West-Virginia students did not believe their
first results, but in the end could not ascribe them to faulty measurements, or other
such factors. They wrote up a paper of 117 pages, and presented a summary
in March 2014 at a meeting of the Real World Emissions Workshop, sponsored by The
Coordinating Research Council, itself funded by the petroleum industry and major car-
makers. In the audience were persons from Volkswagen’s emissions compliance de-
partment, officials from EPA, and employees of the California Air Resources Board
(CARB). Because of the peculiar location of California’s major population centers,
CARB sets tougher standards than US federal laws. The students only spoke about car
A, car B, and car C, but because of the pictures presented, and the high level of knowl-
edge in the audience, it was clear which carmaker violated emissions standards.
Then things started moving. CARB launched a compliance project, and asked
Volkswagen about the pollution control equipment in its cars, including how the en-
gine software regulated doses of the urea solution. When the company was not forth-
coming, CARB put more staff on the investigation. It gradually dawned on CARB that
Volkswagen equipped its diesel engines with a special software device. In laboratories
it made for the injection of urea into the emissions, but it was turned off on the road,
where the sound of laboratory rollers is absent. When Volkswagen delayed the inquiry
by evasive answers, EPA issued on September 18, 2015 a notice of violation against
Volkswagen. The Volkswagen-scandal was born, and by early 2017 Volkswagen settled
with CARB, EPA, and American car owners for $2,000 million dollars. Lawsuits by car
owners against automobile companies may be taken as an outcome of Unsafe at Any
Speed. In the wake of that book, car owners successfully litigated carmakers for dam-
ages in accidents. Five decades later buyers were promised a car with clean diesel, and
actually bought one for dirty driving. By the way, diesel not only reduces the health of
persons driving a diesel car, but also the well-being of people who do not drive at all.
Ewing’s account of the VW-scandal reads like another David-and-Goliath story.
Volkswagen is the giant, and loses out because of David-like students. They study
at an outpost of academia, struggle on US highways to measure car emissions, and
do so with self-made instruments – which often break down. We think a more to
the point analogy and more thorough analysis goes beyond two actors. It takes stu-
dents as Davids too, but brings in two new Goliaths, and devalues Volkswagen. The
giants are the agencies handing out stiff penalties. In our close reading of the Bible,
Volkswagen turns into King Saul: David’s master, who – with his varying moods –
is not as benevolent and wise as before. In the Bible Saul is subdued by David’s
harp playing, in the Volkswagen scandal it gives Saul headaches.
8.3.2 How did it come about that Volkswagen fiddled?
According to Ewing (2017: 178–179), fiddling will have begun in the early days when
software was installed in cars as a stopgap for unexpected difficulties. After that it
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developed into a habit, and even later it turned into a competitive cost advantage for
Volkswagen, at least before the trick was discovered by regulatory agencies. Supposedly
no person at Volkswagen’s higher echelons ordered the installation of deceptive soft-
ware in cars for the US market. We hold it quite possible that upon discovery of tricks at
the lower levels of Volkswagen, the higher echelons tacitly agreed with them.
Ewing (2017) also offers a deeper explanation, which reminds of Merton’s expla-
nation of high US crime rates. Ewing does not refer to it, and at first postulates a
dysfunctional corporate culture – whatever that may be –, and then a succeed-at-all-
costs culture, a thesis richer in content. When winding up, Ewing (2017: 261) offers a
quite informative hypothesis: ‘The pressure to meet corporate goals at any cost is
hardly unique to Volkswagen’, and ‘Practically all corporate scandals stem at least in
part from unrealistic targets coupled with draconian consequences for employees
who fail to deliver, often combined with outsize rewards for the star performers.’
Apart from the clause about big bonuses, this hypothesis is close to Merton’s (1938)
theory of anomie. The goals held up to persons as legitimate – in the Volkswagen
scandal by the chief executive of the corporation that employs them -, cannot be at-
tained with legitimate means, which makes people resort to illegitimate means –
cheating with software. Merton (1938) calls this large discrepancy between legitimate
goals and legitimate means anomie. Here Merton borrowed from Durkheim. Ewing
(2017) adds to Merton’s hypothesis that people do not resort on their own to illegiti-
mate means, but avoid being fired upon a failure to reach that goal.
Economic pages of quality newspapers had carried the story that Volkswagen
aimed to become the world’s largest carmaker by way of diesel. Ewing outlines ef-
fects of this strategy in chapter titles: ‘By all means necessary’ and ‘Impossible does
not exist’. As a quote from Volkswagen’s chief executive attests (Ewing 2017: 62),
Volkswagen’s goal was to be attained with any means necessary, that is, any means
to attain this goal was allowed. And if persons within Volkswagen held that some-
thing was technically impossible, the answer was that impossibilities do not exist –
according to Ewing a saying around in the company (2017: 90). In came illegitimate
means. When a Volkswagen CEO was asked what he would do if engineers insisted
that something was impossible, he answered that he would fire them, and bring in
a new team, and if that squat were to say that it could not do it, he said he would
fire it too (2017: 89). This style of managing emboldened subordinates to behave in
the same way toward their inferiors. However, a weakling ran Volkswagen’s depart-
ment seeing to compliance with outside regulations.
8.3.3 Dieselgate discovered or not in Europe: JRC-Ispra
and TNO-Delft
After September 18, 2015, the question in Europe was why the Volkswagen scandal
had not been outed in Europe. The short answer is that it did come out there, a
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short-long answer that other German diesel makers were involved too. The long an-
swer is that neither EU authorities, nor any of its 28 members, made a fuss about
the things that became infamous as Dieselgate. The longest answer is that officials
washed their hands in innocence and muddy water. Like Pilatus in the Bible, the
EU claimed that is was outside its mandate to prosecute – carmakers.
This is our summary of Teffer (2017). If there is one good gal or guy in Teffer’s
account, it is the European Parliament. It decided on December 17, 2015 to appoint
a committee to seek testimonies on ‘the measurement of emissions in the car indus-
try’. It may be nitpicking, but that title is a misnomer. Emissions were measured by
the car industry itself, and it would have been a case of wise organized distrust to
have car emissions measured by independent agencies, and to let them decide
whether carmakers lived up to the standards specified in emissions laws.
It was known before September 18, 2015 in Europe that European cars sur-
passed EU limits on emissions of nitrogen oxides. One place was the EU’s Joint
Research Centre (JRC). In the town of Ispra in Italy, it runs a laboratory for testing
automobiles, and it developed PEMS, the portable emissions measurement system.
With its help JRC determined car emissions outside the laboratory, and on the road
while driving a car. (So, West-Virginia students designed instruments available
elsewhere.) According to Teffer (2017: 34), JRC-Ispra reports from 2011 and 2013
show that emissions of various diesel cars on the road were much larger than those
in laboratory tests. Teffer (2017: 35) adds that in its 2013 report Ispra suggests that
the discrepancies may be accounted for by defeat devices, that made cars perform
better in laboratories than on the road. Following Teffer (2017: 75), Ispra told the
European Commission at a meeting on November 23, 2010, that on-the-road tests of
diesel cars showed emissions 4 or 5 times higher than the norm. JRC did not name
cars and companies.
That the Volkswagen Passat surpassed emission limits, was known in Delft in the
Netherlands, where TNO (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Toegepast Natuurweten-
schappelijk Onderzoek) has a section for car emissions. TNO – as the name says an or-
ganization for applied research in the natural sciences – investigated car emissions for
the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. The Netherlands has a law that
stipulates governmental documents to be made available to anyone who asks for spe-
cific ones, and a television program requested emails sent from the Ministry. A mail
from January 11, 2012, mentions TNO-tests in the laboratory and on the road for a
Passat, with higher values for tests on the road. TNO asked the Dutch company that
imports Volkswagen for clarification. There are no minutes for a meeting on April 27,
2012, but an email from TNO to the Ministry from August 27, 2012, shows that
Volkswagen did not sent data promised on that occasion. In reply to a question by
Teffer, a spokesperson for TNO said – apparently in 2017 – that TNO had decided in
2012 not to pursue its research on high Passat emissions, since it involved conditions
deviating from the test for admitting this car on Dutch roads. However, an issue
was whether this test was that good.
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8.3.4 Why did Dieselgate languish in Europe?
When Teffer insisted, TNO stated that it does not enforce laws. Did TNO press find-
ings on the Dutch ministry doing so? TNO said in 2017 that research for this ministry
is not meant to contribute to law enforcement, and that TNO’s main goal is to col-
lect data on emissions in the real world. Yet TNO performs applied research, and an
ultimate goal of such investigations is to safeguard public health. When Teffer vis-
ited JRC in October 2016, its expert on car emissions held that he is no watchdog,
and that approval of cars to be driven on the road is a completely different branch
of sport: it is the task of national authorities to act on JRC information. But then,
why did JRC keep car names classified?
At hearings in 2016 of the special committee of the European Parliament, the in
2010 responsible member of the European Commission said that it was not the goal
of the JRC-studies to catch cars and companies in the act, their sole purpose was to
determine discrepancies between tests in the laboratory and on the road. But is not
it exactly the task of the European Commission to learn from this discrepancy? The
European Commission had its own defense: it issues regulations about emissions
levels, but EU members were to implement them. Teffer adds: but why was JRC in-
formation not shared with national authorities issuing permits for cars to be driven
on its roads?
Another justification for the inaction of the European Commission was that car-
makers found loopholes in regulations. But then, why did the European Commission
leave them open? In addition, the European Commission is there to initiate proce-
dures, not to sit on the chair of judges deciding in a court case. Why did it do so?
What is more, the argument of – say – Volkswagen that other carmakers were not
persecuted, and all companies were not treated on equal footing, is a chutzpah. No
police officer will accept of an individual to be fined for parking where this is for-
bidden, the argument that owners of other parked cars have not been charged.
The European Commission also might have taken action under its mandate to
protect public health. Public health declines when standards are not met, but also
when the number of law-abiding cars on the road rises. It may happen that soot
and nitrogen oxides emissions by a car fall, but the total amount of soot and nitro-
gen oxides to which a pedestrian is exposed, goes up: the number of cars explodes,
as well as the number of kilometers driven by each car. Emissions laws are to some
extent a side show, and Eurostat – the EU statistical office – should present figures
about causes of death, and chronic ailments. Just as US statistics about the number
of death in car accidents per million miles driven may mislead, so may a trend to-
ward tougher standards in emission laws.
All in all, the European Commission – as regards car emissions – did not hit
upon the idea that in a budding union, progress occurs by court cases and prece-
dents. Both Ewing and Teffer surmise that the staff of EPA and CARB had a broader
view of the goals of their agencies than the staff of JRC and TNO. This is a too easy
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explanation. Of course, the EU, unlike the USA, did not have an agency seeing to
the implementation of its emissions laws, and this accounts for the discovery of the
Volkswagen scandal in the USA. However, that argument amounts to confounding
a remedy with a cause. An agency is a remedy, the cause is not only the anomic
corporate culture at Volkswagen, but also – as we argue now – fatalism within JRC,
TNO and the European Commission. The goals held up by Volkswagen were too
high, those set by JRC, TNO and the European Commission too low.
Merton’s anomie theory on crime rates improved upon Durkheim’s anomie the-
ory for suicide rates. Durkheim (1897) assumed that human desires are unlimited,
while human beings lack the means to fulfill them all. According to Durkheim most
societies have norms that adjust the goals and means of a person to each other.
However, societies with free enterprise and free labor lack such norms, and the
goals of persons will surpass their means, leading to suicide, particularly when free
markets are booming. Merton (1938) objected to this human-nature explanation:
the legitimate goals of the inhabitants of US society since the 1930s vastly outran
the legitimate means at the disposal of a lot of them. Merton invokes the American
dream, with its from-rags-to-riches stories. The discrepancy between legitimate
norms and legitimate means, would make – so holds Merton – for the use of illegiti-
mate means, like various forms of crime.
It so happens that Durkheim (1897: 311) contrasted anomie with fatalism, a situ-
ation in which the modest goals that people set themselves are considered illegiti-
mate by society at large, so that ‘their future’ is ‘mercilessly walled in’. He adds that
fatalism occurs very infrequently, but it may account for the high suicide rate of
married young men, and of married women without children. (Durkheim did not
elaborate). When it comes to the effect of fatalism on economic crimes, fatalism in
our way of reasoning makes for just doing one’s job, like producing parts never to
be assembled into cars.
We posit that fatalism prevailed within JRC and TNO. Results of these organiza-
tions did not go to the proper places, but these corporate actors just kept up re-
search, perhaps hoping that results one day will be used by authorities issuing
standards. The means of JRC and TNO were specific findings on emissions in labo-
ratories and on the road. Their obvious goal was to publicize specific data on dirty
emissions, but that was an illegitimate aim. Their legitimate goal was to produce
test results for internal reports, which is a humble ambition indeed. This made for
fatalism among the rank-and-file.
JRC, TNO, and the European Commission said that emissions surveillance was
not their task. Researchers worth their salt, would see to it that their results arrive
at the right places, and European politicians up for re-election would go after viola-
tion of emissions standards. Few organizations did, their mindset was fatalist: peo-
ple did not go after modest goals, justified inaction by pointing to a limited task,
and no one leaked to a popular car periodical names of cars failing real world tests.
European politicians were so estranged from European thought, that they forgot
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Hobbes’s dictum about covenants without swords. And they did not hit upon the
idea that when an authority at a certain level of decision-making issues a law, this
authority should provide for an agency at the same level that implements these
rules. It is accepted nowadays that when asked to account for one’s action, it will not
do to state that one was ordered to do so. But apparently, when asked why one did
not do anything, it is considered a good excuse that one was not required to do so.
8.3.5 “Das Kartell” discovered in Germany
Ewing (2017) and Teffer (2017) suggest that the problem with nitrogen oxide emis-
sions of diesel cars was, that companies were afraid to tell owners that their cars
needed frequent refills of their urea tank, twice as frequent as oil checks. This should
not be much of a difficulty for car designers, as this tank may be enlarged. Why the
design was not adapted, became clear in Dohmen and Hawranek (2017). They found
that other German carmakers came to fiddle with software for their diesels too.
EU laws against cartels are strong, and the EU sees to it that its members imple-
ment them. In connection with a case of fixing steel prices, the Bundeskartelamt
raided on June 23, 2016, offices of Audi, BMW, Daimler, Porsche and Volkswagen. By-
products of the catch were documents showing that the companies had made secret
agreements about the design of cars with diesel engines. They did so in meetings of
their experts. An issue was the size of urea tanks. If they were to become larger, the
price of a car would rise too much. But also, if it were too large, the car could not be
fitted with a high quality stereo set, and car owners would not be able to transport
their golf sticks in their golf bag to their golf court. In the end, the companies decided
upon a small tank. Its disadvantage was more frequent refills of urea, and that was
reduced by defective software, installed by more companies than the one who was
first to be found out. Of course, the decision to go after tanks of the same size, limited
competition, and therefore was illegal. When the Bundeskartelamt found out,
Volkswagen decided to cooperate as chief witness: Volkswagen gave away the other
companies, in exchange for a lower penalty. A bit later Daimler confessed, now com-
peting with Volkswagen to become the first chief witness in a cartel case against
German automakers. The prisoner’s dilemma was there in the Wild West of the USA
in the 19th century, and is there now in Germany and the EU.
8.3.6 Car manufacturing and organized distrust
How much organized distrust was there as regards the corporate actor Volkswagen?
One might find organized distrust within Volkswagen itself, at the level of Germany,
and at that of the EU. In the Volkswagen scandal, organized distrust failed on all three
levels.
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Did Volkswagen have internal arrangements to check that it lived up to the
law? Controlling departments were better staffed in the US than in Europe (Ewing
2017: 109, 125). However, Volkswagen’s department – supposed to keep engineers
abreast of regulations – lagged behind those of other carmakers. That EPA and
CARB strictly enforced pollution rules, was not appreciated enough, and jurists
were not in on the exact US penalties for cheating. Volkswagen did not yet have
rules in place that would allow a whistle-blower to report a violation without fear-
ing consequences.
In addition, Volkswagen had a board supervising its executive board. Such a
structure is common nowadays in many organizations, not only in business
enterprises. The main tasks of the supervisory board are appointing new CEO’s and
selecting outside accountants to check the company’s books. For the rest, the ideal
supervisory board critically follows the actions of the executive board from some
distance. In the case of Volkswagen this did not result in organized distrust. The
chief executive of Volkswagen for nearly ten years, Piëch, became president of its
supervisory board. In addition, the Piëch family was the main shareholder of
Volkswagen. So, Piëch was not independent.
States may influence organizations within the boundaries of their territory. States
formulate laws, for example about criteria new cars have to meet to be driven on the
roads. They may also create agencies to monitor whether laws are enforced or remain
dead letters. As to car emissions, the USA was and is different from Europe. In the USA
the federal state acts. The European Commission did not act in the Volkswagen scan-
dal, the right to do so rested with the separate EU member states.
In the USA, ‘Washington’ wrought ‘covenants with a sword’. Since 1990 the
Clean Air Act contained strong standards, and high penalties – and apart from EPA,
there is CARB. Once irregularities were discovered these agencies bombarded
Volkswagen with questions. In contrast, the EU’s emissions rules contained loop-
holes, and had to be enforced by national states, in case of cars more so than as
regards other means of transportation. European agencies exist for airlines, the
maritime sector, railways, but not motorways (Teffer 2017: 199–206). No state in the
EU kept cars off the road after they failed tests. At best member states stipulated
minor penalties for makers of polluting vehicles. The most important conclusion at-
tained – after two years! – by the special committee of inquiry of the European
Parliament, was that a serious mismanagement had occurred in the measurement
of harmful emissions by diesel cars – at the level of the member states as well as
that of the EU.
Finally, organizations testing whether cars pass or fail emissions standards,
should be independent of car companies. Early on, companies tested their own
cars, and it also happened that small firms checked for big producers whether their
cars were OK. According to EU-law, a car certified in one country, is allowed on all
EU roads. This occasions a race to the bottom. A European agency helps.
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8.4 Scandals about sexual abuse of minors by
Roman-catholic clerics in various countries
In Faster, Ewing quotes an ICCT’er (2017: 175): only if sure, an investigator will ac-
cuse a carmaker of cheating on emissions, since it is like accusing a priest of child
sexual abuse (our italics). We now turn to scandals of sexual abuse of minors by
clerics. Part of our argument is that, precisely because people want to be sure be-
fore acting, seemingly small-scale scandals fester. Another element is that precisely
because cases are not decided in court, but settled behind closed doors, penalties
do not deter other clerics. In addition, precisely these arrangements lower the chan-
ces that anyone else who was sexually abused as a minor by a cleric, goes to the
police, and declares so – or that parents declare that a cleric sexually abused their
child. Finally, abuse of minors – although more common than statistics say – is
rare. All this makes for a societal process like that involving an emperor without
clothes. No one dares to tell him of his nudity, since he is supreme, but once some-
one has said that the emperor is clad in Adam’s attire, the emperor’s nakedness is
all over the empire.
Sociology’s initiators took up the theme of sex and society. Weber’s Gesammelte
Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie – taken from a journal he co-edited – touch upon the
effects of religious ethics on eroticism (Weber 1920–1921: i, 554–556). And Durkheims
L’Année Sociologique published in 1898 his piece on the topic of incest – in the first
issue of his own periodical. By studying Australian aboriginals, Durkheim tried to
purge blurring factors. In doing so, he acted not unlike engineers who test car emis-
sions only in laboratories, and sociologists who take experiments as ultimate tests.
Next to Durkheim’s question of the causes of a universal incest taboo, stands
that of the extent to which people violate it. Frequencies will be small, but are –
like suicide rates – societal phenomena: regularities occur in the degree to which a
society’s members trespass its rules. Durkheim noted incidents of incest, and we
discuss his remarks since they throw a peculiar light on Durkheim’s thesis on how
ideas on superior powers originate. When dissecting an eye-witness report on a cor-
roboree of Australian aboriginals, Durkheim (1912: 309) mentions that at such a
staging of a story about primeval ages, sexual rules are broken: men exchange their
wives, and incestuous unisons – although in ordinary times condemned as hei-
nous – occur in the open and without punishment. This happens at night, when
people are overexcited by music. Perhaps not only Pink Pop and Woodstock are
about sex, and drugs, and rock-and-roll. This may account for high corroboree at-
tendance, assemblies that – following Durkheim – bear and nourish the idea of
forces surpassing human beings.
In the 1960s countries like the Netherlands witnessed a sexual revolution. The
new hormonal anti-conception pill begat more sex before marriage, and while co-
habitation without marriage once was frowned upon, it became rife. In several
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countries, homosexuality used to be outlawed, and in others publicly ridiculed,
nowadays marriages between persons of the same sex are concluded in town halls,
with relatives present. It is true, marriages between close kin remain barred.
However, as regards the theme of sex and society, more interesting are recent scan-
dals in western countries, showing that Roman-catholic clerics sexually abused ju-
veniles, with Roman-catholic authorities covering up for clerics who sexually
molested minors. Reports almost exclusively are about priests abusing boys.
This section mentions relative frequencies of sexual abuse of minors by
Catholic clerics, and estimates the percent of clerics who did so, but its main ques-
tion is why it took so long for persons who were sexually abused, to stand up, and
tell that Catholic clerics did so. According to §249 of the Dutch penal code, sexual
acts between parents and their minor children are punished by up to six years in
prison, as well as sexual acts between a minor and a person who instructs, cares
for, or watches over a minor. An earlier version was more concrete, and mentions
parents, guardians, teachers and clerics. The abstract formulation implying misuse
of authority was chosen, not to leave clerics out, but to encompass other concrete
culprits. A contemporary example is sports instructors.
Figures on sexual abuse of minors differ from more familiar statistics on other
crimes published by national statistical offices. The latter refer to events during
one year, the former state how many persons were abused or not in the years of their
youth taken together, and how many priests during their whole career did or did not
abuse a child. This way of counting makes for higher figures, but less so if minors are
victimized later on by another cleric, and if perpetrators are serial abusers.
8.4.1 The USA scandal
Sexual abuse by Catholic clergy was first reported in 1985, by US national newspa-
pers. A priest from Louisiana confessed to have molested 11 minors. In 2002, The
Boston Globe published on abuse of minors in the Boston diocese. This prompted
the assembled American bishops to ask John Jay college of criminal justice in
New York City for a large-scale study. According to The Nature and Scope of the
Problem of Sexual Abuse of Minors by Catholic Priests in the United States from 2004
(the Jay Report), 4% of all US priests from 1950 to 2002 abused at least one minor.
All in all, 4,392 priests abused 11,667 minors (Goodstein 2004). Sources were ques-
tionnaires to dioceses, urged to search archives.
News on abuse of minors by clerics spread to other countries, and therewith re-
ports were ordered for – among others – Australia, Belgium, Ireland, and the
Netherlands. In Australia, 7% of all Catholic priests between 1950 and 2010 were
accused of sexually abusing minors (Anonymous 2017). This figure seems higher
than the 4% for the USA from 1950 to 2002. We found no comparable figures for
perpetrators in the Netherlands, but unique data about victims.
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8.4.2 The discovery that minors were abused in the Netherlands
That Dutch Catholic priests sexually abused minors, became a public concern after
newspaper NRC and broadcaster Wereldomroep on February 26, 2010 publicized
testimonies of three victims of the brothers and fathers of the Congregation of
Salesians from one convent plus seminary. This made for 700 new testimonies by
persons as minors part of the Catholic educational system. Joep Dohmen’s (2010)
Vrome Zondaars (Pious Sinners) contains results of this investigative journalism.
Dutch Catholic education swelled after the 1900 act of compulsory schooling,
as well as the 1917 act financing religious schools to the same extent as public ones.
Religious pillars were highest around 1960: Catholic children visited Catholic
schools with teachers from the Catholic clergy, protestant pupils went to schools
with elders as supervisors, while non-religious persons visited public schools. With
the 1962 Vatican council the Dutch Catholic pillar started reeling, and it had top-
pled by 1990. Among Catholic parents, sending children to a boarding school of
their own faith, was more common than among Protestant parents (we will give fig-
ures). According to Dohmen (2010: 273), in half of the hundred Catholic boarding
schools for boys in the Netherlands in 1958, pupils were sexually abused by their
clerical teachers or wardens. Orphanages and reformatories, where children and
clergy lived under one roof too, were more likely to count victims. Priests abused
altar boys, children who came to confession, choir members, scouts, and nephews
and nieces. Some cases of abuse lasted years.
Under pressure, Catholic bishops and priors congregations conceded to an in-
dependent inquiry into sexual abuse of minors within Catholic organizations. Thus
began the Deetman Committee, led by a former Secretary of State for Education,
publishing in 2010 Seksueel Misbruik van Minderjarigen in de Rooms-Katholieke
Kerk (Sexual Abuse of Minors in the Roman-Catholic Church).
Deetman (2010) estimates that between 1945 and 1985 in the Netherlands a few
thousand minors were severely sexually abused (meaning penetration) by Catholic
clerics. When including less severe cases (like groping), the number rises to 10,000
or 20,000. Misuse decreased at the end of the seventies, when ordination for priest-
hood had crashed, and troves of clerics left their church.
Compared with studies for other countries, Deetman (2010) contains a novelty:
findings for a large sample representative of the Dutch population above the age of
40 years in 2010. (Apparently there was no point in asking younger persons, since
their exposure to an educational system run by nuns and priests was too low). The
34,324 respondents with complete data were part of an internet-panel. Of them
(Deetman 2010: 564), 31% stated to have been raised as Catholic, and of all these
Catholics 9% had been at a boarding school, children’s home, orphanage, or semi-
nary. For the 69% not raised as Catholics, this percentage is 4. This confirms what
was assumed about Catholic education.
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Persons declared whether or not they were, before the age of 18 and against
their will, sexually approached by a non-kin adult. Of all Dutch persons older than
40 in 2010, 10% reported as a youth to have experienced unwanted sexual advan-
ces by an unrelated grown-up. Deetman (2010: 564) also presents percentages for
four subsamples. Of persons raised as Catholic and part of at least one of the four
institutions, where juveniles spend day and night, 21% answered yes to the abuse
question. The percentage is 22 for persons who have been in at least one of these
establishments, but were not brought up as Catholic. If persons were raised as
Catholic and did not visit any foundation, the percent is 12, and it is 8 for those who
did not grow up as Catholic and never were part of one of the four institutions
where young people visit school and sleep.
These data only inform on whether or not a person and potential victim was
raised as Catholic. How many of their offenders were active for Catholic organiza-
tions? That is the key question, and the Deetman (2010: 564) presents pertinent
data from a follow-up survey among all 2,454 sexually abused persons. For these
abused persons, the percent abused by adults active in Catholic organizations was
6. For people raised as Catholics, once part of an establishment, and sexually
abused, 33% of their abusers was active for a Catholic organization. This percent is
9 for sexually abused persons raised as Catholics and never in a foundation. For the
whole sample of 34,324 persons, the percent abused as a minor by an unrelated
adult from a Catholic organization was 0.6.
Taken together, figures do not tell well on the Dutch Catholic church. The differ-
ence between the 8% of sexual abuse for those raised as Catholic, but outside an
institution where they stayed during the night, and the 12% of abuse for persons
brought up as Catholic and part of such an establishment, attests to this. So does
the difference between the 9% abused as minors by an adult active in a Catholic
organization for those raised as Catholic and never in a night-foundation, and the
33% abused by such an adult, for all abused persons raised as Catholic and part of
such an institute.
Figures do not tell well either on growing up in any day-and-night institution.
Of minors raised as Catholic, and part of such an institution, 21% was sexually
abused, similar to the 22% for those not raised as Catholic, and having lived in such
a place. A follow-up ordered by two Dutch ministries on sexual abuse in institutions
for juveniles – as well as on corporeal violence and mental violence – was issued in
2019. It did not involve enough cases for statistical analysis, and is skipped here.
Deetman (2010) advised the creation of an agency to which people could report
by hotline to have been sexually abused as minors by clerics, and lodge a com-
plaint, which was to be heard, and might lead to compensation. This Reporting
Centre issued annual reports, listing the administrative course of calls. To assess
the implementation of organized distrust, we quote from page 118 of the English
version of its Report on Activities 2011–2018 (Reporting Centre 2018), its final report.
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From spring 2010 – the agency’s start – to December 1, 2017 the hotline received
3,712 calls. Of these rings, 1,650 remained a verbal report, 10 a verbal complaint, and
2,056 resulted in a written complaint (a footnote elucidates the discrepancy of 4). Of
all written complaints, 251 were withdrawn, and 334 were settled before a hearing –
meaning damages were awarded behind closed doors. A board heard 1,471 com-
plaints (now figures square). Of those complaints, 13 more were settled during the
hearing, 20 fell outside the board’s jurisdiction, 113 were judged inadmissible, 318
without good reason, and 1,002 valid (when summing, we miss 5 cases). At the time
of the final report, for 946 valid complaints damages had been fixed, with another 7
complaints having been settled. The difference between 1,002 and 953 (946 + 7) is not
accounted for. (Did in these cases people forgo compensation, or was the final report
finished before the agency closed?) The 946 valid complaints for which damages had
been fixed, were awarded in total 28 million euros. In an NRC news article, Dohmen
(2017) quotes that amount from the Final Report, adding that – according to docu-
ments that are not public – for 403 settlements 13 million euros were paid out, that
is, for deals behind closed doors. Reporting Centre (2018: 118) gives 354 (334 + 13 + 7)
settlements, and we counted (Reporting Centre 2018: 159–159) a higher number, to
wit 402 settlements.
The upshot is that, just as for commercial companies organized distrust takes
on the form of professional bookkeeping and independent auditing, so for corpo-
rate actors like churches organized distrust involves consistent administration – on
top of financial disclosure. These types of organized distrust were not fully imple-
mented in the Netherlands in the 2010s in regards sexual abuse of minors by mem-
bers of the Catholic clergy during the decades after World War 2.
8.4.3 How did it come about that abuse of minors became public
only when minors had grown up?
If punishments are more severe and apprehension chances higher, a state’s laws
will be trespassed less frequently. This rich-in-content, well-corroborated hypothe-
sis from classical criminology (Beccaria 1764, Bentham 1789) pertains to apprehen-
sion and penalties by the state. But how would a state’s police learn that a cleric
sexually abused a minor? That cleric will have told this child to remain silent, and
if a minor brings itself to telling its parents, these parents first go to a local church
authority. This power-that-be will check with the cleric named, who may deny. The
chances of a police report about the priest are small, since physical traces – if any –
will have gone. The cleric’s chances of transfer will be high, as well as this cleric’s
chances of backsliding. If a cleric who abused a minor sexually, is not brought be-
fore a public court, sentencing does not deter other priests either.
We now generalize an interesting hypothesis from Jim Rutenberg’s piece in the
NYT for October 22, 2017, on media moguls and prospective actresses, as occasioned
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by #MeToo. A major reason for the delay in US movie stars stepping forward, would
have to do with out-of-court settlements, in which victimized women obtain financial
compensation, and vow silence. In the same way, deals behind closed doors about
minors sexually abused by clerics, decrease the chances that parents of abused mi-
nors declare #WeToo. The same goes for grown-ups abused as minors. To repeat, the
Dutch hotline led to 2,056 written complaints, of which at least 354(=17%) were set-
tled off the record. Before 2010, a couple of well-publicized examples would have
given abused persons courage to speak out, but such instances were rare. The bal-
ance between natural and corporate actors favors the Catholic church. For the oppo-
site reason, when a few others have already stepped forward, more adults will come
forward a bit later to tell that clerics abused them. In addition, just as parents are
unlikely to report to the police their own child for misconduct, so the Catholic hierar-
chy with low probability will tell on its clerics. The prolonged contestation of the sep-
aration of Church and State by the Catholic church – in place for the Netherlands
since Napoleonic times – will have contributed to the infrequent referral of sexual
abuse of minors to the police.
8.4.4 Abuse of minors and organized distrust
Since research is scarce, words were wasted on the question of whether the pledge
of celibacy for Catholic clerics attracts gays and lesbians, the question of the extent
to which Catholic rites occasion homosexuality with minors, as well as the question
of whether Catholic schools tend to do so. We are grateful to the Los Angeles Times
for collecting questionnaires completed by 1,854 priests in the USA in 2002, and to
Andrew Greeley, who analyzed them in Priests. A Calling in Crisis (2004).
According to priest and sociologist Greeley, American priests do not differ from
ordinary men in several relevant aspects. One idea of conservative Catholics is that
abuse of minors entered the Catholic church, because of a growing relative number
of homosexual priests. There is some truth in it. Since 5% of all men is homosexual,
the 16% homosexuals reported by Greeley (2004:39), amounts to a clear-cut over-
representation, and speaks against same-sex sex occasioned by their vow not to
marry a woman. Indeed, the percent of heterosexual priests living in celibacy was
higher than the percent of homosexual priests doing so: 86 versus 63 (Greeley
2004: 41).
Ross Douthat in the NYT of March 28 and 30 (2010) harnessed Jay report data.
Numbers for accused priests and abused minors spike around 1970. The rise was
strongest in sexual misconduct over a long period for priests with teenage boys,
with short-term misconduct involving children aged 12 years or younger increasing
less. Douthat takes this to confirm the thesis that sexual misconduct within the
Catholic church climbed because of the sexual revolution in society at large.
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Of all imaginable causes of sexual abuse of minors by priests, the media invoked
lack of organized distrust the least. How little was there as regards sexual abuse of
minors by Catholic priests? The laws of the Dutch state against sexual abuse of mi-
nors were in place, and had an eye for misuse of minors by authorities. Yet despite a
School inspectorate, the state probably monitored Catholic organizations less closely
than public ones, and Catholic ones would not have accepted detailed reporting.
Catholic congregations ran schools, and what they did outside school hours was out
of reach. The Dutch state let the autonomy of church bodies prevail above the well-
being of minors entrusted to them. In this way, a law by and large remained words.
Supervision was warranted – precisely because Catholics clerics live outside the
world. Nowadays the idea that every school should have an in-house child psycholo-
gist reporting regularly to the school inspectorate would meet little resistance. It
would have been way out – even for boarding schools only – in the 1950s.
Organized distrust was lacking within Catholic organizations too. Culprits did
not have to leave their congregation – indeed, that would have been a very severe
punishment. (It has occurred, even with cardinals, see Elizabeth Dias and Jason
Horowitz 2019). Offenders were reassigned – which may have been something of a
reward. Seemingly things were in good order within the Catholic church. It had its
own laws, and there was a church court. However, church law contained the direc-
tive that in case of misuse by a priest, the victim and witnesses should remain silent.
The Vatican regarded enforcement of church laws as a task for country cardi-
nals: the highest level of a corporate actor delegates duties to a lower level.
Statistics Netherlands records the number of persons convicted for §249 of the
Dutch penal law – and Drukker’s (1937) criminal-sociological study on sexual
crimes in the Netherlands has a time series from 1911 to 1930. In contrast, the
Statistical Yearbook of the Vatican publishes the numbers of priests called, but not
the number of infractions of particular church laws. Recently the Vatican did some
things. Abuse of minors by priests now always should be reported to the police.
This amounts to admitting that it often was not done. The limitation in church law
for sexual crimes was extended from 10 to 20 years after the event.
8.5 Was organized distrust always there, and was
organized distrust always effective?
The present paper replaced a Platonian by a Popperian problem: in the field of poli-
tics and society, the misconstrued question of who should rule, should make way
for the questions of how bad rulers may be eliminated without bloodshed, and how
the damage they do may be minimalized. We did not enumerate in advance forms
of organized distrust, and added types while dissecting three scandals.
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This contribution’s main thesis was Popperian too, and held that organized dis-
trust limits the harm rulers do to the ruled. We replaced Popper’s distinction be-
tween instinctual and institutional individualism, by that between theoretical
methods which postulate individuals only, and methods that bring in natural and
corporate actors. The latter of these methods we dubbed, somewhat lightheartedly,
multi-level modelling. To assess our central hypothesis, we employed data from in-
vestigative journalism. We did so in the understanding that in sociology not so
much findings on societies are in dispute, but hypotheses. In everyday life motiva-
tional accounts get higher billing than situational explanations, and societal re-
search may show that this should be the other way around. We weighed our main
thesis by dissecting three recent scandals: fraud in an academic field, fiddling with
software by cars companies, and sexual abuse of minors by clerics of the Catholic
church.
8.5.1 Findings on three scandals – outside politics – compared
We were pleasantly surprised with the host of data on our three scandals uncovered
by investigative journalism. A difficulty was that data refer to still continuing series
of events.
The Stapel scandal in social psychology was closed, but whether Dutch universi-
ties took effective measures, remains to be seen. Also, in the wake of more fraud, US
social psychology is cleansing the house: flag-bearing experiments – like the Robbers
cave experiment by Sherif (1961), the experiments on obedience to authority by
Milgram (1963, 1974), the Stanford prison experiment by Zimbardo (1973) – have not
been successfully replicated (Carey 2018). As to future frauds, we await a Stapel-like
scandal in Dutch sociology. It may not involve fake data, but a massive massage of a
mis-constructed multi-moment multi-actor multi-context mega-dataset.
To prop our Stapel dissection, we cited older controversies, but one of them
was not closed either. Behind the priority dispute about HIV – settled by the 2008
Noble prize – lurk questions about how AIDS spread. One of them is the extent to
which the medical establishment stumbled, public health authorities failed, and
Act Up – a gay grass roots movement – accelerated the introduction of drugs sup-
pressing the HIV virus. This issue is brought out in the 1987 bestseller And the Band
Played On by San Francisco Chronicle reporter Randy Shilts, Larry Kramer’s 1992
play The Destiny of Me – situated in New York -, and Robin Campillo’s 2017 movie
120 battements par minute – happening in Paris.
As the main culprit of our second scandal, Volkswagen is in the dock now –
with the possibility that a CEO confesses to knowing of trick software -, and the EU
designs tough laws, and adjoined agencies.
The abuse of minors by Catholic clerics – the third scandal we dissected – is
also on-going. It shifted from the USA to Europe, is reaching Latin America, and
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now embraces the complicity of the Catholic hierarchy. Of late it became public
that male clerics violated female ones (Horowitz and Dias 2019). All the same, the
media tended to bring the scandal down to priests abusing minor males.
To counter this penchant, a new Deetman committee published Seksueel
Misbruik en Geweld tegen Meisjes in de Rooms-Katholieke Kerk (Sexual Abuse of and
Violence against Girls in the Roman-Catholic Church) in 2013. It addresses the fol-
low-up question of sexual abuse of female minors by clerics, but does not break
down tables from the First Deetman Report (2010) after gender. From some figures
(Deetman 2013: 46), and others in Deetman (2010: 52), we estimate that of all Dutch
men above 40 years, 0.8% as a minor was sexually abused by an unrelated adult
active in a Catholic organization, and that this percentage for women is 0.2.
Because of the small number for abused girls (39 out of 173 abused youths),
Deetman (2013) omits percentages – although the total sample is unusually large.
(Given the earlier on presented 0.6 percent of men plus women abused as a minor
by an unrelated adult active in a Catholic organization, the average of 0.2 and 0.8
weighed for the share of women and men in the total sample, should amount to
0.6. It does not, perhaps of rounding errors.) Sexual abuse by clerics of male rela-
tive to female minors remains an interesting topic.
Moreover, Deetman missed a chance to deal with the follow-up of whether
priests tend to abuse boys, and nuns girls. It so happens that the Reporting Centre’s
Report on Activities 2011–2018 has a data-matrix for 860 cases of sexual abuse of
minors by clerics leading to compensation, and it yields frequencies for gender
combinations. We do not resist temptation, and compute that 3% (24) of all cases
involved female clerics. In 17 of them a female minor fell victim to a female cleric,
with 7 female clerics abusing a male minor (since these numbers are small, we omit
percentages). From the 836 cases with male clerical perpetrators (97% of all cases),
83% (691 cases) pertains to abuse of boys, and 17% (145 cases) of girls. The answer
to our same- or other-sex follow-up question is yes.
When explaining scandals, we were guided by three tenets for devising auxil-
iary assumptions. The first one was to identify, next to regulations, corporate actors
seeing to their execution. This idea meant to fill a hole Popper’s thesis that institu-
tions should not only be well-designed, but also well-staffed. The police pursues
acts forbidden by a country’s penal laws, other laws sometimes are put into place
by other corporate actors. Whereas an US agency oversaw car emissions, the EU did
not have one. As regards abusive priests, the police at most played a small part.
In testing Popper’s theory of organized distrust, we also wished to bring in
other and older theories, and we mentioned Hobbes’s proposition that covenants
without swords remain words, and Merton’s anomie theory. Hobbes’s idea made us
hunt for corporate actors who see to it that violations of laws are punished, and
Merton’s anomie theory was useful for analyzing Stapel’s fraud within social psy-
chology, and the Volkswagen scandal: the goals corporate actors like universities
and car makers hold up to their employees as legitimate, may be so high that
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employees resort to illegitimate means, like faking data and fiddling with software.
However, when dissecting the Volkswagen scandal we also returned to Durkheim’s
complementary theory of fatalism – in governmental agencies overseeing car com-
panies. Since that theory about low legitimate goals set by agencies and ample
available means rarely is invoked, we are hesitant about this near-novelty.
Our dissection of the scandal that clerics sexually abused minors, brought in hy-
potheses from classical criminology. Punishment is designed to deter a person who
trespassed the law, from doing so another time. That is specific prevention. However,
it is not likely that assigning an abusive cleric to a similar job in another diocese,
without it knowing about this cleric’s past, will deter this cleric. Supposedly punish-
ment also deters other people from performing the punished act. This is general pre-
vention. In case of priests who sexually abused minors, general prevention was not
likely either. The church settled cases behind closed doors, and in exchange for fi-
nancial compensation, victims and witnesses promised to remain silent. Public pun-
ishment deters more than secret sentencing. We also ventured that if punishment is
public, people who later become victim of a similar crime – particularly when its fre-
quency is rather low – are more likely to go to the police, and declare that they be-
came a victim of it, compared to dealing with complaints behind closed doors. This
may be called the general encouragement effect of public punishment: help for other
victims to speak out.
Finally, we had decided not to press our dissection of scandals into the strait-
jacket of settings with just two actors. Stapel’s fraud was discovered, not by aca-
demic periodicals, but students. If all of Stapel’s papers had appeared in one
periodical in a short time, its editor might have noticed that his data were fishy. But
Stapel published in many journals, and double-blind reviewing does not bring out
that one author always obtains fantastic results. Stapel’s students found the results
obtained with his data too good to be true. The Volkswagen scandal did not come
to light in the US because the US did test, and the EU and its members not. It was
known in Europe that Volkswagen’s diesels emitted more than allowed.
Volkswagen’s fiddling with emissions came to light in the USA, because Federal
Washington had strict laws, stiff penalties, as well as a special agency, whereas the
EU left surveillance of weak standards to its members. Our dissection of sexual
abuse involved not only minors and priests, but also parents, church authorities,
and the police.
Reviewing the results obtained by our guidelines for the generation of auxiliary
assumptions, it may be wondered whether we replaced structural individualism, so
prominent in Dutch sociology, by cultural individualism. We do not really think so.
Anomie and fatalism indeed are part of a culture enwrapping individuals. But the
theoretical section of this contribution, pleaded for statements referring to both cor-
porate and individual actors. In our concrete accounts, corporate actors – like
Volkswagen’s CEO and directors of research agencies – held up norms to ordinary
human beings.
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8.5.2 Further questions on various forms of organized distrust –
in politics
The general question guiding our dissection of scandals was: if organized distrust is
there, and that effective, why three recent scandals? The short answer is that in two
scandals organized distrust was absent. It remains to be seen – if the Volkswagen
scandal had not come to light in the USA, say because Volkswagen had decided not
to export diesels to it -, exactly when it would have become public in Europe. And it
may well be that laws on sexual abuse of minors will be trespassed rather fre-
quently as long as the Catholic church stipulates celibacy for its clergy. Laws on
sexual abuse of minors by whatever person, are difficult to enforce anyway, since
minors do not notify the police.
In one scandal organized distrust was ineffective: double-blind reviewing will
not kill off big fraud in academia. We suggested two other forms of organized dis-
trust. The first was periodic meetings of research schools in which junior members
flog research in progress of seniors, the second that a paper up for publication, in-
dicates its vetting at a conference. As regards abuse of minors, we proposed a child
psychologist in educational institutions. Rules protecting whistleblowers would
help employees of corporate actors limiting their legitimate goals, and fostering a
fatalist culture. Proper bookkeeping and consistent administration remain impor-
tant tools for inspection agencies.
To test Popper’s theory of organized distrust, we dissected scandals, and it may
be wondered why we bypassed a financial scandal. We had decided to spotlight the
Netherlands and Holland-within-Europe, and although the 2008 financial crisis hit
Holland hard, it did not occur because of Dutch disgraces. Yet, after reading De
Eurocrisis by Dijsselbloem (2018) – Dutch minister of finance from 2013 to 2017, and
chair in those years of the Euro-group of all 17 euro-countries – we almost changed
our mind. Dijsselbloem’s summary of his observations: ‘As always, the effectivity of
what we erect together in European context, depends on the power of our institu-
tions, and the extent to which our rulers, including the politicians among them, are
like actors master of their lines’ (Dijsselbloem 2016: 165, our translation).This
quote – without a reference to Popper – is richer in content than Popper’s principle
that institutions should be well-designed and well-staffed.
Now a pungent criticism of our questions on scandals. Were they attuned to
testing Popper’s theory of organized distrust? After some pondering, not that
closely. Our test involved several assumptions. The central thesis was that orga-
nized distrust eliminates or limits damages rulers inflict upon their subjects when
making and executing laws. The classical auxiliary assumption going with it, says
that periodic general elections are the only or main form of organized distrust in
politics. For academic periodicals, car companies, and churches, we pointed to
other forms of organized distrust. Another auxiliary assumption held that scandals
reveal vast violations of laws and massive personal damages.
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A check of the last assumption, made us review our initial decision to skip poli-
tics as a test for our central thesis. We still take scandals as proper test cases.
However, we bypassed political scandals, as other scandals would test our prime
proposition more severely. But then, if no political scandals arise, has organized
distrust been omnipotent? The auxiliary assumption of periodic general elections as
the only form of organized distrust is plainly false, but as to content its alternative
of more forms of organized distrust is watery: these forms lower the damages rulers
inflict on their subjects too, but it remains elusive to what extent they do so. So, it
is worthwhile to raise questions on the size of the outcomes of these forms of orga-
nized distrust: are they as small as implied by the initial auxiliary assumption of
one major form of organized distrust? This strategy for testing hypotheses does not
start from scandals or other ‘negative’ effects, but from additional forms of orga-
nized distrust as ‘positive’ causes. As the final number of this show – and food for
thought for follow-up questions – we present a recent instance of organized distrust
within politics, but emanating outside parliament.
Germany was late in decriminalizing sexual acts between adults of the same
sex, and late in giving same-sex couples the right to marry. Was the former the
cause of the latter, as the journalist Görlach (2016) implied in “Germany’s Retro
Record on Gay Rights”? Less than a year later, German parliament gave same-sex
couples the right to marry. How did the pertinent proposal make it to the legislative
agenda? The left in parliament was too weak, and within the right (CDU-CSU) the
more conservative branch (CSU) had the overhand in this matter. Hence a persistent
inconsistency between marriage law and a constitutional right to equal treatment.
The law for same-sex couples to marry, landed in German parliament through
organized distrust, which may not be recognized quickly as such. Ministers and
prime-ministers, in line with organized distrust, answer questions by members of
parliament. They also give speeches at public meetings outside parliament, and
would flout organized distrust, if they repeatedly ducked questions from the audi-
ence. We now posit that a question by an ordinary German citizen to Germany’s
prime-minister during a public gathering, led to the extension of German laws al-
lowing marriages between a man and a woman, to marriages between persons of
the same sex, whether male couples or female couples. Whereas questions from an
audience seem less effectual than questions in parliament, in this case an unfore-
seen question from the audience was surprisingly consequential.
On Monday June 26, 2017 Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel took part in a
meeting at the Maxim Gorki Theater in Berlin organized by Brigitte, Germany’s larg-
est women’s magazine. At the end, its readers had an opportunity to ask questions.
Few women rose, and a man got up asking Merkel with resoluteness in his voice
the simple and short question ‘When will I be able to marry my boyfriend, and call
him my husband?’. The audience applauded, Merkel rambled, then said she re-
cently had seen how a lesbian couple took care of eight stepchildren, added she
opposes same sex-marriage, and finished by saying she would allow a vote in
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parliament, with the members of her CDU-CSU party free to vote according to their
conscience. On Friday June 30, 2017 that vote was cast. A query from a man in the
audience of a meeting organized by a women’s magazine caused a stir, and
Merkel’s reply ended a stand-off in German parliament. We take it, that if someone
had addressed this question at a similar meeting a couple of decades earlier to the
(then) German chancellor, it would have caused a disturbance in the audience and
a scandal in the papers.
The man who addressed Merkel was Ulli Köppe, 28 years young, raised in
Saalfeld in the federal state of Thüringen, and earning his living in Berlin as event
manager. Did Merkel misspeak, were Brigitte readers rightly surprised? According to
journalist Lindhout (2017), the German CDU – to avoid a polarizing issue in the 2018
elections – recently discussed a free vote. So, did Köppe’s resort to a form of orga-
nized distrust advance same-sex marriages in Germany with a few months only?
We here only state this question, but wish to underline its import, and that of
similar questions. The question of marriage for same-sex couples is part of a larger
question in societal theory, that of the conditions under which laws become stricter
or more lenient, and change in other ways. Are more cases around of an effect of or-
ganized distrust from outside parliament? As a preliminary: how to pose questions
about The Emergence of Norms? We allude to Edna Ullmann-Margalit’s (1977) book.
To begin with, the question of how norms arise does not refer to any specific
norm. This increases the danger of cherry picking when theorizing (Ultee 1996).
Auxiliary assumptions are far from ancillary, and here we propose to select specific
questions before applying general theories.
Also, our questions about scandals at first were about the infringement of sub-
stantive laws, but when analyzing scandals, we began to raise questions on proce-
dural laws as causes of transgressions of substantive laws. We compared procedures
in one state with those in another state, and in other corporate actors. Sexual acts
with minors are forbidden – that is material law -, penalties in one country may be
more severe than in another, court cases are conducted behind closed doors or in
public, some criminal proceedings are precluded by lapse of time, and more of such
adjectives. We also entered into the question of how substantive laws and procedural
laws change. So, apart from the division of actors in natural and corporate actors
from jurisprudence, we applied its distinction between substantive and procedural
law. Indeed, it should be employed in breaking down questions about the emergence
of specific norms into more doable smaller questions.
The question of same-sex marriage suggests another rule for picking specific
questions on norms. The law against sex between adults of the same sex, held in
France until 1791, the Netherlands until 1811, and Germany until 1969. When study-
ing the emergence of a norm at a particular time and place, the auxiliary assump-
tion of no original norm and evolution towards the current norm, may fail: for some
time possibly an opposite norm prevails. Questions about the emergence of norms
should specify in which period, and from what to what, a change occurred.
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Finally, specific questions on norm shifts should invoke unexpected findings.
One surprising change in Western countries after World War 2, was that marriage
became possible for same-sex couples. Which other remarkable changes are instan-
ces of the general question of how norms shift? In passing we pointed to three.
Nader (1965) published Unsafe at Any Speed, which found strong support in US con-
gress. Act UP-Paris speeded up the introduction of drugs against AIDS, and NRC-
reporter Joep Dohmen (2010) investigated sexual abuse of Dutch minors by clerics,
contributing to reparation for victims.
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9 Polarization and Radicalization in the
Bounded Confidence Model:
A Computer-Aided Speculation
Abstract: In the bounded confidence model agents update their opinions by averaging
over all opinions that are not too far away from their own opinion. The article gives a
precise definition of the basic model, offers several interpretations of the model, and
introduces two simple extensions that allow to analyze polarization and radicalization.
The basic model and its two extensions are seemingly simple. But the simplicity is de-
ceptive. Lots of counterintuitive effects come as a surprise. Additionally, the article
demonstrates that in terms of explanatory understanding of mechanisms, it makes a
lot of sense to work with deterministic idealizations of random start distributions.
9.1 Introduction
The so-called bounded confidence model (BC model) spells out a simple idea: In
their ongoing exchange of opinions, individuals (or agents) take seriously those
others whose opinions are not too far removed from their own. The core of this arti-
cle are two extensions of the basic BC model. The first extension (Section 9.2) intro-
duces a bias of the type: “Leftists listen more to the left, rightists listen more to the
right.”We show how, given the bias, strongly polarized camps of radicalized agents
can evolve endogenously. In the second extension (Section 9.3) a group of radicals
enters the field. Different from normal agents, the radicals simply stick to their radi-
cal opinion – no other view is taken seriously. We analyze how normal agents that
take seriously opinions that are not to far removed from their own opinion, may or
may not become radical.
This article also has a methodological objective. I want to demonstrate that the
following is a fruitful approach: First, we initialise all our opinion dynamics with the
same, constant start distribution. It is a very special, namely representative start dis-
tribution: it idealizes deterministically high numbers of random start distributions.
Second, in tiny steps, a selected parameter is varied. Then, by direct comparisons
of single runs of the system, we try to get an understanding of the dynamics. In con-
trast to laboratory experiments, such an approach is easy to implement with the help
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of computers. Our computational analysis of polarization and radicalization in
Sections 9.2 and 9.3 applies this approach. In the concluding Section 9.4 we discuss
the advantages, limits, and dangers of our strategy.
Finally a warning: What follows is not the presentation of an empirically cali-
brated model. It is more a computer-aided speculation on the consequences of
mechanisms that, as some empirical findings suggest, seem to be at work in the
real world. I analyze the idealized mechanisms in an artificial world wherein noth-
ing else interferes. The hope is to get thereby a better feeling for what might be at
work in the real world. However, there is also bad news: My computer-aided spec-
ulations suggest that there might exist a fundamental problem for both the under-
standing of and intervening in polarization and radicalization processes.
9.1.1 The bounded confidence model: A formal description
and some possible interpretations
Stated in a precise language, the constitutive assumptions of the BC model are:
1. There is a set I of n agents; i, j 2 I.
2. Time is discrete; t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
3. Each individual starts at t =0 with a certain opinion, given by a real number
from the unit interval; xi 0ð Þ 2 0, 1½ .
4. The profile of opinions at time t is X tð Þ= x1 tð Þ, . . . , xi tð Þ, . . . , xj tð Þ, . . . , xn tð Þ.
5. Each agent i takes into account only ‘reasonable’ others. Reasonable are those
individuals j whose opinions are not too far away, i.e. for which xi tð Þ− xj tð Þ
 ≤ ϵ,
where ϵ is the confidence level that determines the size of the confidence interval.
6. The set of all others that i takes into account at time t is:
I i,X tð Þð Þ= j j xi tð Þ− xj tð Þ
 ≤ ϵ . (9:1)
7. The agents update their opinions. The next period’s opinion of agent i is the
average opinion of all those, which i takes seriously:
xi t + 1ð Þ= 1
# I i,X tð Þð Þð Þ
X
j2I i,X tð Þð Þ
xj tð Þ. (9:2)
The description 1. to 7. gives some very general interpretation of the symbols
i, j, n, t, I, xi tð Þ, X tð Þ which otherwise would be terms in a pure and ‘naked’ for-
malism. We get specific interpretations if we think of certain contexts in which the
mechanisms described by equations (9.1) and (9.2) might be at work. Some such
(partially overlapping) interpretations are the following:
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– Expert interpretation: There is a group of experts on something. Each expert has
an opinion on the topic under discussion, for instance the probability of a certain
type of accident. Nobody is totally sure that he/she is totally right. Within
bounds everybody is willing to adjust and to adapt: An expert i considers as com-
petent all experts j that are not too far away, i.e. for which xi tð Þ− xj tð Þ
 ≤ ϵ.
The updated compromise opinion is the arithmetic mean over all opinions within
i’s confidence interval. Such opinion revisions produce a new opinion distribu-
tion which may lead to further revisions of opinions, and so on.1
– Compromise interpretation: There is a group of people that exchange views
which can reasonably described by real-valued numbers.2 For reasons as uncer-
tainty, respect for others that seem to be as reasonable as oneself, an interest in
a compromise, a preference for conformity, or due to some social pressure, every-
body is, at least in principle, willing to compromise with others.3 However, the
willingness to compromise is bounded: An agent i with view xi tð Þ is willing to
compromise with agents j with view xj tð Þ iff j’s view is not too far away, i.e. for
which xi tð Þ− xj tð Þ
 ≤ ϵ. Then averaging.
– Social media interpretation: There is a digital platform with a central algorith-
mic coordination that brings together with user i those users j whose opinions
xj are not too far away from i’s opinion xi. Then averaging. In such a context ϵ
is the ‘distance tolerance’ of a centrally organised filter bubble (Pariser 2011).
Another variant is a digital platform that allows all users j to send their opinion
xj to all other users i. As a receiver, user i reads only opinions that are not too
far away from i’s opinion xi. Then averaging. Under this interpretation, ϵ is the
distance tolerance of a decentralised echo chamber (Sunstein 2017).
This is not a complete list of possible interpretations. We could also use the BC
mechanism as a kind of aggregation devise, and look for the smallest ϵ that, for a
given distribution of start values, leads to a consensus.4 From a normative point of
view, we could use the model to analyze the effects of different recommendations
1 Obviously, that is the procedural format of so-called Delphi studies.
2 That includes much more than opinions on the probability of any quantitative or qualitative propo-
sition. As long as one can reasonably normalise the range of possible opinions to the unit interval,
opinions could regard any real-valued quantitative problem. The opinions could express the intensity
or importance of a wish (though only under the condition of intersubjective comparability). The ex-
change of opinions might be about moral praiseworthiness (0: extremely bad; 0.5: neutral; 1: ex-
tremely good). Or the opinions could regard a budget share. Not covered are non-continuous opinions
(for instance, discrete or binary).
3 The overview article Flache et al. (2017) mentions and shortly describes many empirical findings
from different fields that I interpret as supporting evidence.
4 This interpretation gives the BC model a similar status as it was originally claimed for the
Lehrer/Wagner model in Lehrer and Wagner (1981).
9 Polarization and Radicalization in the Bounded Confidence Model 201
for how to resolve peer disagreement and other epistemic problems (Douven 2010;
Douven and Kelp 2011; Douven and Wenmakers 2017). A technical, namely control
perspective is taken in Hegselmann et al. (2015).5
9.1.2 Basic features of the BC dynamics
For certain ϵ-values the BC dynamics is trivial: If ϵ=0, then all agents stick to their
opinions forever; if ϵ= 1 then all agents’ opinion is the arithmetic mean of the start
profile X 0ð Þ from t = 1 onwards. But what’s about the region 0< ϵ< 1? Figure 9.1
shows the dynamics for ϵ=0.05, 0.20, and 0.25. The x-axis is the (discrete) time t;
the y-axis represents the opinion space 0, 1½ . The grey graphs show the trajectories
of the opinions of 50 agents.
For the analysis of the dynamics two concepts will be very fruitful: First,
we call an opinion profile X tð Þ= x1 tð Þ, x2 tð Þ, . . . , xi tð Þ, . . . , xn tð Þ an ordered profile iff
0≤ x1 tð Þ≤ x2 tð Þ . . . ≤ xi tð Þ . . . ≤ xn tð Þ. Second, we call an ordered profile an ϵ-profile
iff for all i= 2, . . . , n it holds that xi+ 1 tð Þ− xi tð Þ≤ ϵ. Thus, in an ϵ-profile neighbour-
ing opinions xi tð Þ, xi+ 1 tð Þ mutually influence each other. In Figure 9.1 vertical grey
lines between two neighbouring opinions indicate that the distance between the
two is ≤ ϵ. As a consequence, a continuous vertical line from x1 tð Þ to x50 tð Þ means
that X tð Þ is an ϵ-profile in the sense defined above.
For an explanation of important effects, we start with the dynamics in the mid-
dle of Figure 9.1. That is the case ϵ=0.2. Careful inspection, time step by time step,
shows several effects:
– Extreme opinions are under a one-sided influence and move direction center.
Therefore, the range of the profile starts to shrink.
– At the extremes of the shrinking profile, the opinions condense.
– Condensed regions attract opinions from less populated areas within their
ϵ-reach: In the center opinions >0.5 start to move upwards, opinions <0.5
start to move downwards.
– The ϵ-profile splits in t = 5. From now on the split sub-profiles constitute different
‘opinion worlds’, i.e. two communities without any influence on each other.
5 In substance, the model was described for the first time in Krause (1997). In a conference presenta-
tion in 1998, the naming “bounded confidence” was used for the first time; see Krause (2000). A first
comprehensive analytical and computational analysis of the BC model was given in Hegselmann and
Krause (2002). For the history of the BC model and a systematic classification of alternative models of
opinion dynamics see Sections 1–3 of Hegselmann and Krause (2002). The closest relative of the BC
model is the model in Deffuant et al. (2000); for the similarity see Urbig et al. (2008). For overviews
on other, later, and future developments see Lorenz (2007), Xia et al. (2011), Sîrbu et al. (2017), Flache
et al. (2017).
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Figure 9.1: BC dynamics for 50 agents.
Notes: Top: ϵ=0.05. Middle: ϵ=0.2. Bottom: ϵ=0.25. Filled black or grey circles indicate the size of
a cluster. A black circle is just one agent. A black circle with an inner white circle represents two
agents. Grey circles are scaled according to their cluster size.
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– In the two split off sub-profiles opinions contract. In t = 5, in the two sub-profiles
all opinions have all opinions within their confidence interval. Therefore, in t = 6
in each sub-profile all opinions merge into one and the same opinion.
– As a consequence, we get X 7ð Þ=X 6ð Þ. The dynamics is stabilized in the sense
that X tð Þ=X t + 1ð Þ.
The dynamics in Figure 9.1, middle, ends up with two camps, one to the left, one to the
right of the center of the opinion space – a kind of polarization. Figure 9.1, top, shows a
dynamics based upon the much smaller ϵ=0.05. The ϵ-profile splits twice in period 6,
leaving behind a big ϵ-sub-profile in the center that splits again in period 9. Some more
splits occur some periods later. Finally 8 clusters of opinions survive. Let’s call such a
pattern plurality. Figure 9.1, bottom, is based upon a confidence interval ϵ=0.25. In this
case, the ϵ-profile never splits. A cluster of two opinions in the center contracts outer
opinions such that, finally, all opinions merge into one – consensus. In all cases, the
final pattern of fragmentation – plurality, polarization, or consensus – is brought about
by shrinking, condensing, attracting, contracting, splits, and mergers. And it is always
brought about in finite time. For the latter result, simulations are not necessary: for a
rigorous proof see Hegselmann and Krause (2002, Theorem 6).
The differences in the three examples in Figure 9.1 are all due to different
ϵ-values. The start profile X 0ð Þ is always the same. It is a profile for which it holds
that
xi 0ð Þ= in+ 1 ,∀i= 1, . . . , n. (9:3)
Such a profile is at the same time very specific and representative: The ith opinion
is exactly there, where it will be at the average over infinitely repeated draws of n
opinions that are uniformly distributed on the unit interval. Thus, equation (9.3)
gives the expected value of the ith opinion of a uniform distribution of n opinions.
We refer to that type of start distribution as the expected value distribution. It is a
kind of deterministic idealization of a certain random distribution.6 The expected
value distribution generates a start profile in which the distances between two
neighbouring opinions are always the same: the start profile is equidistant.
In all what follows, we will rely on one and the same expected value start distri-
bution with n= 50. For that constant start distribution we will analyze the effects of,
for instance, stepwise increasing ϵ-values. That will be done by careful inspections
and comparisons of single runs. On purpose, programmatically, we deviate from the
6 We can do the same with regard to other types of random distributions. However, one has to
derive the equations that then correspond to equation (3). The equidistance is due to the uniform
distribution that is deterministically idealized by equation (3). If, for example, we do the same with
a normal distribution, the corresponding expected value distribution would not be equidistant. The
relevant discipline is order statistics.
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usual practice to run, firstly, a major number of random initialisations, and then, sec-
ondly, to do some statistics on the runs. Our approach will blind us to effects that
depend largely on the randomness of initialisations.7 However, our approach may ex-
pose directly effects that are otherwise hidden in averages. Anyhow, I postpone the
discussion of advantages and disadvantages to the concluding Section 9.4.
9.1.3 A warning: The model’s simplicity is deceptive
The three dynamics in Figure 9.1 suggest a more general idea about the confidence
level ϵ: The number of finally surviving and stabilized clusters decreases as ϵ increases.
A first diagram – we will call it an ϵ-diagram (see Figure 9.2) – supports that idea.
An ϵ-diagram visualizes for one and the same start distribution X 0ð Þ the effects of a
stepwise increasing ϵ on the final, completely stabilized cluster structure. Figure 9.2
is an ϵ-diagram. The x-axis does not represent time rather than increasing values of ϵ.
For each ϵ value, we run the dynamics until it is stabilized, i.e. X t + 1ð Þ=X tð Þ.
Figure 9.2: ϵ-diagram for an expected value start distribution with n= 50.
Notes: On the x-axes ϵ increases with step size 0.01. For a given ϵ, the y-axis indicates the
stabilized end positions of opinions. The lines connect ranks in the ordered profiles. Different sizes
of grey circles indicate the size of an opinion cluster. A small black circle is a cluster with just one
opinion. A small black circle with a white inner circle indicates a cluster of two opinions.
7 For instance, whatever n, our expected value start distribution generates equidistant start pro-
files – random start distributions do not. But that may have consequences for the number of finally
surviving clusters.
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The y-axes of an ϵ-diagram is used to display the stabilized positions. Lines connect
the positions of ranks in the ordered profiles.
The lessons from the ϵ-diagram in Figure 9.2 seems to be very clear: For confidence
intervals in the range 0, 0.17½  the number of final stabilized clusters monotonically
decreases from 50 to 3 – plurality; in the range 0.18, 0.22½  we get polarization; for
ϵ≥0.23 the final result is always consensus. Thus, the general idea about the effects of
the confidence level seems to be: Given the same, constant start distribution, for in-
creasing values of the confidence level, the number of finally stabilized clusters de-
creases monotonically; we have a monotonic transition from plurality to polarization,
and from there to consensus.
Intuitive as it may be, the general idea is actually wrong, and Figure 9.3 makes that
very clear.8 As Figure 9.2, Figure 9.3 is an ϵ-diagram for an expected value start dis-
tribution with n= 50. The only difference is the step size of ϵ: it is now much
smaller, namely 0.0025. The smaller step size reveals that the transition from polar-
ization to consensus is not monotonic: A consensus that is reached for a certain ϵ,
may fall apart under a greater ϵ. There is always an ϵ* such that for all ϵ≥ ϵ*, con-
sensus is guaranteed.9 But an actual ϵ that leads to consensus does not necessarily
have to be ϵ*. The non-monotonicity is not confined to the transition from two to
one final clusters. And it is not an effect (or artifact) of the equidistant expected
Figure 9.3: ϵ-diagram for an expected value start distribution with n= 50.
Notes: Different from Figure 9.2, ϵ increases on the x-axes with step size 0.0025; start is at ϵ=0.16.
For other details see the caption of Figure 9.2.
8 Wedin and Hegarty (2015: 2016) write about the model: “The update rule is certainly simple to
formulate, though the simplicity is deceptive.”
9 This is an observation, not a proof. For ϵ= 1 we get trivially a consensus. But, as a matter of fact,
normally ϵ* is much smaller than 1.
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value start distribution: the same type of non-monotonicity holds for random start
distributions as well.10
9.2 Extension one: Polarization by biased
confidence
The confidence intervals that we considered so far were symmetric: whatever the total
size of the interval, the left and the right part were always of equal size. But what if
individuals that hold a more left [more right] opinion ‘listen’ more into the left [right]
direction – and the more to the left [right] their opinions are, the more so. The idea
suggests an opinion dependent asymmetry of the following type: The more left [right]
an opinion is, the more the confidence interval is biased direction left [right]. For opin-
ions closer to the center of the opinion space, the bias is less pronounced. Only for
opinions exactly in the center the confidence interval is symmetric.
9.2.1 Modelling biased confidence
To model the intuitive idea precisely, we divide a confidence interval of any size into
a left and right proportion βl and βr, such that 0≤ βl, βr ≤ 1 and βl + βr = 1. Following
our intuition stated above, the values of βl should be given by a monotonically de-
creasing function f xð Þ, defined over our opinion space 0, 1½ . That, then, allows us to
get βr as 1− βl. Since we request symmetry of the confidence interval for x=0.5, it
should hold that βl 0.5ð Þ=0.5.
One can get all what we want by the simple linear function
βl xð Þ=mx+
1−m
2
, (9:4)
where m, the slope of the function, controls the strength of the bias. A reasonable
range for m is − 1, 0½ . Figure 9.4 shows the resulting functions. For all values of m,
the function rotates around 0.5, 0.5h i. The meaningful functions are between the
dashed graphs with the slope m= − 1 and m=0. For the strongest bias m= − 1, the
most extreme leftist [rightist] opinion, that is x=0 [x= 1], the right [left] portion of
the confidence interval is 0. For m=0 the opinion dependent bias disappears: For all
opinions x it holds that βl = βr =0.5 – the confidence interval is symmetric. The black
graph is an example for a bias in between the extreme values for m. Given the black
10 Note that for any type of constant start profile (e.g. random or expected value), the width of an
opinion profile does also not decrease monotonically with an increasing confidence level.
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graph with m= −0.7, we get for an opinion x=0.3 the proportions βl 0.3ð Þ=0.64 and,
correspondingly, βr 0.3ð Þ=0.36. Note: whatever the value of m, for the center opinion
x=0.5 we always get βl 0.5ð Þ= βr 0.5ð Þ=0.5.11
Figure 9.5, top, shows a polarization – two opinion camps, one to the left, one to
the right of the center of the opinion space. It is a polarization based upon a symmet-
ric confidence interval. As already noticed in Section 9.1.2, for certain regions of ϵ,
polarization may evolve in the simple BC model. However, that is a rather weak polar-
ization: the final distance between the two camps is only ≈0.36. The two camps are
much closer to the center opinion 0.5 than they are to the extremes 0 and 1, respec-
tively. A severe opinion dependent bias, for instance m= − 1, produces polarization
of another quality. Figure 9.5 shows the difference: The dynamics in Figure 9.5,
Figure 9.4: Opinion dependent bias.
Notes: The x-axis represents the opinions. The slope of the black graph gives the strength of the
opinion dependent bias m (with − 1≤m≤0) in equation (9.4). For an opinion x, f xð Þ on the y-axis is
the left proportion of the total size of the given confidence interval. 1− f xð Þ is the right proportion.
11 In Hegselmann and Krause (2002) we used the function βl xð Þ=mx+ 1−m2 , defined βr xð Þ by
1− βl xð Þ, and used the range m 2 0, 1½ . As a consequence, the most severe bias is + 1, while above it
is − 1. The only reason for the change is ‘psychology’: I find it more intuitive that a function over
opinions ‘from the left to the right’ gives the left portion of the confidence interval. Anyhow, the old
and the new approach are equivalent.
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Figure 9.5: Effects of an opinion dependent bias.
Notes: Top: No opinion dependent bias,m=0; ϵl = ϵr =0.2 (symmetry).Middle: Opinion dependent bias
m= − 1, ϵtotal =0.4. Bottom: Biasm= − 1, ϵtotal =0.5. Vertical grey lines indicate mutual influence between
xi tð Þ and xi + 1 tð Þ in the profile (ascending order); black vertical lines indicate a one-sided ϵ-split in the
opinion profile: only the more extreme of the two neighboring opinions influences the less extreme.
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middle, and Figure 9.5, bottom, are both driven by the maximum bias m= − 1. In
both figures, the two opposite camps end up almost at the lower and upper bound of
the opinion space: their distance is ≈0.92. Thus, a severe opinion dependent bias,
produced a strong polarization: two camps at the opposite ends of the opinion
space – and the center almost or entirely empty.
How comes? Two effects contribute. First, under symmetric confidence, those
at the extremes are under a one–sided influence of less extreme agents. Their in-
fluence drives more extreme opinions direction center. With an increasing
strength of the bias, the drive direction center disappears, or, depending upon the
total size of the confidence interval, is significantly weakened at the extremes.
(Whatever that size, under the maximum bias m= − 1, the most extreme opinions,
do not move at all.) The second effect works in the opposite direction. Under sym-
metric confidence it always holds: If agent i influences j, then j influences i as
well. In contrast, under asymmetric confidence influence may be one-sided. And
if so, then it is a very specific one-sidedness: only the less extreme opinion is
influenced by the more extreme opinion. Together the two effects generate a drift
to the extremes.
In Figure 9.5 vertical lines indicate the type of influence between neighbour-
ing opinions.12 Grey vertical lines between neighboring opinions indicate mutual
influence between xi tð Þ and xi+ 1 tð Þ. Black vertical lines indicate one-sided influ-
ence; either only xi tð Þ influences xi+ 1 tð Þ or only xi+ 1 tð Þ influences xi tð Þ. Wherever a
vertical line is black, we have a one-sided ϵ-split in the opinion profile: only the
more extreme of the two neighbouring opinions influences the less extreme – no
moderating influence in the other direction. Thus, above 0.5, black vertical lines
connect opinions for which only xi+ 1 tð Þ influences xi tð Þ; below 0.5, only xi− 1 tð Þ in-
fluences xi tð Þ. Figure 9.5 demonstrates a remarkable point: Different from the two-
sided ϵ-splits that are definitive splits for ever, one-sided splits may after some
periods close again. In the meantime they generate an unmoderated pull to the
more extreme position.
9.2.2 Strange effects
At this point, a generalising intuition suggests itself: As an opinion dependent bias
m stepwise increases, a weak polarization under symmetric confidence will become
more and more severe – monotonically increasing the distance between the two
camps, that, at opposite ends, get closer and closer to the bounds of the opinion
12 Recall, the profiles are always ordered in an ascending order.
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space. And indeed, for m-values from certain partial sections of − 1,0½  that is true.
But in general, the generalisation is definitively wrong.13
The refutation of the generalising intuition is given in Figure 9.6. As in the
ϵ-diagrams in Figures 9.2 and 9.3, the y-axis shows stabilized end positions of opin-
ions. Different from Figures 9.2 and 9.3, the y-axis represents the bias m. In steps
of –0.01, the bias gets stronger and stronger. It starts with m=0 (no bias at all)
and ends with m= −0.5. Everything else (expected value start distribution with
50 agents, a confidence interval of a total size 0.4) is kept constant.14
The most perplexing result is that an opinion dependent bias may lead to consensus
when, for the same start distribution, a symmetric confidence interval of the same
total size leads to polarization. For an expected value start distribution with n= 50
that is the case for m= −0.03, −0.04, −0.05, −0.09. Since all the underlying runs of
Figure 9.6 are uniquely initialized, we can directly look into the single runs that pro-
duce the perplexing effect. Figure 9.7 does that for m= −0.03.
Figure 9.6: Stepwise stronger bias for the same start distribution.
Notes: On the x-axis the bias m gets stronger in steps of size −0.01. For a given bias, the y-axis
indicates the stabilized end positions of opinions. The lines connect ranks in the ordered profiles.
Different sizes of grey circles indicate the size of an opinion cluster. A small black circle with a
white inner circle is a cluster of two opinions. All runs start with the same expected value start
distribution n= 50ð Þ. The total size of the confidence interval is always 0.4.
13 The relevant Section 4.2.2 of Hegselmann and Krause (2002) did (luckily enough) not claim that
the generalisation is true, but – based upon that article and the underlying research – I believed
the generalisation to be true until very recently.
14 We might refer to this type of diagrams as ceteris-paribus-diagrams (CP-diagrams). They show
the final stable results of runs that are uniquely initialized; then everything is kept constant – ex-
cept for one parameter.
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The cause of the unexpected effect is visible in Figure 9.7: it is the evolution of a
small cluster of just two opinions in the center of the opinion space. That cluster,
then, is a bridge between the two outer opinion camps and pulls them direction
center. Nowhere in Figure 9.7 we see, indicated by a black vertical line, a one-sided
ϵ-split – the perplexing results occurs without such splits. The same is true for all
other cases of consensus in Figure 9.6.15
Careful inspection of Figure 9.6 reveals a further type of non-monotonicity: It
is only a tiny margin, but the range of the final profile for m= −0.20 is smaller
than for m= −0.19; in a certain sense, locally, a stronger opinion dependent bias
has lead to a less extreme polarization. The same effect occurs for several other
values of the bias m. In Figure 9.6 the bias gets stronger by a step size of –0.01.
For both types of non-monotonicity (as to the number of finally stable clusters,
and the final width of the profile), a smaller step size would unveil even more
complicated non-monotonic structures. Obviously, an understanding of the polar-
ization dynamics includes the task to understand surprising sensitivities and non-
monotonicities.
Figure 9.7: Consensus by biased confidence.
Notes: For an opinion dependent bias m= −0.03 the dynamics leads to consensus, while (for the
same start profile and the same total size of ϵ) symmetry of the confidence interval leads to
polarization (see Figure 9.5, top).
15 In the range m= −0.5, . . . , − 1, I never found a case of consensus.
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9.3 Extension two: A group of radicals enters
the field
Let’s now assume that there is a group of radicals. They all have the same opinion R,
more or less close to the upper bound of the unit interval, for example R=0.9, or even
holding the most extreme position R= 1.0. (Alternatively, we might locate the radical
position R close to the lower bound of our opinion space. Whatever we do, for the fol-
lowing it does not matter.) The radicals stick to their opinion – and that for ever16:
R t+ 1ð Þ=R tð Þ=R. (9:5)
The size of the radical group may matter. We refer to the number of radicals by #R.
Additionally we have the normals, i.e. agents as we know them from the simple BC
model. They have opinions from the interval 0, 1½ , they all have a strictly positive, con-
stant, and symmetric ϵ>0. Normals update according to equation (9.2). Now the modi-
fication comes: Whenever the radicals are in a normal agent i’s confidence interval,
that is whenever xi tð Þ−Rj j≤ ϵ, then the whole group of radicals is in I i,X tð Þð Þ. Since the
radical group has#R members, the radical position R is#R-times in I i,X tð Þð Þ.
Figure 9.8 shows a single run for 5 radicals with the radical position R=0.9; the
black horizontal line is their trajectory. They interact with 50 normals (expected
value start distribution). The normals’ confidence interval is ϵ=0.2. Without radicals,
Figure 9.8: Normals and radicals.
Notes: 50 normals (expected value start distribution, ϵ=0.2) and 5 radicals (R =0.9). Vertical black
lines indicate a chain of direct or indirect influence of radicals on normals.
16 That is equivalent to assuming that their confidence interval is zero.
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the opinion dynamics among the normals would be the dynamics in Figure 9.5, top.
The dark grey area in Figure 9.8 indicates that part of the opinion space, in which all
normals, given the size of their confidence interval, are under the direct influence of
the radicals. Black vertical lines indicate the existence and length of a chain of direct
or indirect influence of radicals on normals: Normals in the dark grey area are directly
influenced by the radicals. But the radicals’ influence does not end there. A normal j
outside that area is indirectly influenced by a normal i inside the area of direct radical
influence if xi tð Þ− xj tð Þ
 ≤ ϵ. Agent j, then, may influence other agents k outside the
area of direct radical influence with opinions not further away than ϵ, and so forth.
Figure 9.8 shows a far-reaching indirect influence of the radical group in the first pe-
riods: The chain of radical influence pervades the whole opinion profile, i.e. the radi-
cals influence all normals. In period 4 that chain breaks. An upper part of the
opinion profile converges towards the radical position. Below, the normals end up
(obviously in finite time!) in a cluster. That cluster is far away from the radical posi-
tion R. However, compared to the dynamics without the 5 radicals (see Figure 9.5,
top), the lower cluster’s final position is a bit shifted in the direction of the radical
position. Obviously indirect radical influence matters.
It is very natural to think, that final numbers of radicalized normals crucially
depend upon the number of radicals compared to the number of normals (hopefully
only the ratio matters), the confidence level ϵ, and the radicals’ position R. Under
this working hypothesis, our model has only few parameters and we should be able
to answer our questions for major parts of the parameter space. One possible simu-
lation strategy, then, is the following: Let’s assume we have 50 normal agents and
the most extreme radical position that is possible, i.e. R= 1.0. Two parameters are
left: The number of radicals, and the confidence level ϵ. Now we put a grid on the
two dimensional parameter space: In 50 steps of size 0.01 the confidence level of
normals increases from 0.01 to 0.5 on the x-axis. On the y-axis the number of radi-
cals increases in 50 steps from 1 to 50 (then the group of radicals has as many mem-
bers as the group of normals). We compute the runs for each of the 50× 50
parameter constellations ϵ,#Rh i. A run is considered stabilized, iff the opinion pro-
files X tð Þ and X t + 1ð Þ are almost the same. More precisely, we stop a run if for all
agents i it holds that xi t + 1ð Þ− xi tð Þj j≤ 10− 5. As to statistics, we will focus on one
number only: the number of normals that finally hold an almost radical position.
And we consider a normal agent i’s opinion as almost radical iff xi tð Þ−Rj j≤ 10− 3.
Again, for all runs in the whole parameter space we will use one and the same
expected value start distribution as given by equation (9.3). As a consequence,
there isn’t any randomness in our analysis. If we find in the grid of 50× 50 parame-
ter constellations ϵ,#Rh i some interesting effects, then we can go straight into the
unique single runs that generated perplexing macro-effects.
There are other models of radicalization, for instance Deffuant et al. (2002) or
Baurmann, Betz, and Cramm (2014). Often, they are more complicated than ours, or
do not allow for the type of analysis that we want to apply. We go for extreme
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simplicity and aim at a complete understanding, including the micro level that
brings about the patterns on the macro level, for instance the numbers of finally
radicalized agents.17
9.3.1 A bunch of surprising effects
Result of the computation of single runs for the 50× 50 parameter constellations
ϵ,#Rh i is an array of numbers. It is much easier to detect patterns and structures in
colored landscapes rather than in an array of numbers (even if they are only inte-
gers – as in our case). Therefore (as a kind of phase diagram) Figure 9.9 shows, in-
dicated by color, the number of normals that finally end up at the radical position
R= 1.0. For ease of reference, we refer by the capital letters A, B, C, D, E, and F to
certain regions of the parameter space, as they are partitioned by the black lines
(two vertical, one horizontal).
Figure 9.9: Radicalization landscape for an expected value start distribution.
Notes: x-axis: the confidence level increases in 50 steps of size 0.01 from 0.01 to 0.5. y-axis: the
number of radicals increases from 1 to 50. Colors indicate the number of normals that end up at the
radical position which is here assumed to be R = 1.0. The total number of normals is always 50.
17 The analysis presented here is extended in Douven and Hegselmann (2020).
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On the y-axes the number of radicals increases stepwise. Therefore, sudden dra-
matic color changes in vertical direction are dramatic changes in the number of rad-
icalized normals that – ceteris paribus – are caused by just one more radical.
Correspondingly, a dramatic color change in horizontal direction is – ceteris pari-
bus – a dramatic change in the number of radicalized normals caused by a tiny in-
crease of ϵ by 1=100.
In the following we inspect region-wise our parameter space. We start with the
three vertical regions. Our question is, how the number of normals that end up at
the radical position, depends upon the number of radicals. Then an inspection of
the two horizontal region follows. Our question there, is, how the radicalization of
normals depends upon confidence levels.
1. In the region F ∪ C, i.e. a region with higher confidence levels ϵ, the number of
radicalized normals monotonically increases as #R increases. But for all ϵ<0.49,
there is a sudden jump: One more radical, and the number of radicalized normals
jumps from none to all. Obviously there is an ϵ depending threshold #*R of radicals,
such that, first, for that threshold no normal ends up at the radical position,
while, second, for #*R + 1 all normals end up at the radical position.
2. In the region E ∪ B, i.e. a region with middle-sized confidence levels we find
jumps of all sorts and in various directions: In region E there are – again in vertical
direction – jumps from none to all: One more radical, and, instead of none, all nor-
mals end up at the radical position R. But, additionally, in region E and B there are
jumps in the opposite direction: One more radical, and instead of all, significantly less
(about half of the normals, or even less) end up radical.
By careful inspection of region E ∪ B in Figure 9.9 one can verify: With the ex-
ception of one of the ϵ values (the exception will be discussed later), it holds for the
middle-sized confidence levels in region E ∪ B:
1. For all of them exists an threshold #*R for none-to-all jumps.
2. For all of them exists another ϵ depending threshold #**R of radicals, such that,
first, for that threshold all normals end up at the radical position, while, second,
for #**R + 1 significantly less normals become radical. Obviously, there is a second
type of jumps, now working into the opposite direction.
3. In region E the second threshold #**R equals #
* + 1. As a consequence, two steps
of adding just one more radical causes the dramatic change from none to all,
and then back to about half of the normals being radicalized.
4. For the thresholds #**R that are in region B, the jump from all to significantly
fewer comes later – but it comes: There is always a number of radicals such
that just one more reduces the number of radicalized normals from all to about
less than the half.
There is one exception from observation (a) to (b): For step 28 on the y-axis
(ϵ=0.28) there is a threshold #**R , but no threshold #*R. To be frank: I do not know
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the reason. May be it is simply as it is – in the non-linear BC-dynamics often minor
differences matter. The missing threshold may be a hint, that the exact position pat-
tern of the thresholds #*R is a more complicated issue than it looks under our
50× 50 grid of ϵ,#Rh i parameter constellations. A grid that is finer with regard to ϵ
could give an answer. And finally, bleak as it is: The missing threshold #*R may be
the consequence of numerical problems.18
Leaving the one exception aside and summing up: E ∪ B, a region of middle-sized
confidence levels, is a region with sudden ups (from none to all) and downs (from all
to significantly less) radicalized normals. Along certain lines in the parameter space
the sensitivity to tiny changes is extreme. The predominant phenomenon is, that the
number of radicalized normals is not monotonically increasing with an increasing
number of radicals. Just one more radical may lead to much less radicalization.
Even in the smooth areas of region B the radicalization of normals is clearly not
monotonically increasing with regard to #R. On the contrary: In the left part of area B
the radicalization of normals is slightly decreasing as the number of radicals increases.
3. The region D ∪ A is the region of smaller confidence levels ϵ. Again, for an in-
creasing #R, there are certain threshold values where jumps occur. But they are not
jumps from none to all. Nevertheless, they are jumps from none to a significant pro-
portion. In the right part of D the sudden increase is more drastic than in the left
part. Again there is a striking effect: Above the jumps from none to a significant pro-
portion, the number of radicalized normals clearly decreases as the number of radi-
cals increases – less radicals would havemore effect.
4. Horizontally, i.e. with regard to #R, we distinguish two regions. There is an upper
region with a major number (or proportion) of radicals, the region A ∪ B ∪ C. It is a
region with always more than 10 radicals, i.e. a radical group size of more than 1=5 of
the number of normals, or, respectively, more than 1=6 of the whole population.19
Given such a major #R, if ϵ increases, there always exists a threshold ϵ* such that for
ϵ* +0.01 the number of radicalized normals jumps from about 1=3 to all. The upward
jumps are compatible with monotonicity. However, careful color inspection of the
area to the left of the thresholds ϵ* clearly shows (especially clear for the middle
sized confidence levels in region B) that, with increasing confidence levels, #R –
slightly and smoothly – first increases, but then decreases (again slightly and
smoothly). In sum, for major numbers of radicals, as to the numbers of radicalized
normals, there is no general monotonicity with respect to the size of their confidence
interval.
18 For a description and discussion of the numerical problems see Hegselmann and Krause (2015:
483ff.).
19 If one counts the cells up to the horizontal line, the result is 10. Note: The y-axis’ origin is 1 (and
the x-axis origin is 0.01).
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There are two regions in the whole parameter space, that behave very smoothly:
the regions A and C. Both belong to the upper horizontal region with a major num-
ber of radicals that we inspect right now. In region C, that is for higher confidence
levels, for any #R all normals end up radicalized. In region A, that is for smaller
confidence levels, it is the normals’ confidence level that matters – not #R: The rad-
icalization of normals increases as their ϵ increases. In the bottom right area of A
the number of the radicals has a bit effect: The number of normals, that end up at
R, slightly decreases as #R increases.
However, a warning side remark: Figure 9.9 shows the number of normals that
become radical. We consider a normal agent i as “radical”, “radicalized”, “ending
up at the radical position” etc. iff xi tð Þ−Rj j≤ 10− 3. Therefore, even if #R has (al-
most) no effect on the number of – in this sense – radicalized normals, it may nev-
ertheless have (and often has) a major effect on the mean or median opinion of the
normals’ opinions, the cluster structure etc., which we do not analyze here.
In region A and C the number of radicals has very little or no effect on the radi-
calization of normals. In region B that is different, and #R seriously matters: The
exact location (though not the existence) of the threshold ϵ* depends upon the
number of radicals: As their number increases, the jumps occur more to the right,
i.e. they require higher confidence levels.
5. The lower horizontal region, i.e. D ∪ E ∪ F, is a region with minor numbers of
radicals (not more than 1=6 of the whole population of normals plus radicals). In
terms of jumps it is the wildest region: In E and F we find (as in B) thresholds ϵ* such
that for ϵ* +0.01 the number of radicalized normals jumps from less than a half or
even none to all. But, additionally, there are values ϵ**, such that for ϵ** +0.01 the
number of radicalized normals jumps from all to zero. The most striking point is, that
in E both threshold values are horizontally next to each other, i.e. ϵ** = ϵ* +0.01.
Obviously, the radicalization of normals reacts in E, i.e. an area with both, a minor
number of radicals and a middle-sized confidence level, extremely sensitive with re-
gard to both initial conditions, the confidence level and the number of radicals.
However, there is again a conspicuity in area E, now in vertical direction: For all
#R > 2 except for #R = 6, 7, 8 there exists a threshold ϵ* (as defined above). Again we
do not know the reason. The same considerations, as mentioned above in the corre-
sponding case for ϵ=0.28, apply (see the second observation).
In area D we find for an increasing ϵ a lot of jumps in both directions: from
some to none and from none to some. The jumps are less dramatic than in region E,
but they are there. For a description one might introduce thresholds that corre-
spond ϵ* and ϵ** but have reduced requirements.
To sum up, with respect to the confidence level, the whole region D ∪ E ∪ F is a
region of non-monotonicity, jumps up and jumps down.
What are the main results of our inspection? There are two ‘smooth’ areas in the
parameter space, the areas A and C. But in all other areas we find the thresholds ϵ*,
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ϵ**, #*R, and #
**
R (in D we observe corresponding thresholds with reduced require-
ments). Let’s call a region of our partitioned ϵ,#Rh i-parameter space wild iff, first, we
have in that region a non-monotonicity (both, decreasing and increasing) with re-
spect to one or both parameters, and, second, the region is pervaded by sensitivities.
Under that definition we can distinguish two wild regions: In vertical direction the
region E ∪ B, a region of middle-sized confidence levels; in horizontal direction the
region D ∪ E ∪ F, a region of comparatively small numbers of radicals.
For all regions, wild or not, immediately “Why is it, that . . . ?”- questions arise.
Why is it, that in region C neither the number of radicals, nor the confidence level
has any effect on the number of radicalized normals? Whatever the specific parame-
ter constellation in that region, all normals end up radical – but why? Why is it,
that in region A, a region where the number of radicals is above 1=6 of the whole
population, radicalization of normals is not very much influenced by the number of
radicals. Obviously, it is the confidence level of normals that matters – but why?
In the following we will make expeditions into the ‘wild’ regions of our parame-
ter space and try to understand, how ‘in the deep’ some completely deterministic
mechanisms create the wild ‘radicalization landscape’, that Figure 9.9 displays.
9.3.2 An expedition into the wild parameter region
Our use of always the same expected value start distribution has two consequences:
First, whenever we want to understand what causes certain effects in our radicaliza-
tion landscape, we can go directly into unique single runs. No statistical analysis of
100 or so randomly started runs is necessary. Second, since, additionally, all the sin-
gle runs start with the same start distribution of normals, we can, by comparison of
single runs, on the level of single agents directly observe the effects of changes of ϵ or
#R. Especially, if we inspect single-run-sequences of small stepwise changes, we di-
rectly observe the working of the ‘forces in the deep’ that generate the surface of our
radicalization landscape – and that should be a good starting point for an identifica-
tion and understanding of the mechanisms that bring about the puzzling landscape.
Our expedition will be an expedition direction north that starts at ϵ=0.31. On
that path are two puzzling points: First, a sudden change from none to all of the
normals being radicalized (explanandum 1); second, with only a few more radicals,
a sudden change from all to only about 1=3 normals being radicalized (explanan-
dum 2). For each of the parameter constellations that we pass going north on the
50× 50 grid of ϵ,#Rh i, we have unique single runs with the same start distribution.
Therefore, we can generate a sequence of 50 pictures, one for each ϵ,#Rh i constella-
tion that we pass. Each of the pictures displays the trajectories of all 50 agents.
The time scale on the x-axis is always the same: 50 periods. Going strictly north im-
plies, that ϵ is kept constant. Therefore, whatever is changing in the sequence of
pictures, it is the consequence of one factor only: the number of radicals.
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Figure 9.10 displays the first explanandum: The jump from none to all normals
being radicalized when the number of radicals increases from 10 to 11. For an expla-
nation we start in Figure 9.10 bottom, i.e. the dynamics under the influence of 10 rad-
icals. As the dark grey vertical lines indicate, there is up to period 7 (we start with
period 0) a chain of direct or indirect influence of the 10 radicals even on the most
distant normals. Soon 3 opinion clusters emerge among the normals. The cluster in
the middle functions as a bridge between the upper and the lower cluster. The upper
cluster is in the dark grey area of the opinion space, and that is the area of direct
influence of the radicals. Thus the upper cluster of normals is a bridge between the
radical group and other two clusters of normals, which, period by period, move direc-
tion R. But that works only for a while: As the lower cluster of normals moves
Figure 9.10: One more radical and everybody gets radicalized.
Notes: Bottom: #R = 10. Top: #R = 11. ϵ=0.31. One more radical causes a jump from none to all of
the normals ending up at the radical position.
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upward, at a certain point the upper normal cluster has both, the middle and the
lower cluster within its confidence interval. Their combined influence on the upper
cluster is strong enough to pull the upper cluster completely out of the area of direct
influence of the radicals. The consequence is, that no bridge between radicals and
normals exists any longer. However, the radicals had an effect on the normals:
Without radicals the normals would end up at a 0.5-consensus. With 10 radicals (1/5
of the number of normals, 1=6 of the whole population) it is about 0.64.
Now we add just one radical, analyze the trajectories in Figure 9.10 top, and
compare it with what we see in Figure 9.10 bottom: With the one more radical,
again, the three clusters of normals evolve. However, it takes a few periods more
until the upper cluster gets under the direct influence of both clusters below,
which, therefore, both are moving direction R a bit longer, before, then, that period
comes. When it comes, the upper cluster makes – as in the case with one radical
less – a steep move away from the radicals’ position. But different from the case
with #R = 10, the upper cluster does not get out of the area of direct influence of
radicals. From that moment onwards everything is lost: Though now further away
from the radical position, the upper cluster continues to function as a bridge be-
tween all other normals and the radicals. After two more periods the bridge isn’t
necessary any longer: Now all normals are under the direct influence of the radi-
cals – and that is a point of no return: From now on (and as one cluster) all normals
irreversibly move and converge – though in infinite time – to the radical position.
The inspection of the underlying dynamics resolves the puzzling effect in the
radicalization landscape: The sudden jump from none to all is due to what we
might call a positive bridging effect: For #R = 10 a cluster evolves that for a while
functions as a bridge between the radicals and all other normals. But then the
bridge breaks down and, additionally, the upper cluster gets out of the area of di-
rect radical influence. For #R = 11 the bridge to the radicals continues to function
until it becomes superfluous. The functioning of the bridge is critical and accounts
for the difference between none or all of the normals ending up radical.
Figure 9.11 displays the second explanandum: The sudden drop down from all
normals being radicalized to only 1=3, and that by increasing the number of radicals
from 13 to 14. We start our analysis in Figure 9.11 bottom. What we see there, is very
similar to Figure 9.10 top. Based on what we saw there, we understand the positive
bridging effects that are (still) at work in the dynamics in Figure 9.11, bottom. But
the one more radical in Figure 9.11, top, causes dramatically different trajectories:
the middle cluster of normals is somehow ‘blown up’: One of the former members
joins the upper cluster, all others join the lower cluster. For some periods the radi-
cals still influence even the most distant normals. But there is no evolution of a
bridging cluster in-between the two clusters of normals. The distance between the
two clusters enlarges. As a consequence, the radicals’ chain of influence breaks
and becomes very short afterwards. More than 2=3 of the normals form a cluster at
about 0.45, that is even slightly lower than the center of the opinion space.
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Decisive for the sudden jump downwards is, that the one more radical causes a
rupture in a segment of the normals’ opinion profile that, without the additional radi-
cal, would have become a bridging cluster. – Obviously, there are not only positive
bridging effects. In our explanation of the second explanandum a negative bridging
effect is at work: Under one more radical a former bridge to the radicals ceases to
exist. And that causes a dramatic reduction in terms of radicalized normals.
We can’t analyze here all the details of the mechanics that works underneath
the radicalization landscape on the route further north. Only so much: The number
of radicalized normals goes up to a maximum of 19, fluctuates for a while between
18 and 19, and ends for #R = 50 with 18 radicalized normals. All explanations of
these figures, their small range, and their fluctuations, are about the details of how
the cluster, that for #R = 13 functions as a bridge between the upper and the lower
Figure 9.11: One more radical and the radicalization goes down.
Notes: Bottom: #R = 13. Top: #R = 14. ϵ=0.31. One more radical causes a jump down from all to
less than one third of the normals ending up at the radical position.
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cluster of normals (see Figure 9.11, bottom), is ‘blown up’, disassembled, and rup-
tured into pieces, once we add one more radical, and another one, and so forth.
In a similar style we could do an expedition going east, for instance starting at
#R = 5. As Figure 9.9 shows, on that path we would encounter three dramatic sud-
den changes that ask for explanation.20 What lessons can we learn from our expedi-
tions? The most important lessons are these:
1. A prominent role in all explanations of sudden jumps of the number of finally
radicalized normals have bridges from normals to radicals. They require, as a kind
of pier, normals (cluster or single) that, given a confidence level ϵ,
1. are themselves inside the area of direct radical influence,
2. are within the confidence interval of other normals, that are outside the area of
direct radical influence.
Let’s call such bridges type-R bridges. They are decisive for any influence of radicals
outside their limited area of direct influence (which is determined by the normals’ con-
fidence level). Type-R bridges allow for indirect influence of radicals on normals.
There is a second type of bridges, bridges from normals to normals. They re-
quire (again as a kind of pier) normals (cluster or single), that, given a confidence
level ϵ,
1. are themselves inside the confidence interval of at least two other normals (clus-
ter or single),
2. that themselves are outside each other’s confidence interval.
Let’s call this type of bridge type-N bridge.
What we have seen, then, is, that via an uninterrupted chain of bridges, starting
with a type-R bridge and then prolongated by a number of type-N bridges, the radicals
may have an influence even on normals that are far away from the radical position.
But, except for the group of radicals, the piers of our bridges can move over time – and
that may destroy a bridge, whether of type-R or type-N. At the same time new piers for
new bridges may evolve. Lesson: Understanding the radicalization landscape is an un-
derstanding of types, evolution, and breakdown of bridges in a dynamical network.
2. The probably most striking puzzles are sudden jumps down from all to none, or
significantly fewer radicalized normals – and that caused by an increasing
#R or ϵ (as an expedition direction east would demonstrate). In explanandum 2 one
more radical causes a pull upwards, which, via a type-R bridge, disrupts a former
and essential type-N bridge. The movable pier of the type-N bridge moves steeply
direction R. Thereby the bridging capacity, given by ϵ, is over-stretched, and the
type-R-bridge breaks down (see Figure 9.11).
20 Hegselmann and Krause (2015) describes that expedition in detail.
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An increasing number of radicals may have the effect that the upward pull dis-
rupts piers of type-N bridges and/or attracts too fast the pier of a type-R bridge. An
increase of ϵ causes a stronger contraction. That may sweep along a former pier of a
type-R bridge, and the former pier gets outside the area of direct radical influence. In
both cases the breakdowns of bridges depends upon thresholds. Therefore they are
sudden events. In both cases the breakdown of bridges may stop the radicals’ influ-
ence on major fractions of normals. As to the numbers of radicalized normals, even
jumps from all to none are possible. Lesson:We can explain the sudden jumps down-
ward in terms of effects on type-R and type-N bridges in an opinion profile, that is
exposed to two interlinked forces, that get stronger: the first pulls upwards,
the second contracts the range of the profile. If the forces get stronger, they may de-
stroy decisive bridges of influence.
3. Sudden jumps upwards are another puzzling effect. Such a jump occurs in the
explanandum 1. With one more radical the pier of a type-R bridge is no longer pulled
downwards outside the area of direct radical influence (see Figure 9.10). Lesson:
Obviously we can explain the sudden jumps downwards in terms of effects of the in-
terlinked forces for type-R or type-N bridges. If the forces get stronger, bridges that
before broke down, may keep functioning, or piers for new bridges may evolve.
That are some lessons. Many questions are left open, for instance with regard
to the location of the extreme sensitivities. To answer them requires many more ex-
peditions into the wild.
9.4 Concluding remarks and future perspectives
In this article we presented two extensions of the BC Model. In Section 9.2 we intro-
duced an opinion dependent bias. In Section 9.3 radicals entered the field. Both exten-
sions revealed phenomena of general importance: First, the importance of bridges;
second, an extreme sensitivity in certain regions of the parameter space. In these re-
gions very small differences in the parameter values have massive effects.
With regard to bridges, in the polarization processes of Section 9.2, opinion
clusters that had developed in the middle of the opinion space were able to pull
evolving outer clusters towards the center; without the bridge in the middle, the
outer clusters would belong to different opinion worlds. Conversely, the absence or
disappearance of such bridges contributed decisively to polarization. In Section 9.3,
bridges or chains of bridges were decisive for the influence of a group of radicals on
normal BC agents. They connected the cluster of radicals with clusters of normals
outside the direct influence of the radicals. The ϵ splits that we introduced in the
context of the basic BC model, can also be described as the absence or disappear-
ance of bridges. The term bridge in the sense as we use it here, originates from net-
work theory. The term is explicitly introduced in the network theory classic Harary,
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Norman, and Cartwright (1965). In the classical sociological application of network
theory, namely in Granovetter’s The Strength of Weak Ties (1973), the weak ties are
bridges. The use of the term in the context of the BC model is not a transfer of the
concept into another field: The BC dynamics can be understood as a dynamic net-
work in which the edges connect agents (nodes) whose opinion distance is not
greater than ε.
As to sensitivity, we saw in the first extension that polarization reacts extremely
sensitive to small changes of a relatively weak bias. In the second extension the num-
ber of radicalized normals reacts extremely sensitive to small changes of a relatively
small proportion of radicals or, respectively, small changes of a medium-sized confi-
dence interval. The sensitivity is associated with certain non-monotonicities: a more
pronounced bias does not necessarily lead to a more pronounced polarization – it
can even lead to consensus; while an even stronger bias then leads to polarization
again. In the second extension, more radicals or larger confidence intervals can lead
to a larger, but also to a smaller number of radicalized normals.
In the first instance, this sensitivity is the sensitivity of artificial worlds created
as instantiations of the BC model. If, however, with regard to relevant and critical
aspects, these artificial worlds are sufficiently similar to the real world, then one
would also have to reckon with all the mechanisms and effects in the real world. As a
consequence, for an understanding of polarization and radicalization processes in
the real world, a concentration on network bridges would be a good idea. As far as
details are concerned, things could become epistemically and politically difficult in
the real world: In certain parameter ranges, anyone who wants to make a prognosis
on the results of an actual dynamics of opinions would have to have extremely pre-
cise knowledge of the situation, that is the actually given parameter values. The
same applies to the exact explanation of a factual dynamics. A social planner who
could within certain but narrow limits, manipulate parameter values, would have to
know very precisely where he or she actually is in the parameter space in order to
even give his or her intervention only the desired direction. In a radicalization land-
scape that we calculate for one and the same random start distribution, the difficul-
ties would become even more severe.
All results and insights of this article are based upon one and the same ex-
pected value start distribution of 50 opinions according to equation (3). That made
it easy to analyze the factors and mechanisms that cause sudden massive changes
in sensitive parameter regions. But are the findings that the radicalization land-
scape of Figure 9.9 shows perhaps essentially due to the equidistance of opinions in
the expected value start profile that deterministically idealizes an even random
start distribution? Would this landscape have looked substantially different if one
carries out 50, 100 or 1000 experiments with 50 randomly distributed opinions of
normals (uniform distribution) and then averages over the number of radicalized
normals? The answer is given by such random simulations carried out by Igor
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Douven.21 As Figure 9.12 shows, the answer is: No, the radicalization landscape
calculated in this way does not look much different. The abrupt changes are
slightly blurred, but they remain abrupt – the sensitivity is preserved. In this re-
spect, the general use of the same expected value start distribution is obviously a
good representative substitute for high numbers of random experiments. The re-
quired computing time is reduced by one to three orders of magnitude. A radicali-
zation landscape as the 50× 50 parameter constellations ϵ,#Rh i with colors
indicating the final number of radicalized normals, constitutes a major explanan-
dum. If the underlying start distribution is both representative and always the
same, there is a straightforward strategy to find explanations: we directly go into
the single runs that produced the puzzling radicalization patterns. In our case the
single run analysis made very clear that the crucial point is the emergence and
the collapse of bridges (type-R or type-N bridges) between clusters.
Figure 9.12: Radicalization landscape for random start distributions.
Notes: For each of the 50× 50 parameter constellations ϵ,#Rh i, Igor Douven ran 100 simulations
based upon random start distributions (uniform). x-axis: the confidence level increases in 50 steps
of size 0.01 from 0.01 to 0.5. y-axis: the number of radicals increases from 1 to 50. As in Figure 9.9,
the radical position is R = 1. Colors indicate the average number of radicalized normal.
21 On November 1, 2018, Igor Douven has sent to me the respective radicalization landscapes. They
were computed with the newly developed, very fast Julia programming language.
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All that does not mean that, from now on, we should forget about iterated runs
based upon random start distributions. In the research strategy that I propose here,
runs with random start distributions are still important, but more as a hedging mea-
sure: By computing as well the radicalization landscape for iterated random start
distributions we hedge against the danger of artifacts, as they may be caused by
expected value start distributions. The similarity between the landscape that is
based upon one and the same expected-value start distribution (Figure 9.9) and the
landscape that is based upon iterated runs based upon random start distributions
(Figure 9.12) suggests that our single-run based explanations of puzzling phenom-
ena regard and cover generic effects.
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10 Local Brokerage Positions and Access
to Unique Information
Abstract: The theory of structural holes (Burt 1995) provides an explanation regarding
network positions and their associated benefits in many social settings. One of the key
points of the theory is formulated on the node level and is about efficient access to
information and resources. Namely, actors bridging structural holes by connecting
otherwise disconnected segments of a social network, the brokers, have access to in-
formation that circulates over the network while simultaneously maintaining rela-
tively small number of ties. For example, scientists often maintain non-redundant
collaboration ties because they are associated with academically-relevant resources
unavailable in other collaborations. Apart from the above node-level property one can
formulate a tie-level property corresponding to the ‘tie redundancy’. Studying a pro-
cess of the network information diffusion explicitely with a computational experiment
and tools of information theory allows us to compare local properties of the diffusion
with structural features related to the Burtian notions of brokerage and redundancy.
We argue and demonstrate that (1) the above mentioned node-level and tie-level prop-
erties can be supplemented with a triad-level one. Specifically, that the notion of ‘tie
redundancy’ should be in fact considered as an essentially triadic property. Further, (2)
each of the three properties is associated with a viable empirical strategy of testing
whether (aspects of) the structural holes mechanism is at work in a given network.
10.1 Introduction
The theory of structural holes (Burt 1995) identifies network positions having ties
that connect otherwise unconnected segments of a social network as brokerage po-
sitions. Occupying a brokerage position in social networks is usually associated
with various benefits. Further, the theory stipulates, among other things, that it is
beneficial for an actor to occupy such broker positions as it allows for efficient ac-
cess to information that spreads in the network. This statement pretends to the
node level – it specifies that certain actors (network nodes), namely brokers, will be
more successful than other actors given some appropriate notion and measure of
success. For example, managers occupying such positions in an organization have
been shown to be more likely to be promoted (Burt, Hogarth, and Michaud 2000).
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Among the other elements of the theory of structural holes is the one about infor-
mation flow and access to resources. It is related to the notion of tie redundancy. A tie
is redundant for an actor to an extent that it connects others, to whom an actor al-
ready has access via his other ties. This concept is related to the concept of weak ties
(Granovetter 1977). Granovetterian “weak ties”, or Burtian “non-redundant” ties, are
usually sources of information that is less likely to be acquired through “strong” or
“redundant” ties. As such, it is a statement on the tie level. It has been famously
shown by Granovetter (1974) that people usually learned about their current job
through social contacts who are not well embedded in their personal networks.1
When approaching a research setting with a question whether the structural
holes mechanism is at work one usually tests one of the two implications mentioned
above: whether brokers are more succesful than non-brokers or whether relevant in-
formation is usually coming to an actor through a non-redundant rather than a re-
dundant tie. Consider Figure 10.1 presenting a hypothetical personal network of actor
A. We assume that this personal network is embedded in a much larger network –
alters of A might have further connections, but we do not know them. We can (1)
mark through which actor A learned the information of interest (e.g. about a job),
and (2) measure the extent of redundancy of each of A’s ties, e.g. using dyadic redun-
dancy. If the tie-level implication of structural holes is true the information is more
likely to come to A from alters with low redundancy. Most likely actor F.
A
B
C
D
EF
G
H
Figure 10.1: For actor A alters G, H, and E are redundant to the same extent. At the same time, sets
of actors G-H and B-C-D-E can be sources of different information as they are disconnected from
each other.
1 While the issues addressed in this paper can be argued to operate on a scale of complete, as op-
posed to ego-centric, graphs (see Borgatti 2005) we are limiting our attention to personal networks.
This is of great relevance as a lot of empirical studies of the mentioned phenomena, including the
seminal work of Granovetter (1974), is conducted with ego-centrically sampled network data.
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We argue that the abovementioned approach is often insufficient. Consider a research
setting in which there are multiple types of information circulating in the social net-
work and none of these types is any way more special than other types. For example,
collaboration between scientists is often motivated by a possibility to acquire or ex-
change various resources relevant for functioning in academia, such as specific exper-
tise, access to costly equipment or mentorship.2 As all types of information are equally
salient we cannot approach the problem, as suggested by the tie-level implication, by
studying a probability of receiving “new” information as a function of tie redundancy.
None of the information is “new”. What we need instead is to analyze whether the
information received through a non-redundant tie is different from the information re-
cieved through the other ties. In Figure 10.1 actors E, G, and H are redundant for the
actor A to the same extent because each has exactly one tie to other contacts of A.
However, they are clearly not redundant vis a vis each other. For example, the lack of
connection between E and H might suggest that they can be sources of different infor-
mation even though they are redundant to the same extent. What we need then is tri-
adic notion of redundancy and a way of measuring how the information coming to A
from E might be different from that coming to A from H.
To achieve that we, first, in Section 10.2, develop qualitatively the implications of
Burtian theory of structural holes for node-, tie- and triad-level properties of informa-
tion passing through personal networks of actors. Second, we formalize the process of
information flow as a stochastic process in Section 10.3. Third, in order to study these
properties we designed a computer simulation described in Section 10.4. Among the
results presented in Section 10.5 are five conjectures relating, on the one hand, local
properties of the information flow and structural characteristics of the ego-network on
the other hand. In particular, the developed a triad-level implication of the theory of
structural holes together with the simulation results provide a stronger theoretical
justification for the index of pairwise redundancy proposed by Bojanowski and
Czerniawska-Szejda (2018). We conclude the paper with Section 10.6 by discus-
sing, among other things, what empirical strategies the presented results suggest
that are applicable in research settings in which there are multiple types of re-
sources/information being shared through a social network.
10.2 Brokerage and information flow
Actors facing a network information diffusion process can have interests in various
aspects of such a situation. Important instance that we will focus on is access to
2 We might expect, as argued by Bojanowski and Czerniawska-Szejda (2018), that structurally non-
redundant collaboration ties will be associated with resources that a scientist is unable to acquire
through his other collaborations.
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information, that is staying informed. An actor might be interested in maximizing
chances that any information appearing somewhere in the network will eventually
reach him. Other examples include being informed as soon as possible (Buskens
and Yamaguchi 1999; Buskens 2002, chap. 4) or maintaining power defined as con-
trol over information flow (Reagans and Zuckerman 2008; Emerson 1962). If staying
informed is assumed to be a goal motivating tie-forming and tie-dissolving actions
of the actors the question of what kind of social networks will emerge endogenously
via actors’ relational choices becomes a micro-macro problem in the sense of Raub,
Buskens, and Van Assen (2011). An example is depicted in Figure 10.2. Macro condi-
tions include assumed properties of the process of information spreading in the net-
work. Properties such as: whether actor loses information when it is shared or not,
how the probability of some actor i passing information to some actor j is defined.
Micro conditions include assumptions about the goals and constraints of the actors
such as willingness of staying informed while maintaining as few connections as
possible. Should the theory of structural holes apply, actors will be likely to drop
structurally redundant ties as they are a liability. This would be a micro-level out-
come. Removal of redundant ties by the actors leads to appearance of brokers on
the macro level. Further, Buskens and Van de Rijt (2008) shown that the value of
brokerage positions lies in a “social opportunity structure” that is exhaustible.
Empirically, when analyzing a single snapshot of a network we usually observe a
mixture of broker and non-broker positions. This can be because of the network
being far from the structural hole-less equilibrium derived by Buskens and Van de
Rijt (2008) or there might be other network formation incentives operating apart from
brokerage.
As signaled in the Section 1, brokerage and its properties can be analyzed on dif-
ferent levels: nodes, ties, and triads:
– Nodes: Position of a broker in an information flow can be expected to be “infor-
mation-efficient”. That is, every tie should serve a purpose in the sense of being
a channel for specific information unavailable through other ties. Statistically
Macro conditions:
Network information
diffusion
Micro conditions:
Actors want to be informed
Maintaining ties is costly
Micro outcomes:
Redundant ties are
dropped as a liability
Macro outcomes:
Network with
broker positions
Figure 10.2: Micro-macro mechanism of emergence of brokers when facing information diffusion.
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speaking the information type arriving to an actor with high brokerage should
be correlated with (predictable from) the alter that it is arriving from.
– Ties: Information coming to an actor through a non-redundant tie should be dif-
ferent from that coming through other ties. In statistical terms the distribution of
information type coming through a non-redundant tie should be different from
the distribution of information type arriving through all the other ties combined.
– Triads: Not all redundant ties are alike, even if they are redundant to the same
extent. As exemplified with actors E and H in Figure 10.1, an alter can be more
or less redundant to ego vis a vis some other alter. In other words, it is a triadic
property. We can expect that pairs of alters who are, for example, disconnected
in ego’s neighborhood to be sources of more different information than pairs of
alters who are connected. In statistical terms the distributions of information
type in those two pairs will be more similar for connected than for discon-
nected pairs of alters.
Concrete statistical tools to quantify above mentioned concepts such as brokerage,
dyadic and triadic redundancy, as well as for measuring dependence and (dis)simi-
larity of distributions will be introduced in detail in Section 10.5 below.
10.3 The model of information diffusion
Let us have an undirected network G= V,Ef g. Every actor s 2 V is endowed with a
unique piece of information which will be spreading through the network. At any
given time every actor i 2 V can be either informed or uninformed about information
s. Actor i is informed about s if the information that started spreading from actor s
has reached him in the past. He is uninformed about s otherwise. As every actor is an
origin of unique information his identity (s) defines the “information type” – if some
actor i learns the information that started spreading from some other actor s we
might say that actor i learned information type s. The overall history of information
status of all actors can be described with an array M = mist½  such that an element
mist = 1 if at time t actor i is informed about information s and mist =0 otherwise.
In principle the diffusion processes of different types of information may inter-
act. For example, consider some actor i informed about information types s and s'.
The probabilities of sharing s and s' with some neighbor j of i may not be indepen-
dent. Actor imight share s or s' at a given time but not both. In this paper we restrict
our attention to models in which the processes of diffusion of different types of in-
formation are independent. That is, the probability that actor i shares information s
with actor j does not depend on whether i is informed or uninformed about some
other information type s', whether he spread s' to j at the same time step or in the
past, etc.
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Information spreads through network ties at discrete times. This can be modeled
in several ways. For example, Buskens and Yamaguchi (1999) consider two scenarios:
1. the multinomial version in which such information-passing events are indepen-
dent between actors. The two actors can spread information each to a single
neighbor at a single time step
2. the product-binomial version in which information-sharing events are addition-
ally independent within actors. A single actor can spread the information to
multiple neighbors (see also Buskens 2002, chap. 4).
Similarly, Borgatti (2005) considers a “gossip model” which is similar to scenario
(1) above, but with additional restrictions. First, at each time step the information is
shared once. Second, an actor will not share the information with a neighbor who
already knows it. There is also a subtle difference in the way Borgatti (2005) imple-
mented the model in their simulations, which we will comment upon in Section 10.4.
The model we analyze in this paper is closest to the Gossip model of Borgatti
(2005). We assume that at discrete times an informed actor having at least one
uninformed neighbor is selected randomly. She then informs a randomly se-
lected uninformed neighbor. Such processes for each information type s take
place independently from each other. Following Buskens and Yamaguchi (1999)
and Buskens (2002, chap. 4) for the sake of comparability we represent the model as
a finite Markov chain.
Let Aij be the adjacency matrix of graph G and the set of actors who are cur-
rently informed as S1, itself a subset of V. Let us consider the probability that in the
next step certain actor u will be informed by somebody from S1. In other words that
in the next time step the set of informed actors becomes S2 such that S1  S2 and
S2nS1=U where U = uf g. Define
rij =
AijP
j2VnS1 Aij
which is a partially-normalized form of the graph adjacency matrix A. Of our inter-
est will be only a submatrix of rij for i 2 S1 and j 2 VnS1. Elements of that submatrix
are conditional probabilities that uninformed actor j will be informed by i given
that i is to inform anybody. Additionally, let ri+ =
P
j2VnS1 rij are row sums of that
submatrix and ni is the number of elements of ri+ which are positive. With that we
can define the transition probability of the Markov chain as
P S1 ! S2ð Þ=
0 if S2 ∉ S1 or Uj j≠1P
i: i2S1^ri+>0
riu
ni
otherwise
8<
:
The chain is defined over the power set of nodes of graph G.
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Consider an example network from Figure 10.3. Calculating all transition proba-
bilities leads to a process shown in Figure 10.4. It is worth noting two facts about
this stochastic process:
1. There is a single absorbing state corresponding to the situation in which all ac-
tors are informed, namely 1, 2, 3, 4f g.
2. All other states constitute singleton transient sets each. In words, each of these
states is visited at most once.
To compare alters with respect to the information they bring to ego we need to as-
sess how frequently ego receives particular type of information through a particular
alter. We are interested in conditional probabilities of actor i informing actor j with
information of type s conditional on actor j being informed about s. In other words,
what proportion of times actor j becomes informed about s through neighbor i but
not any other neighbor. It does not seem possible to derive such probabilities from
the Markov chain defined above. One of the reasons for that difficulty is that defin-
ing the state of the chain as the set of informed actors does not provide enough de-
tail on the dynamics of the process which would allow for calculating above
mentioned conditional probabilities. To illustrate this, consider the process in the
state 1, 3f g and transitioning to the state 1, 2, 3f g. In such transition actor 2 is getting
informed actor 1 or actor 3. We know from above calculation that the transition
probability is 0.75 – given that actors 1 and 3 are informed in the next step actor 2
will be informed (with probability 0.75) or actor 4 will be informed (with probability
0.25). What we do not know is whether actor 2 learned the information from actor 1
or from actor 3. The conditional probabilities of these two events are not equal:
– Given that actor 1 is to inform anybody, she will inform actor 2 with probability 1
– Given that actor 3 is to inform anybody, she will inform actors 2 and 4 each
with probability 0.5
1
2
3 4
Figure 10.3: Example graph.
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Assuming that a random informed actor is to inform somebody, we select one actor
from actors 1 and 3 at random. It then follows that:
– Actor 3 will inform actor 4 with probability 0.5 ·0.5=0.25.
– Actor 3 will inform actor 2 with probability 0.5 ·0.5=0.25.
– Actor 1 will inform actor 1 with probability 0.5.
Such calculations of conditional probabilities become more complex in a generic
case and on a larger graph. We therefore turn to a numerical simulation to approxi-
mate them. This is presented in the next section.
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Figure 10.4: Markov Chain of information diffusion over the example graph. Each state (graph
node) is a subset of actors who are informed. Arcs of the graph are state transitions labelled with
transition probabilities. The set 1, 2, 3,4f g is an absorbing state.
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10.4 Simulation study
We designed a computational experiment in which a single run consists of the fol-
lowing steps:
1. Take an undirected connected graph G= V,Ef g.
2. Define a node attribute partitioning nodes into informed and uninformed. Initially
all nodes are uninformed.
3. Select a node, called seed, and set him as informed.
4. Time progresses in discrete steps. In every time step the information is shared
by a random informed node with a random network neighbor who is uninformed.
In particular:
a) Identify ties that connect an informed node and an uninformed node
b) Identify informed nodes incident on the ties listed in (a)
c) Select a random node from those found in (b)
d) The informed node identified in (c) shares the information with a random
uninformed neighbor.
5. Repeat (4) until all the nodes are informed.
The fact the network is connected guarantees that every node will ultimately learn
the information. The design of the information diffusion model implemented in
step 4 above additionally guarantees that there are no “idle” simulation steps as on
every step some informed node will share the information with an uninformed
node. In consequence, each simulation run always consists of exactly Vj j− 1 steps.
The process is almost identical to the “gossip process” used by Borgatti (2005). The
only difference is in the stopping criterion (item 5 above). Primarily for the purpose
of comparability with other types of network flow processes Borgatti (2005) used a
setup in which a random seed and “target” nodes were selected. The simulation
was complete when starting from a single informed “source” node the process
reached the state in which the “target” node became informed.
For the purpose of this paper we use the Zachary’s Karate Club network (Zachary
1977). It consists of 34 nodes and 78 ties presented in Figure 10.5. We run3 the simula-
tion 100 times for every seed node amounting to the total of 34× 100× 33= 112200
information-sharing events.
The data generated by the simulation consists of a set of information sharing
events each being described with the following variables:
– B – simulation run with values from 1, . . . , 100f g
– S – ID of the seed actor with values from V = 1, . . . , 34f g
– I – ID of the informed actor (information sender) with values from V = 1, . . . , 34f g
3 The simulation was implemented using R (R Core Team 2019) and packages: “igraph” (Csardi
and Nepusz 2006), “netflow” (Bojanowski 2019), “graphlayouts” (Schoch 2019).
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– J – ID of the uninformed actor (information receiver) with values from
V = 1, . . . , 34f g
– T – Time step at at which actor I shared information S with actor J. A number
from 1, . . . , 33f g.
In words, every row is an event that took place in simulation run B at time T in
which the information that started spreading from seed actor S was passed by actor
I to actor J.
10.5 Simulation results
To analyze the simulated data, we are interested in studying statistical relationships
between structural characteristics of personal networks on the one hand and local
properties of the information flow on the other. Following the arguments from
Sections 10.1 and 10.2 we discuss the results in the following subsections split by
the level of analysis: actors, ties (dyads), and triads respectively.
10.5.1 Actors
Our intuitions from Section 10.2 were that personal networks of actors in brokerage po-
sitions will be characterized with a kind of “information efficiency” in which the mes-
sage type is highly correlated with the identity of the alter through whom the actor
learns it. To quantify this intuition we need measures for both concepts. Popular
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Figure 10.5: Zachary’s Karate Club network used in simulations.
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ways of capturing the extent of brokerage in a personal network is Constraint (Burt
1995, 54) defined as
ci ≡
X
j≠i
ðAij +
X
k≠i, k≠j
AikAkjÞ2
where A is, as above, the adjacency matrix of the graph. Another one is network
efficiency (Borgatti 1997) defined as:
ei ≡
1
n
n−
2t
n
 
= 1− 2t
n2
where t is the number of alter-alter ties in ego’s neighborhood and n is the number
of alters.
Assessing the dependence between message type and alter identity requires an
index of dependence between variables S (information type) and I (alter ID) calcu-
lated separately for each value of J (information receiver) – the ego. As the variables
S and I are nominal, we need an index of stochastic dependence for which we
choose the information-theoretic quantity (Lissowski 1977):
κ≡
H Sð Þ−EðHðSjJÞÞ
H Sð Þ
where H ·ð Þ is the entropy of a, possibly conditional, distribution of a variable. The
index varies between 0 (stochastic independence) and 1 (functional dependence),
and has a convenient interpretation as a proportional reduction in prediction error
(e.g. Agresti and Finlay 1997, chap. 8.7).
Figures 10.6 and 10.7 show actors in the Karate network plotted according to
the strength of dependence between message type and alter ID (vertical axis)
against two measures of brokerage (horizontal axis): Burt’s constraint and network
efficiency. In Figure 10.6 we see that actors with low values of constraint, the
brokers, are characterized with higher dependence and the higher the constraint,
the weaker the dependence. In Figure 10.7 the higher the network efficiency (indi-
cating higher brokerage) the stronger the dependence. This leads us to:
Conjecture 1: (Brokers) In social networks actors in brokerage positions are charac-
terized with a relatively strong dependence between (1) type of information arriving
(identity of the seed node) and (2) an alter that is the source of the information for
the actor.
10.5.2 Ties
We need to quantify two concepts: (1) the redundancy of alter j to ego i and (2)
the extent to which the information coming from alter j to ego i is different from
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information coming to ego from the remaining alters. Common way of measuring
alter’s redundancy is dyadic redundancy (Hanneman and Riddle 2005, chap. 9):
dyadic redundancyij ≡
dij
ni
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Ego's network efficiency
De
pe
nd
en
ce
 b
et
we
en
 m
es
sa
ge
 a
nd
 in
fo
rm
an
t (
κ)
Figure 10.7: Strength of dependence between message type and informant versus ego’s network
efficiency. For brokers (high ego-network efficiency) it is more predictable what information comes
from which alter. Linear (dashed) and LOESS (solid) trends superimposed.
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Figure 10.6: Strength of dependence between message type and informant versus Burt’s
constraint. For brokers (low constraint) it is more predictable what information comes from which
alter. Linear (dashed) and LOESS (solid) trends superimposed.
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where dij is number of alter-alter ties in the neighborhood of ego i adjacent to actor
j and ni is the number of alters of ego i.
To compare different distributions we will use Kullback-Leibler Divergence
(Kullback and Leibler 1951; Kullback 1959). For two discrete probability distribu-
tions pi = P X = xið Þ and qi =P Y = yið Þ of some variables X and Y it is equal to
KLD X,Yð Þ=
X
i
pi log
qi
pi
It is equal to 0 if and only if distributions of X and Y are identical. In order to com-
pare the distribution of information coming to ego from an alter to the distribution
of information coming to ego from all other alters we are interested in calculating
KLD S J = j ^ I = i, Sj jJ≠j ^ I = ið Þ.
Figure 10.8 shows all ego-alter ties in the Karate network according to dyadic
redundancy (horizontal axis) and KL divergence calculated as above. We can see
that alters characterized with low redundancy are more likely to bring different in-
formation to ego than those with high redundancy. This can be summarized as:
Conjecture 2: (Redundant ties) In personal social networks the two distributions of
information types coming to an actor (1) from an alter and (2) coming from the re-
maining alters will be more different the lower the dyadic redundancy of that alter.
Thus both conjectures are along the initial intuitions. Firstly, on the actor level,
that brokerage positions are information-efficient. Secondly, on the tie level, that
non-redundant ties tend to bring different information than other ties.
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Figure 10.8: Dyad information divergence versus dyadic redundancy. Non-redundant ties (low
dyadic redundancy) tend to bring different information than other ties. Linear (dashed) and LOESS
(solid) trends superimposed.
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10.5.3 Triads
We have argued in Section 10.2 that the consequences of occupying brokerage posi-
tions in a social network and information diffusion extend beyond the actor and
dyadic levels. To make these intuitions more concrete we are going to analyze the
simulated data on a triadic level by focusing on triples of actors consisting of ego j
and two alters i and k and the following properties:
1. The (dis)similarity between (a) distribution of information type that arrives to
ego j from alter i and (b) distribution of information type that arrives to ego j
from alter k.
2. A measure capturing the extent of redundancy of alters i and k to ego j.
We will measure the dissimilarity between the distributions (item 1 above) with Kullback-
Leibler Divergence as defined in the previous section. To capture the triadic notion of
redundancy (item 2) we may look at geodesic distance between alters i and k in ego’s
neighborhood. The closer the alters are the more they are redundant. Figure 10.9 shows
all ego-alter-alter triplets for which the alter-alter distance is finite according to the alter-
alter distance (horizontal axis) and KL divergence measuring dissimilarity between infor-
mation type distributions for the two alters in the triplet. We can indeed observe that
the further the two alters are apart in the triplet the more dissimilar are the distributions
of information type that arrive from these alters to ego. We summarize this with
Conjecture 3: (Alter-alter distance) In personal social networks the distributions of
information types coming to the ego from two alters are the more dissimilar the
greater the distance between these alters in ego’s neighborhood.
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Figure 10.9: In ego-alter-alter triads in which alters are further apart, alters tend to bring more
different information. Linear (dashed) and LOESS (solid) trends superimposed.
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Using alter-alter distance to indicate the extent of redundancy has two limitations.
The first one is that we do not account for the pairs of alters who are disconnected.
Distance between them is by convention equal to infinity. The second one is that
we treat pairs of directly connected alters (at distance 1) as redundant to the same
extent irrespectively of their embeddedness in the personal network of ego. To ad-
dress the second issue we may capture that embeddedness by counting how many
alters the pair of alters under study has in common. In the example network in
Figure 10.1 actors G and H have no other alters in common while the pair B-D has
one alter in common – actor C. We might expect the more embedded a pair of alters
is the more similar the distributions of information types will be. This is what we
observe in Figure 10.10 which shows all ego-alter-alter triples in the Karate network
according to the number of shared alters of the alter-alter pair (horizontal axis) and
KL divergence of the distributions of information type coming from the two alters to
ego. The more embedded the alter-alter pair is the less dissimilar the distributions.
Hence the conjecture
Conjecture 4: (Alter-alter embeddedness) In personal social networks the distribu-
tions of information type coming to the ego from two alters are the less dissimilar
the more embedded the alter-alter pair is in ego’s neighborhood.
Table 10.1 shows a cross-classification of all ego-alter-alter triples in the Karate net-
work. While number of shared partners (in columns) is shown as is, we have trans-
formed the alter-alter distance (in rows) by (1) showing the inverse and (2) assigning
value 0 to those triples in which the alters are not connected directly or indirectly.
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Figure 10.10: In ego-alter-alter triads alters sharing more partners tend to bring similar information.
Linear (dashed) and LOESS (solid) trends superimposed.
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Notice that alter-alter distance and alter-alter embeddedness are almost complemen-
tary characteristics describing the neighborhood of of an ego. The (inverse) distance
between the alters takes non-zero values only for those ego-alter-alter triples in
which there are no shared partners indicating a null alter-alter embeddedness. This
suggests that the two characteristics can be combined into a single numerical index.
Let dðj, i, kÞ− 1 be the inverse of the length of the shortest path between alters i and k
in personal network of actor j having all of j’s ties removed. By convention we as-
sume dðj, i, kÞ− 1 =0 if the path i and k does not exist. Further, let sh j, i, kð Þ be the
number of alters of ego j who are directly connected to alters i and k. The combined
index, which we call pairwise redundancy (Bojanowski and Czerniawska-Szejda 2018)
can be defined as:
PR j, i, kð Þ=
0 if d j, i, kð Þ=0 and sh j, i, kð Þ=0
d ðj, i, kÞ− 1 if d j, i, kð Þ > 1 and sh j, i, kð Þ=0
1 if d j, i, kð Þ= 1 and sh j, i, kð Þ=0
sh j, i, kð Þ+ 1 if d j, i, kð Þ= 1 and sh j, i, kð Þ > 0
8>><
>>:
In words:
– It is 0 if alters i and k of ego j are not connected directly or indirectly, e.g. alter
F vs all other alters of ego A in Figure 10.1.
– It is in the interval (0, 1) if alters i and k of ego j are connected only indirectly,
e.g. alters B and E of ego A in Figure 10.1. It is the inverse of the shortest path
between j and k.
– It is 1 if alters i and k are connected directly with no shared partners, e.g. alters
G and H of ego A in Figure 10.1.
– It is in the interval 1,∞ð Þ if alters i and k are connected directly and have com-
mon some of ego’s alters in common. It is the number of shared partners plus 1.
For example for alters B and D in Figure 10.1 it is PR A,B,Dð Þ= 1+ 1= 2 as alters
B and D have alter C in common.
Table 10.1: Cross-tabulation of inverse alter-alter distance and number
of shared alters. The two measures are almost complementary.
Inverse alter-alter distance Number of shared alters
   
.    
.    
.    
.    
.    
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For illustration Table 10.2 contains all the pairwise redundancy scores for alters of
ego A in the network from Figure 10.1.
We can now use the pairwise redundancy scores to characterize all ego-alter-alter
triples from the Karate network jointly and set it against the KL divergence scores
comparing the distributions of information type arriving from the alters to ego. This
is shown in Figure 10.11. We can see that the more pairwise-redundant the alters
are, the more similar the distributions of information type coming from these alters:
Conjecture 5: (Pairwise redundancy) In personal social networks the distributions
of information type coming to the ego from two alters are the less dissimilar the
more pairwise-redundant the alters are to ego.
Table 10.2: Pairwise redundancy scores for
pairs of alters of actor A in the network from
Figure 10.1.
Alter  Alter 
C D E F G H
B   .   
C  .   
D    
E   
F  
G 
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Figure 10.11: Pairwise-redundant alters tend to bring similar information. Linear (dashed) and
LOESS (solid) trends superimposed.
10 Local Brokerage Positions and Access to Unique Information 245
Conjectures 3, 4, and 5 formulated in this section are along the qualitative arguments
discussed earlier, namely that there is a triadic dimension to brokerage and redun-
dancy. Alters who might be redundant to the same extent may be at the same time
non-redundant vis a vis each other in terms of the divergence of incoming information.
10.6 Conclusion and discussion
In the presented paper we have formalized a model of information diffusion and
used computer simulation to show how statistical properties of information flow
are related to brokerage characteristics on different levels of analysis. The results
encapsulated in conjectures 1–5 provide us with viable empirical strategies for an-
swering research questions regarding possible impact of the network structure on
the tie content, if the latter is understood as the diversity of the types of informa-
tion/resources being transferred or shared along that tie.
Consider a research setting in which there are multiple types of resources or infor-
mation spreading in the network. Collected data could have a form of a set of dyadic
variables, one for each resource, combined into an array, say, R= rijk
	 

. Elements of R
could be binary, e.g.: rijk = 1 if resource k has been shared/passed from actor i to actor j
and rijk =0 otherwise. Alternatively rijk’s could be frequencies of how often actor j used
resource k provided by i in some period of time. Symptoms of brokerage could be
then analyzed on the three different levels we covered in the conjectures, namely:
– Node level: By Conjecture 1 we expect stronger dependence of information
type and alter for brokers than for non-brokers. It is then sensible to character-
ize every actor j with the strength of statistical association in the corresponding
layers ri jð Þk. The actual choice of the measure of association depends on the
measurement level of rijk’s.
– Tie level: By Conjecture 2 we expect the non-redundant ties to be characterized
with higher dissimilarity between distribution of incoming information types
and the distribution of information incoming from other alters. Consequently,
we may compare the dissimilarity of a bundle acquired by actor j from actor i
described by the vector r ijð Þk to aggregated bundles from all other neighbors of j.
– Triad level: By Conjectures 3, 4, and 5 we may compare resource bundles ac-
quired by actor j from actor i to a resource bundle acquired by actor j from some
other actor i′. If rijk’s are binary a reasonable choice for dissimilarity measure is
the Jaccard coeficient. The ego-alter-alter triads characterized with higher pair-
wise redundancy are then expected to be characterized with higher dissimilarity.
An approach of this kind was used by Bojanowski and Czerniawska-Szejda
(2018).
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A critical reader may notice that associations behind the formulated conjectures il-
lustrated in Figures 10.6 through 11 show quite some variation. It is to be expected
as our analyzes are based on personal networks of the actors. The choice was inten-
tional as egocentrically sampled data is popular empirical material in the social sci-
ences. The variation, at least in part, comes from higher-order structural properties
of the network. In particular, higher-order redundancies. A natural follow-up re-
search question could therefore be whether and how a concept similar to pair-
wise redundancy could be formulated when complete network data is available.
An intuition already formulated by Burt (1995) points to ideas of “redundancy by
equivalence”.
More immediate problems are related to strengthening the presented results.
Firstly, it should be possible to derive the conditional diffusion probabilities analyt-
ically. It seems promising to represent the information diffusion process formulated
as a Markov chain in Section 10.3 terms of diffusion trees. The results are elusive
though. Secondly, it is interesting whether the presented results will still hold under
different variants of the information diffusion model. Obvious alternatives are the mul-
tinomial and product-binomial models of Buskens and Yamaguchi (1999). It seems that
in the case of the multinomial model the differences should not be substantial. We
leave these questions for further research.
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Thomas Gautschi
11 Who Gets How Much in Which Relation?
A Flexible Theory of Profit Splits in Networks
and its Application to Complex Structures
Abstract: Starting from exogenously given negotiation networks, sociological ex-
change theories explain bilateral divisions of fixed surpluses (e.g., cake, dollar) as
consequences of the respective partners’ structural embeddedness. There are many
competing theories, most of which are, despite of their differences, exclusively con-
cerned with explaining outcomes in pure negatively connected networks with a one-
exchange rule. That is, the modelling efforts are directed towards scenarios in which
an actual exchange in one relation prevents transfers in other relations and, in addi-
tion, only one exchange per round is allowed. Such a narrow focus seems unnecessary
since experimental results for networks with more complex relational characteristics
are available: (i) networks with positively connected negotiation ties (Yamagishi,
Gillmore, and Cook 1988), (ii) networks with varying cake sizes to be partitioned
(Bonacich and Friedkin 1998), and (iii) networks where positions differ with respect to
the number of exchanges they need to complete (Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and
Willer 1993; Willer and Skvoretz 1999). In this paper we present a simple model which
is not limited to a particular class of exchange networks but allows for point predic-
tions in networks with (all combinations of) complex characteristics. Specifically, we
combine the generalized Nash bargaining solution from cooperative game theory with
the assumption that both relational features and network positions affect exchange
outcomes. Its predictions correspond closely with experimental results.
11.1 Introduction
Sociological exchange theories seek to explain the bilateral division of a fixed and
perfectly divisible surplus (e.g., cake, dollar). Such a positive surplus may, for in-
stance, materialize if the buyer’s willingness to pay exceeds the seller’s reservation
price. Exchange theories then assume that ac- tors agree on the partitioning of the
surplus in bilateral negotiations. And, exchange theorists agree with Emerson (1972,
1981) that negotiations and exchange rarely occur in isolate encounters. They thus
consider situations in which a given network structure defines matches between
pairs of bargaining partners (Cook et al. 1983) and attribute exchange outcomes in
dyads to the effects structure has on individual negotiation success. Exchange theory
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thus purposely neglects effects other than structure on exchange outcomes (e.g.,
effects of individual characteristics such as age, sex or education).
In accordance with this assumption, the basic premise of sociological exchange
theory is that actors seek to benefit from exchange by exploiting structural advan-
tages. That is, they use their network positions to maximize their individual shares of
the cakes to be negotiated on in dyadic bargaining. Theorists thus prefer a rational
actor perspective in the sense that interactive choices are characterized by purposive
and profit maximizing individual behavior. Consequently, dyadic exchange will pro-
duce outcomes in which one actor will not necessarily obtain as much exchange
profit as the other. And, exogenous restrictions may force actors to choose an ex-
change partner from a larger set of negotiation partners. In accordance with these
ideas, sociological exchange theory thus searches for answers on two fundamental
questions. First, who gets, depending on his position in the negotiation structure,
how much of the surplus? And second, who exchanges with whom if, after negotia-
tions with different partners, an exchange partner has to be chosen? Put differently,
can structural deviations between the bargaining and exchange networks be identi-
fied?1 Besides the consensus to study the effects of structure only on exchange
outcomes, sociological exchange theories have other common features. At least
partly, these features reflect that theory building was closely related with the re-
stricted exchange situations studied in laboratory experiments. Most experimental re-
search focuses on the study of exchange structures with negatively connected and
equally valued relations.2 The latter refers to exchange systems where relations con-
cern the split of an identical surplus. And, negatively connected systems are charac-
terized by the fact that exchange in one relation tends to prevent exchange in other
relations (e.g., dating networks). Accordingly, the close relationship between model
building and experimental work lead to the situation that the focus was put on devel-
oping theories for negatively connected exchange structures only.3 Even though most
1 While we do not address the latter question in this paper either, we show in Braun and Gautschi
(2007) how our model (or any other model which provides point predictions on the division of
cakes) can be used to decide whether given bargaining ties become exchange patterns if there is
competition between potential trading partners. However, there are publications which endogenize
the formation, stabilization, and modification of actor relations in networks (e.g., Aumann and
Myerson 1988; Bala and Goyal 2000; Demange and Wooders 2005; Dutta and Jackson 2003; Gould
2002; Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; Skyrms and Pemantle 2000; Slikker and van den Nouweland
2001; Vega-Redondo 2007; Watts 2001) and thus treat the network as the “explanatory variable”.
2 Exceptions are Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook’s (1988) experiments on a positively connected 5-
LINE and Bonacich and Friedkin’s (1998) experiments on simple exchange structures with variations
in the value of the cake to be partitioned. Networks with positively connected exchange ties are
normally associated with situations in which resource transfers in one relation tend to promote
transfers in other relations (e.g., communication networks).
3 Modifying and extending Coleman’s (1973, 1990) competitive equilibrium approach, Yamaguchi
(1996) is the only theory which can be applied to negatively and positively connected exchange
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established theories can be adjusted to account for variations in cake sizes to be di-
vided (e.g., Friedkin’s (1986, 1992) Expected Value theory, Skvoretz and Willer’s
(1993) Exchange Resistance theory, Yamagishi and Cook’s (1992) Equi-Dependence
theory, and partly, Markovsky, Willer, and Patton’s (1988) GPI measure), the focus of
most theories nevertheless appears considerably narrow and seems an unnecessary re-
striction. Especially since Cook et al. (1983), Cook and Emerson (1978), and Emerson
(1972) have established the distinction between negatively and positively connected
exchange relations quite some time ago.
On the one hand, as claimed above, modeling efforts are confined by its close
connection to the experimental focus on negatively connected exchange structures
and equally valued relations (i.e., homogeneity with respect to cake sizes). On the
other hand, however, basic characteristics of the experimental bargaining protocol
are still not reflected by established theories4 such that they are, at least, partly
based on divergent assumptions. In short, two points are most relevant. First, all
theories assume that negotiation partners pursue their self-interest, and such is
stimulated in laboratory experiments. However, the theories usually do not specify
an optimization problem. And, it is unclear where network features enter the choice
calculus and how they influence decision making. Second, interactive choices char-
acterize (experimental) negotiation processes. However, only a few theories explic-
itly refer to game-theoretic ideas but none uses a dyadic bargaining solution with a
solid foundation in non-cooperative bargaining theory. Not one theory thus reflects
the experimentally implemented bargaining protocol of alternating offers. This di-
vergence between experiments and theories seems questionable since experimental
results make up the measure rod against which the theories’ performance is tested.
structures. He equates negative (positive) connections with closely substitutable (complementary)
exchange relations and introduces a flexible continuous parameter for substitutability/complemen-
tarity (viz., the elasticity of substitution). Yamaguchi’s theory thus embraces situations in which
exchange in one relation tends to prevent or promote transfers in others. Its application requires,
however, an ad hoc specification of the elasticity of substitution. And, it is limited to the analysis of
either substitutable or complementary relations in a given network. Combining basic ideas of his
original model with additional assumptions, Yamaguchi (2000) presents a theoretical analysis of
structures characterized by the simultaneous presence of both substitutability and complementarity
among the multiple exchange relations of an actor.
4 There are a wide range of different theories but about as many controversies among them as well
(e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992, 1993, 1997; Bonacich 1998, 1999; Bonacich and Bienenstock
1995; Bonacich and Friedkin 1998; Burke 1997; Friedkin 1992, 1993, 1995; Lovaglia et al. 1995;
Markovsky et al. 1993, 1997; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988, 1990; Skvoretz and Fararo 1992;
Skvoretz and Lovaglia 1995; Skvoretz and Willer 1991, 1993; Thye, Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997;
Yamagishi and Cook 1990; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988; Yamaguchi 1996, 1997, 2000).
Special issues of journals (cf., Social Networks 14, No. 3–4, 1992 and, at least partly, Rationality and
Society 9, No. 1–2, 1997) contain additional articles and controversies. Willer and Emanuelson
(2008) test ten prominent theories on their empirical relevance.
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Current sociological exchange theories are limited in scope which restricts them
in being able to make predictions for exchange systems with more realistic features.
Especially given the empirical accuracy of established theories in predicting out-
comes in negatively connected structures, researchers should make the necessary fur-
ther step, adjusting and revising their theories (or developing new theories) to be
able to deal with more complex networks (viz., negatively connected, positively con-
nected and mixed network structures with potentially unequally valued relations and
no restrictions on node-specific parameters such as the number of exchanges a posi-
tion intends to complete). Results from experiments employing networks with more
complex relational and positional characteristics are publicly available. Yamagishi,
Gillmore, and Cook (1988), for instance, present results for a positively connected 5-
Line. Positive connections were ensured by (i) introducing distinct resources at oppo-
site ends of the line structure, (ii) dictating that resource x be traded for resource y in
one relation and y for x in the other relation, and (iii) by paying profit points only for
pairs of resources collected (complementary goods). Moreover, Yamagishi, Gillmore,
and Cook correctly emphasize that real networks often are mixtures of both, negatively
and positively connected relations. Consequently, they additionally provide experi-
mental results for a mixed network structure.5 Experimental evidence of yet another
kind is offered by Bonacich and Friedkin (1998). They discuss results from an experi-
ment on four network structures, each of which was characterized by unequally valued
relations. As their results show, profit distributions are considerably affected, com-
pared to a system of equally valued relations, by the heterogeneity in the surpluses to
be divided in bilateral negotiation. Finally, Skvoretz and Willer (1993) and Willer and
Skvoretz (1999) discuss experimental findings from networks with equally valued rela-
tions but where positions differed with respect to the number of exchanges they
needed to complete. These networks were thus characterized by a heterogeneity in the
number of exchanges positions conclude per round of negotiation and exchange. For
those structures where results from equivalent networks with a one-exchange rule are
available, it is found that dyadic profit splits indeed differ from the simple (homoge-
neous) scenario.
While there are theories which can, at least partly, deal with some of the more
complex network characteristics (e.g., Markovsky et al. 1993; Skvoretz and Willer
1993; Yamaguchi 1996, 2000), there is not a single model which could consistently
address all aspects of complex networks. Moreover, some theories which can partly
handle complex networks are adjusted versions of existing theories which have
been revised such that ad hoc assumptions now delineate their updated versions.
This indicates the need for a sufficiently general theory of exchange networks.
5 This relational assessment was ensured by ‘adding’ two new actors to one of the peripheral posi-
tions in the positively connected 5-LINE. This position can now obtain identical resources (say, x)
through either of his new contacts. Since they offer the same resource, they are thus negatively con-
nected to the former peripheral 5-LINE actor.
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First of all, such a model should be parsimonious and simple to apply. At the
same time, if researchers stress that negotiation partners pursue their self-interest
(i.e., the rationality postulate stimulated in laboratory experiments), a theory
should clarify how structural features affect the actors’ decision-making and how
their interactive choices determine the negotiation outcomes. Second, a model may
not be limited to the analysis of negatively connected settings but must embrace all
relational assessments of ties. Third, it should allow for unequally valued relations
(i.e., variations in terms of the surplus to be partitioned) and positional heterogene-
ity in the number of exchanges positions wish to complete per round. Finally, the
model should offer unique point predictions for negotiation outcomes which closely
fit the available experimental evidence. That is, it should be able to predict empiri-
cal evidence from simple as well as from more complex bargaining experiments.
We present and apply a model with these properties in the remainder of this
article. This model combines the generalized Nash (1950, 1953) bargaining solution
from cooperative game theory (cf., Binmore 1992) with a specific definition of each
actor’s bargaining power in terms of relational as well as positional features and
network embeddedness.6
11.2 Relational assessment
Even though the classification of negatively and positively connected network rela-
tions (Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983; Emerson 1972) is widely accepted in
the sociological exchange literature, there is no sound and formal definition for nega-
tive or positive ties. The lack of such a definition poses no problem in the case of
pure negatively or positively connected negotiation structures. However, Yamagishi,
Gillmore, and Cook (1988) correctly emphasize that real networks often are mixtures
of both types of relations (e.g., exchange in the Kula Ring as described by Malinowski
1922). The loose definition of negatively and positively connected ties – that is, ex-
change in one relation either prevents or promotes transfers in others – is unfortu-
nately not sufficient for a precise mathematical description of mixed negotiation
networks. Consequently, unique profit point predictions for mixed networks are not
necessarily guaranteed. From a methodological point of view it is, however, essential
6 Since we first presented this basic idea (Gautschi 2002), other authors also suggested exchange
theories based on the Nash bargaining solution (Bayati et al. 2015; Chakraborty and Kearns 2008;
Chakraborty et al. 2009; Kleinberg and Tardos 2008). The cooperative bargaining solution coincides
with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of Rubinstein’s game if the focus is on the lim-
iting scenario in which the amount of time between proposals vanishes (cf., Binmore 1985, 1998;
Muthoo 1999; Osborne and Rubinstein 1990). The generalized Nash bargaining solution thus is an
appropriate cooperative solution concept because it can be derived from a strategic analysis in the
sense of non-cooperative game theory.
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to have a definition of negative and positive connection which allows for an unequiv-
ocal characterization of network ties. Only this provides a basis for unique profit
point predictions in all types of networks.
In experiments, positive connections are ensured by demanding that two goods
flow through the network (Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988).7 Since actors can
derive utility from pairs of goods only – that is, goods which are always consumed
together in fixed proportions (perfect complements) –, they need to collect both
goods in equal quantities. Exchange for one good in one relation thus promotes
transfers in other relations providing the complementary good. Each actor will en-
gage in a series of dyadic bargaining sessions to obtain as much as he can from
each good. However, this procedure is not suited to define mixed networks in a
proper sense.
To eliminate this problem, we introduce a new and more precise classification
of network connections which, however, embraces pure negatively and pure posi-
tively connected network structures as special cases. It is thus ensured that profit
point predictions can be compared with empirical evidence stemming from labora-
tory experiments on negatively and/or positively connected networks. However, it
eliminates, on the one hand, the troublesome correspondence between negative
connections and the concern for the distribution of just one homogeneous good.
And, on the other hand, it abandons the correspondence between positive connec-
tions and the pairwise distribution of perfectly complementary goods. The new clas-
sification hinges on three fundamental network characteristics.8
Before we can define the new relational types, we thus need to introduce these
basic network parameters. In any given bargaining network, we can distinguish be-
tween peripheral and non-peripheral positions. Specifically, actor i is said to be at a
peripheral network position if he has just one bargaining partner (i.e., ni = 1).
Otherwise, actor i is said to be at a non-peripheral position if he has two or more
distinct bargaining partners (i.e., ni ≥ 2).
In addition, we introduce two node-specific parameters for the precise classifica-
tion of relations. Specifically, let mi be the number of actor i’s bargaining relations
(i.e., mi is the number of (non-directed or symmetric) arcs associated with node i) and
let gi be the number of exchanges actor i intends to complete (i.e., gi could denote the
7 Note, however, that positive connections do not necessarily involve distinct goods. Exchanges
between, say, a professional athlete and his agent as well as complementary relations between the
agent and organizers of athletic events may involve money only. Or, a broker can obtain informa-
tion in one relation which eventually makes it possible to give advice to another of his partners.
However, neither of these alternative considerations on positively connected ties solves our meth-
odological problem.
8 Willer and Skvoretz (1999) also present an alternative categorization of network connections
which, as they emphasize, differs from the positive/negative classification. Their distinction embra-
ces five types of connections. It draws on the ranking and values of several node-specific parame-
ters which are, however, at least partly, unique to their theoretical approach.
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number of goods i wants to buy or sell in a period), where mi ≥ gi ≥ 1.
9 For any actor i
in a given network, it thus will either holdmi > gi ≥ 1 ormi = gi ≥ 1. These cases refer to
the following situations:
– If mi > gi ≥ 1, i has more bargaining ties than he can conclude exchanges. Actor
i therefore has a set of competing bargaining ties with respect to the exchange
of one or more substitutable goods. He can thus select his exchange partner(s)
from his set of exchange relations.
– If mi = gi ≥ 1, i can conclude just as many exchanges as he has bargaining part-
ners. We say that i has non-competing bargaining relations. Consequently,
there are two possibilities: mi = gi = 1 or mi = gi > 1. When mi = gi = 1 is given, i
has just one bargaining relation with respect to an exchange of one specific
good he intends to complete. On the other hand, if mi = gi ≥ 2 is satisfied, i has
different non-competing bargaining relations with respect to the exchange of
two or more goods which are either complementary or independent (i.e., nei-
ther complementary nor substitutable).10
Taking into account that an actor may either be located at a peripheral position or
at a non-peripheral position, these above cases provide the basis for the new rela-
tional classification of an individual i who is matched with a bargaining partner j:
Rival Orientation: i has a rival orientation in the relation with j if
– i has a non-peripheral position (ni ≥ 2) and competing bargaining ties from
which he can select exchange relations (mi > gi ≥ 1), or,
– i is at a peripheral position (ni = 1) and his only partner j has competing bar-
gaining relations (mi = gi ≥ 1 and mj > gj ≥ 1).
Non-Rival Orientation: i has a non-rival orientation in the relation with j if
– i has a non-peripheral position (ni ≥ 2) and non-competing bargaining ties
(mi = gi ≥ 2), or,
– i is at a peripheral position (ni = 1) and his only partner j has non-competing
bargaining relations (mi = gi ≥ 1 and mj = gj ≥ 2).
Our postulate reflects that people decide about the type of their connections in reality –
we assume that every system actor who has two or more ties in the given negotiation
network classifies each of his relations as either a rival or a non-rival connection. This
9 Our postulate reflects that these parameters denote decisions and/or restrictions people take or
face in reality. However, in experimental work the parameters mi and gi are exogenously fixed by
the experimenter, together with the relations defining the bargaining structure.
10 Note that here lies a major difference between our classification and the negative/positive con-
nection classification. A positive connection is generally identified with perfectly complementary
goods. Our classification is flexible enough to embrace situations in which the analogous of a posi-
tively connected tie does not necessarily ask for complementary goods to be exchanged.
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typology further draws on the assumption that an actor with just a single bargaining
partner (i.e., an actor at a peripheral position) in a network with two or more relations
simply adjusts to the relational categorization of his only partner (in the special case of
the Dyad-structure, each actor has a peripheral position and, by postulate, a non-rival
orientation).11 To keep things as simple as possible, however, the actors’ assessments
of relations are exogenous components in our model.12
Combining the possible cases of rival and non-rival orientations for two adja-
cent actors i and j in any exogenously given bargaining network suggests a parsi-
monious classification of relations:
Pure Rival Connection: A pure rival relation between i and j exists if both ac-
tors have a rival orientation.13
Pure Non-Rival Connection: A pure non-rival relation between i and j exists if
both actors have a non-rival orientation.14
As a consequence of our assumptions, a peripheral actor never will be involved
in a mixed relation. When an actor i has two or more partners, however, he may
face a non-peripheral bargaining partner j with another relational orientation. If so,
a mixed relation between i and j will exist.15
Mixed Connections: A mixed relation between i and j exists if the actors differ
in terms of their relational orientation.
Mixed Rival Connection: A mixed rival relation is said to exist if i has a rival
orientation and j has a non-rival orientation.
Mixed Non-Rival Connection: A mixed non-rival relation is said to exist if i
has a non-rival orientation and j has a rival orientation.
11 Note that this assumption does not exclude that the individual classifications of network con-
nections simply reflect systemwide incentives. Our postulate therefore should not create problems
in experimental work as long as test persons (have learned to) systematically react to incentives.
Suppose, in accordance with the usual design of network exchange experiments (e.g., Skvoretz and
Willer 1991), that subjects’monetary compensation for participation explicitly depends on their bar-
gaining success. We expect that these incentives ensure, at least after several training rounds, rela-
tional assessments in the sense of the experimenters.
12 Following the usual practice in the field, we thus predict exchange profits and structures only.
This clearly simplifies the model – apart from the actors’ structural positions (e.g., just one poten-
tial exchange relation or several bargaining relations), the assessments of relations may reflect the
network type (e.g., dating or communication network), the number and type of goods to be divided,
and the existence of systemwide restrictions (e.g., laws, norms, rules).
13 If the bargaining network is characterized by mi ≥ gi = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . ., n, the structure of
pure rival connections corresponds to what is normally referred to as a pure negatively connected
network (with a one-exchange rule).
14 The only experimental work on a positively connected network structure is due to Yamagishi,
Gillmore, and Cook (1988). This bargaining network was characterized by mi = gi = 2 for all non-
peripheral actors, and thus constitutes a special case of a pure non-rival network.
15 Under special parameter constellations, these mixed relations correspond to negatively-positively
and positively-negatively connected bargaining structures, respectively.
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More precisely, there is a mixed rival connection if ni ≥ 2 and mi > gi ≥ 1 as well as
nj ≥ 2 andmj = gj ≥ 2, but a mixed non-rival connection if ni ≥ 2 and mi = gi ≥ 2 as well as
nj ≥ 2 and mj > gj ≥ 1. In all other cases, the relational orientations of two bargaining
partners coincide such that they face either a pure rival or a pure non-rival connection.
Consider the example of the basic T-Shape structure where position B is connected
to two peripheral actors, A1 and A2, as well as to position C. The latter is in addition
tied to the peripheral position D. Assume further that we seek to ensure mixed rela-
tions by inserting complementary goods at both ends. Assume that the peripheral A’s
are provided with good a and the peripheral position D with good d. According to
Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook (1988), the B–A ties is negatively connected – the A’s
are competitors in providing B with good a – while the B–C and C–D relations are posi-
tively connected. The theoretical definition of negative and positive ties, however, cre-
ates difficulties in appropriately defining such a mixed network. Our new classification
of network connections makes no assumption about whether ties classified on the dy-
adic level would promote or prevent transfers in other relations. We thus can uniquely
define mixed networks. In our example, B nB = 3, mB = 3, and gB = 2ð Þ as well as
the two As nA = 1,mA = 1, and gA = 1ð Þ have rival orientations, due to mB > gB ≥ 2 and
mA = gA ≥ 1. On the other hand, both C nC = 2,mC = 2, and gC = 2ð Þ and D nD = 1,ð
mD = 1, and gD = 1Þ have non-rival orientations since mC = gC ≥ 2 and mD = gD ≥ 1. This
results in a T–Shape with mixed connections, where the B:A relations are pure rival
connections and the C:D is a pure non-rival connection. The B:C relation is, from B’s
point of view, a mixed rival connection while C would see the connection as a mixed
non-rival one. Consequently, both B and C can engage in two exchanges per round
while the As as well as D can only exchange once. Since B has three ties but seeks to
exchange twice, he can choose between exchanging with A1 and A2, or with C and ei-
ther of the As. Actor C, in contrary, is – if two exchanges need to be concluded – forced
to exchange with C and B. Note, however, that the sequence of dyadic exchanges does
not matter for our new classification of relations. It therefore allows for a proper defini-
tion of a mixed network.
11.3 Theoretical model
Consider an exogenously given network with m mutual ties between a finite num-
ber of rational actors (i, j, k=1, 2, . . ., n).16 These symmetric relations limit the
16 As will become clear later, the conclusion of the model does not rest on the assumption of fully
rational and selfish egoists. As long as an actor’s utility is determined by his own share of the cake
and the actor purposively negotiates his share of the surplus, it suffices to assume boundedly ratio-
nal, but learning actors. The use of the rational actors’ framework, however, simplifies the presen-
tation of the model.
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matches of potential partners for negotiations and exchanges. Each bargaining ses-
sion refers, by postulate, to the bilateral distribution of a fixed quantity of a per-
fectly divisible resource (e.g., money). Exchange appears here, in accordance with
sociological approaches (e.g., Bonacich and Friedkin 1998; Willer 1999), as an
agreement of two rational actors on the division of a fixed surplus. Specifically, we
assume that the actors i and j bargain over the partition of a surplus of given value
vij = vji. When xij represents i’s negotiated share of the value vij, it holds that 0 ≤ xij ≤
vij.
17 Put differently, xij denotes i’s negotiated exchange profit in the relation with j.
The profit shares xij and xji are to be explained in terms of structure and posi-
tional features. For that purpose, it is postulated that, once i and j negotiate over
the partition of the value vij, they determine their profit shares as if they would
apply the generalized version of the Nash (1950, 1953) bargaining solution from co-
operative game theory (see, e.g., Binmore 1987, 1992). That is, they choose the profit
shares xij and xji as if they would solve the optimization problem
max xbiij x
bj
ji subject to xij + xji = vij, (11:1)
where the positive parameters bi and bj refer to i’s and j’s absolute level of individ-
ual bargaining power.18 As will become clear below, the solution of the optimiza-
tion problem implies that the split of the given surplus between i and j reflects the
combination of their bargaining powers (i.e., the distribution of “relative bargaining
power” determines the negotiated exchange profits). And, most important, the gen-
eralized Nash bargaining solution has a solid non-cooperative foundation in the
limiting equilibrium of Rubinstein’s (1982) Alternating Offers Game.19 Even though
our approach has desirable properties, it differs from other theories on exchange
17 If the actors perpetually disagree, they do not get a proportion of the surplus. That is, the payoff
associated with disagreement is 0 for both network partners.
18 Binmore (1992: 184–188) proves that the solution of the optimization problem specified in eq.
(11.1) is the only bargaining solution which satisfies the following three axioms: (A) the bargaining
outcome does not depend on how the negotiation partners’ utility scales are calibrated; (B) the bar-
gaining outcome is individually rational and Pareto- efficient; (C) the actors’ choice is independent
of the availability or unavailability of irrelevant alternatives (i.e., if the bargaining partners some-
times agree on a specific outcome when another outcome is feasible, then they will never agree on
the latter when the former is feasible).
19 The AOG is a non-cooperative game in which rational egoists alternate in making proposals on
how to divide a cake with one time periode elapsing between offers. If the focus is on a scenario in
which the amount of time between proposals vanishes, its equilibrium coincides with the general-
ized Nash bargaining solution (cf., Binmore 1985, 1998; Muthoo 1999; Osborne and Rubinstein
1990). This insight is especially important if one agrees with Nash (1950, 1951, 1953) and regards
non-cooperative games more fundamental than cooperative ones. It is noteworthy that (if theoreti-
cal predictions should be tested against experimental results) the subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the limiting Rubinstein game is robust against deviations from the strict logic of offers and
counteroffers as can happen in computerized experiments (Perry and Reny 1993).
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networks. While Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992, 1997) conceptualize a network of
potential exchange partners as a cooperative game with transferable utility, they
predict negotiation profits via other solutions concepts from cooperative game the-
ory (e.g., core, kernel). Other theorists (e.g., Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz and
Willer 1993) determine the bilateral bargaining outcome by defining and equating
“resistance” equations. Although they do not use game-theoretic concepts, resis-
tance theorists (e.g., Willer 1999) emphasize that their approach rests on the prem-
ise of strategically rational actors. Still others (e.g., Yamagishi and Cook 1992;
Friedkin 1993; Yamaguchi 1996) more or less explicitly refer to non-strategic profit-
maximizing behavior when they model exchange relations in networks.
While we think that the foundation in non-cooperative game theory should be
a relevant aspect of a theory of network exchange, there are yet other reasons for
employing the Nash model over existing theories of sociological exchange theory:
– Bienenstock and Bonacich’s (1992, 1997) cooperative solution of the core (or
the kernel) neglects the strategic process by which players form coalitions and
make demands. From the perspective of non-cooperative game theory, how-
ever, it seems necessary to ask for a description of precisely this strategic process.
Up to now, the core has no grounding in non-cooperative bargaining theory. From
an empirical point of view, on the other hand, it weighs heavy that the core mea-
sure does not allow for point predictions for all networks which have so far been
experimentally studied.20
– Yamaguchi (1996, 2000) models the bargaining and exchange game via the as-
sumption of a perfectly competitive market (i.e., an anonymous and centrally
located market with many relatively homogenous participants who offer and
buy sufficiently homogenous resources only at the systemwide equilibrium
price) in which all the price adjustments are costlessly made by a fictitious and
neutral Walrasian auctioneer. His approach is a general equilibrium model
(viz., each actor acts as if he would solve a constrained CES-utility maximiza-
tion problem). Hence, Yamaguchi does not allow for strategic rationality, but
focusses on dominant strategies only. And, it may be doubted whether this ap-
proach is appropriate for the small social settings usually being studied in net-
work exchange experiments.
– A group of prominent models (e.g., Willer and Skvoretz’s (1993) ER-model or
Lovaglia et al.’s (1995) GPI-RD model) is based on (extensions of) the resistance
logic. The resistance logic of these approaches, however, is just an ad hoc
transformation of Heckathorn’s (1980) original resistance equation with addi-
tional but questionable assumptions about the actors’ aspiration levels and
20 For example, its application gives only range predictions for a structure as elementary as the 4-
Line network. Moreover, the core measure predicts unstable exchange outcomes, that is, it has an
empty core, for, for instance, the simple Kite structure (see Figure 11.3 for both networks). It thus
contradicts experimental work (cf., Willer 1999) which demonstrates just the opposite.
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conflict points. Moreover, these theories do not offer a measure which captures
the effects of structural position on bargaining power.
– Heckathorn’s (1980) original resistance model, however, corresponds to the Kalai-
Smorodinsky (1975) bargaining solution (the above mentioned models are not suf-
ficiently characterized by the Kalai-Smorodinsky axioms). Nevertheless, the Nash
bargaining solution is to favor over the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for at least
two reasons. First, the latter does not possess a realistic non-cooperative founda-
tion. There is a non-cooperative game invented by Moulin (1984) which is often
cited as providing a non-cooperative foundation for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tion. This game, however, has nothing to do with either network exchange ex-
periments nor real life bargaining situations. Among other things, Moulin’s
game requires the presence of an impartial referee who costlessly organizes
consecutive lotteries about feasible proposals in which all the players volun-
tarily engage. Second, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is most relevant in a
situation in which the surplus to be divided between two players contracts or
expands in a way that possibly makes the set of allocations asymmetric. In
network exchange experiments, however, the cakes to be partitioned neither
shrink nor grow.
The concrete application of the generalized Nash bargaining solution, even though
favorite to competing approaches, requires a numerical specification of each actor’s
bargaining power. The latter is exogenous to the Nash bargaining model. Therefore,
it is precisely here where the basic idea of sociological theories for exchange net-
works comes in – we assume that, once a relation has been classified as either a
rival or a non-rival connection, each actor’s bargaining power results from his
structural position in the network under consideration. Therefore, our model essen-
tially combines the generalized version of the Nash bargaining solution with a spe-
cific definition of each actor’s bargaining power in terms of relational features and
structural embeddedness.
More precisely, we claim that actors, depending on their structural positions in
the exogenous bargaining network and the values of their relations (i.e., the sizes of
the cakes to be partitioned), differ in terms of their “network control” (i.e., the
extent to which an actor controls the relations to him by his relations to others).
And, depending on the actor’s assessment of the relation he has with a potential
exchange partner (i.e., rival or non-rival), his network control either positively or
negatively affects his individual bargaining power. Once individual bargaining
powers have been determined, the generalized Nash bargaining solution enshrines
the distributions of relative bargaining power and exchange profit in the relations
under consideration.
After having introduced the new classification of relations and the generalized
Nash bargaining solution, it is left to show how a given negotiation structure deter-
mines network control and how it is then related to bargaining power.
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11.4 Network structure and bargaining power
Consider an exogenously given bargaining network with a fixed number of struc-
tural positions and given values of their respective ties (i.e., the size of the cakes to
be partitioned). Such a network may reflect a snapshot of a negotiation situation in
real world where cake sizes represent surpluses to be negotiated. A positive surplus
may materialize if the buyer’s willingness to pay exceeds the seller’s reservation
price. Or, it simply represents a bargaining structure implemented by the experi-
menter in a laboratory experiment where each tie refers to a fixed amount of points
available for negotiation. Starting from such a network, we postulate that actors,
depending on their structural position and the size of the cakes they can negotiate
on, differ in terms of their network control. And, depending on an actor’s relational
assessment of ties to adjacent partners (i.e., rival or non-rival) and the number of
exchanges he intends to complete, his network control positively or negatively af-
fects his individual bargaining power. We now successively present these assump-
tions and their implications in detail.
11.4.1 Negotiation structure and network control
11.4.1.1 Unequally valued relations
Let the n×n matrix V with main diagonal elements vii = 0 for all i and off-diagonal
elements vij ≥ 0 for all i ≠ j represent the exogenously given network of m valued
bargaining relations between the n actors. While the relation between the bargain-
ing partners i and j is always symmetric, an actor’s relations with distinct partners
may differ with respect to the values at stake – the corresponding off-diagonal ele-
ments vij = vji express whether i and j are bargaining partners and, if so, how large
the cake is they can divide. Formally, it holds vij = vji > 0 in the presence of a bar-
gaining relation between i ≠ j, but vij = vji = 0 in its absence.
21
Even if matrices of valued adjacencies differ, they may represent the same rela-
tional structure. A standardization is thus reasonable. Let R be the n × n matrix of
standardized actor relations such that rij: =
vijPn
k = 1 vkj
≥0 for all i,j, and
Pn
k = 1 rkj = 1
for all j. That is, R is the column-stochastic matrix derived from the valued graph.
Its off-diagonal element rij measures i’s fraction of the systemwide valued relations
to j. In other words, rij represents i’s degree of “control” over the valued relations to
21 In the basic scenario, each pair of connected actors bargains over the partition of just one cake
with a specific size. In a slightly more complicated case, there may be more than just one recipro-
cated tie between each pair of connected actors in the network (e.g., each dyad can divide two pies
per round of negotiated exchanges). If so, the sum of the relevant surpluses determines the off-
diagonal elements of matrix V.
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j in the system. Put differently, rij informs on i’s control over the total of j’s resources
available for negotiation. For example, rij = 0.333 means that i “controls” one third
of j’s resources to be negotiated on. As will become clear below, in a negotiation
structure with homogeneous cake sizes, the interpretation of rij is even more
straightforward. It is the reciprocal of the number of j’s negotiation partners. For
instance, rij = 0.333 means that j has three negotiation partners of which i is one.
Regardless of the cake sizes, it holds 0 ≤ rij ≤ 1, where rij = 0 indicates that i has no
control over j (i.e., absence of a tie between i and j) and rij = 1 reflects that i has com-
plete control over j (i.e., i is j’s only bargaining partner).
However, rij reveals only part of the available information on the tie between i
and j. While the i-th row of the matrix R informs about i’s control over each other
actor in the system, the i-th column of R informs about the other’s control over i.
That is, rji denotes j’s control over the valued relations to i. Adding up the relevant
pairwise elements of R defines the network control of actor i:
cij: =
Xn
k = 1
rikrki for all i. (11:2)
Put verbally, ci is the degree to which i controls the valued relations to him by his val-
ued relations to others. For example, ci = ¾ means that actor i controls, via his valued
relations to others, ¾-th of their valued relations to him. The control fraction ci thus
may be interpreted as i’s ‘structural autonomy’ as well.22 And, given information about
i’s valued relations and those of his partners, its calculation is straightforward. As a
consequence, we do not have to assume that every actor has complete information
about the overall shape of the network structure. For the determination of the control
distribution in the system, it suffices to postulate that everyone has complete infor-
mation about his own valued relations and those of his network partners. In this re-
gard, we need not assume fully rational but boundedly rational actors only.
11.4.1.2 Equally valued relations
The weak informational requirements reflect the parsimony of our operationaliza-
tion of network control. However, there is only one experimental study which sys-
tematically varies the size of the cakes to be partitioned in bilateral negotiations
(Bonacich and Friedkin 1998; see section 11.5.3). All other laboratory experiments
22 The definition of network control (cf. eq. (11.2)) shows that the ci’s are the positive main diago-
nal elements of the n×n matrix C ≔ RR. That is, ci = cii > 0 for all i. Like R, C is a column-stochastic
matrix. That is, 0 < ci ≤ 1 and 1− ci =
P
k ≠ i cki ≥0 for all i. Since the upper bound of ci is 1, its com-
plement 1 – ci measures i’s ‘structural dependence’ (i.e., the degree to which the other system mem-
bers affect, via their valued relations to one another, the valued relations to actor i).
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focus on networks with equally valued relations. That is, each bilateral bargaining
session concerns the division of an identical surplus vij = vji = v for all i ≠ j. Given
the current lack of evidence on exchange systems with heterogenous cake sizes, it
seems useful to demonstrate the simple calculation of ci for networks with equally
valued relations (viz., applications in section 11.5.1 and 11.5.2).
Let vij = vji = v for all i ≠ j. The n × n matrix V thus reduces to the n × n adjacency
matrix A with main diagonal elements aii = 0 for all i and off-diagonal elements
aij 2 0, 1f g for all i ≠ j representing the exogenously given and symmetric bargain-
ing relations. More precisely, aij is a binary measure for the absence or presence of
a mutual tie between the actors i and j (i.e., aij = aji is coded as 0 or 1 for all i ≠ j).
Let again R be the n×n matrix of standardized actor relations such that
rij: = aij=
Pn
k = 1 akj ≥0 for all i, j, and
Pn
k = 1 rkj = 1 for all j. In the case of equally valued
relations, R is the column-stochastic matrix derived from the adjacencies bearing
the properties as described above.
The calculation of ci is then straightforward. A closer look at eq. (11.2) shows
that ci may be alternatively expressed as the mean of the i-th row in the matrix R. In
other words, i’s network control is the mean of i’s control over the systemwide rela-
tions to his partners. Formally,
ci =
1
ni
Xn
k = 1
rik =
1
ni
Xn
k = 1
aik
mk
for all i. (11:3)
where ni denotes the number of i’s negotiation partners and mi the number of i’s
ties in the network structure under consideration.23 Since the number of positive
elements in the i-th row in R is always ni, the relevant control distribution can be
practically read off from the standardized actor relations.
The number of i’s bargaining partners, ni, coincides with the number of positive
elements in the i-th row of the adjacency matrix A, too. As indicated by the far
right-hand side of eq. (11.3), information about i’s network relations and the number
of his partners’ ties therefore suffices for the computation of i’s network control as
well. Put differently, the distribution of network control can be determined when
each actor knows his connections and the connections of his partners.
The concept of network control thus requires only weak assumptions about the
structural information of network members. This becomes more obvious if ci is
23 In the basic scenario of an adjacency matrix, the number of each actor’s negotiation partners ni
is equal to the number of his ties mi (i.e., ni = mi for all i). If, however, more than just one cake per
round is to be divided by each pair of connected network members, every actor has more ties than
partners (i.e., mi > ni for all i). For instance, if i has ni = 3 bargaining partners where two cakes per
tie can be divided, we have that mi = 6. If more than one cake per round can be divided between i
and j, we assume per definition that i and j are connected by the respective number of ties. In such
a case, we can alternatively write rij := aij=
Pn
k = 1
akj = aij=mj ≥0 for all i,j.
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expressed in still another way. When Si denotes the set of the ni bargaining partners
of actor i, it is possible to rewrite eq. (11.3) as follows:
ci =
1
ni
X
k2Si
1
nk
= 1ðni=
P
k2Sið1=nkÞÞ
for all i. (11:4)
Stated differently, i’s network control ci reflects how many negotiation partners
actor i and his partners have. Hence, information about the number of i’s bargain-
ing partners and the numbers of their partners allows the calculation of i’s network
control.24
A closer inspection of the far right-hand side of eq. (11.4) shows, moreover, that
the concept of network control is compatible with a rational actor perspective – ci is
simply the reciprocal of the estimate a rational actor i will have for the mean num-
ber of partners of his partners in a given network.25 It thus holds that, for example,
ci = 34 expresses that the average number of bargaining partners of i’s partners is
4
3 = 1.333. Clearly, i’s network control ci decreases if the mean number of partners of
i’s partners increases. And, ci rises if the mean number of bargaining partners of i’s
partners falls. In the limit case, the mean number of bargaining partners of i’s part-
ners equals 1 (i.e., actor i is their only negotiation partner) such that i has full net-
work control ci = 1. So, when the assumption is made that i’s behavior reflects his
network control or structural autonomy, it is postulated, in effect, that he takes ac-
count of the mean number of partners of his partners.
Whether or not we focus on bargaining structures with equally valued relations,
the weak informational requirements reflect that i’s network control captures the
structure only two steps from i (but neglects structural effects which are three or
more steps away). The degrees of network control thus may be seen as parsimoni-
ous indicators for the actors’ structural positions. They are, by postulate, essential
determinants of the individual bargaining powers. That is, actor i’s network control
ci affects bi, i’s level of individual bargaining power. The direction of the relation-
ship between network control ci and bargaining power bi depends, however, on i’s
categorization of the respective network relation.
Referring to the typology of relational orientations introduced in section 11.2,
we now can specify how network control affects individual bargaining power for
24 For the determination of the distribution of network control, we thus do not have to assume
that every actor has complete information about the overall shape of the network structure. It suffi-
ces to postulate that either everyone has complete information about his own relations and his part-
ners’ ties or that everyone knows the number of his bargaining partners and the number of the
partners’ partners.
25 Feld (1991) explains why friends always seem to have more friends than oneself. For the sce-
nario in which this ‘class size paradox’ is fully understood, he derives the appropriate estimate for
the mean number of friends of an individual’s friends. The latter corresponds with the denominator
of the far right-hand side of eq. (11.4).
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given specific relational orientations. For that purpose, imagine first a system with
non-rival relations. Such a network has two essential features: depending on the
values involved, i’s bargaining relations are more or less substitutable and compete
with the relations of i’s partners to others (“friends of friends are enemies”).26 Both
features suggest that i’s absolute bargaining power rises with his network control –
by definition, more control means that i depends less on his current negotiation
partners for exchange and that i’s bargaining partners tend to have fewer and/or
less valued relations. For the case of rival relations, it thus can be assumed that i’s
bargaining power bi rises with i’s network control ci.
It is reasonable to postulate just the contrary for the opposite scenario of non-
rival relations. The features of non-rival relations thus suggest that i’s bargaining
power increases if i’s network control decreases. If an actor’s structural autonomy
is lower, the others more affect, via their valued links to one another, the valued
relations to him. Put differently, if his network control is smaller, an individual has,
by definition, a higher structural dependence. Especially in the (experimentally rel-
evant) case where different goods flow through the network, this creates additional
opportunities in a non-rival setting. Due to the others’ transactions, a less autono-
mous actor may serve as a broker – that is, an actor who either crucially controls
the flow of a resource through the system or who controls a specific resource in the
system (e.g., a subject who receives one resource for input into the system).27 In
such a setting, relations with different partners are complementary for the resource
flow through the system, and concluded exchanges promote transfers with others.
The exchange partners of an individual’s partners thus appear as intermediaries
(“friends of friends are friends”). For the case of non-rival relations, it thus can be
assumed that i’s bargaining power bi rises if i’s network control ci falls.
11.4.2 Relational assessments and bargaining power
Drawing on the typology of relational orientations introduced in section 11.2 and
taking into account that actors may differ in terms of the number of exchanges they
26 In extremum, this refers to a situation in which bargaining sessions with different partners con-
cern the distribution of just one homogeneous good (what is elsewhere termed a negatively con-
nected network). As a matter of fact, if there are at least two distinct resources, negative
connections are also possible – negotiation partners then have to be willing to substitute one good
for the other on a one-to-one basis (perfect substitutes).
27 Non-rival relations may be characterized by the property that exchanges with distinct partners
increase individual benefits. Such a situation exists, for example, if the focus is on pairwise distri-
butions of different goods which are always consumed together in fixed proportions (perfect com-
plements) – since every actor only cares about the combination of those goods, he will successively
engage in a series of dyadic bargaining sessions to obtain as much as he can from each good. Note,
however, that non-rival relations do not necessarily involve distinct goods.
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wish to complete, we now show how an actor’s bargaining power comes about. To
capture the effect of potential variations in the number of desired exchanges across
the network, we model two plausible hypotheses: actor i’s bargaining power bi in-
creases (decreases) if, ceteris paribus, i has a rival (non-rival) orientation and wants
to complete fewer (more) exchange relations. Put differently, the number of ex-
changes a position needs to conclude can weaken a rather beneficial network posi-
tion but can also improve the bargaining power of a rather weak structural position.
In detail, we start from the postulate that the number of desired exchanges (gi)
matters at certain positions more than at others. More precisely, we introduce a
case distinction in the following definition of a node-specific weight zi:
zi: =
gi if ni = 1, or, gi = 1, or,mi =m, or, gk = g for all k;
or,mj =mi, gj = gi, cj = ci for at least one j 2 Si,
fi gið Þ otherwise
8><
>: (11:5)
where the function fi gið Þ denotes a Box-Cox (1964) transformation of gi:
fi gið Þ= g
di
i − 1
di
with di = 1− 2
m−mi
n n− 1ð Þ . (11:6)
Put verbally, the node-specific weight zi > 0 either equals gi or results from a flexible
Box-Cox transformation of gi in which, by postulate, the exponent and denominator
di falls as 2 (m − mi)/n(n − 1) rises. Notice that zi always increases in gi, the number
of exchanges actor i wants to complete.28 Since 2(m − mi)/n(n − 1) measures the dif-
ference between the network density and i’s density contribution (i.e., the density
of the bargaining network without i’s relations), the Box-Cox scenario assumes that
the effect of gi on the node-specific weight zi also depends on the number of i’s bar-
gaining relations (mi), the number of system actors (n), and the number of network
relations (m). The combination of these additional parameters reduces the positive
effect gi has on the node-specific weight zi.
29
Basically, we postulate that actor i’s bargaining power bi increases with his net-
work control ci when he sees a potential exchange relation as rival. If he classifies a
relation as a non-rival one, however, his bargaining power bi decreases with his net-
work control ci. To formalize these ideas, we follow Binmore (1985: 273) who defines
individual bargaining power as the negative reciprocal of a logarithmic expression.
28 In the Box-Cox scenario, it holds m > mi > 0 by definition. This ensures 0 < di < 1. Therefore, fi is
concave in gi (i.e., d fi/dgi > 0 and d
2 fi/dg
2
i < 0).
29 Since 0 < di < 1 holds in the Box-Cox scenario, fi is always smaller than the exogenously given
parameter gi.
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Taking into account the node-specific weight zi (and its hypothesized effect on bi), it
is assumed that
bi: =
− 1= ziln wcið Þð Þ, if ihas a rival orientation
− zi=ln 1−wcið Þ, if ihas a non− rival orientation
− zi=ln wcið Þ, if ihas amixed rival orientation
− 1= ziln 1−wcið Þð Þ, if ihas amixednon− rival orientation
8>><
>>:
. (11:7)
where we use the shorthand
w := m+ n
1+m+ n (11:8)
The latter is a network-specific fraction which rises with the number of mutual ties
in the network, m, and the number of network members, n. In eq. (11.7), the weight
w scales the degrees of network control or structural autonomy such that bi is al-
ways a positive number.30
Equation (11.5) reflects the general character of our approach. All possible network
parameters are taken into account in defining an actor’s bargaining power. Of course,
the additional parameters play no role when the Box-Cox transformation does not
apply. By postulate, it holds zi = gi if at least one of the following conditions is met:
– actor i has a peripheral network position (i.e., ni = 1);
– actor i wants to complete just one exchange (i.e., gi = 1);
– actor i is involved in all relations in a network (i.e., mi = m), which, in effect,
means that i has the central position in a branch structure (i.e., hub-and-spoke
network) of arbitrary size;
– actor i belongs to a bargaining network in which each member wants to com-
plete the same number of exchanges (i.e., gk = g for all k);
– actor i faces at least one bargaining partner with the same network control, the
same number of bargaining relations, and the same number of desired ex-
changes (i.e., cj = ci, mj = mi, and gj = gi for at least one j 2 Si).
30 An arbitrary choice of w should not be considered since exchange results are of course not ro-
bust against choices of the value of w. Starting from this insight, there are three reasons for eq.
(11.8), the specific definition of w. First, admissible transformations of network control are those
which just change the unit of scale. The weight w clearly fulfills this requirement. Second, any bar-
gaining network may be characterized by the number of mutual ties, m, and the number of system
actors, n. It thus is reasonable to define the scaling factor w in terms of these system parameters.
Third, weighting should preserve the essential role of network control in our approach. The weight
w is a systemwide constant which, at most, moderately changes the original values of network con-
trol – because of m ≥ 1 and n ≥ 2, it holds that 0.75 ≤ w < 1.
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These conditions for zi = gi reflect that the application of the Box-Cox transforma-
tion does not always make sense.31 Their inspection shows that zi = gi is assumed in
either limit cases or situations with some form of symmetry. The limit cases include
the scenarios in which i intends to complete just one exchange (gi = 1) or resides at
an extreme network position (ni = 1 or mi = m). The symmetric situations embrace
the (experimentally relevant) scenario in which the number of exchanges to be
completed does not vary across the network (i.e., gk = g for all k) as well as the case
in which i has at least one fully equivalent bargaining partner (gi = g j and mi = mj
and c j = ci for at least one j 2 Si). For all other situations, however, we assume that
zi = fi(gi) such that the weight zi increases with the number of desired exchanges gi,
but always falls short of it.
Starting from the distribution of network control (cf., eq. (11.2)), each actor’s
bargaining power results from combining eqs. (11.5–11.8) for either relational classi-
fication he may have. We then can derive the negotiation outcomes associated with
the different types of relations.32
11.4.3 Relational assessments and negotiation outcomes
If i and j negotiate over the partition of the given cake of size vij = vji, we assume
that they determine their profit shares as if they would solve the optimization prob-
lem expressed in eq. (11.1). The maximization of the equivalent welfare function
xbiij vij − xij
 bj implies that i can obtain the exchange profit
xij =
bi
bi + bj
 
vij = pijvij for i≠ j (11:9)
31 For example, if gi = 1, the Box-Cox transformation would not assign a positive value to zi. Or, if
the number of exchanges to be completed does not vary across the network (i.e., gk = g for all k),
the Box-Cox transformation would not necessarily ensure a common weight zi = z.
32 Empirical evidence on exchange networks, by and large, results from experiments in which a sys-
temwide one-exchange rule holds. Subjects can thus conclude only one exchange per round (i.e.,
zi = gi = g = 1 for all i). In such an extreme scenario, eq. (11.7) can be simplified. Substituting zi = 1 for
all cases defining bi in eq. (11.7) facilitates the computation of an actor’s bargaining power, such that
bi :=
− 1=ln wcið Þ, if i has a rival orientation.
− 1=lnð1−wciÞ, if i has a non− rival or mixed non− rival orientation.
(
Since such negotiation networks show no variation in the allowed number of exchanges, it does
not surprise that only network control matters. Consequently, the definition of bargaining power
for actors in pure rival (pure non-rival) and mixed rival (mixed non-rival) relations coincides.
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where pij := bi/(bi + bj) defines i’s relative bargaining power in the relation with j.
And, since pji = 1 − pij holds by definition, i’s partner j will receive xji = (1 − pij) vij =
pjivji. Accordingly, the optimal partition of the given surplus depends critically on the
combination of bi and bj. Put differently, the bargaining power of just one partner is
irrelevant for the negotiation outcome – it is the relative bargaining power (i.e., pij or
pji = 1 − pij) which matters for the profit split.
33 Notice, however, that pij does not coin-
cide with xij when vij ≠ 1. Since xij = pij vij and x ji = (1 − pij)vij, a comparison of actor i’s
profit share with that of his bargaining partner j yields the following chain of equiva-
lent conclusions:
xij
>
< xji , xij
>
<
1
2
vij , pij ><
1
2
, bi >< bj for i≠ j (11:10)
Put verbally, a symmetric distribution of bargaining powers (bi = bj or pij = 1/2 = pji)
always yields an equal split of the pie (xij = vij/2 = xji). There will be an unequal
profit division, however, when the power of the two negotiation partners differs.
Specifically, i’s exchange profit xij dominates j’s exchange profit xji such that i gets
more than half of the pie if and only if pij exceeds pji. Because of pij + pji = 1, the
latter is satisfied if and only if i’s relative bargaining power in the relation with j
exceeds 1/2. And, this is equivalent to the condition that i’s absolute bargaining
power bi exceeds j’s absolute bargaining power bj.
The actors’ bargaining powers depend, by postulate, on their structural em-
beddedness and relational classification. As a consequence, the model implications
for the distributions of relative bargaining power and surplus in any given match
reflects these determinants. Substituting eq. (11.7) into eq. (11.9), we can distinguish
four relational types each of which allows specific conclusions about the effects
structure has on relative bargaining powers and negotiated exchange profits.
Pure Rival Connection: If the relation between actors i and j is, from their per-
spective, a pure rival one, then actor i’s profit in match with j is
xij = pijvij
zj ln wcj
 
zi ln wcið Þ+ zj ln wcj
 
 !
vij for i≠ j. (11:11)
Hence, i’s relative bargaining power and exchange profit in a pure rival connected
relation with j rise, everything else being constant, when either i’s network control
ci increases or j’s network control cj decreases. Equivalently, i’s relative bargaining
33 As put forward in fn. 24, an actor need not possess complete information about the network as a
whole. To calculate ci it is sufficient that he knows his immediate vicinity, that is, the network
structure two steps away from him. However, i’s relative bargaining power in match with j, pij, is
affected by ci as well as cj. This slightly extends the borders of i’s immediate vicinity – to compute
his profit share in match with j, i actually requires the knowledge of the network structure three
steps away from him.
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power and exchange profit increase, everything else again being constant,34 when
either i’s number of desired exchanges gi decreases or j’s number of desired ex-
changes gj increases.
35
Mixed Rival Connection: If i classifies the relation to j as mixed rival and j cat-
egorizes the relation as mixed non-rival, then actor i’s profit in the match with j is
xij = pijvij =
zizjln 1−wcj
 
ln wcið Þ+ zizjln 1−wcj
 
 !
vij for i≠ j. (11:12)
For such a mixed rival relational orientation, actor i’s relative bargaining power
and negotiated profit increase if, everything else being constant, either ci or cj rises.
Note that conclusions about a reaction of pij with respect to a change in gi or gj are
only meaningful if the classification of relations always remains unchanged.
However, this is not necessarily guaranteed in case of mixed rival, mixed non-rival,
and pure non-rival connections.
Mixed Non-Rival Connection: If i classifies the relation to j as mixed non-rival
and j categorizes their relation as mixed rival, then actor i’s profit in the match with
j is
xij = pijvij =
ln wcj
 
zizj ln 1−wcið Þ+ ln wcj
 
 !
vij for i≠ j. (11:13)
In this mixed non-rival relation i’s relative bargaining power and profit share in-
crease, everything else being constant, when either ci or cj falls.
Pure Non-Rival Connection: If the relation between actors i and j is, from
their perspective, a pure non-rival one, then actor i’s profit in the match with j re-
sults from
xij = pijvij =
ziln 1−wcj
 
zj ln 1−wcið Þ+ ziln 1−wcj
 
 !
vij for i≠ j. (11:14)
Consequently, if their relation is a pure non-rival one, actor i’s relative bargaining
power and negotiated profit increase, everything else being constant, if either i’s
network control ci falls or j’s network control cj rises.
Since w:= (m+n)/(1+m+n) and ci:=
P
k rikrki hold by definition while rij measures
i’s fraction of the systemwide valued relations to j, and gi denotes i’s desired
34 These conclusions reflect that ∂pij/∂ci > 0, ∂pij/∂cj < 0 and ∂xij/∂ci > 0 as well as ∂xij/∂cj < 0. The
signs of these partial derivatives inform about the reaction of i’s relative bargaining power pij and
i’s profit share xij in the match with j when exogenous structural changes affect either i’s network
control ci or j’s network control cj, but preserve the valued relation between i and j.
35 These conclusions reflect that dpij/dgi < 0, dpij/dgj > 0 and dxij/dgi < 0 as well as dxij/dgj > 0.
Note, however, that they are only meaningful as long as mi – gi ≥ 2 as well as mj – gj ≥ 2 since other-
wise the classification of relations changes if gi or gj change.
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number of exchanges, we thus may uniquely predict the distributions of relative
bargaining power and negotiated profit for any given combination of relational ori-
entations in each exogenously given bargaining network with m valued ties be-
tween n actors. A comparison of the four model conclusions shows, moreover, that
the negotiated profits associated with the distinct relational types just differ in
terms of pij, i’s relative bargaining power in the match with j. And, the calculation
of relative bargaining powers and negotiated profits requires, in principle, just a
pocket calculator.36
Analyses of concrete network structures illustrate, as will become clear below,
the straightforward application of our approach. To compare such theoretical pre-
dictions with empirical observations, we first need to describe and select relevant
experimental studies.
11.5 Applications
There are a bulk of experimental results with regard to profit distributions in simple
exchange networks (e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich 1993; Lovaglia et al. 1995; Skvoretz
and Fararo 1992; Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Yamagishi, Gillmore, and Cook 1988).
However, all these experiments were subject to a relatively homogeneous experi-
mental protocol. Subjects at distinct structural positions did not differ with re-
spect to the number of exchanges they could complete per period. And, there was
no variation in the value of the relationships across the network (i.e., equal cake
sizes to be divided in all relations). While there are various theoretical approaches
(Bienenstock and Bonacich 1992; Burke’s 1997; Friedkin’s 1986, 1992; Lovaglia
et al. 1995; Skvoretz and Willer’s 1993; Yamagishi and Cook’s 1992; Yamaguchi’s 1996)
which make acceptable predictions for a range of such simple networks (e.g., 4-Line,
Stem, Kite, or 3-Branch), there is no general theory of exchange networks which is par-
simonious and could coherently be apply to complex network structures. While the
36 Note that dyadically negotiated profits need not always be realized since pure rival networks
may reflect exogenous restrictions (e.g., one-exchange rule). This may have further consequences
for the network structure as a whole. In such settings (and in mixed exchange networks as well), at
least one system member may select his actual exchange partners from a larger set of potential ex-
change partners. Depending on the negotiation outcomes, he may never complete transfers with
one or more of his negotiation partners (consistent or permanent exclusion). Braun and Gautschi
(2007) provide an analysis of such “network breaks” and give necessary and sufficient conditions
for coincidences or deviations between bargaining and exchange structures. Their conclusions on
“network breaks” (e.g., in the T-SHAPE, the H-SHAPE, or the X4-LINE structure) are strongly sup-
ported by empirical evidence (viz., Markovsky, Willer, and Patton (1988); Simpson and Willer
(1999)). Braun and Gautschi (2007) further provide testable conclusions on a wide range of network
structures not yet tested in laboratory experiments.
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Network Control Bargaining (NCB) approach presented in this paper can easily be ap-
plied to such simple networks, this paper demonstrates the generality of our model by
submitting its theoretical predictions to three different sets of experiments on complex
networks.
Due to theoretical considerations and/or experimental evidence on complex
networks, some older models have been successively adjusted or revised to now be
able to at least address some aspects of complex networks. We compare NCB predic-
tions for dyadic exchange outcomes in complex networks with such alternative ap-
proaches. Since none of the alternative approaches makes predictions for both
complex characteristics – a variation in the number of exchanges positions can
complete per period, and, variations in the value of the relationships across the net-
work –, we refer to different theories for comparison with NCB predictions on these
two characteristics.
With regard to results on networks where certain positions were allowed to
complete more than one exchange per round, we compare our results to ‘updated’
versions of Skvoretz and Willer’s (1993) GPI-measure. Those are Markovsky et al.’s
(1993) GPI-R with an adapted version of the exchange resistance equation, Willer
and Skvoretz’ (1999) GPI-I-Resistance measure37 and Lovaglia et al.’s (1995) GPI-RD
measure, however, with a revised interpretation of the degree index.38 Empirical
validation is done using results from Skvoretz and Willer (1993) as well as from
Willer and Skvoretz (1999).
For networks with heterogeneous cake size, we use results from Bonacich and
Friedkin (1998).39 NCB predictions are compared to Bienenstock and Bonacich’s
37 The updated version of the GPI-R measure re-defines (and introduces a case distinction for) the
resistance equation. The precise specification of the resistance equation depends on Willer and
Skvoretz’ (1999) categorization of network connections which draws on the ranking and values of
several node-specific parameters. As a consequence, the resulting GPI-R measure is unique to their
theoretical approach on network connections (i.e., inclusive, exclusive, null, inclusive-exclusive,
and inclusive-null connections; cf., Willer and Skvoretz 1999: 197–199). Moreover, to account for
inclusive-exclusive and inclusive-null connections, an additional adjustment in the calculation of
the original Graph-theoretic power index (GPI, Markovsky, Willer, and Patton 1988) is necessary.
This results in the new GPI-I-Resistance measure.
38 Calculation of the degree index in the original approach is based on the number of ties negotiat-
ing partners possess (i.e., their respective number of alternative negotiation partners). However, if
a position is allowed (more than) two exchanges per period, the number of negotiation partners is
not necessarily unique anymore. A position’s effective number of ties need then be calculated as a
weighted average of the number of exchange possibilities a position has for each of its allowed ex-
changes. Consequently, its effective number of ties depends on the sequence of exchanges the posi-
tion engages in (for an example, see Lovaglia et al. 1995: 142–143).
39 Unfortunately, Bonacich and Friedkin (1998) do not report these results as profit splits between
positions, as is normally the case in the literature. Instead, exchange results are graphically de-
picted. Since the data are not publicly available, we try to read profit splits off these graphics as
good as possible.
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(1992, 1997) core measure. This cooperative solution from game theory can be applied
rather straightforward to complex networks with differences in the value of the ties if
one assumes that the payoff v(S) denotes the maximum value of all cakes the set of
actors S in the core can divide. However, there are networks with an empty core. In
general, Bonacich and Friedkin suggest to make predictions based on an extension of
the Power-Dependence theory (Yamagishi and Cook 1992) which is, under certain
assumptions introduced by Bonacich and Friedkin (1998: 162–164), identical to
the kernel. Since Friedkin’s (1993, 1995) Expected-Value theory can also deal with
heterogeneous cake sizes, we especially compare NCB predictions to those of these two
models. For a concise description of the above mentioned models for exchange net-
works, we refer the reader to the original literature. Before we move on and confront
our theoretical predictions with empirical evidence from complex networks, it is advis-
able to say a few words about network exchange experiments in general. The design of
experiments on exchange networks has common features (see, e.g., Skvoretz and
Willer 1991). All experiments consist of several rounds of negotiation and exchange,
while the endogenously given relational structure is kept constant. Bargaining sessions
involve adjacent network positions only, where usually a cake of identical size (nor-
mally 24 “profit points”) is to be split in any bilateral match. Experiments generally
concern negatively connected networks with a one-exchange rule. That is, the number
of exchanges per connection and round is restricted to one. While the latter two points
are relaxed in the experiments to be discussed, the experimental protocol other-
wise remains unchanged. That also includes that negotiations between adjacent
positions occur as a series of offers and counteroffers. Negotiations stop when an
agreement is reached.40 Bargaining experiments on exchange networks thus re-
flect the non-cooperative scenario of Rubinstein’s (1982) Alternating Offers Game
(respectively its limiting solution, see fn. 19). This game has, as this paper made
clear, a cooperative solution in the presented generalized Nash bargaining solu-
tion (Nash 1950, 1953).41
40 Partly due to a computerized setting, proposals can be made within seconds and bargaining
sessions do not last long (viz., agreement in less than a few minutes).
41 However, the theoretical assumption of rational and selfish actors need not hold in experimen-
tal situations. Student populations need time to learn to rationally play the game, that is, to system-
atically exploit their strategic position in the network and to maximize exchange profits.
Fortunately, Young (1993, 2001: ch. 8) shows that the full rationality assumption is not needed to
deduce the generalized Nash bargaining solution. He shows that the generalized Nash bargaining
solution is “stochastically stable” (i.e., robustness under small, persistent random shocks (Foster
and Young 1990)). That is, the high-rational solution from game theory has a representation in a
low-rational environment through the process of learning. Put differently, whether we have hyper-
rational actors who jump into equilibrium right away or whether boundedly rational actors (who
are allowed to make minor mistakes from which they learn) adapt to their environment and learn
from past outcomes, does not matter. In equilibrium, both sorts of actors will split the cake as if
they would implement the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
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The experimental protocol knows no misdirection. Experimental subjects (nor-
mally undergraduates who participate for pay) receive general information about
the purpose and the number of rounds of the experiment. They also possess com-
plete information about the bargaining rules, the earnings of their partners, the
shape of the negotiation structure, and their own positions within the network.
Therefore, experimental results are interpreted as effects the given network struc-
ture has on exchange patterns and/or profit divisions between adjacent positions.
And, results on exchange profits are represented by the means of profit points the
advantaged positions in given matches could realize over several rounds of the ex-
periment. Mostly, this is the mean over the last 10 rounds of the experiment while
the first 10 rounds are discharged as learning and adaption rounds.
11.5.1 Branch-NMQ structures
Starting point of an exchange network experiment is a specific bargaining structure
which limits matches between potential exchange partners. The presentation of ex-
perimental findings therefore refers to the types of structural positions (A,B,C,D,E)
the different actors have. Individuals located at structurally equivalent positions are
normally distinguished by numeric subscripts (e.g., A1, A2). In this subsection, we ex-
clusively focus on branch structures where a central actor is connected to a specific
number of peripheral actors (hub and spoke network). We denote the branch struc-
ture under investigation, in accordance with Willer and Skvoretz (1999), as Branch-
NMQ structures. NMQ refers to node-specific parameters which are, at least partly,
unique to their theoretical approach and which are the basis for an alternative cate-
gorization of network connections (p. 197–200). N is the number of exchange rela-
tions connected to a node (i.e., the number of potential exchange partners), M is the
maximum number of relations in which the node can benefit, and Q denotes the min-
imum number of relations in which exchanges must be completed.42 Therefore, Q is a
subset ofM while the latter itself is a subset of N.
N and M are thus equivalent to ni and gi, respectively, in our theory. Therefore,
(N − M) gives the number of exchange partners which, in every round of bargaining
and exchange, are necessarily excluded from exchange. However, since the parame-
ter Q is unique to Willer and Skvoretz’ (1999) theory, we cannot compare empirical
results for networks with M ≠ Q to NCB predictions. Take a look at Figure 11.1. NCB
makes predictions for Branch311 and Branch333. However, predictions for Branch332
cannot be made by NCB since M > Q (a dotted circle indicates M = 3 > 2 = Q). Only the
42 In network exchange experiments, subjects with Q < M are forced to exchange at least Q times
and at most M times. When fewer than Q exchanges with adjacent partners are completed, no
points at all, not even from completed exchanges, are paid out.
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experiment will tell whether the central actor B will eventually conclude two or three
exchanges. It thus cannot be decided in advance whether the negotiation structure
Branch332 in fact coincidences with a Branch322 or a Branch333 exchange structure.
To test NCB predictions against experimental data from Branch-NMQ structures and
predictions from GPI-R (Markovsky et al. 1993) with an adapted version of Exchange
Resistance, where the definitions of the ER equations depend on the combination of
N, M, and Q (see Willer and Skvoretz 1999: 2005), we restrict ourselves to Branch
structures where M = Q hold. Table 11.1 reports the results.
It can be seen that NCB makes rather accurate predictions for the profit points
of B in relation with A in all eight branch structures. Note that the first four branch
structures in Table 11.1 are pure non-rival ones while the latter four branch struc-
tures are pure rival ones. NCB predictions are less off the empirical observations
than predictions from GPI-R in all relations. This is also reflected by the two good-
ness-of-fit measures we report in Table 11.1.
The branch structure is a network where a central monopolist B can exploit his
peripheral exchange partners since he can play the As off against each other (put
literally, he can, up to a certain point, threaten the As with permanent exclusion
from exchange). It can thus be expected that B’s profit increases, ceteris paribus, in
the number of exchange partners but decreases, ceteris paribus, in the number of
exchanges he must complete. NCB and GPI-R predictions as well as the experimen-
tal results clearly show this latter fact.43 For instance, the more exchanges B must
conclude, the lower his profits, as the comparison of Branch533 to Branch555, or,
Branch311 to Branch322 clearly shows. The most dramatic effect, that is, the com-
plete loss of the monopoly rent can be found if B must conclude exchanges with all
of the A’s (i.e., N = M or ni = gi). In Branch333, B only gets about one third of the
profit while in Branch332 he could still get about five sixth of the profit. The same
Figure 11.1: Example of complex Branch-NMQ structures according to Willer and Skvoretz (1999)
43 For evidence of the former claim, see Braun and Gautschi (2006).
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dramatic collapse in profit points for B can be observed for the remaining (N = M)-
branches in Table 11.1, that is, for the Branch777 in comparison to the Branch755.
NCB seems to be able to make rather accurate predictions for a first set of com-
plex networks. However, branches are rather simple structures. The following two
subsections will use network structures with a little more complexity as the mea-
sure rod against to pitch our theory.
11.5.2 Diamond, H- and T-Shape structures
The negotiation networks to be discussed in this subsection basically exhibit the
same property as the branch structures just discussed: certain positions must ex-
change more than once. Figure 11.2 depicts the negotiation networks. For instance,
in the H-2-3 network, position C must conclude two exchanges. He can, however,
choose from his exchange partners A1, A2, and D. On the other hand, position D
must exchange three times. Since he only has three possible negotiation partners,
he is forced to conclude one exchange per round with each adjacent position. D
Table 11.1: Observed and predicted dyadic profit splits in complex branch structures.
Network Match Tiea NCB GPI-R Observed (s.e.)
Branch B:A pnr .† .† . (.)
Branch B:A pnr .† .† . (.)
Branch B:A pnr . . . (.)
Branch B:A pnr . . . (.)
Branch B:A pr .† . . (.)
Branch B:A pr .† no prediction . (.)
Branch B:A pr . no prediction . (.)
Branch B:A pr . no prediction . (.)
ADb . (.) .
MDb . (.) .
Note: Observed profit splits as reported in Skvoretz and Willer (1999). NCB = Network Control
Bargaining model. Predictions and observations are for profit points (out of a cake of 24 profit
points) of the structural position B. GPI-R (Markovsky et al. 1993) with an adapted version of
Exchange Resistance, where the definition of the ER equations depends on the combination of N,M,
and Q (no predictions for inclusive-exclusive and inclusive-null), see Willer and Skvoretz (1999).
aClassification of relations: pnr = pure non-rival; pr = pure rival.
bAD = Absolute Deviation (the sum of absolute distances between observed and predicted profit
points relative to number of comparisons); MD = Mean Deviation (the Euclidean distance between
observed and predicted profit points relative to number of comparisons). Figures in brackets for
NCB refer to the comparison of ties with the latter three networks excluded.
†Daggers indicate that predicted values fall within the 95% confidence interval of the observed
values. Put differently, these predictions fit the observations at the p < 0.05 significance level (two-
tailed tests).
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thus is in a rather weak negotiation position and it is to be expected that he can be
exploited by his partners. Generally, the experimental results should thus show
that the advantage of a structural position in a pure or mixed rival relation is weak-
ened by an increasing number of necessary exchanges.
In addition to the number of exchanges per negotiation round, Figure 11.2 intro-
duces yet another feature. A position who must exchange more than once can, but
need not, engage in multiple exchanges with an adjacent position. In the Double-T
network, the number of lines connecting two adjacent positions indicates the maxi-
mum possible exchanges per round between these positions. Position B, who must
conclude two exchanges per round, can thus choose to exchange with just one adja-
cent position (A1 only or A2 only) or with two distinct positions (viz., A1 and A2, C and
A1, or C and A2). While the number of exchanges to be concluded, ceteris paribus, de-
creases the profit points of the focal positions (the Double-T structure is a pure rival
one), it can be expected that the number of cakes which the focal position can divided
with one partner, ceteris paribus, increases his bargaining power (and thus his profit
points). A position can then threaten more of his partners with permanent exclusion
from exchange – due to the possibility of multiple exchanges in one relation – than in
a similar situation where only one exchange per connection is possible.
We have seen in subsection 11.5.1, that Willer and Skvoretz (1999) needed to ad-
just Markovsky et al.’s (1993) original GPI-R measure to cover for networks in which
positions differ with respect to the allowed number of exchanges. They do so by
Figure 11.2: Examples of complex structures according to Willer and Skvoretz (1999; Diamond, H-2-3)
and Skvoretz and Willer (1993, H-2, Triple-T, and Double-T).
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re-defining (and introducing a case distinction for) the resistance equation. The pre-
cise specification of the resistance equation depends on Willer and Skvoretz’ (1999)
categorization of network connections which draws on the ranking and values of
the node-specific parameters N, M and Q. However, as Table 11.2 shows, there are
some networks (for which N > M ≥ Q > 1) where still no profit point predictions are
possible. The application to such, so called, inclusive-exclusive and inclusive-null
connections requires – in addition to the updated resistance equations – the adjust-
ment of the original Graph-theoretic power index (GPI; Markovsky, Willer, and
Patton 1988) via the “correction index” 1/Q (see for details Willer and Skvoretz 1999:
Table 11.2: Observed and predicted dyadic profit splits in complex diamond, H- and T-shape
structures.
Network Match Tiea NCB GPI-I-R/GPI-RD Observed (s.e.)
Diamond A:B pr . ProfitA = ProfitA . (.)
H-- C:A pr .† ProfitC:A < ProfitC:D . (.)
C:D mr .† ProfitC:D > ProfitC:A . (.)
D:B pnr .† ProfitD:B > ProfitD:C . (.)
H- B:A pr .† . . (.)
Triple-T B:A pnr . . . (.)
B:C mnr . . . (.)
C:D pr . .† . (.)
Double-Tb B:A pr . . . (.)
C:D pr . . . (.)
ADc . (.) .
MDc . (.) .
Note: Observed profit splits as reported in Willer and Skvoretz (1993) and Skvoretz and Willer
(1999). NCB = Network Control Bargaining model. Predictions and observations are for profit points
(out of a cake of 24 profit points) of the first named structural position. GPI-I-R makes no point
predictions but only compares for (in)equality of profit splits (DIAMOND and H-2-3) while
GPI-RD allows for point predictions in the remaining networks. However, for GPI-RD, assumptions
have to be made with whom a position with more than one possible cake to be divided exchanges
first and the number of ties of such an actor are adjusted accordingly (see Lovaglia et al. 1995:
142–143).
aClassification of relations: pr = pure rival; mr = mixed rival; pnr = pure non-rival; mnr = mixed
non-rival.
bThe Double-T network is not stable in the sense that the negotiation and exchange structure differ
(see text for more details).
cAD = Absolute Deviation (the sum of absolute distances between observed and predicted profit
points relative to number of comparisons); MD = Mean Deviation (the Euclidean distance between
observed and predicted profit points relative to number of comparisons). Figures in brackets for
NCB refer to the comparison of ties of the latter three networks only.
†Daggers indicate that predicted values fall within the 95% confidence interval of the observed
values. Put differently, these predictions fit the observations at the p < 0.05 significance level (two-
tailed tests).
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215–216). Willer and Skvoretz apply this GPI-I-R model to the Diamond and H-2-3
structures depicted in Figure 11.2. However, no point predictions for profit splits but
only relative comparisons are reported (see the first two networks in Table 11.2).
Since we wish to confront NCB predictions with profit point predictions from
other theories, we rely on experimental results from H-2, Triple-T, and Double-T (see
Figure 11.2) reported in Skvoretz and Willer (1993) and the respective theoretical pre-
dictions based on Lovaglia et al.’s (1995) GPI-RD measure. It makes use of a revised
interpretation of the degree index, which is part of GPI-RD. Calculation of the degree
index in the original approach rests on the relative number of ties negotiating actors
possess. However, if a position is allowed to exchange (more than) twice per round,
its effective number of ties then depends, by assumption, on the sequence of ex-
changes the position engages in. To account for this ‘path dependency’, a position’s
effective number of ties need to be calculated as a weighted average of the number of
exchange possibilities a position has for each of its allowed exchanges (for details see
Lovaglia et al. 1995). While GPI-based measures thus can be adapted to embrace situa-
tions which deviate from the one-exchange rule, it is unclear how they could account
for negotiation structures with heterogeneous cake sizes (see subsection 11.5.3).
Table 11.2 summarizes the empirical results for the networks depicted in Figure 11.2
and in addition reports on the classification of relations for each exchange tie under
consideration. First, take a look at the results for the Diamond and H-2-3 structures.
GPI-I-R makes no profit point predictions but allows for a ranking comparison of profit
splits in different dyads. As can be seen, GPI-I-R predicts the ordinal ranking of profit
splits correctly for the H-2-3 networks. Since the As in the Diamond structure are struc-
turally equivalent, it is no surprise that GPI-I-R predicts the same profit shares for the A
positions in match with a respective B. NCB calculations, on the other hand, allow for
point predictions in both networks which are extremely well in line with empirical ob-
servations. For the H-2-3 structure, they all fall within the 95% confidential interval of
the observed values. And, it can clearly be seen that position D in the H-2-3 structure,
even though, structurally well positioned, is exploitable because he must conclude one
exchange with each of his partners. For the Diamond structure, NCB predicts correctly
that the As – even they are forced to conclude two exchanges – are in a far better net-
work position than the Bs. All ties are pure rival ones and the fact that the Bs need to
exchange twice only marginally deteriorates their advantageous structural position.
Now take a look at the H-2 structure where the B positions are forced to ex-
change twice in each round. It can be expected that exchange between B1 and B2
would result in an equal split of the cake due to their structural equivalence. We
know that the simple H-Shape structure with a one-exchange rule (i.e., the Bs can
only exchange once in every round) breaks. The bargaining network does not coin-
cidence with the final exchange network since the Bs permanently refrain from ex-
change with each other and prefer a monopoly position in a 3-Line to exchange
with their peripheral As (see Braun and Gautschi 2007). The 3-LINE generates more
profit for a rational and profit point maximizing B (almost 84% of the cake in
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exchange with A) than they could earn in the H-Shape structure (only about 78% of
the cake). The question now arises whether H-2 will show the same property as its
simple brother? Since expected profits in pure rival relations decrease in the num-
ber of necessary exchanges, B can surely not expect 84% of the cake in exchange
with A in a 3-Line where he must exchange with both As in each round. NCB pre-
dicts, for this simple structure, that B could only harvest a little more than 37% of
the cake. However, this is far less than he gets from the As when he at least occa-
sionally exchanges with the other B as well in a H-2 structure. Position B then re-
ceives about 64% of the cake in relation with A (see fifth row in Table 11.2). The H-2
structure therefore is stable in the sense that the negotiation and exchange net-
works coincide. And, as can be seen, NCB profit point predictions fall within the
95% confidence interval of the observed values.
We now turn to the Double-T structure where all actors need to complete two
exchanges in each round.44 Just having in short discussed the logic of network
breaks, it is easy understood that the Double-T structure is not stable. The negotia-
tion structure decays into a Double-3-Line and a Double-Dyad due to B’s decision to
permanently refrain from exchange with C. B can increase his profit in relation with
A from about 82% of the cake in the Double-T to about 86% of the cake in the
Double-3-Line by excluding C from bargaining and exchange.45 The latter is thus
forced into a dyad with D where profit points are split evenly (due to structural
equivalence). As Table 11.2 shows, NCB prediction for the Double-T are most accu-
rately in line with laboratory observations.
Finally, let us discuss the Triple-T network. Table 11.2 clearly shows that none
of the NCB predictions fall within the 95% confidence interval. They are far away
from observed values, especially for the B:A and B:C relation. To explain this lack
of conformity with observed profit splits, take a closer look at the B:A relation. Why
should B get about 56% of the cake in relation with A, as experimental findings sug-
gest? B is in a similar situation as in the Branch333 structure (see Figure 11.1) where
the observed profit for B in match with A was 7.96 or just about 33% of the whole
cake (see Table 11.1). The crucial argument in favor of NCB predictions now is the
fact that in the Triple-T structure, position B even depends on the A’s somewhat
more since C no longer is peripheral (as in the branch structure) but itself has a
peripheral exchange partner D. This should increase C’s negotiation power over B
as well as the As negotiation power over B. It can thus be expected that B in relation
44 Note that peripheral actors (i.e., A1, A2, and D) are not punished if they cannot realize two ex-
changes in each round. They are dependent on B and C, respectively, for negotiation and exchange
and those positions dictate whether peripheral actors will indeed realize two exchanges in each
round. However, B and C must complete two exchanges in each round.
45 Only 4 out of 307 exchanges occurred in the B:C relation. A one-tailed exact binomial test for
proportions of exchange shows that this is significantly less than could be expected if positions
choose each other at random.
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with A in the Triple-T structure would earn (a little) less than B in relation with A in
the Branch333 structure. This is exactly what NCB predicts for the B:A relation: 7.81
profit points in favor of B. This is less than the observed 7.96 profit points of B in
relation with A in the Branch333 network (see Table 11.1). The observed value of
13.53 profit points in the B:A relation therefore seems puzzling. Personal communi-
cation with David Willer, however, confirms our skepticism. The Triple-T experi-
ments were subject to 10 rounds of negotiation and exchange only as well as a
small N. The empirically observed values for this network, as reported in Table 11.2
should therefore be taken with care.
In sum, one can conclude that NCB predictions for networks where multiple ex-
changes per round are possible are more than satisfying. We now turn to a final set
of networks which again, on the one hand, were subject to a one-exchange rule but
then varied the value of the negotiation ties (i.e., varying cake sizes) instead.
11.5.3 Structures with different cake sizes
The final set of experiments to be discussed stems from Bonacich and Friedkin
(1998) and concerns network structures with unequally valued pure rival relations
(heterogeneity with respect to cake sizes). Figure 11.3 depicts the four network
structures. Besides the labels for the positions, we now also label the negotiation
ties where the respective value of each negotiation tie can be read off the third col-
umn in Table 11.3. For instance, there were three different 4-Line structures studied
in the experiment. First, one with equal profit points of value 8 in all ties. Second, a
4-Line with cake size 6 in the two B:A relations and a cake size of 12 in the A:A rela-
tion. And third, a structure where the B:A relations negotiated over a cake size of 4
and the A:A relation haggled over a cake size of 16.
Unfortunately, Bonacich and Friedkin (1998) do not provide point predictions for
the experimentally observed profit splits. They do, however, represent the results in
Figure 11.3: Examples of complex structures with varying cake sizes according to Bonacich and
Friedkin (1988).
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graphs (p. 169, Figure 4). The observed profit points reported in Table 11.3 thus are
the respective values read off these graphs as accurately as possible. This is also
true for the reported predictions of the Power-Dependence theory (Yamagishi and
Cook 1992) and the Expected-Value theory (Friedkin 1993, 1995). Bonacich and
Friedkin (1998: 162–163) use predictions based on a slight extension of the Power-
Dependence theory which then is, under certain assumptions, identical to the ker-
nel. No adjustments have to be made to the Expected-Value theory. Bonacich and
Friedkin (1998: 169) also “report” profit point predictions by the core. However,
since the core is empty for the Kite network and otherwise only makes range predic-
tions, we refrain from reporting and comparing its predictions in detail. It is suffi-
cient to report that NCB predictions and observations for the 4-Line, the T-Shape,
and the D-Box fall within the range of the prediction of the core (viz., a share of 0 to
0.5 of the respective cake sizes in the 4-Line and the D-Box, and a share of 0.4 to
0.8 of the whole cake in the T-Shape).
Table 11.3: Observed and Predicted Dyadic Profit Splits in Complex Structures with Varying Cake Sizes.
Cake Size
Network Match a b c NCB EV PD Observed
-Line B:A   – . . . .
  – . . . .
  – . . . .
Kite B:A    . . . .
   . . . .
   . . . .
T-Shape B:C    . . . .
   . . . .
   . . . .
D-Box B:A   – . . . .
  – . . . .
  – . . . .
ADb . . .
MDb . . .
Note: Observed profit splits as graphically depicted in Bonacich and Friedkin (1998).
NCB = Network Control Bargaining model. Predictions and observations are for profit points of the
structural position B in the relation with value a (cake size). Observed profit points and predictions
for the Expected Value theory (EV; Friedkin 1993, 1995) and the Power-Dependence theory
(PD; Yamagishi and Cook 1992) are read off Figure 2 in Bonacich and Friedkin (1998: 169) since no
table with accurate profit splits is available.
bAD = Absolute Deviation (the sum of absolute distances between observed and predicted profit
points relative to number of comparisons); MD = Mean Deviation (the Euclidean distance between
observed and predicted profit points relative to number of comparisons).
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In networks with equally valued relations, absolute and relative profit shares of
i in match with j provide identical information. However, in networks with un-
equally valued relations, absolute shares can become more important since a small
fraction of a large cake can still outperform a large fraction of a small cake. It is
therefore to be expected that i’s share in match with j, ceteris paribus, increases
when the value of relation in the i:k match increases. Since the latter then becomes
more favorable to i, j’s only chance to be considered for further exchange is to in-
crease his offer to i.
Unfortunately, this scenario is not implemented in a “pure form” in the net-
works under study. However, this mechanism can be observed in the 4-Line. The
value of the A:A tie was increased in steps from 8 to 16 while, however, the value of
the B:A tie was changed as well. Therefore, we also consider B’s relative profit
shares in match with A and not just his absolute profit shares. As Table 11.3 shows,
B’s share of the cake in match with A decreases in absolute and relative terms when
the A:A relation increases in value. B gets about 34% (i.e., 2.70/8) of the B:A cake in
an equally valued 4-Line, still about 24% (i.e., 1.43/6) when the A:A tie is increased
in value from 8 to 12. However, if the A:A value is further increased to 16, B only
receives 15% (i.e., 0.60/4) of the cake in match with A anymore.
While NCB predictions are less accurate than predictions by the Expected Value
theory (see goodness-of-fit measures reported in the last two rows of Table 11.3),
they are far better than the Power Dependence predictions. And, all theories cor-
rectly predict the ordinal ranking of profit splits in the respective networks. Again,
recall that observed profit splits as well as those reported for the competing theories
have been read off a graphical representation in Bonacich and Friedkin (1998:
Table 11.4). These figures are thus subject to some margin of error.
Take a look at the T-Shape structure in Figure 11.3. We have already discussed var-
iants of this structure in the previous subsection. We are interested in the profit splits
between B and C (value of relation a). Observations for all three variants of this struc-
ture is an equal split of the cake. Expected Value theory predicts precisely this.
However, from a structural point of view, this result is not plausible. The structural
position B is always more powerful than C. B has, in comparison to C, two additional
peripheral exchange partners (A1 and A2) who are fully dependent on him for negotia-
tion and exchange. C, on the other hand, only has one additional peripheral partner
D. Since bargaining power is a function of the network embeddedness (structural inde-
pendence in pure rival relations) and B is better embedded than C, his profit in match
with C should exceed half of the pie. B’s advantageous structural position is even rein-
forced by the heterogeneous values of relations – the B:A cake remains constant at b =
6 between experiments while profit points in the C:D relation (value c) decrease.
In contrast to a T-Shape with equally valued relations which breaks (i.e., no co-
incidence between the negotiation and exchange structures), NCB now predicts ex-
changes between B and C in all T-Shape structures under investigation. To see this,
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consider the T-Shape where a = 9, b = 6 and c = 9. B receives 4.78 profit points (of a
total of 6) in match with A (not reported in Table 11.3). In an equally valued 3-Line
with cake sizes b = 6, however, he would receive 4.97 profit points out of 6 (i.e.,
pBA = 0.8276, B’s relative bargaining profit, times 6). This is more than B gets from
A in the T-Shape. The necessary condition for a network break would thus be ful-
filled. But since B gets even more from C, namely 5.05 out of 9, he will keep ex-
changing with both A and C. B thus he has no rational to refrain from permanent
exchange with C (as is the case in the simple T-Shape with equally valued rela-
tions). And, as discussed in the previous paragraph, B’s profit in match with C ex-
ceeds half of the pie – he gets 56% of the pie from C.
That the T-Shape is stable thus crucially hinges on the fact that the B:C relation is
valuable to B in absolute terms. Even though in relative terms, B gets less from C if
compared to the equally valued T-Shape. In the latter, pBC = 0.6397 while in the un-
equally valued T-Shape with a = 9, b = 6 and c = 9, pBC = 0.5605 only. However, since
the absolute share of the B:C cake exceeds the absolute share of the B:A tie, B has no
incentive to refrain from exchange with C.46 The B:C relation should now proof even
more valuable when it increases in value. Table 11.3 clearly shows an increase in abso-
lute profit points for B in match with C. And, since the value of the B:A relations (i.e.,
b = 6) remains constant, it pays less and less for B to break into a 3-Line. Note that
since the value of the B:C tie increases while (i) the B:A remains constant and (ii) the
value of the C:D tie decreases, both B and C should become more powerful in match
with A and D, respectively (see discussion above). But because of (ii), C gets more de-
pendent on B for a significant absolute share of the exchange profit. Consequently,
B’s relative power over C also increases from pBC = 0.5605 in the first T-Shape struc-
ture to pBC = 0.6397 when a = 12 and, finally, to pBC = 0.7372 when a = 15.
As mentioned earlier, figures from Bonacich and Friedkin (1998) should be looked
at with some reservation. That the observed profit splits for the T-Shape networks are
not especially plausible should increase this skepticism. If we consider the other three
networks, NCB predictions could be called reasonably good. Unfortunately, Bonacich
and Friedkin (1998) is the only paper which reports observed profit splits from experi-
ments with unequally valued relations. Even though Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi
(2001) also provide results on network bargaining in two unequally valued networks,
the drawback of their experimental setting was the fact, that they did not put subjects
into an alternating offers bargaining setting but only played a five-stage Ultimatum
Game. Knowing that NCB predictions assume alternating offers bargaining, we never-
theless in short confront our predictions with their experimental findings.
46 If the value of the B:C relation is 8 or even less (everything else being constant), this logic
would no longer hold. In absolute terms, B’s share in match with C would then be worse than his
share in match with either A. Moreover, B’s share in match with either A in the respective 3-Line
would outperform his B:A gain in the T-Shape. The T-Shape negotiation structure where a ≤ 8, b = 6
and c = 9 would therefore break.
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Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi (2001) considered two bargaining networks. First,
a Triangle with the B:A relation of constant value a = 16, the A:C relation with con-
stant value b = 4, and the B:C relation with varying cake sizes (c1 = 10, c2 = 16, and
c3 = 22). They were interested in changes in power of B over A. Since the value of the B:
C tie increases, both B and C should become more powerful in relation to A. Therefore,
B’s profit in relation with A should increase. NCB correctly predicts an increase in B’s
profit over A when the B:C relation increases in value, starting with 10.28 profit points,
then 11.54 profit points, and finally 12.32 profit points (always out of a total of 16 profit
points). Experimentally observed values were, respectively, 9.44 profit points, 11.68
profit points, and 12.80 profit points. These values, however, have a rather large stan-
dard error such that all NCB predictions fall within the 95% confidence interval.
The second experiment was conducted using a Box structure (i.e., four actors
residing on each corner of a quadrangle). B1 is tied to B2 (with varying cake sizes of
again c1 = 10, c2 = 16, and c3 = 22), B2 is further connected via a relation of a con-
stant value of a = 16 profit points to A2 while A2 in turn is tied via a relation of a
constant value of b = 4 profit points to A1. Finally, A1 “closes the circle” with a rela-
tion of a constant value of a = 16 profit points to B1. The line of reasoning is again
the same as in the Triangle network. As the B1:B2 relation increases in value, B1 (B2)
should become more powerful in relation to A1 (A2). Again, NCB correctly predicts
the increase in absolute cake sizes. The predicted values of 9.13 profit points, 10.10
profit points, and 10.88 profit points, again out of a total of 16 profit points, fall
within the 95% confidence interval of the observed values of 7.84 profit points, 9.12
profit points, and 10.40 profit points, respectively. Again, relatively large standard
errors characterize the observed values.
Whether these large standard errors are due to only five rounds of offers and
counteroffers or yet other aspects of the experiment cannot be answered. However,
it stands out that NCB predictions are consistently larger than the observed values.
It would be interesting to see whether these experimental observations would tend
toward the Nash equilibrium if a true alternating offers bargaining situation had
been implemented. In general, observations on the development of bilateral nego-
tiations (i.e., offers and counteroffers) until an agreement is reached would show
whether experimental subjects ever reach the Nash equilibrium and if so, how fast
this occurs. Adjusting exchange theories to be able to make predictions about the
evolution of offers and counteroffers over time – and not just about the profit split
in the exchange equilibrium – would thus be a desirable next step.
11.6 Conclusion
This paper presented an approach to the study of complex bargaining and ex-
change structures. Partly due to experimental evidence on negatively connected
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exchange networks with a one- exchange rule, model building has widely neglected
possibly more complex features of exchange networks. Therefore, only a few theo-
ries are capable of making profit point predictions for bargaining and exchange
structures where (i) the one-exchange rule is relaxed and positions are allowed to
conclude more than one exchange per round, and, (ii) with unequally valued rela-
tions across the bargaining structure. However, there is no theory which can be ap-
plied to bargaining and exchange structures which are characterized by (i) and (ii).
The NCB model seeks to close this gap.
In the course of developing the new model, we have found a weakness in the
well-established network classification of negatively and positively connected rela-
tions. We therefore introduce a new and more precise classification of network rela-
tions which embrace negatively and positively connected ties as special cases. The
new network classification is based on structural features and two node specific,
but endogenous network parameters: the number of ego’s bargaining partners, the
number of ego’s bargaining relations, and the number of exchanges ego intends to
complete. The resulting parsimonious classification allows for unique profit point
predictions in networks with combinations of different relational aspects.
In accordance with other theories, our approach reflects the idea that rational
actors take advantage of their structural positions in negotiations. Moreover, posi-
tions are now aware that the number of exchanges which must be concluded and
the value of the respective bargaining ties (i.e., the size of the cakes to be divided in
bilateral bargaining) can further deteriorate or improve the (dis)advantage of a spe-
cific network position. Contrary to other sociological models, we take into account
that negotiation partners pursue their self-interest and thus specify the actors’ opti-
mization problem and show where these network parameters enter the choice cal-
culus and how they influence decision making. To comply with this demand we
have combined the generalized Nash bargaining solution from game theory with
the assumption that both relational features and network positions affect exchange
outcomes. The applications section has shown that the resulting Network Control
Bargaining (NCB) model makes predictions which closely correspond to experimen-
tal results by Bonacich and Friedkin (1998), Molm, Peterson, and Takahashi (2001),
Skvoretz and Willer (1993), and Willer and Skvoretz (1999).
While the presented NCB approach can handle different relational features of
exchange networks, it still assumes interindividual heterogeneity with respect to
characteristics such as age, gender, education or wealth (status). Since it is known
that such attributes can matter for negotiation results (e.g., D’Exelle et al. 2010;
Dufwenberg and Muren 2006; Eckel and Grossman 2001; Holm and Engsfeld 2005;
Schwieren and Sutter 2008; Solnick 2001), a broader approach should account for
non-network related characteristics which may influence bargaining outcomes.
Such personal variables, aij, could be taken into account via the actors’ individual
bargaining powers: bi = f (zi, ci; aij).
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Besides these limitations which prevent that the model captures all relevant as-
pects of real world negotiations, it must be emphasized that the approach rests on
strong premises. They ensure that the theoretical model mirrors the bargaining pro-
tocol of laboratory exchange networks. However, conditions in laboratory experi-
ments should not be set in stone. It thus would be a worthwhile task to construct
less artificial (laboratory) experiments while concurrently broadening the theoreti-
cal models for sociological exchange studies.
The behavioral postulate of the model would mark a good point of departure for
such a task. According to our theory, each actor is the neoclassical selfish profit maxi-
mizer. Even though the experimental protocol tries as good as possible to induce
profit point maximizing behavior, it cannot completely suppress additional motiva-
tions such as fairness and aversion to inequality. These motivations have been studied
widely in the recent literature on behavioral game theory (for an overview and intro-
ductions, see Camerer 2003) and shown to be present (e.g., Dictator Game, Ultimatum
Game) even in best controlled and artificial laboratory experiments. Likewise, experi-
mental subjects engaging in repeated negotiation and exchange may produce positive
feelings towards their exchange partners. They form attachments and make commit-
ments in durable negotiations (e.g., Lawler and Yoon 1996). While some experimental
protocols try to inhibit such behavior by rotating subjects through all positions of a
network, it only helps to forfend artificial laboratory conditions. An increase in rela-
tional cohesion stabilizes exchange relations, breeds trust and is to the benefit of both
bargaining partners. These aspects of durable exchange relations deserve attention
because of their importance in everyday life.
It is well established through experiments that motivations such as fairness
and aversion to inequality unfold equal forces even across different cultural back-
grounds (e.g., Camerer 2003; Henrich 2000). Nevertheless, there seem to be norms
in distributive bargaining which could further affect outcomes in real world settings
(Gautschi 2018). As Young (1996: 116) puts it: “[. . .] norms condition the parties to
expect certain outcomes that depend on the bargaining context.” Moreover, such
norms or convention can even change over time. A realistic model of bargaining
and exchange should thus be able to account for the bargaining context. The real
world is not the clean laboratory environment with its legitimate tendency to create
congeneric situations.
In sum, while the current model is broader in scope and thus capable of making
predictions for more complex bargaining and exchange networks, it nevertheless
lacks some relevant real world features, as just discussed above. Therefore, the gen-
eralization of the current model beyond relational features (such as more than one
exchange per round) and unequally valued relations is important and worthwhile.
Especially if the model should be suited for the analysis of real bargaining and ex-
change situations. They are hardly ever characterized by the artificial and highly
controlled conditions of a laboratory experiment.
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Part II: Experimental Tests
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12 Social Identity and Social Value
Orientations
Abstract: This study provides an extension of the social value orientation model
and a tool, other-other Decomposed Games, to quantify the influence of social iden-
tity on social value orientations. Social identity is induced experimentally using the
minimal group paradigm. Subsequently, the weights subjects add to the outcomes
of outgroup others relative to ingroup others and to the absolute difference between
the outcomes of ingroup and outgroup others are estimated. Results are compared
to a control condition in which social identity is not induced. Results show that
when the outgroup is better off than the ingroup, the average subject is spiteful:
they derive negative utility from the outcomes of the outgroup other. When the
ougroup is worse off than the ingroup, the average subject attaches similar weights
to the outcomes of outgroup and ingroup others. There is also significant variation
across subjects with respect to the level of ingroup bias.
12.1 Introduction
A quick glance at any major newspaper nowadays will, very likely, show that hu-
mans are willing to incur significant costs to members of outgroups in order to pro-
tect or better the outcomes for the ingroup. Children whose parents are caught
crossing the border illegally are separated from their parents to deter illegal entry
to the US.1 Legal and “skilled” immigrants in the UK are required to pay an annual
Immigration Health Surcharge of £400, in addition to the expensive visa fees and
the usual tax contributions to the National Health Service.2 Almost all countries are
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imposing tariffs or quotas to certain foreign goods to protect domestic producers.3
There are very strong barriers to international labor mobility, legal or illegal. These
examples show that humans value the outcomes of ingroup members more than
the outcomes of outgroup members. But how much more?
Harvard economist Dani Rodrik asks a simple and related question: “how strong
a preference must we have for our fellow citizens relative to foreigners to justify the
existing level of barriers on international labor mobility” (Rodrik 2017). After a simple
calculation based on a plausible scenario, he concludes that “we must place a weight
on the utility of fellow citizens that is at least between four and five times greater
than the weight we place on foreigners”. Or equivalently, a foreigner must be worth
less than 22 percent of a fellow citizen. In a similar exercise, Kopczuk et al. (2005)
argue that the observed levels of international assistance to developing countries
imply that Americans must value their fellow citizens’ outcomes about six times
more than they value foreign citizens’ outcomes. Or equivalently, a foreign citizen is
worth 17 percent of a fellow citizen. It thus appears that the weight attached to the
outcomes of outgroup members is 17 to 22 percent of the weight attached to the out-
comes of ingroup members. But how accurate is this estimate? The calculations of
Rodrik (2017) and Kopczuk et al. (2005) are rather indirect. They use the levels of bar-
riers on international labor mobility and foreign assistance to estimate the relative
weights. Barriers to labor mobility and foreign assistance are complex policies that
are influenced by many factors, in addition to how much actors weight the outcomes
of outgroups.
In this chapter, I propose a simple tool to estimate directly how much actors weight
the outcomes of outgroup members relative to the outcomes of ingroup members. I build
on the social value orientation and the minimal group paradigm literatures. The social
value orientation literature investigates how actors value certain outcome allocations be-
tween self and others (Griesinger and Livingston 1977; McClintock 1972; Schulz
and May 1989). Cooperative orientation, maximizing the sum of the payoffs for self and
others; competitive orientation, maximizing the difference between the payoffs for self
and others in favor of self; equality orientation, minimizing the inequality between out-
comes are some of the social value orientations distinguished in the literature.
Numerous methods have been developed to measure social value orientations (Aksoy
and Weesie 2012; Aksoy and Weesie 2013; Kuhlman, Brown, and Theta 1992; Liebrand
and McClintock 1988; Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf 2011; Van Lange 1999). All of
these methods involve some form of Decomposed Games in which subjects are asked to
choose a certain outcome allocation between self and others among a menu of possible
self-other allocations.
There is a hidden but strong link between the social value orientation literature
and the minimal group paradigm. The minimal group paradigm is about how actors
3 http://tariffdata.wto.org/
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value outcome allocations between two others, e.g., one ingroup and one outgroup
(Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971). In other words, as opposed to the social value orienta-
tion literature, the minimal group paradigm involves other-other allocations instead
of self-other allocations. In fact, in minimal group experiments self-other allocations
are carefully avoided. This is because in minimal group experiments, subjects’ own
individual interests should not be at stake to isolate the influence of mere social cate-
gorization from any form of realistic conflict (Sherif et al. 1961). Because of this omis-
sion of self from outcome allocation tasks, the tools of the social value orientation
literature cannot readily be applied to minimal group settings.
In this chapter, I explicitly bridge the social value orientation literature with
the minimal group paradigm. I extend the social value orientation model to other-
other allocations (Macro and Weesie 2016). Moreover, I also show that the classical
self-other Decomposed Games of the social value orientation literature can easily be
adapted to other-other allocations, hence to minimal group setting. Using experi-
mental data, I quantify the influence of social identity on social value orientations.
12.2 Theory: Social value orientations in other-other
allocations
In the classical social value orientation model, for an outcome allocation for self (x)
and other (y), an actor i attaches a wi weight to the outcome of other such that
(Aksoy and Weesie 2012; Aksoy and Weesie 2014; Griesinger and Livingston 1977;
McClintock 1972):
Ui x, yð Þ≡U*i x, y ; wið Þ= x+wiy. (12:1)
Let’s now assume that there are two types of others, ingroup and outgroup. Let I (O)
denote the set of ingroup (outgroup) others. Consider an other-other allocation situa-
tion in which the ingroup other gets yI, the outgroup other gets yO, and there is no
outcome for self, i.e., x = 0. In this situation, the social value orientation model in
(12.1) can be written as:
Ui yI , yO
 
≡U*i y
I , yO; wIi ,wOi
 
=wIi yI +wOi yO (12:2)
where wIi and w
O
i are the weights actors attach to the outcomes of ingroup and out-
group others, respectively. Because utility is defined up to positive affine transfor-
mations, and assuming that wIi >0, equation (12.2) can be written as:
Ui yI , yO
 
≡U*i y
I , yO; ΘOi
 
= yI +ΘOi yO with ΘOi =
wOi
wIi
. (12:3)
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Equation (12.3) is now equivalent to the model in equation (12.1) where the out-
comes for self and other are replaced by the outcomes for ingroup other and out-
group other, respectively. Consequently, the weight actors attach to the outcomes
of outgroup others relative to ingroup others can easily be estimated using other-
other Decomposed Games just as the social value orientations are estimated with
self-other Decomposed Games (Aksoy and Weesie 2012).
Finally, social value orientation research has shown that some people also con-
sider inequality in outcomes, such as those with equality or maximin orientations
(Aksoy and Weesie 2012; Grzelak, Iwinzki, and Radzincki 1977; Macro and Weesie
2016; Schulz and May 1989). These orientations are typically captured by adding an-
other term in equation (12.1), the absolute inequality between the outcomes for self
and other. In the other-other allocation case, an equivalent term will be adding the
absolute inequality between the outcomes for ingroup and outgroup others. Thus,4
Ui yI , yO
 
≡U*i y
I , yO; ΘOi , βi
 
= yI +ΘOi yO − βi yI − yO
 . (12:4)
A useful reinterpretation of the model in (12.4) is the following:
Ui yI , yO
 
≡U*i y
I , yO; ΘOi , βi
 
=
yI + Θ
O
i + βi
1− βi
yO if yI ≥ yO
yI + Θ
O
i − βi
1+ βi
yO if yI < yO
8><
>: (12:5)
Equation (12.4) is mathematically equivalent to (12.5) when –1 < β < 1. My empirical re-
sults below will indeed show that –1 < β < 1, hence I will use (12.4) and (12.5) interchange-
ably. The specification in (12.5) is easier to interpret than that in (12.4). In (12.5) we have
two separate terms that represent the weights attached to the outcomes of the outgroup
other relative to the ingroup. When the outgroup is worse off than the ingroup this
weight is Θ
O
i + βi
1− βi
. When the outgroup other is better off than the ingroup other the weight
to the outgroup is Θ
O
i − βi
1+ βi
. Hence, while (12.5) and (12.4) are mathematically equivalent,
specification (12.5) provides an alternative, more convenient interpretation.
One could in principle modify the model in (12.4) by taking not the outcomes for
the ingroup or outgroup, but the utilities for the ingroup and outgroup. For example,
one could define U′i y
I , yO
 
as U
′
i y
I , yO
 
=UiI yI , yO
 
+ Θ′Oi UO yI , yO
 
− β
′
i U
I yI , yO
 
−

UO yI , yO
 j. That is, replacing the outcomes of ingroup and outgroup others with
4 When inequality concerns are introduced, in other-other allocations in which self gets zero it can
be argued that actors may take two additional terms into account: the difference between outcomes
for ingroup others and self as well as the difference between outgroup others and self. In this case,
the model can be written as U = x+wIi yI +wOi yO −bIi yI − x
 −bOi yO − x − βi yI − yO . Because in other-
other allocations x = 0, this alternative formulation can be re-arranged (assuming
yI >0, yO >0, wIi >bIi Þ such that U = yI + w
O
i −b
O
i
wI
i
−bI
i
yO − βi yI − yO
 , which is equivalent to the formula-
tion in equation (12.4) with w
O
i − b
O
i
wIi − b
I
i
=ΘOi .
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utilities for ingroup and outgroup others. Alternatively, one could define equality as
yI =ΘyO, and hence replace the term yI − yO
  in (12.4) with yI −ΘyO . These alternative
formulations are examples of interdependent utility, i.e., actors are interested in utili-
ties of other actors not just outcomes (Becker 1993). In this chapter, I don’t consider
interdependent utility.
12.3 Method
12.3.1 Subjects
186 subjects were recruited with the Online Recruitment System for Economic
Experiments (ORSEE; Greiner 2004). Majority of the subjects were students at the
University of Oxford from a variety of different study fields. Subjects were on average
30 years old (S.D.=14) and 58% of them were female.5
12.3.2 Procedure
Subjects participated in one of ten sessions in Hilary Term (February-March) 2014.
Subjects in seven sessions were assigned to the experimental group and in the re-
maining three sessions to the control group. Seven sessions were run between 16
and 24 subjects and three sessions were run between 12 to 14 subjects. Subjects sat
randomly in one of the cubicles in the Centre for Experimental Social Sciences
(CESS) lab at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Subjects could not see each
other or the experimenter during the experiment. This also meant that the subjects
were not fully aware of the total number of subjects in the experiment, though they
might have a rough guess about the session size (the median session size was 20).
The experiment was carried out on computers using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007).
12.3.2.1 Experimental group
After general instructions, subjects in the experimental group were shown five pairs
of paintings by Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee. For each pair, subjects chose the
painting they liked more. 50% of subjects in a session were classified as Kandinskys,
5 The experiment reported here is embedded in a larger study which included additional unrelated
tasks. These additional tasks were administered after the procedure described here took place and
were analyzed elsewhere. See Aksoy (2015) for details of these additional tasks.
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and the remaining 50% as Klees, based on subjects’ relative preferences. Each subject
was privately informed about his/her group.
After classification, a collective quiz in which subjects guessed the painters of
two paintings (Klee or Kandinsky) was administered. Subjects earned £0.8 if at
least 50% of their group correctly guessed the two painters. Subjects earned a fur-
ther £0.8 if their group correctly answered as many questions as the other group.
Quiz results were shown only after the experiment was completed.
After the collective quiz, subjects made decisions in 10 other-other Decomposed
Games shown in the appendix (Table A1). The order of these 10 games was varied in
two factors. These 10 games were modified versions of the self-other Decomposed
Games used by Aksoy and Weesie (2012).6 Recipients in these Decomposed Games
were a randomly selected ingroup member and a randomly selected outgroup member.
At the end of the experiment, one Decomposed Game was selected at random, and two
actual other subjects received the tokens based on a subject’s decision (20 tokens =
£1). Similarly, each subject was a recipient for a randomly selected other subject.
12.3.2.2 Control group
The control group followed the procedure above but without inducing group iden-
tity. Subjects stated their preferences in the same 5 painting pairs. However, they
were not classified as Klees or Kandinskys. They completed the same guessing quiz
but they were rewarded for their individual success: for each correct guess, a sub-
ject earned £0.8. Finally, subjects decided in the same 10 other-other Decomposed
Games. Different from the experimental group, the two recipients were two other
subjects randomly selected from the session, without any reference to any groups.
12.4 Results
I follow the estimation procedure described in Aksoy and Weesie (2012). In this pro-
cedure, the outcomes in an other-other Decomposed Game are transformed into
utilities via equation (12.4). In addition, an additive random utility term ϵ is added
to the model to have stochastic behavioral predictions. The random utility term
makes the utility model statistically estimable. How much a subject i prefers option
A relative to option B is the utility difference in options A and B in a game:
6 The modifications aimed to improve the statistical precision to estimate the social value orientation
parameters based on the results reported in Aksoy and Weesie (2012) and additional simulations.
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UAB yI , yO;ΘOi , βi
 
= yIA − yIB
 
+ΘOi yOA − yOB
 
− βi y
I
A − y
O
A
 − yIB − yOB  + ϵA − ϵBð Þ
(12:6)
where yIA is the outcome for ingroup other in option A and y
O
B is the outcome for
outgroup other in option B in a Decomposed Game. A subject prefers option A in a
Decomposed Game when UAB >0. Following Aksoy and Weesie (2012), (ΘO, β) are
treated as bi-variate normally distributed variables and ϵ is assumed to have an in-
dependent normal distribution with zero mean and nonzero variance. This implies
a multilevel probit model in which the dependent variable is a subject’s preferences
in the 10 Decomposed Games and independent variables are the outcome differen-
ces given in equation (12.6). The distribution of (ΘO, β), the variance of (ϵA − ϵB), and
the empirical Bayes predictions (posterior means) of ΘO and β per subject are esti-
mated with the Stata program GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles
2002). The replication material with the Stata code and the data are available at
https://osf.io/wxra3/.
Table 12.1 and Figure 12.1 show the results. When social identity is induced (ex-
perimental group), the estimated mean of ΘO is 0.2 which is significantly different
from both zero and one. This means that when the inequality between ingroup and
outgroup is zero, the average weight subjects add to the outcomes of outgroup
others is only 20% of the weight they add to the outcomes of ingroup others. The
estimated mean of β is 0.39 and significantly different from zero (and one). This
Table 12.1: Social value orientation estimates for the experimental and control groups. ΘO = “outgroup
cooperative orientation parameter”; β = “equality orientation parameter”; ϵA, ϵB= evaluation error. For
the variances, p-values are derived from the correct boundary tests using the mixture distribution Self
and Liang (1987).
Experimental Group Control Group
Parameter Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
mean(ΘO) .*** . .*** .
mean(β) .*** . .** .
var(ΘO) .*** . . .
var(β) .*** . . .
cov(ΘO,β) −.*** . −. .
var(ϵA − ϵB) .*** . .*** .
N(Subject)  
N(Decision)  
log-likelihood −. −.
***p 2-sided<0.001;**p 2-sided<0.01
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means that while subjects add a small weight to the outcomes of outgroup others
relative to ingroup others, they are still concerned with reducing inequality be-
tween ingroup and outgroup others. There is also a negative correlation between
ΘO and β.
A further noteworthy finding is the significant and large variance of ΘO in the
experimental group. An estimated variance of 0.34 implies that although on aver-
age there is significant ingroup bias, there is also a significant variation among sub-
jects regarding the level of ingroup bias. A minority of subjects in fact have ΘO
values very close to, but never exceeding one (see Figure 12.1a). These subjects
could be described as “multicultural” as they add very similar weights to ingroup
and outgroup others’ outcomes. On the other hand, quite a few subjects (about
36%) add not only lower but negative weights to the outcomes of outgroup others,
displaying a very high level of ingroup bias.
In the control group in which social identity is not induced ΘO is estimated as vir-
tually 1. This shows that without any difference in group identities, equal weights are
added to the outcomes of two random others. This finding adds confidence to the esti-
mation method because any value significantly different from 1 would hint at a meth-
odological artifact and cast doubt on the validity of the results. Also, the difference
between the means of ΘO in the experimental and control groups is highly significant
(p 2-sided < 0.001). In the control group, the estimated variance of ΘO is insignificant
and the mean of β is estimated as 0.235. The difference in average βs in the control and
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Figure 12.1: Scatter plots of utility weights in the experimental group for the two alternative
interpretations of the social value orientation model.
Panel A: ΘO and β
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experimental groups is not very large and in fact statistically marginally insignificant
(p 2-sided = 0.06). Similar to the variance of ΘO, the variance of β in the control group
is statistically insignificant. Finally, the variance of the error term (ϵA − ϵB) is virtually
identical in the experimental and control groups.
A ΘO =0.2 is a remarkably similar estimate compared to the indirect estimates
of Rodrik (2017) and Kopczuk et al. (2005). The utility weight that subjects attach to
the inequality between ingroup and outgroup (β), however, is an argument that
Rodrik (2017) and Kopczuk et al. (2005) omit. The existence of the β term somewhat
complicates the interpretation of ΘO. This is because the actual weight one attaches
to the outcome of outgroup others is affected by the inequality between ingroup
and outgroup. For a more convenient interpretation, I will now use the alternative
and equivalent specification of the utility function given in (12.5). In this alternative
interpretation we can define two weights attached to the outcomes of outgroup
others relative to that of ingroup others when (i) the outgroup is worse off than the
ingroup and (ii) the outgroup is better off than the ingroup.
These weights are obtained using the β and ΘO parameters (see equation 12.5).
More precisely, when the outgroup is worse off than the ingroup (i.e., yI − yO >0)
the net weight one adds to the outcomes of outgroup others relative to ingroup
others is Θ
O + β
1− β . Substituting the estimated means of Θ
O and β gives us an estimate of
0.2+0.39
1−0.39 =0.97. In other words, when outgroup others are worse off their outcomes
are worth 97% of the outcomes for the ingroup, for an average subject. This means
that an average subject will be somewhat indifferent to a policy that redistributes
outcomes from the ingroup to the outgroup, when the outgroup is worse off. When
(ρ=0.72)
–1
–.
5
0
.5
1
1.5
W
ei
gh
t t
o 
ou
tg
ro
up
/in
gr
ou
p 
if 
O 
< I
–1 –.5 0 .5 1 1.5
Weight to outgroup/ingroup if O > I
Figure 12.1 (continued)
Panel B: ½ΘO +β1−β and Θ
O −β
1+β 
12 Social Identity and Social Value Orientations 303
the outgroup is better off than the ingroup the net weight one adds to the outcomes
of the outgroup relative to the ingroup is Θ
O − β
1+ β . Substituting the estimated means
gives us 0.2−0.391+0.39 = −0.14. This implies that when the outgroup is in a better position
than the ingroup, the average subject is spiteful: they derive negative utility from
the outcomes of the outgroup other. Figure 12.1-b shows the scatter plot of these
two weights. An interesting finding is the positive correlation between the two
weights. The figure also shows that there is precisely one subject who adds a nega-
tive weight to the outcomes of the outgroup even when the outgroup is worse off
than the ingroup. When the outgroup is better off than the ingroup, the majority of
subjects are spiteful toward the outgroup.
12.5 Conclusions
In this study I bridge the social value orientation literature with the minimal group
paradigm. I extend the social value orientation model to other-other allocations, par-
ticularly to the case in which the two recipients are an ingroup member and an out-
group member. Moreover, I provide a set of other-other Decomposed Games. Using
these games and inducing social identity via minimal groups, I estimate the weights
subjects add to the outcomes of outgroup others relative to ingroup others and to the
absolute difference between the outcomes of ingroup and outgroup others. I compare
these results to a control condition in which social identity is not induced. This method
quantifies clearly the effect of group identity on social value orientations.
Results show that the average weight subjects add to the outcomes of outgroup
others relative to ingroup others is negative when the outgroup is better off than the
ingroup. In other words, the average subject is spiteful toward the outgroup when
the outgroup is in an advantageous position compared with the ingroup. When the
outgroup is worse off than the ingroup, the average subject weights the outcomes of
ingroup and outgroup others similarly. There is also a significant variation among
subjects with respect to the level of ingroup bias. While a substantial number of sub-
jects show high levels of ingroup bias, a minority of “multicultural” subjects display
little bias. This variation is an interesting finding and future research should focus on
identifying subject level characteristics that explain this variation.
The method I present here is very easy to implement. The 10 other-other
Decomposed Games can easily be embedded in a survey or an experimental study.
Also the social identities of the two recipients in these 10 items can be adjusted de-
pending on the researcher’s interests. For example, the recipients could be from
two different real social (e.g., ethnic) groups. The method I describe here gives a
clear quantitative estimate of average ingroup bias. Furthermore, it captures indi-
vidual differences in the level of ingroup bias. These individual-level estimates can
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be outcome variables themselves. Alternatively, the researcher can use these esti-
mates to predict an outcome variable of interest.
How much an average actor weights the outcomes of outgroups relative to in-
groups affects important macro-level decisions. Barriers to international labor mobility
(Rodrik 2017), foreign assistance to poor countries (Kopczuk et al. 2005), redistributive
tax policies in ethnically heterogeneous contexts (Rueda 2018), intergroup trust and co-
operation (Aksoy 2015; Simpson 2006), collective action in a competitive environment
(Simpson and Aksoy 2017) are among the many social outcomes that are directly influ-
enced by the extent of ingroup favoritism. The current study shows that a relatively
minor minimal group identity treatment with a highly educated subject pool (the ma-
jority of the subjects were Oxford University students) is enough to create strong levels
of ingroup favoritism. One could easily imagine that the extent of ingroup favoritism
would be higher when real groups and less selected subject pools are considered. It is
thus not surprising to see widespread support to hostile policies toward foreigners in
almost all countries. Furthermore, the current study shows that ingroup favoritism is
much stronger when the outgroup is better off than the ingroup. This may explain why
low income groups are more likely than high income groups to favor policies that re-
duce the outcomes of outgroups, such as “Brexit”. This is because compared with high
income groups, low income groups are more likely to be worse off than the outsiders.
Moreover, stressing that the outsiders are well educated and skilled may not change
the opinion of the insiders. On the contrary, better off outsiders might trigger stronger
ingroup favoritism from the insiders.
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Appendix Other-other decomposed games
Table A1: 10 other-other Decomposed Games used in the study. The last three columns include
percentages of subjects choosing option B in experimental and control groups and a t-statistics for
the difference between the experimental and control groups, respectively (N=146 in the experimental
group and N=40 in the control group).
Option A Option B Data
(ingroup) (outgroup) (ingroup) (outgroup) % B choices difference
game other gets other gets other gets other gets Exp. Control t-value
     . . .
     . . .**
     . . .+
     . . −.***
     . . −.***
     . . −.
     . . −.***
     . . .***
     . . .+
     . . .
***p -sided<.;**p -sided<.;+p -sided<.
12 Social Identity and Social Value Orientations 307

Fabian Winter and Andreas Diekmann
13 Does Money Change Everything? Priming
Experiments in Situations of Strategic
Interaction
Abstract: Recent work by Kathleen D. Vohs and colleagues has argued that being
primed with money-related stimuli brings about a self-sufficient orientation. People
reminded of money are supposedly more willing to engage in solitary vs. social activ-
ities, donate less to social causes and help others less more generally. In the spirit
of Raub’s triangulation efforts to understand social phenomena, we first replicate
two of the individual-choice experiments reported in Vohs et al (2006). We then
extend their work to strategic situations, such as the Trust Game or the Volunteers
Dilemma. Our replications partially support the findings of Vohs et al. but we find no
effects of money priming in strategic interaction. The results suggest that strategic,
and thus social interaction may be of a different quality than individual choices.
The richer context may indeed mute subtle primes such as the ones used in previ-
ous experiments.
13.1 Introduction
Rational choice theorists and analytical sociologists alike focus on three elements of
explanations: Preferences, beliefs, and constraints (Hedström 2005, Gintis 2007).
Both beliefs and constraints are dependent on the social structure of interaction.
Thus, the social structure of interaction, the rules of ‘the game’, the information con-
dition, and the payoff matrix are at the core of parsimonious explanations of social
phenomena. Many situations of social interaction are strategic and the tools of game
theory proved to be very useful in describing the structure precisely. In contrast to
other rational choice theorists, Raub introduced game theory to sociology very early
and even before the ‘gold rush’ of behavioral economics (e.g. Raub 1982a, 1982b,
1984). In accordance with hypothetico-deductive reasoning and with the tools of
game models at hand he is able to derive precise predictions which can be corrobo-
rated by experimental methods or survey data. Raub’s pioneering work on social
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dilemmas, on networks and social exchange, on repeated games in a sociological
context, on trust and commitment and many other topics demonstrated the fruitful
approach of the “Utrecht school” (e.g. Raub 2004; Raub and Weesie 1990; Raub and
Buskens 2011). On the other hand, psychological game theory and framing models
may extend the parsimonious models. By this approach, more or less salient motives
are elicited by priming techniques. Also, the perception of the situation can be ma-
nipulated by presenting a certain type of “frame” (e.g. Esser 2010; Lindenberg 2006
for framing theories in sociology). A typical example is the “Wall Street Game experi-
ment” (Liberman et al. 2004). A switch from a “Community” to a “Wall Street” frame
strongly reduced the probands’ inclination to contribute to the common goal in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
In a similar vein, Vohs et al. (2006, 2008) suggested a priming theory of money.
They argue that a money prime (e.g. reading a text, a list of words referring to mon-
etary transactions or observing images reminding of money, etc.) elicits cognitive
processes and activities that may be described as more “self-sufficient”. The self-
sufficiency hypothesis does not necessarily imply selfish behavior. The authors pre-
dict that “when reminded of money, people would want to be free from dependency
and would also prefer that others not depend on them” (Vohs et al. 2006). On the
other hand, money priming may enhance performance and an equity, exchange-
based orientation (Vohs et al. 2008).
The effects of money priming are demonstrated by nine experiments (Vohs et al.
2006; further experiments are reported in Vohs et al. 2008). All experiments refer to
non-strategic social interactions, i.e. the outcome of a decision is not dependent on
other actors’ strategies. The question arises if money priming may also have self-
sufficiency effects in situations of strategic interactions, as modelled by game theory.
These are clearly predicted by the hypothesis because money-primed subjects should
focus more on oneself and less on others. In the following we will try to replicate two
experiments conducted by Vohs et al. (2006). In a second step we will extend this
research by investigating money priming in four games of strategic interaction: The
Ultimatum Game (UG), the Trust Game (TG), the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and the
Volunteer’s Dilemma (VOD).
13.2 The experiments by Vohs et al
In this section, we want to briefly summarize the relevant experiments and results
presented in the work by Vohs et al. (2006). In total, the authors present nine experi-
ments. We will later repeat two of them, although we follow different experimental
protocols than the original authors. Our study is thus not a direct one-to-one replica-
tion but an independent test of their theory.
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Here is the description of the design of the questionnaire study taken from the
original publication:
In Experiment 8, we tested whether money-primed participants would place a premium on being
alone even when choosing leisure activities that could be enjoyed with friends and family.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three priming conditions. Participants first sat at a
desk, which faced one of three posters, to complete filler questionnaires. In the money condition,
the desk faced a poster showing a photograph of various denominations of currency (fig. S3). In
two control conditions, the desk faced a poster showing either a seascape or a flower garden (figs.
S4 and S5). Subsequently, participants were presented with a nine-item questionnaire that asked
them to choose between two activities. Within each item, one option was an experience that only
one person could enjoy and the other option was for two people or more (e.g., an in-home catered
dinner for four versus four personal cooking lessons). (Vohs et al. 2006)
The authors find that participants in the money-prime condition are more likely to
choose solitary activities than those in the two control conditions.
The second replication in this chapter zeros in on the relation between money
and altruism. Here is the description of the original experiment:
Experiment 6 tested for the psychological effects of money by operationalizing helpfulness as
monetary donations. Upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were given $2 in quarters in
exchange for their participation. The quarters were said to have been used in an experiment that
was now complete; in actuality, giving participants quarters ensured that they had money to
donate. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, in which they de-
scrambled phrases that primed money or neutral concepts. Then participants completed some
filler questionnaires, after which the experimenter told them that the experiment was finished
and gave them a false debriefing. [. . .] As the experimenter exited the room, she mentioned that
the lab was taking donations for the University Student Fund and that there was a box by the
door if the participant wished to donate. Amount of money donated was the measure of helping.
(Vohs et al. 2006)
As predicted by their theory, the authors find that participants primed with money
donate significantly less than those in the neutral frame.
Our replications deviate in several aspects from the original studies, which we
further spell out in the next section. Importantly, we use the screen-saver priming
from the donation experiment also in the questionnaire study instead of the posters
used by Vohs et al. (2006).
13.3 Experimental Setup
Our experiments were conducted as computerized experiments with the zTree pack-
age (Fischbacher 2007) in the experimental lab of the ETH Zürich. Participants were
students from the University of Zürich and the ETH Zürich who were invited via
ORSEE, an internet-based recruitment system (Greiner, 2015) and had never partici-
pated in an economic experiment before. As it is standard in the experimental research
13 Does Money Change Everything 311
on social dilemmas and strategic interaction, all experiments were incentivized, how-
ever in a non-standard way. Instead of playing for money, our participants played for
time in the lab (see for instance Berger et al. 2012 for a similar approach). Participants
received a flat payment of 33 SFr. and played over the amount of simple mathematical
calculations everybody had to perform. The more of these calculations someone was
assigned to as the outcome of the games, the longer it took him or her to perform the
task. Due to this design choice, we were able to induce an incentivized strategic situa-
tion without relating it to money, which could threaten the treatment effect.
All experiments involved the same priming mechanism adopted from Vohs et al.
(2006), which worked as follows. First, participants did 100 calculations to familiarize
with the “currency”. Thereafter, they were asked to fill out a questionnaire including
the experimental questions for experiment 1 and to read the instructions for either ex-
periment 2 or experiment 3, which took about 7–15 minutes. During that time, a screen-
saver appeared, which either showed fish (neutral prime) or money bills (money
prime) floating through water (see Supporting Online Material of Vohs et al. 2006).
Every participant took part in experiment 1 and either in experiment 2 or experiment 3.
13.4 Findings
13.4.1 Experiment 1: Replication of the Vohs et al.
questionnaire experiment
Our first experiment was designed to test the robustness of experiment 8 reported
in of Vohs et al. (2006) and to confirm that our manipulation worked. We included
the same experimental items in our questionnaire, asking participants to choose be-
tween nine social and solitary activities (e.g., an in-home catered dinner for four
versus four personal cooking lessons). Confirming the results of Vohs et al. (2006),
we find that participants primed on money (N = 66) choose significantly more soli-
tude activities as compared to those with a non-money prime (N = 66) [μmoney = 2.97
(σ= 1.15), μneutral = 2.53(σ = 1.26), t(130) = 2.10, p = 0.038, Cohen’s d = 0.371]. Note,
however, that the effect size is much smaller than in the Vohs et al. study and at an
overall lower level.1 We are thus confident, that our priming worked.
1 Vohs et al.: µmoney = 4.00 (σ = 1.20), µneutral1/µneutral2 = 2.82/3.10 (σneutral1 = 1.00/σneutral2 = 1.80),
Cohen’s dmoney vs. neutral 1 =0.59, Cohen’s dmoney vs. neutral 2 = 1.06.
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13.4.2 Experiment 2: Does activating the concept of money affect
fairness and trust?
Experiments 2 directly followed experiment 1 in two sessions with 30 participants
each (N = 60). According to experiment 6 in Vohs et al. (2006), priming participants
on money reduces their willingness to donate money to charitable organizations.
With our second experiments, we aim to test the robustness of this finding in a
more controlled environment. To get a robust measure of altruistic and fair behav-
ior, we implemented the Ultimatum Game (UG, Güth et al. 1982), the Trust Game
(TG, Dasgupta, 1988) and the Dictator Game (DG, Forsythe et al. 1994), played once
by all participants in this order. If the results of Vohs et al. (2006) hold, we would
expect less egalitarian behavior across games if participants are primed on money.
In UG, two players, Proposer and Responder, bargain over a divisible good (in our
case 100 calculations). The Proposer makes an offer, stating how many of the 100 cal-
culations the Respond41er has to solve. At the same time, the Responder states how
many calculations he or she will solve at most, without knowing the Proposers offer. If
the Proposer’s offer is at least as low as the Responder’s threshold, the Responder will
solve the offered calculations, and the Proposer will solve the remaining ones. This pro-
cedure is known as the strategy method (Selten 1967) and has been argued to elicit
normative behavior (Rauhut and Winter 2010). If the offer is above the threshold, both
players have to solve the full 100 calculations.2 Under the canonical assumptions of
game theory, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is such that the responder
will accept any positive amount, and by backward induction the proposer offers ex-
actly that. A higher threshold of the responder is often associated with a concern for
equitable outcomes (cf. Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Winter et al. 2012). Money-induced self
sufficiency should thus lead to lower thresholds, as the comparison with the Proposer
is less important. Conversely, a self-sufficient Proposer should make lower offers, as
fairness as well as the Responder’s fairness concerns are less important. In both cases,
however, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of different offers and thresholds, re-
spectively [Offers: μmoney) = 44.6 (σ = 16.8), μneutral) = 45.7 (σ = 11.0), t(130) = 0.29,
p = 0.77, Cohen’s d = .08, Thresholds: μmoney) = 51.7 (σ = 17.1), μneutral) = 54.1 (σ = 12.4),
t(130) = 0.62, p = 0.53, Cohen’s d = .16].
In TG, there are again the two roles of Proposer and Responder. First, the
Proposer decides between the two options C (for cooperate) and D (for defection). If
the Proposer chooses D, both players have to solve 200 calculations. If the Proposer
chooses C, the number of calculations depends on the Responder’s decision: If the
Responder chooses C, both players have to solve 150 calculations, which is less
2 In this and the following two games, we used the strategy vector method, that is, we asked the
participants to decide for both roles, Responder and Proposer, and only later assign them randomly
to one of the roles. See Rauhut and Winter (2010) for a discussion of this method.
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than the 200 they would have to solve if the Proposer chooses D. If the Responder
chooses D, however, he or she would have to solve no calculations at all, while the
Proposer has to solve 300. Thus, if the Proposer trusts in the Responder’s fairness,
he would choose C, but D otherwise. Again, via backward induction, we can show
that the (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium of the game leads the proposer to
choose D, yielding (200, 200) because the responder would choose D herself, yield-
ing (300, 0) which is worse than the 200 calculations the proposer would receive
from opting out early.
Self sufficiency should lower the willingness to rely on the friendly behavior
of others and should thus lower both player’s probability of choosing C. Again,
we are not able to reject the null hypothesis for either of the decisions [Proposer:
χ2(1, n = 30) = 0.07, p = 0.60, Responder: χ2(1, n = 30) = 0.27, p = 0.79].
The DG mirrors the UG, however without the Responder’s power to veto an un-
acceptable offer. Thus the Proposer’s task is simply to decide how to allocate
100 calculations between himself/herself and the Responder. The DG can therefore
be considered as a replication of experiment 6 in Vohs et al. (2006). But also in this
case, we do not find significant differences between the two experimental condi-
tions [Offers: μmoney= 67.2(σ = 24.7), μneutral = 65.6(σ = 24.5), t(130) = 0.25, p = 0.80,
Cohen’s d =.07].
In sum, we cannot find evidence that participants primed on money behave dif-
ferently from those confronted with a neutral prime in strategic interactions.
13.4.3 Experiment 3: Does activating the concept of money affect
cooperation?
Experiments 3 directly followed experiment 1 in four other sessions with 18–20 partici-
pants each (N = 74). As in experiment 2, participants were exposed to the priming and
answered a set of control questions. The experimental task consisted of two other well-
know experimental paradigms, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (cf. Rapoport and Chammah
1965), and the Volunteer’s Dilemma (Diekmann 1985) displayed in Table 13.1. Both
games were played once in the above order by all the participants without giving feed-
back about the outcomes until the very end of the experiment.
Table 13.1: Prisoner’s Dilemma (left) and Volunteer’s Dilemma (right). The values in the cells denote
the number of calculations to be performed associated with the choices.
Player 
Player 
Cooperation Defection Player 
Player 
Cooperation Defection
Cooperation ,  ,  Cooperation ,  , 
Defection ,  ,  Defection ,  , 
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In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), defection is always better on the individual level
than cooperation (denoted by C), but worse on the collective level, which creates the
social dilemma. Self sufficiency should thus lead to less cooperation, as people tend
to focus on individual rather than collective aims. Our empirical results, however,
show an unexpected effect in the opposite direction: Priming participants on money
increases the likelihood of cooperation (χ2(1, n = 74) = 4.34, p = 0.04).
On the contrary, cooperation should be more pronounced in the Volunteer’s
Dilemma (VD). The game as played by our participants has three equilibria: two in pure
strategies where either of the two cooperates while the respective other abstains, and a
mixed strategy equilibrium where both players cooperate with the same probability
0 < p < 1. From the decision maker’s perspective, the most important thing is that some-
one (including the decision maker) volunteers to choose C, but its better if someone else
does it. In this case, money-induced self sufficiency would lower the willingness to rely
on someone else, and consequently increase the likelihood of choosing the cooperative
option. Our empirical results, however, do not allow us to reject the null-hypothesis of
no differences between treatments: Participants primed on money are as cooperative as
participants exposed to the neutral prime (χ2(1, n = 74) = 0.05, p = 0.82). In sum, we
cannot confirm the hypothesized effects of money-priming on cooperation levels in in-
centivized social dilemmas.
13.5 Conclusions
We replicated the effect of a money screensaver on the choice of solitary activities (ex-
periment 8 in Vohs et al. 2006). The effect size found in our replication was lower than
in the original experiment. The diminished size of the effect is no surprise. Smaller effect
sizes found in replications are very well in accordance with “the winner’s curse” hy-
pothesis (Young et al. 2008) as well as with results from the recent wave of replications
in psychology (Klein et al. 2014; Open Science Collaboration 2012, 2015). As in commer-
cial auctions, where of course the largest bid will win, large experimental effects found
in scientific research have an increased chance of publication. Due to publication bias
replication studies often report smaller effect sizes than the original study (if there is an
effect at all). Moreover, we did not find a significant difference in fairness behavior with
the Dictator Game. The replication of experiment 6 of Vohs et al. (2006) failed to provide
evidence for the self-sufficiency hypothesis. Our results also mirror recent replication at-
tempts of the Vohs et al. study by Klein et al. (2014), who also find no effects of the
prime across many labs.
Our key questions target possible effects of money priming on the behavior
in situations of strategic interaction. Here, our answer is clearly negative. In the
Ultimatum Game neither the proposer’s nor the responder’s behavior was signifi-
cantly influenced by the money screen saver. Also, there was no significant effect
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in the Trust Game or in the Volunteer’s Dilemma. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma we
even found a significant effect in the opposite direction of what was predicted.
Here, money-primed subjects showed significantly more cooperation than sub-
jects in the control group.
At least in situations of strategic interaction, the evidence for money-priming
effects on actor’s decisions is weak or non-existent. This is not to say that priming
or framing has no impact on strategic interactions in general. For example, the Wall
Street Game experiment provides evidence to the contrary. Framing the situation of
a Prisoner’s Dilemma had strongly affected the level of cooperation (Liberman et al.
2004). However, we do not know under which conditions which type of priming or
framing really has an impact on the various situations of strategic interaction.3
In contrast, game theory is much more systematic and elaborated. Given the
structure of strategic interaction, game theory is a powerful tool to derive precise
predictions on actors’ decisions. The work of Raub and collaborators clearly demon-
strates this. Enriching game models by social context, framing, and psychological
hypotheses is an important step to enhance the explanatory power of a theory of
social interaction. However, we are still far away from a general, unified theory and
doubts remain that the social sciences will ever attain this goal.
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Martin Abraham, Kerstin Lorek and Bernhard Prosch
14 Social Norms and Commitments in
Cooperatives – Experimental Evidence
Abstract: Cooperatives, which are characterized by pooling of jointly owned and
controlled resources in an enterprise by individual actors, are popular and wide-
spread in modern societies. However, since each actor has an incentive to withhold
resources individually while benefiting from the common pool, opportunistic behav-
ior may result. One possibility to overcome this dilemma situation are internalized,
normative beliefs which foster cooperative behavior. By experimentally modeling di-
lemma situations, we examine whether normative values work as behavioral refer-
ence points for members of cooperatives and whether this enhances cooperation.
Our results from two lab experiments demonstrate that a cooperative framework,
which we use as an indicator for normative beliefs, produces significantly higher
cooperation rates in social dilemma situations. Furthermore, we see that an insti-
tution framed as a cooperative is chosen by a substantial share of persons, even if
this institution produces inefficient results. Consequently, we conclude that gen-
eral norms contribute to the cooperative effect of cooperatives.
14.1 Introduction
Cooperatives are popular around the world. Rooted in forms of collective action al-
ready in medieval times (De Moor 2008), it became also an important type of orga-
nization in capitalistic systems. Beginning with the Rochdale Society of Equitable
Pioneers in 1844 in England, the idea of cooperatives as an organizational form of
self-help for bundling resources and power spread around the world and resulted
in a multitude of cooperatives. The International Co-operative Alliance defines a co-
operative as “[. . .] an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to
meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a
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jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise” (ICA 2018). All coopera-
tives rely on an internationally shared set of values rather than profit orientation.
The shared values comprise self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, eq-
uity, and solidarity.
Cooperatives can be found in various economic sectors (Higl 2008: 9f). Some exam-
ples are credit unions, housing cooperatives, energy cooperatives or agricultural coopera-
tives. In Europe, approximately 176,000 cooperatives exist, with 141 million members and
4 million employees. Since 2009, the number of cooperative enterprises has increased by
approximately 12%. Italy, Turkey, France, and Spain comprise the countries with the larg-
est numbers of cooperatives. The largest number of cooperative members can be found in
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and Italy. Most of the cooperatives in Europe
are in the industry and services sector, followed by agriculture and housing. The largest
sector by membership is, however, banking, followed by consumer and insurance.
In Germany, there are almost 7,500 cooperatives that have approximately 22 mil-
lion members and an annual turnover of 195 € billion. In 2015, 126 new cooperatives
were founded. The largest sector is agriculture, followed by the housing, industry,
services, and social sectors as well as banking. In the Netherlands, approximately the
same number of people (20 million) are members of one of the 70 cooperatives, and
agriculture is also the largest sector (all numbers come from Cocolina 2016).
In general, people find and join cooperatives to overcome problematic situations
by pooling their resources. Theoretically, in these situations, a “social dilemma”
arises, which is also often called a public good dilemma. Actors face cooperation
problems: since each actor has an incentive to withhold resources individually while
using the common pool of resources, group and individual interests diverge, and op-
portunistic behavior may result. One of the classic examples is the tragedy of com-
mons (Hardin 1968), where, for example, farmers overexploit land owned by the
community because cattle are sent to graze there by all farmers. Institutions offer a
solution for social dilemma situations by establishing rules to enforce cooperation.
In this paper, we see cooperatives as a specific kind of institution that bundles
resources and provides incentives for cooperative behavior in dilemma situations. In
our opinion, there are basically two types of mechanisms that may lead to coopera-
tive behavior in cooperatives. First, cooperatives may be based on general normative
beliefs, which promote cooperation in cooperative institutions. Second, sanctions of
misbehaving members are the classical mechanisms to ensure cooperative behavior
(see, for example, Camerer 2003; Raub 2004; Raub, Buskens, and Corten 2015).
The last mechanism has been the main subject of research on cooperation, and
selective incentives such as sanctions, hostages or rewards can enhance coopera-
tion. However, often enough, the assignment of this mechanism is difficult due to
information problems or the possibility to guarantee a sufficiently high incentive.
Especially, when we look at the literature on cooperatives, we see that norms are an
important part of this type of organization (for example, Spear 2000: 520). However,
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such mechanisms is rare.
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Consequently, the aim of our paper is to analyze the role of normative beliefs in
the functioning of cooperatives. By experimentally modeling dilemma situations,
we examine whether normative values work as behavioral reference points for
members of cooperatives and whether this enhances cooperation. Our results dem-
onstrate that a cooperative framework, which we use as an indicator for normative
beliefs, produces significantly higher cooperation rates in social dilemma situa-
tions. Furthermore, we see that an institution framed as a cooperative is chosen by
a substantial share of persons, even if this institution produces inefficient results.
Consequently, we conclude that general norms contribute to the cooperative effect
of cooperatives.
In the following sections, we take a closer look at the concept of cooperatives
and their principles (2). We then argue that cooperative principles work as an infor-
mational framework, helping build expectations about others’ behavior and there-
fore affect their own behavior (3). Furthermore, institutional rules of cooperatives
work as (costly) commitment devices that enhance cooperative behavior (3). We de-
scribe our experiments and their results (4) and conclude with a discussion of the
implications of our findings (5).
14.2 Basic principles of cooperation in cooperatives
Regardless of cooperatives’ specific interest, all cooperatives share one basic idea:
the collective solution of problems via cooperation and a set of shared values.
Although there are examples of cooperatives without primary economic goals (for
example, cooperatives that organize living opportunities for senior citizens), most
cooperatives have economic aims. The basic principles that any cooperative is based
on also form a distinctive difference from conventional profit-maximizing enterprises.
Although within more economically oriented cooperatives, members expect to make
a profit, and the maximum support for its members and cooperatives’ causes remain
the main goal. The generated surplus is distributed evenly among the members or
reinvested in the cooperative (Draheim 1955: 95f). As a result, each individual mem-
ber of the cooperative benefits from collectively produced resources and services. The
cooperative pools resources and makes it possible to reach goals that would not be
possible with only the individual’s capacity. The core principles of self-help, self-
administration, self-responsibility, and the identity principle underline this notion.
According to the principle of self-help, members of cooperatives share a com-
mon interest that they follow based on voluntary and open membership by cooper-
ating with each other. The underlying goal is the promotion of their economic and
social situation without external help and as a solidary collective. The principle of
self-help therefore implicitly formulates the cooperative values of subsidiarity and
solidarity (Harbrecht 2000).
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The principle of self-administration states that cooperatives are the property of
their members. The management of cooperatives therefore lies within the hands of
their members. Executive directors and the supervisory board are therefore elected
by all members at general meetings. Decisions are based on the one member, one
vote principle, which awards every cooperative member with only one vote, regard-
less of the member’s investment.
The principle of self-responsibility states that the cooperative and its members take
over sole liability against its creditors (Zerche, Schmale, and Blome-Drees 1998: 9ff).
Bonus (1994: 64ff.) formulates additional values: equality, equal treatment, trust and
reliability. All of this goes along with the identity principle. According to this prin-
ciple, each member of the cooperation fulfills a double role as owner and em-
ployee, client, and supplier at the same time.
These key principles, which are identified in the literature as the core principles
of cooperatives, can be seen as specific norms that guide the individual behavior of
cooperative members. We believe that people know in advance that a membership
requires compliance with these norms, and members will tend to cooperate due to
internalized norms and selective membership. We will describe this idea in more
detail in the next section.
14.3 Cooperatives and the solution of social
dilemma situations
There are basically two mechanisms that may explain the higher cooperation rates
within cooperatives. First, cooperatives may have a normative basis, which is based
on internalized beliefs about appropriate behavior towards other members of a co-
operative (Spear 2000: 520). Second, the sanctioning of misbehaving members and
incentives for compliant members are the classical mechanisms for ensuring coop-
erative behavior (see, for example, Camerer 2003; Raub 2004; Raub, Buskens, and
Corten 2015). Moreover, those incentives are safeguards against defective free riders
seeking to exploit normative-driven cooperators. Often, the sanctions and incen-
tives result from network embeddedness, for example, by awarding status or ex-
cluding defecting members from other private activities (Raub and Weesie 1990;
Fehl, van der Post, and Semmann 2011; Raub, Buskens, and Frey 2013). Although
this network embeddedness will probably have in most cooperatives an important
effect (Ole Borgen 2001), there are cooperatives that do not rely heavily on face-to-
face contact among the members, such as members of a banking cooperative. In
this paper, we question whether cooperatives can increase cooperation, even with-
out close-knit networks among members. Consequently, we concentrate on the ef-
fect of normative beliefs tied to cooperatives.
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14.3.1 Cooperative values as informational cues for cooperative
behavior
Dilemma situations often arise because in the short run, opportunistic behavior
is more profitable for individuals than cooperation. In the long run, however, the
group – and therefore an individual – benefits from cooperation (see, for exam-
ple, Raub and Voss 1986; North 1990). Institutions and norms are the core mecha-
nisms that help to overcome opportunistic behavior and support cooperation among
individuals (Coleman 1990: Ch. 10; Hechter, Opp, and Wippler 1990; North 1990;
Williamson 1985).
In this paper, we analyze cooperatives as a special kind of institution. People
associate and organize to solve a common problem such as making an investment
that would be too large for a single actor to perform. The core values and principles
of cooperatives describe social norms that expect a cooperative’s member to invest
and to cooperate to reach a commonly shared goal. However, even within coopera-
tives, incentives for opportunistic behavior exist. Each member’s contribution within
the cooperative can only be observed incompletely by the other members and man-
agement. This leads to asymmetrical information problems. For an individual actor,
incentives exist to maximize his or her own profit from the collective by reducing his
or her own contribution (Olson 1965; Akerlof 1970: 490ff).
The result would be collectively inefficient, and cooperatives therefore would not
be a stable organizational form. However, as we observe a decades-long cooperative
tradition, there must exist internal structures or mechanisms that create incentives
for cooperative behavior and promote norm-abiding behavior among its members.
The role as a member of a cooperative is accompanied by formal and informal
expectations about the behavior fueled by the cooperative principles. This in turn in-
fluences other members’ behavior. Within cooperatives, everyone knows what behav-
ior can be expected and what behavior would not be accepted. This argument is
supported by Draheim (1955: 43ff), who sees the “ghost of the cooperatives” promot-
ing loyalty among members and reducing opportunism (see also Spear 2000: 520).
We argue that the use of the term “cooperative” in an experiment can trigger
these (internalized) normative beliefs. We follow here Dufwenberg, Gächter, and
Hennig-Schmidt (2011: 472), who define framing effects as “a two-part process where
(i) frames move beliefs, and (ii) beliefs shape motivation and choice.” They find
that the use of the term “community” can lead to higher cooperation rates in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma. An additional explanation is provided in the “Wall Street ver-
sus Community Game” by Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004) and Ellingsen et al.
(2012), who similarly find that cooperative behavior is more likely when the game is
called the “Community Game” than when it is called the “Wall Street Game”. However,
they conclude that social frameworks can be coordination devices that influence peo-
ple’s beliefs rather than their preferences. In this sense, cooperation would increase
because actors expect others to be more cooperative in an appropriate framework.
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We do not distinguish between beliefs and preferences in our paper, and both ar-
guments lead to the hypothesis that participants should behave more coopera-
tively if they are given the possibility to act under a “cooperative” framework.
Moreover, normative beliefs may affect not only cooperative behavior but also the
choice to become a member of an institution. If these norms are sufficiently strong,
they may even override a primary incentive structure. We will use this possible effect
to reveal the normative motives when deciding to join a cooperative. Therefore, we will
look at a situation in which the cooperative solution produced by a cooperative is inef-
ficient and observe to what extent people nevertheless join the institution.
14.4 Experiments
14.4.1 Framing experiment
The first experiment examines the effect of membership in cooperatives and salient
knowledge of the cooperative principles on cooperation. The experiment took place
at the LERN (Laboratory for Experimental Research Nuremberg at the Department
of Economics of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg), with a total of 84 student
participants. Programming and execution were performed with z-Tree (Fischbacher
2007), and recruiting was performed with ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
The participants are, on average, 24 years old and in their third year of study.
Approximately 60% of the participants had knowledge about the concept of cooper-
atives beforehand. Approximately the same share of participants could imagine
joining a cooperative. This positive attitude towards cooperatives is further sup-
ported by two-thirds of the participants thinking of cooperatives as a good idea.
The experiment was a basic one-shot public good game (first introduced by
Marwell and Ames 1979) for the control group (CG), with three treatments, con-
ducted in a total of three sessions. For each session, participants were randomly
invited using the participant pool of the LERN. In the control treatment (CT), the
control group, each participant receives a starting budget. Divided into groups of
four, each participant has to contribute to a group project. The sum of the individ-
ual contributions within the group is multiplied by 1.5, and the resulting amount is
divided equally among the group members. Economic theory based on an egoistic
actor would predict a cooperation of 0 from participants. Empirically, however, vari-
ous studies show cooperation rates higher than 0 (for example, Fehr and Fischbacher
2004; Fehr and Gächter 2000).
Treatment 1 (T1) includes a framing treatment. In addition to the instructions
of the Public Good Game, participants receive information about the concept of
cooperatives and the cooperative value system (the text of this instruction can be
found in the Appendix of this chapter). Participants are again divided into groups
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of four. However, the groups are called cooperatives throughout the instructions
and experiment. With this treatment, we examine the effect of the normative be-
liefs triggered by being a member in a cooperative.
Treatment 2 (T2) adds a mandatory contribution of 10% of the starting budget.
This mandatory contribution is added to the group contribution and again equally di-
vided between the group members. In all other aspects, this treatment resembles T1.
This treatment considers the investments that come along with the membership in a
cooperative. As one of the goals of cooperatives is to collect enough resources to reach
the shared (economic) goal, we test whether a mandatory contribution leads to the
crowding out effects of voluntary cooperation.
The descriptive analysis of this first experiment (see Figure 14.1) shows signifi-
cantly higher cooperation for T1 (66.8%) than for the control group (47.1%). This in-
dicates that, according to our expectation, that the framing effect of being in a
cooperative instead of a free group and consequently the triggering of cooperative
values increase cooperation. The cooperation rate in T2, 62.3%, only slightly and not
significantly differs from the rate in T1. The mandatory contribution seems to have no
negative effects on participants’ intrinsic motivation to contribute.
Comparing the absolute amount of group contributions, we see no significant differ-
ence between the two treatment groups. The absolute voluntary contribution in T2
is lower, but this is only the case because participants in T2 have a lower endow-
ment (18 ECU instead of 20 ECU). If we add the mandatory fee of 2 ECU from each
cooperative member, the absolute average group contribution is almost the same.
This means that cooperatives seem to be able to collect the necessary resources
47.1
CONTROL TREATMENT T1 CO - OP FRAME T2 CO - OP FRAME WITH 
FEE
RATE OF COOPERATION
66.8 62.3
Figure 14.1: Cooperation rates in the framing experiment.
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even without mandatory contributions. However, even if mandatory contributions
exist, there is no support for the crowding out effects of voluntary cooperation.
Table 14.1 shows that the results are stable when we control for individual char-
acteristics. Only the effect of T2 disappears when we include participants’ attitudes
towards cooperatives. However, the difference does not disappear. Moreover, we
find a significant negative effect of the belief that cooperatives will not work in prin-
ciple. Interestingly, the effect of T2 ceases to be significant when controlling this
belief, whereas the effect of T1 remains stable. Although this could be caused by the
small sample size, another possible interpretation is that the mandatory contribu-
tion leads to a higher belief that cooperatives do not work (otherwise, a mandatory
commitment would not necessary) and that this effect in sum cancels out the posi-
tive effect of cooperatives. This idea would be in line with the idea that cooperatives
are aligned with the belief that people will be more cooperative, and if this belief is
weakened, people lose their trust in the institution.
Although the result of the first experiment is evidence for a general framing effect
and thus a normative belief that cooperatives enhance cooperation, the question
arises as to whether the decision to obtain a member and the subsequent decision
to cooperate is based on those beliefs. This is the subject of the next experiment.
14.4.2 Joining experiment
The second experiment also examines the cooperation-enhancing effect of cooperatives
as well as the effects of an entrance fee, which is a sunk cost. However, in this experi-
ment, we additionally observe that the decision to join a cooperative is dependent
Table 14.1: OLS regression on cooperation in the framing experiment.
DV: cooperation Model  b/se Model  b/se
Treatment: Ref. CT
Treatment  .* (.) .* (.)
Treatment  .* (.) . (.)
Social value orientation . (.) . (.)
No knowledge about coops −. (.)
Coop membership unwanted −. (.)
Belief: coops do not work −.** (.)
Participant has honorary post −. (.)
Constant . (.) . (.)
N = 
OLS estimates with robust standard errors; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Additional controls are age, sex, income and political party preference.
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on its effectiveness. This allows us to analyze whether people (a) tend to join an
institution called a cooperative even if it is not beneficial to do so and (b) the rela-
tionship between joining and the cooperation rate.
The experiments took place on study information days in schools and a public
event at the university in 2003. As the participants are mainly pupils from the
German Gymnasium (high school) and the interested public, we expect no signifi-
cant knowledge about game theory and cooperation experiments. Participation in
the experiment is voluntary and not financially remunerated. A total of 272 persons
participated in the experiment.
Again, we use a framed experimental design, this time based on the Classic
Chicken Game (see Table 14.2; for similar experiments, see Prosch and Petermann
2001; Prosch 2000). As in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation in a Chicken Game
is a Pareto-optimal result. However, in contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the re-
sult in the Chicken Game is not stable (see Rapoport and Chammah 2016 for a clas-
sical analysis). If one actor in the game assumes that the other actor cooperates, he
or she has an incentive not to cooperate. If both actors follow this logic, the result is
the worst for both and thus collectively inefficient. The game has two Nash equilib-
ria in pure strategies (C/D and D/C) and one in mixed strategies (for our payoffs,
the probability for each strategy is p=0.5)
Each participant was seated alone at a table in a room and received instructions
and the decision form. The participants were informed about the fact that they
would play several stages. At the beginning of each stage, they were informed
about the rules and the possible payoffs. Participants were told that they would
play against a computer that simulates a purely rational player. Each participant
played three treatments, starting with the control treatment, followed by treatments
A and B. The participants were told that they would play multiple stages, but they
did not obtain information about the rules until the beginning of each stage. The
resulting points of each round were summed up and copied in a certificate, which
was handed to participants.
In the first stage of the experiment, the control treatment (CT), the basic Chicken
Game without any modification, played a single shot against another anonymous
player. This shows us the baseline cooperation rate, which is used as a reference for
the following treatment groups.
Table 14.2: Chicken game.
Player 
Player  Cooperation Defection
Cooperation  /   / 
Defection  /   / 
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In the second stage of the experiment, the first treatment (TA) is introduced.
The participants were offered the opportunity to join a cooperative called “Exclusive”.
In joining the cooperative, the participant automatically makes a costly investment by
paying a fee of two points. Additionally, the new member of the cooperative commits
to following the cooperative rules. These rules state that a member has to cooperate if
the partner is also a member of the cooperative. If the partner is not a member of the
cooperative, one has to defect. Not meeting these rules is sanctioned with a fine of two
points. The participants knew whether their partner was a member of the cooperative
but had no further knowledge about their partner (stranger matching). Then, the basic
game is played once. If a player decides to join, the dominant strategy against other
members is cooperation and against a nonmember is defection. If a player does not
join and plays with a member, the best answer against the member’s dominant strat-
egy D is to cooperate. If both members did not join, they enter the basic Chicken Game,
without any dominant strategies. It is important to note that joining the cooperative is
not a rational strategy: due to the entrance fee, two members, each playing C, obtain
only one point, which is the lowest payoff in equilibria possible. Playing the dominant
strategy when paired against a nonmember or the best answer as a nonmember against
a member ensures two points, and the mixed strategies even lead to an expected payoff
of 2.5 points. If players become a member in this treatment, this can be seen as an indi-
cator for normative beliefs that one should join a cooperative since it ensures a cooper-
ative solution (even if this is not efficient).
In the third stage, participants face a second treatment (TB). The participants
are again asked to decide if they want to join a cooperative called “Free”. The treat-
ment resembles TA, with the exception that in TB joining, the cooperative is free of
charge. The other characteristics of the game (one shot with stranger matching) re-
main the same, including the commitment to cooperative behavior when meeting
another member and noncooperative behavior. This rule is again backed up by a
sanction of two points. The structure of dominant strategies is the same as in TB: a
rational member plays C against another member and D against a nonmember. A
nonmember plays D against a member, and nonmembers play a mixed strategy
against each other. However, in this case, joining the cooperative is the best option:
it ensures three points against other members or even four points against nonmem-
bers, whereas nonmembers can expect two points against members or 2.5 points
against other nonmembers.
This structure of treatments sheds light on the normative basis of cooperatives.
First, the comparison between treatments TA and TB shows to what degree the par-
ticipants choose an inefficient institution, which is framed as a cooperative, com-
pared to a completely efficient institution. An explanation for this behavior can be
the normative beliefs regarding cooperatives and their results: they ensure a coop-
erative result under certain costs. Second, the comparison between TA and TB addi-
tionally reveals the share of persons who are opposed to the idea of a cooperative:
they do not join the institution even if doing so leads to a lower payoff.
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Table 14.3 shows the average cooperation rate for each treatment. In the control
treatment, that is, the basic chicken game, 63% of participants cooperate. This re-
sult is in line with the typical results in similar studies. Having the choice to join
the “Exclusive” cooperative by paying a joining fee of two points, 46% of the partic-
ipants decide to do so, even if joining is inefficient. The majority, however, do not
join the cooperative, avoiding the accompanying costs. This could indicate that
within the cooperative, we have a positive selection of cooperative and intrinsically
motivated persons, who ascribe more importance to the cooperative values than to
financial efficiency. However, if we compare the cooperation rates in the base treat-
ment of the participants who will join the costly cooperative in the next step
(61.60%) with those participants who will not join the costly cooperative (63.95%),
we do not see any difference. The same applies for the comparison of cooperation
rates in the base treatment for participants who join or do not join the free coopera-
tive. This means that the selection of people joining the institution is not driven by
a general attitude to behave cooperatively but by a kind of preference for coopera-
tive results, even if those are Pareto-inferior.
If members of the cooperative are paired with another member, 90% of them show co-
operative behavior. In contrast, if members meet a nonmember, cooperation rates de-
crease to only 11%. These results are not surprising since they mirror the dominant
strategies in the respective games. Nevertheless, commitment devices considerably en-
hance the cooperation rates. Participants who decided not to join the cooperative show
similar cooperation rates as those in the control group (approximately 63%). However,
an interesting point is that nearly one-half of the participants (46%) joined an institu-
tion that is clearly inefficient since both members could do better as nonmembers.
Table 14.3: Cooperation rates in the commitment experiment; N = 272.
Base Game (CT):
%
“Exclusive” Cooperative (TA)
Ego becomes member
(% of participants)
Ego does not become member
(% of participants)
Partner is member Partner is not member Partner is member Partner is not member
% % % %
“Free” Cooperative (TB)
Ego becomes member (% of participants) Ego does not become member (% of participants)
Partner is member Partner is not member Partner is member Partner is not member
% % % %
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The second treatment shows joining rates to the “Free” cooperative of 81%. This
is not surprising considering that the decision is efficient. The cooperation rates in-
crease slightly for cooperative members (from 90 to 96%). In addition, 19% did not
join the cooperative even if it was inefficient.
Finally, we see that the rate of cooperative behavior within the population is in-
creasing with each step: in total, 171 participants (63%) choose cooperation in the base
game, 205 persons (75%) choose cooperation in TA, and 245 persons (90%) choose co-
operation in TB. Hence, each institution increases the rate of cooperation within the
group, and the effect of the inefficient cooperative is nearly half as large as that of the
efficient one.
14.5 Conclusion and outlook
Cooperatives are an often overlooked but nevertheless prevalent form of economic orga-
nization (Altman 2010). However, in theory, cooperatives are especially jeopardized by
collective good problems since the pooling of resources enables free-riding among mem-
bers. Consequently, cooperatives need specific cooperation mechanisms to overcome
this collective good problem. We discussed two important mechanisms: first, normative
beliefs about appropriate behavior in a cooperative, and second, norms that are trig-
gered by joining a cooperative. Based on two distinct experiments, we are able to show
that the framing of a Public Good Game as resource pooling within a cooperative leads
to higher cooperation rates. This is in line with the finding that similar cooperative
frameworks enhance cooperation in Public Good Games (Dufwenberg, Gächter, and
Hennig-Schmidt 2011; Ellingsen et al. 2012). In a second experiment, we employed a
Chicken Game to analyze the decision to become a member of a cooperative and the
resulting effects. Unsurprisingly, we find, in line with a great deal of literature on co-
operative behavior, that selective incentives – here, sanctions for noncooperative
members – lead to higher cooperation rates. More interestingly, our results confirm
that cooperatives seem to have a value on their own: a substantial number of them –
nearly one-half of our respondents – joined an institution framed as a cooperative,
even if this yielded lower payoffs than staying a nonmember. Within the cooperative,
the sanction mechanism leads to a higher cooperation rate.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to show these framing effects for coop-
eratives. The results shed light on the institutions in general, which tend to be more
effective if they are based not only on positive and negative incentives but also on a
normative basis. It is an interesting question as to why cooperatives are especially
successful in producing such a basis, whereas state institutions seem to be in need
of behavioral incentives to a much higher extent. We can only speculate here, but
there are two main differences between cooperatives and many other institutions.
First, membership in cooperatives is always voluntary, which allows for a strong
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self-selection of members that share the normative basis. Second, cooperatives are
based on a high extent of equality and equity among members. These findings may
support the evolution of the norms and beliefs regarding cooperatives over time.
We think that it is noteworthy that the results are stable across two different
games (Public Good and Chicken Game) and two sampling procedures (economic
lab with remuneration and paper and pencil without financial incentives). This
makes us confident that the results are stable. Of course, the experiments have a
weak spot in regard to external validity; hence, future research should focus on co-
operative behavior in real cooperatives.
Appendix: Information treatment for cooperatives in
the framing experiment
General information
– The experiment lasts one round.
– The participants of the experiment will be divided into groups of 4 persons
each. Each of these groups forms a cooperative. The other members of your co-
operative are anonymous, this is, you will not find out who is a member of your
cooperative either during or after the experiment.
– Your payout depends on your own decisions and the decisions of the members
in your cooperative.
Information on cooperatives
The basic idea of a cooperative is to solve problems together. In contrast to purely
profit-maximizing business enterprises, the aim of cooperatives is to provide maxi-
mum support for their members. This means that any surplus earned is distributed
to the members.
In addition to the economic situation, the social concerns of the members are
particularly important. Cooperative values such as solidarity, self-help and mutual
support as well as self-administration and self-responsibility determine the actions
of their members.
Within the framework of a voluntary and open membership in the cooperative, the
members support each other. With the sense of solidarity and self-help, they strive to
together improve their economic and social situations. Each individual member of a
cooperative benefits from the collectively provided services and resources.
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Cooperatives have established themselves in different economic sectors, for exam-
ple, in the housing sector. In addition to rental and owner-occupied housing, coopera-
tive housing is a widespread form of housing in Germany. A housing cooperative
manages its own real estate, maintains it and takes care of renting it out. The members
of a housing cooperative share a common interest in affordable housing in which it is
worth living. The cooperative union helps the members of a cooperative improve their
living conditions, which would not be realizable as an individual person.
Cooperative membership is tied to a one-off payment upon entry. With the help of
contribution payments, the cooperative can provide a safe living space at socially re-
sponsible prices. In addition, members are free to make an additional financial contri-
bution to support the cooperative.
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Hartmut Esser
15 Rational Choice or Framing? Two
Approaches to Explain the Patterns in the
Fehr-Gächter-Experiments on Cooperation
and Punishment in the Contribution to
Public Goods
Abstract: The paper “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments” by
Fehr and Gächter from 1999 was a milestone for the change of RCT from its standard
versions to the adoption of elements from non-economic fields. The contribution in-
vestigates the scope of possible explanations for the observed patterns in the F&G-
experiments by Rational Choice Theory (RCT) extended by motives of reciprocity,
with the model of frame selection (MFS). Main result is that most findings can be re-
constructed rather easily by both approaches – with one exception: After starting
with punishment and after withdrawal of this option after 10 rounds subjects should
following RCT react immediately with at least some defection, following MFS, how-
ever, with keeping a high level of cooperation, independently of motives of subjects.
An independent empirical test with data also from other experiments (Hermann et al.
2008) confirmed this hypothesis: no change in cooperation, not even by egoists.
Alternative RCT-explanations aiming to find cooperative equilibria for keeping coop-
eration unchanged by egoists could be the assumption of reputation-effects in finite
iterated games. This interpretation, however, seems to be not plausible: Fehr and
Gächter tried to control explicitly for reputation effects for all versions, and at least
for the stranger-version no reputation effects are expected by RCT. The effect, how-
ever, appeared in both versions, and for the stranger-version of the data set by
Hermann et al. even stronger than in the original experiment.
15.1 Prologue
There is a long history of consent with regard to basic assumptions on sociological
theory and empirical research. It all started when Raub and Voss visited, apparently
intentionally, various lectures and seminars across the newly founded universities in the
Ruhr area. It was an extremely exciting time, in which the concept now known as
‘model of sociological explanation’ was developed – around the mid-seventies and thus
long before the well-known Coleman’s ‘bathtub’ became popular (see Coleman 1986;
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Raub and Voss 1981, 2017). From the beginning for many researchers, but certainly not
for all, the Rational Choice Theory (RCT), which was either unknown or frowned upon
within the field of sociology, became the center of the necessary microfoundation of so-
ciological explanation. This included its particularly promising applications to social sit-
uations within game theory. Despite all advantages as compared to all other approaches,
doubts occurred that it possibly doesn’t capture all important aspects of (social) action,
for example emotions, internalized norms, habits and – last not least – the ‘definition of
the situation’ by ‘significant’ symbols, which then defines what has to be considered as
‘rational’. Some of those who played a direct and leading role in these developments
had, therefore, looked for ways to meet this incompleteness. Examples are Viktor
Vanberg who considered rational choice as a respectively activated ‘program’ within sit-
uations (Vanberg 2002), or Siegwart Lindenberg and his to date further and further ex-
tended concept of goal framing (Lindenberg 2015). Such relapses had to appear strange
to those who were happy to have finally discovered RCT and game theory as instru-
ments, which seemed to make a serious, explaining sociology possible.
The author of this contribution had felt the same at first and in fact for a long
time: not again all this drivel about culture! And then the attempts to integrate it into
the framework of RCT! Was there any alternative? But there was more and more evi-
dence indicating that RCT wouldn’t possibly be the last word and that one wasn’t able
to cope with various anomalies by – more or less skillful – extensions of the theory.
My personal re-framing started with different findings in the course of a long-term proj-
ect on divorces. Here, empirical evidence had shown that – inter alia – the fact of the
ritual of church wedding alone reduces dramatically the probability of a later divorce.
This applied even after controlling for really all conceivable RCT hypotheses on this
topic, like public commitment, religiosity, or normative climate within peer groups.
Moreover, later marital crises are clearly reduced by church wedding, A parallel run-
ning qualitative panel study with detailed, intensive interviews revealed that in ap-
proximately two thirds of the cases there were virtually no variations in the ‘framing’
of the relationships, even if extreme stress occurred. In short: If the ‘frame’ of the rela-
tionships was ‘matching’ from the very beginning and if it was symbolically reinforced,
the marriage would be considered as naturally intact, despite all occurring highs and
lows, and a separation would be completely out of question.
On the basis of earlier considerations on the integration of approaches of symbolic
interactionism for the ‘definition of the situation’, the theory of everyday behavior by
Alfred Schütz, (1971) above all Herbert Simon’s concept of ‘bounded rationality’ (1983)
and Thomas S. Schelling’s game theoretical contributions on focal points (1960), and the
newly emerging script and schema theories as well as dual process models of cognitive
social psychology, gave rise to the development of the model of frame selection (MFS). It
allowed for – in the first instance theoretically – identifying causally the ‘definition of
the situation’, which is controlled by symbols, and for specifying conditions for a rational
choice to occur in a very simple way. And this all happens within the framework of an
also formally specified theory and causal relations.
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Nearly nobody liked this model (at first). This is true for all kinds of cultural soci-
ologists, who would lose their methodological dualistic autonomy, but also for adher-
ents of RCT – including Raub and Voss. This becomes unequivocally obvious in
several passages in a contribution to a ‘polemic’, which was published for a similar
occasion like this one. One example: “First, it is not necessary to introduce so to say
different ‘forms of rationality’ in order to explain normative action. Second, it is deci-
sive to overcome the restriction to a parametrical concept of action and to take into
account explicitly social interactions in processes of the definition of the situation.”
And subsequently: “The model of frame selection is not suitable for this.” (Raub and
Voss 2009: 188, translation H.E.). Here is another late reaction to these objections.
15.2 Background
The paper “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments” (Fehr and
Gächter 1999; also cited as F&G in the following) is not only a typical example of
game-theoretical modeling and empirical testing of theoretically derived hypothe-
ses, but it is also a milestone for the change of RCT from its orthodox and strict eco-
nomic versions to the adoption of ever more elements from non-economic fields
like cognitive psychology, sociology and anthropology. A ‘general’ theory of action
for all social science sub-disciplines seems to be conceivable (cf. Fehr and Gintis
2007: 60f.; Gintis 2007: 15f.) and the process of convergence is actually in full speed
(Tutić 2015: 84ff.). Main result of the experiment was that in a public good situation,
where traditional RCT expects no contribution at all, subjects not only started with
a contribution rate of about 50%, but that with merely announcing the opportunity
to punish free riders, contributions made a strong jump upwards and converged to
nearly 100% in the following rounds – although punishment was expensive for
punishers and should not occur for selfish rational actors.
Rational Choice Theorists and Behavioral Economists usually are convinced
that an explanation of these and other deviations from traditional RCT is possible
with rather minor changes in the two core elements, which drive the rational selec-
tion of actions: preferences and beliefs, and that it is not necessary (or even a bad
mistake) to change the general micro-foundation of the selection of action as future
oriented, strategic ‘choice’ itself. That means that other processes to explain action
and behavior like pattern recognition, categorization and the triggering of reaction-
programs by (subtle) symbolic cues in a situation as they were found in the seminal
experiments by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) on the framing of decisions by differ-
ent wordings for same incentives or by Liberman et al. (2004) on contributions to
collective goods by labeling a situation with same incentives as ‘Community’ or as
‘Wallstreet’ Game were unnecessary. In both cases it became evident, that peculiar
preferences to cooperate or to defect seemingly play no role. Irrelevance of other
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aspects than preferences and stability of preferences, however, are two of the key
elements of any version of RCT. The findings give thus good reason to take up this
point: Is it possible to explain the patterns in the F&G-Experiment by means of RCT
keeping the principles of utility maximization untouched? Or is it necessary to
change not only assumptions about preferences, beliefs and utility functions but
also the mechanism for the micro-foundation in face of such results.
The aim here is to compare the story RCT has to tell to explain the results of the
F&G-Experiments with the story of the MFS, which has been considered by many
researchers as being not suitable at all to deal with social situations and the dynam-
ics of interactions. The following describes first the structure and core results of the
F&G-experiment in its original version from 1999, gives a short overview of the core
elements of RCT and MFS in comparison, tells two (short) stories to explain the cru-
cial patterns of the findings with a summary for the fit of theoretical predictions
with the findings, and presents an additional empirical test of both approaches.
15.3 The experiment
The peculiar aim of the F&G-experiments was a systematic test for effects of opportu-
nities to punish free riders in public good games. The prediction following strict ortho-
dox RCT was that nobody would contribute and nobody would punish if punishment
is costly. With a tiny bit of incomplete information cooperative equilibria are possible,
but the specific patterns of the experiments hardly can be explained with egoistic mo-
tives alone. Fehr and Gächter therefore assumed “reciprocity” as an additional mo-
tive – over and above of altruism, which could explain cooperation, but not (costly)
punishment, because punishment reduces the gains of altruism (see also section 6).
The experiment lasted 20 rounds. It was split up after 10 rounds with one of the two
opportunities to change to the other version for another 10 rounds. Subjects were in-
formed about the contributions of the others after every round and knew that the
experiment would be terminated after round 20. Experiments were varied in two dif-
ferent ways: Without and with punishment opportunity first and with randomly vary-
ing subjects in the single rounds (stranger condition), or with the same subjects over
all 20 rounds (partner condition). The aim was to control for reputation effects and
effects of the experience of a common history.
15.4 Main findings
Figure 15.1 shows the pattern of the two variants of the experiments (starting without
punishment NoP1 and with punishment WiP1 in the first 10 rounds followed by a rever-
sal in the following 10 rounds WiP2 and NoP2, respectively, each in the partner version).
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The findings can be summarized in 6 observations.1
1. With no punishment option in round 1 (NoP1) an average of about 10 units (or
50% of the maximum of 20) of contribution to the public good is observed.
2. Contributions deteriorate in the following rounds more or less steadily and ap-
proach the level of nearly overall defection in round 10.
3. With the announcement of a punishment option after round 10 (WiP2) contribu-
tions rise in round 11 immediately in a strong jump of about 10 units.
4. After round 11 with the punishment option a steady increase of contributions
takes place up to about 19 of possible 20 units.
5. The general shape of the patterns is similar for both variants of order: conver-
gence of cooperation up to nearly 100% and decay with WiP down to nearly
full defection with NoP.
6. If punishment comes first (WiP1), a rather small decrease of about 4 units (from
about 18 down to about 14) takes place from round 11 with no punishment
(NoP2) in contrast to the jump up of 10 units up if punishment comes after no
punishment (WiP2) and the decay in cooperation (from ca. 3 up to ca. 13).
20.0
15.0
10.0
0.0
5.0
1      2      3      4       5      6      7      8     9      10   
11    12     13    14     15    16    17    18    19    20   
Contributions
Rounds
with P
without P
with P
without P
Figure 15.1: Patterns of contributions for two variants in the F&G-experiment (partner version).
1 For an extended and more detailed comparison on 14 findings see: Esser 2018: 19f.
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These six findings make up the core of the following comparison of RCT and MFS in
being able to explain the patterns. The comparison refers to differences between
RCT and MFS in their theoretical arguments and their ability to offer explanations
without changing basic assumptions.
15.5 RCT and MFS
Before we start with the comparison we summarize shortly the peculiarities of RCT
and MFS as background for their theoretical predictions for the outcomes in the
F&G-experiment (cf. for a summary of central RCT-assumptions: Gintis 2007, part 4;
of main elements of MFS: Esser and Kroneberg 2015; and for a comparison of basic
tenets of both approaches Tutić 2015, parts 2 and 3). One reason is that at least the
peculiarities of MFS cannot be presupposed for most readers, in- and outside the
RCT-camp, but also to demonstrate, where the substantial differences become obvi-
ous. Aspects are the basic principles to explain (re-)actions, the modeling of social
situations, the explanation of processes and changes in view of each approach.
Especially it should become clear, that the MFS cannot be interpreted simply as an-
other extension of RCT – as some representatives of (orthodox and wide) RCT as
well as most critics from Interpretative Paradigm or cultural sociology are inclined
to do.
Two elements can be assigned as basic principle of RCT. First, action is con-
ceived as ‘choice’ between alternatives by maximizing the product of preferences
and beliefs for consequences in the future. Second, choices have to fulfil certain ax-
iomatic conditions like transitivity and independence of variations in their verbal
presentation. Situational cues should, therefore, have no systematic effect on pref-
erences, but possibly on beliefs. RCT varies in some variants between fully informed
homo oeconomicus with transitive preferences and differing variants of ‘bounded’
rationality. The respective type of rationality, however, is assumed as fixed and not
subject to situational change. Emotions are not part of common versions of RCT,
but are sometimes conceived of as special kind of preferences. All effects of incen-
tives, costs or risks are conditional: They add to expected gains or losses, but with-
out changing the respective utility functions. Social situations are characterized in
RCT by common knowledge about opportunities, beliefs, and preferences of others
in a situation and by anticipation of their possible reactions. The main aim of RCT
is the derivation of typical equilibria for collective outcomes, in particular by instru-
ments of game theory. Processes of strategic interaction are conceived as iterations
and causally connected chains of single acts. Changes in behavior and collective
outcomes are possible by two mechanisms: first, anticipation of reactions and
gains/losses for a complete sequence and, second, adaptation of beliefs from the
observable behavior of others by (Bayesian) learning, for instance as “conditional”
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cooperation or defection. Preferences are assumed to be stable over all situations,
but can change in the long run by adaptive reinforcement-learning and evolution.
Basic principle of MFS is a process of decoding ‘significant’ symbols (‘cues’) in a
situation, which trigger the activation of a specific mental model for the “definition”
of the situation, the ‘frame’, connected programs for reacting, more or less habitual-
ized ‘scripts’ for sequences of behavior and single acts. Mental models and reaction
programs were encoded in the past mainly by socialization, but in part also by bio-
logical evolution. They contain typical patterns of main goals, preferences, beliefs
and emotions for typical situations. The set of mental models for different situations
makes up the (multiple) identity of actors. The strength of the activation for a specific
frame depends on the mental model’s internal accessibility, the external presence of
a particular physical object, the cognitive link between mental model and physical
object, and the degree of occasional noise for this link. If the match between object,
cue and a (strongly) accessible mental model is perfect, the activation of a frame and
the execution of the connected behavior will follow immediately and without any
‘choice’ and deliberation of consequences in the future. The MFS denotes it as as-
mode of selection. Main implication of a strong framing is the suppression of the ef-
fects of other incentives, costs, and risks with corresponding changes of the respec-
tive utility function up to the complete unconditionality of a frame. In case of a
certain mis-match and strong motives and available opportunities to deliberate con-
sequences, a ‘rational’ choice can take place – up to a level even orthodox RCT and
homo oeconomicus presumes. MFS denotes it as rc-mode of selection. Insofar RCT
could be regarded as a special case of the MFS, but with an explicit consideration of
a peculiar ‘definition’ of the situation preceding any ‘choice’ – what is missing in all
versions of common RCT. Social situations can be conceived in two ways in the MFS.
First, as framing of the situation by mental models for types of common actions and
collective outcomes. If framing is strong, a kind of mechanical coordination by the
automatic activation of the same frame of social action for all actors will simulta-
neously take place. Second, if framing is weak and motives and opportunities for de-
liberating consequences are given, strategic social action will become possible – just
in the same way as RCT and game theory conceive social situations – but again with
a preceding definition of the type of social situation. Processes can be modelled as
sequences of single acts of framing and subsequent behavior with effects on the next
steps of framing and (re-) action, possibly also with switches between automatic and
strategic (re-) actions in an as- or a rc-mode. Changes in framing situations (and in
the modes of selection) can occur by two mechanisms. First, alterations in decoding
and categorization, e.g. by sudden mis-matches and/or the appearance of cues indi-
cating another type of situation. Second, changes in encoding mental models by
adaptive learning from deviations with regard to content, accessibility and the link,
which transforms objects in ‘significant’ symbols. For both changes actions of others
can serve as cues for the framing of the situation in the next rounds.
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Table 15.1 summarizes the core constructs, proposed mechanisms and addi-
tional assumptions for both RCT and MFS (as-mode only).
15.6 Two (Short) stories
RCT-explanations of the empirical patterns of the findings in the F&G-Experiment
(Figure 15.1) start with the assumption of social motives as preferences and two types
of actors: egoists (EP) and altruists (AP). In WiP1 both types start with their preferen-
ces: EP-types defect, AP-types cooperate. The sharp decay of cooperation after a cer-
tain period of stability can be explained by ‘conditional cooperation’: Altruists learn,
that they are exploited and that it is better to defect, simply as defense. With the an-
nouncement of the punishment opportunity Altruists have an offensive option: to
punish defectors. Cooperators with only altruistic motives, however, would not choose
this option, because any punishment is not only costly, but decreases their own bene-
fits, like the feeling of a warm glow by cooperation itself and for the well-being of
others. In order to explain the rise of contributions after the decay in round 11,
Table 15.1: Basic constructs and assumptions of RCT and MFS.
Aspects RCT MFS
Mechanism Choice
max. expected utility
shadow of the future
Categorization
(Mis-)Match
shadow of the past
Opportunities yes yes
Beliefs yes yes
Preferences yes yes
Emotions (no) yes
Cues/Symbols ‘cheap talk’
relevant for beliefs only
‘definition of the situation’
relevant for beliefs and preferences
Types of rationality fixed variable
Unconditionality no yes
Social situations strategic interaction mechanical coordination
Processes Sequences of situations and actions Sequences of situations and actions
Changes: short-term Bayesian learning
Beliefs only
(Mis-)Match/Re-Framing
Beliefs and preferences
long-term adaptive reinforcement
evolution
adaptive reinforcement
evolution
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additional motives have to be assumed: Cooperators are not only altruistic, but ‘recip-
rocals’ (RP) with strong motives to retaliate against defections. EP-types know this,
anticipate severe punishment and cooperate, because this pays now for them. RP-
types anticipate this and start for WiP2 with the punishment option in round 11 with
cooperation – on a higher level not only after the decay before, but also in comparison
to the beginning in NoP1. The steady rise of contributions after round 11 up to nearly
100% can thus be explained easily: Both EP- and RP-types have good reasons to con-
tinue with cooperation – even if not all participate immediately, but quickly learn that
cooperation is better for them, too.
The MFS-explanation of the pattern starts also with a distinction of motives, but
not as stable characteristics of actors over different situations, but as varying impera-
tives in situations. The no punishment situation in the F&G-Experiment is objectively
one of the type of a prisoner’s dilemma, but not framed very clearly. If we assume
some kind of default options for not clearly defined situations, Cicourel’s ‘basic rules
of interactions’, results for round 1 can be explained by following their mental models
of EF or AF: 50% cooperation, 50% defection in each case. If reactions in the first
round (and later) serve as cues to define the situation more clearly, the decay in co-
operation can be explained as stepwise increase of a framing as Wallstreet Game,
where selfishness and competition prevail, until all actors follow this definition of
the situation regardless of their social motives. The announcement of punishment
after round 10 serves in a similar way as significant cue for another definition of the
situation: not as Community Game with rather innocent altruism and friendliness,
but as ‘Reciprocity’ Game, connected with strong inclinations to retaliate against de-
fections immediately and without any consideration of further consequences as the
costs of punishment. This not only explains the higher level of contributions in
round 11 as compared with the undefined situation in round 1 with its random or de-
fault reactions, but also the sudden jump of about 50% difference up from the level
after the decay of cooperation before. The steady rise up to nearly full cooperation in
the last round would be a consequence of the increasing match for the reciprocation
frame – backed by effectively punishing defectors and collecting more and more col-
lective gain – up to the end of the last round.
15.7 Comparison
Table 15.2 provides an overview of the theoretical arguments and assumptions of
the two approaches to explain the six findings mentioned above.
For findings 1 to 5 both approaches can rather easily explain the respective pat-
terns (with different theoretical arguments). The base is a peculiarity of reciprocity:
Common knowledge of the possibility of self-inflicting retaliations by (strong) emo-
tions is presumed by RCT for the assumption of a subgame perfect equilibrium
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given the punishment option, instant activation of strong affects and inclinations to
retaliate against violations of cooperation- and fairness-norms as part of the reci-
procity frame activated by the announcement of the punishment option is presumed
by the MFS. Finding 6 indicates, however, a difference. RCT predicts a clear decrease
in contributions after removing the punishment option as first sequence: Selfish de-
fectors now have not longer to fear retaliations, and altruistic cooperators are facing
the risk to be exploited. MFS in contrast assumes a process of strengthening accessi-
bility and match of the reciprocation frame first with a following history of high, sta-
ble and unbroken cooperation: An increased ‘priming’ of AF by repeated cooperation
of nearly all. Defection after removing the punishment options could, therefore, be
perceived as occasional mis-match of a firmly established frame in which cooperation
prevails. This explains the rather small decay of contributions with the change from
punishment to no punishment – in contrast to the reversed situation of the decay of
cooperation first, increasing anger of exploited cooperators, who will change immedi-
ately to reciprocation if punishment becomes possible. Finding 6, however, confirms
MFS, but RCT has no explanation for the asymmetry in changes of contributions
between round 10 and 11 for the two variants of NoP1 and WiP1 (highlighted
in Table 15.3).
The summary in Table 15.3 refers to the most extended variant of wide RCT so
far: from the orthodox version with the assumption of selfish motives only (RCT 1.0)
over the extension by motives of conditional cooperation, warm glow, altruism,
fairness or inequity aversion (RCT 2.0) to the assumption of another type: strong
reciprocation with a nearly unconditional willingness to punish violations of group
standards (RCT 3.0). Table 15.3 summarizes how the different versions of RCT fit
with the 6 findings (numbers indicate confirmation of the resp. finding).
Table 15.2: Theoretical arguments and assumptions to explain the F&G-findings.2
Findings RCT MFS
 Types of preferences (EP, AP) Types of frames (EF, AF)
 conditional cooperation: beliefs C/D Mis-Match AF
 common knowledge P with WiP activation RF with WiP
 common knowledge P with WiP increasing match for RF
 similar conditions in both versions similar conditions in both versions
 no explanation Priming RF by C in WiP
2 Preferences: Egoism (EP), Altruism (AP), Reciprocity (RP); Frames: Egoism (EF), Altruism (RP),
Reciprocity (RP); (Re-)Actions: Cooperation (C), Defection (D), Punishment (P).
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RCT 1.0 is clearly refuted by most of the findings. Only two of the six findings
are in accordance with selfish utility maximization in public goods games: decay of
cooperation as consequence of attempts to defend oneself against further exploita-
tion (finding 2), independently of the order of both sequences (finding 5). The as-
sumption of altruism as social motive in RCT 2.0 allows an explanation of even high
rates of cooperation in the first rounds of the sequences (finding 1) and for the
larger effects for partners (finding 9): Motives for cooperation compensate probably
the selfish ones, and for cooperation with partners higher amounts of warm glue
and stronger beliefs in the reliability of their type may arise. To explain the effects
of the punishment option, however, more than social motives of warm glow or al-
truism has to be assumed: credible willingness to strongly and unconditionally re-
taliate against defective deviations from a group standard (RCT 3.0). With one
exception, all findings can be explained with these assumptions. The exception
concerns the rather small decrease of cooperation after punishment: Defectors
don’t change their identity even by long sequences of successful cooperation before
in round 11 for WiP1 to NoP2, and they should reduce their contributions immedi-
ately just by the same amount, by which they increased their contributions with an-
nouncement of the punishment option in round 11 for NoP1 to WiP2.
The listed arguments of MFS in Table 15.2 refer to the as-mode of an automatic
activation of a certain kind of what Victor Vanberg sometimes has called program
based behavior (PBB). All 6 findings fit with the MFS-predictions for this case. MFS,
however, comprises also ‘rational choice’ as selection-mechanism – provided that
conditions for the rc-mode are met and, thus, in principle for all versions of RCT as
special cases (including the applicability of all formalizations and instruments like
game theory). But this does not mean a straightforward subsuming of common RCT
simply under the rc-mode of the MFS: For the MFS, all selections are preceded by a
Table 15.3: Theoretical predictions and empirical fit between variants of RCT and MFS.
theoretical predictions and empirical fit
RCT MFS
F. Content RCT . RCT . RCT . PBB RCT*
 % C rd.  for NoP refuted    ()
 % C rd.  for NoP     ()
 % C rd.  for WiP refuted refuted   ()
 % C rd.  for WiP refuted refuted   ()
 same both versions     ()
 asymmetric change rd.  not expl. not expl. not expl.  (not expl.)
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process of categorization and a certain ‘definition’ of a situation, and it depends on
the strength and content of framing, what happens. The strength of framing deter-
mines the degree of (variable) rationality and the content how a situation is seen
and ‘interpreted’ by actors. Framing, then, can be a matter of automatic activation
as well as of a ‘rational choice’. This implies that any ‘definition’ of a situation will
lose its unconditionality, if cues are ambiguous and accessibility for a specific men-
tal model is weak. In this case other motives can interfere, like especially selfish-
ness, which always tends to be pushed to the fore and to override social motives
and the impulse for costly emotional reactions (according to Goal Framing Theory
by Lindenberg 2015: 47ff.). This specific MFS-version of RCT with framing is labeled
as RCT* – in remembrance of the concept of ‘unit act’ proposed by Talcott Parsons
already in 1937, who postulated that any act is preceded by a ‘normative orienta-
tion’, which defines the situation with respect to preferences, beliefs and perceived
opportunities. The MFS is the formalized version of this concept, enriched and com-
pleted by well-established insights and findings from cognitive psychology, neuro-
science, anthropology and evolutionary biology since this contribution of Talcott
Parsons to a ‘General Theory of Action’.
For the F&G-Experiment RCT* would make in principle the same predictions as
version RCT 3.0 (with the same arguments, assumptions, confirmations, refuta-
tions, and blanks in explanations). But RCT 3.0 assumes a preceding step of ‘defini-
tion’ of the situation with effects like those in the experiments by Tversky and
Kahneman or Liberman et al. That leads to another MFS-story – now for framing
the situation in the rc-mode. Beginning again with no punishment first and assum-
ing a rather open, undefined situation (as in the F&G-experiment) selfish or social
preferences and types of actors determine what happens: More than 50% coopera-
tion from the beginning, conditional cooperation and decay. Assuming a clear cue
for cooperation- or reciprocity-frame contributions should change: an even higher
cooperation rate and no decay. Wallstreet-cues would have the reverse effect: sup-
pression of cooperation and no change for the following (as in the Liberman-
experiment). For all effects and patterns possible framing-effects, however, would
be weaker in case of a rc-mode as compared to an as-activation: A certain mis-
match is one of the necessary conditions for any (rational) deliberation. And refer-
ring once more to Lindenberg’s Goal-Framing Theory, selfish motives should be-
come stronger with the degree of (possible) deliberation. Exactly that is observed
accidently and mostly more as by-catch in other experiments of behavioral econom-
ics (Costa et al. 2014; Duwfenberg et al. 2011; Ellingsen et al. 2012; Engel and Rand
2014; Rand et al. 2012; Rubinstein 2013). In Table 15.3 predictions and fits with the 6
findings are, therefore, presented in brackets for version RCT* – ‘Rational Choice’
in the rc-mode of the MFS.
346 Hartmut Esser
15.8 A separate test
The only case where the approaches contradict each other theoretically is finding
number 6 with the asymmetry occurring when the punishment option is changed
between round 10 and 11. This relates directly to the core of both approaches:
According to RCT, same reactions should occur both upwards and downwards, re-
gardless of whether the punishment option is introduced or abolished in the first
or second sequence. The only thing that counts is the common knowledge of the
options, and neither introducing or abolishing the punishment option leads to
changes in preferences. By contrast, according to the MFS on would expect different
reactions (in the as-mode): Introducing the punishment option after prior decay of
cooperation without punishment option (transition NoP1 to WiP2) will result in a
significant jump upwards, too. Abolishing the punishment option after having
started with it and after the subsequent sequence with high cooperation rates (tran-
sition WiP1 to NoP2), however, will (at least in the first instance) will cause no spe-
cial change. The theoretical argument for this refers to the basic mechanism of
frame selection: the increasing match of a cooperation (resp. reciprocity) frame via
a process of an ever stronger activation of the framing, being reinforced by coopera-
tive acts themselves, the iterative symbolic ‘constitution’ of a cooperation ‘commu-
nity’, just as it had been observed in Liberman’s experiments in the ‘community
game’ or analogous field experiments on priming of altruistic attitudes (cf., inter
alia, Keizer et al. 2013).
So much on the reconstruction of the findings that can be reconstructed from
the publication of the F&G experiments. But would there also be a chance for a test
independently of the published results? An obvious way is linked to the core of the
respective approaches: actors’ preferences (EP and RP) and the different frames (EF
and RF). It is possible to derive specific hypotheses from both approaches with re-
gard to changes in the transition from round 10 to round 11 for both versions (NoP1-
WiP2 and WiP1-NoP2).
RCT suggests that introducing or abolishing the punishment option alone will
change the respective expectations: Accordingly, changes would amount to the
same effect on cooperation for both types in both directions (see the left-hand side
of Figure 15.2: RCT, NoP1-WiP2 and WiP1-NoP2 for EF and RF). The main reason is
that following RCT beliefs only would change, but preferences should remain con-
stant. If beliefs on other´s cooperation are increased, however, temptations to defect
after the withdrawal of the punishment-option would be even higher than before and
rather strong defection should follow in round 11. In contrast, according to MFS one
would expect a differential pattern (see the right-hand side of Figure 15.2: MFS, NoP1-
WiP2 and WiP1-NoP2 for EF and RF). This is because changes vary with the content
of framing (EF and AF type) and with the accessibility of respective cues, here the
announcement that a punishment option is introduced or abolished. Four theoretical
expectations result from this: First, in version NoP1-WiP2 there is a clear change
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upwards for EF types after introducing the punishment option after round 10, quite
similar to the magnitude of the change as proposed by RCT (for all types), because
their expectations change (Figure 15.2, number 1). Second, among RF types coopera-
tion increases clearly, too, in version NoP1-WiP2 in round 11. However, it exceeds the
changes among EF types (and all of RCT), because the reciprocity frame is (only)
available for RF types (Figure 15.2, number 2). Third, in version WiP1-NoP2, contribu-
tions immediately decline among EF types after a long period of high cooperation be-
tween rounds 2 and 10: What counts for them (as for RCT in general) are only
expectations, and if the risk for punishment no longer exists, they will have no reason
for cooperation anymore. In addition, there is no ‘community’ priming, because it is
not available to them (Figure 15.2, number 3). Fourth, according to the MFS, nearly no
changes will finally occur among RF types in the transition WiP1-NoP2, at least not in
round 11 (Figure 15.2, number 4): Among them, the RF frame is ever further activated
1 2
3 4
Change
round 11
NoP1-WiP2 WiP1-NoP2 NoP1-WiP2
RCT MFS
EP-Type RP-Type EP-Type RP-Type EF-Type RF-Type EF-Type RF-Type
WiP1-NoP2
Figure 15.2: Theoretical expectations of RCT and MFS regarding the effects of introducing or
abolishing the punishment option between rounds 10 and 11 of both versions NoP1-WiP2 and WiP1-
NoP2 according to actors’ preferences and frames (EP/EF type and RP/RF type; cf the text above on
the different numbers).
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through mutual cooperation. Only more obvious and repeated disruptions of the
prior ‘constitution’ of the cooperation ‘community’ may finally give rise to condi-
tional defection in subsequent rounds.
Three specific hypotheses on the relationships of differences in contributions be-
tween rounds 10 and 11 result from this. First, the difference in the change of coopera-
tion between rounds 11 to 12 as regards version NoP1-WiP2 is significantly positive for
RF types as compared to EF types (compare number 1 with number 2). Second, be-
tween versions NoP1-WiP2 and WiP1-NoP2 there is no difference with regard to the
amount (!) of the change among EF types: Their contributions decrease to the same
extent when the punishment option is abolished as it increased before its introduc-
tion (compare the amount of number 1 and 3). Third, among RF types no change in
cooperation occurs in the transition for version WiP1-NoP2 in round 11 as compared
to round 10 (number 4).
How could one make an empirical comparison if the types weren’t measured
separately? One simple consideration provides the solution: The behavior in ques-
tion when options change, relates to what happens in rounds 10 and 11, but prior
sequences exist and one can presume at least for round 1 that actors followed
(largely) their (private) motives and mental models. These reactions can, therefore,
be used as (proxy) measurements of the types, analyses can be conducted sepa-
rately for both types, and the findings can be compared with the hypotheses stated
in Figure 15.2. This is exactly what had been done then.
As the number of cases in the original experiment (Fehr and Gächter 1999 – for
Zürich) appeared to be too small for separate analyses, another dataset which is
comparable with the approach was used and pooled.3 The types were dichotomized
according to their contributions in the respective first round. All subjects who had
spent at least half of their available means (10 out of 20 units) were classified as RF
types and those who had spent less than one half as EF types, respectively. This
corresponds to a central theoretical aspect in the explanation of reciprocity effects:
Already simple fairness norms include sharing as being part of the basic rules of
interaction and only those who stay below can be designated as egoist. This creates
a certain asymmetry in the distribution of the types, because there aren’t so many
3 The dataset used by Hermann et al. (2008) includes altogether 17 cities from different national
cultures. Except the one for St. Gallen, none of the experiments there corresponds to the approach
of the original experiment in F&G 1999, because either they considered only one version of intro-
ducing the punishment option, or they conducted fewer rounds (for example, six rounds twice in-
stead of 10 rounds twice). Anyway, St. Gallen would have proven more suitable for an analysis,
because with it the wider national-cultural context was held constant. Zürich was also included in
the complete dataset, but it’s structure didn’t correspond with the one in the F&G experiment, too.
Different from the original experiment, however, only a stranger version of the experiment was con-
ducted, which normally shows the whole pattern less pronounced (cf. the findings 13 and 14 on
partner versions in Fehr and Gächter 1999). This makes the test conducted here even more thorough
as compared to the hypotheses of the MFS.
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egoists then, particularly when the game starts with an available punishment op-
tion (WiP1-NoP2). This cannot be avoided, but testing for ‘significant’ effects is thus
conducted even more thoroughly.
The findings of the analyses testing the three hypotheses are summarized
in Table 15.4.
The first hypothesis is clearly confirmed (column 1): The difference in contributions
between rounds 10 and 11 (columns a and b) among RF types exceeds by 4.2 units
significantly the one among EF types (column c). In contrast, the second hypothesis
of the MFS proves to be incorrect, at least at first sight (column 2). It is expected that
the amount of change among EF types between rounds 10 and 11 remains the same
for both versions, NoP1-WiP2 and WiP1-NoP2, and thus, this difference equals zero
(column 2H). Yet, the change during transition to WiP1-NoP2 amounts only to -0.4
(column c WiP1-NoP2, EF type), so that the difference with regard to the change in
version NoP1-WiP2 is smaller by 8.5 units that the reference value of the change of
8.9 units for the transition regarding NoP1-WiP2 (column c, NoP1-WiP2, EF type). To
put it more simple: Contrary to hypothesis 2 of the MFS, EF types virtually don’t re-
spond to the abolishment of the punishment option in round 11 after a long period of
prior cooperation. The third hypothesis is then again confirmed clearly (column 3):
With regard to version WiP1-NoP2, RF types continue their high levels of cooperation,
which indeed even further increase by 1.4 units: from 15.6 units in round 10 to 17.0
units in round 11 (column c, WiP1-NoP2, AF type). The findings are summarized graphi-
cally in Figure 15.3.
Table 15.4: Changes in contributions at the transition from introducing or abolishing the
punishment option between rounds 10 and 11 from NoP1 to WiP2 and from WiP1 to NoP2 for egoists
and altruists (EF and RF types) using the pooled dataset (Fehr and Gächter 1999 for Zürich;
Hermann et al. 2008 for St. Gallen); bold: difference significant with p≤0.001.
Average Contribution Hypotheses MFS (H)
and findings F&G (B)
n
a b c   
Version Round

Round

Diff.
–
H B H B H B
NoP-WiP
EF Type
RF Type
.
.
.
.
.
.
plus . 

WiP-NoP
EF Type
RF Type
.
.
.
.
–.
..
zero –. zero . 

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The according to hypothesis 2 greater decline in cooperation among EF types
(Table 15.4, column 2) looks like a refutation of the MFS. But is this really true?
Hypothesis 2 is based on the really extreme assumption that egoists are basically
not susceptible to a cooperation priming over long sequences of a profitable com-
munity. This seems not to be true and there is considerable ethnographic evidence
in support of this. Already the various experiments by Liberman had demonstrated
that the ‘definition’ of a game’s framing can override all preferences. Although dif-
ferences in the level of cooperation between EF and RF types remain in phase WiP1,
the decline in round 11 with NoP2 predicted by RCT (3.0) doesn’t occur. Despite all
egoism there obviously always exists also a certain susceptibility to processes of
symbolic constitution of a cooperation community and a mitigation of reactions to
changes in opportunity structures and incentives alone. In any case this finding is a
clear rejection of RCT, even in its widest version: namely the assumption that ‘fram-
ing’ and ‘definition of the situation’ don’t exist and that symbols and language are
nothing but ‘cheap talk’.
NoP1; EF
WiP1; EF
WiP1; RF
NoP1; RF
NoP2; AF
WiP2; EF
WiP2; RF
NoP2; EF
100
150
50
100
2 10
0
11 20
1 2
3
4
Contributions
Figure 15.3: Cooperation in the F&G-experiment for the two versions NoP1-WiP2 (thicker lines) and
WiP1-NoP2 (thinner lines) in dependence on actors’ frames (EF types: dashed lines, RF types:
solid lines; cf. the text on arrows and numbers; without round 1, which was used to determine the
different types).
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15.9 Evaluation
Reconstruction of the F&G-experiments with RCT and MFS shows, that both ap-
proaches work rather well. But both have also to make several assumptions without
a really sound theoretical and/or empirical foundation until now.
The main problem for RCT is the stepwise extension of types of motives and ac-
tors, sometimes appearing simply as post-hoc-‘explanation’ of clear refutations of
the foregoing version of RCT by assuming a new motive for what had just been ob-
served: selfishness, altruism, strong reciprocity, the last including the assumption
of the activation of emotions for explaining costly retaliations and thus transcend-
ing the boundaries of core elements of common RCT again. It looks sometimes very
much like a degenerative problem shift. Two of the six findings could not be ex-
plained even by version RCT 3.0 with reciprocity as a stable trait of types of actors,
and especially the absence of end-game-effects in the very last round after high co-
operation contradicts each of the three versions of RCT.
The MFS is able to explain these two anomalies of RCT 3.0 rather easily if con-
ditions for the as-mode were met: A longer period of cooperation strengthens at
least a Cooperation-frame, and single interferences, e.g. by announcement that the
punishment option is withdrawn now, are not able to re-frame the situation in-
stantly. The same should apply for end-game-effects if punishment is possible and
high cooperation prevails in the second sequence. And: Emotions are not a strange
addendum for MFS, but an essential part of any program based behavior (PBB) in
an as-mode of framing, activated in an uncontrollable way by certain ‘significant’
symbols or cues. Indirect evidence for framing-effects, including the activation of
emotions and unconditional retaliation of defections, which serve as (very) signifi-
cant cues triggering aggressive reaction in a Reciprocity-frame, is given by Fehr and
Gächter themselves (see above). For RCT* and rc-condition predictions and preced-
ing framing are somewhat different to those of common RCT without any assump-
tion of preceding framing: The ‘rational’ choices hinge at least partly also on a
‘rational’ selection of a specific frame, but the effects are weaker in its strength and
more selfish in content – the less strong a situation is defined and the more oppor-
tunities to deliberate are available. Predictions and fits for RCT* are therefore also
marked by brackets in Table 15.3.
The detailed analysis of the F&G-Experiment leaves the question quite open,
whether RCT delivers a satisfying explanation within its (more and more opened)
boundaries or whether MFS fares better. Both approaches have at least one problem
in common: Any additional assumption decreases the logical content of a theory,
and that applies to RCT as well as to MFS. RCT has to extend types of motives and
actor – up to the assumption of unconditional emotions, and MFS has to distinguish
and verify types of frames and certain conditions for the mode-selection. Because
both approaches differ strongly in core constructs and assumed mechanisms they
can hardly be compared in their logical content. But such an incommensurability is
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inevitable in most cases of ‘correcting’ explanations and theory development. It is the
price for achieving a ‘comprehensive’, general theory, which explains the anomalies
of different approaches by preserving its merits.
F&G-experiments have speeded up undoubtedly the process of a kind of unifi-
cation of social sciences by employing some changes in types of preferences in the
initial conditions of RCT, but Liberman-experiments and occasional findings of
framing effects in behavioral economics remind that this could perhaps not be
enough. MFS is a conjecture to integrate framing-effects into a comprehensive con-
cept of a ‘general’ theory of action – even if a majority of cases can be explained
actually by means of (wide) RCT alone. But a rigorous experimental test is still miss-
ing. What could be done, however, as a first next step seems to be obvious: combin-
ing the F&G-experiments with the Liberman-experiments and varying the easiest
possibility to restrict opportunities for deliberation, namely time pressure to react
in situations defined by different cues for frames with different types of actors.
15.10 Epilogue
Many have always viewed the MFS with skepticism. And there have been periods,
partly up to date, when differences seemed to increase and when mutual rationali-
zations of the superiority of one’s own approach have started to prevail once more
(see Fehr and Gintis 2007: 60f., Gintis 2017: 161ff., Chapter 12). There are certainly
good reasons for such resistances, as we know from Lakatos’ work: As long as one
has an alternative useful theory: formally precise, logical in substance, empirically
proven, one won’t change it only because single anomalies occur. This even applies
in case that anomalies increase in number – as long as no better alternative is in
sight and as long as one can hope that the problems can be solved by (more or less:
marginal) changes in the established approach. And this is exactly what has been
done for a long time: extension of RCT by introducing ever more additional motives
and, finally, the withdrawal to a purely formal definition of RCT by, for example,
certain axioms. But the rather flat waves of a slowly upcoming flood of hardly
adjustable anomalies also from game theoretical experiments take their toll on even
core assumptions of RCT. In addition, it is obvious that prominent representatives,
who are well aware of all RCT’s possibilities, themselves attempt to solve these
problems (cf. Tutić 2015 on the approach of an integrative microfoundation from
various convergences regarding developments within economy, cognitive (social)
psychology, and sociology). It looks as though these developments have meanwhile
also influenced some criticasters, at least there are indications that they have in the
meantime been acknowledged as noteworthy developments in the microfoundation
of the model of sociological explanation (Raub and Voss 2017: 29 f.). Not everybody
has this open-mindedness and self-confidence to admit, that there is perhaps more
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that has been established by now. I wish to thank Werner Raub especially, who,
unlike others, was willing to do so.
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Christoph Engel and Axel Ockenfels
16 Maverick: Experimentally Testing a
Conjecture of the Antitrust Authorities
Abstract: Antitrust authorities all over the world are keen on the presence of a partic-
ularly aggressive competitor, a “maverick”. Yet there is a lack of theoretical justifica-
tion. One plausible determinant of acting as a maverick is behavioral: the maverick
derives utility from acting competitively. We test this conjecture in the lab. In a pre-
test, we classify participants by their social value orientation. Individuals who are ri-
valistic in an allocation task indeed bid more aggressively in a laboratory oligopoly
market. This disciplines incumbents. We conclude that the existence of rivalistic atti-
tudes may justify antitrust policies that protect mavericks.
16.1 Introduction
One man’s meat is another man’s poison, as they say. Antitrust is a field of applica-
tion. For those forming a cartel, or coordinating tacitly, collusion is a dilemma.
Individually, each is best off if the others are faithful cartelists, while this one firm
undercuts price, or exceeds the quota for that matter. However, if cartelists succeed
to coordinate, this has negative external consequences for consumers. Antitrust au-
thorities are therefore pleased to learn that one supplier in a market is particularly
aggressive. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines have coined the graphic term
“maverick” for such firms. The Guidelines describe such firms as “firms that are un-
usually disruptive and competitive influences in the market”.1 The European Horizontal
Merger Guidelines express the same concern.2
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In the next section, we review the case law and the (rather small) economic lit-
erature on maverick behavior. In this paper, we focus on one potential source of
aggressive market behavior that has gotten short shrift. Market participants might
bid aggressively because they hold particularly competitive preferences. They might
derive utility from getting a higher payoff than their peers. In this sense, our study
looks at macro-level implications of individual social preferences and thus builds on
most of the literature, which asserts that such preferences exist in the field (see refer-
ences in Ockenfels et al. 2015).
A preference-based explanation for aggressive market behavior, and its effect on
the behavior of other market participants, would be hard to study in the field, if not
impossible, though. This is why our study is conducted in a controlled laboratory en-
vironment, despite the inevitable wedge between our object of interest (the behavior
of firms in a product market) and our object of study (the behavior of students in a
laboratory market); we further discuss external validity in the concluding section.
Social preferences are assumed to be personality traits. Personality traits cannot
be induced on the spot, but they can be measured. We proceed in two steps. In a first
experiment, we classify participants by their social value orientation (Liebrand and
McClintock 1988). We select those participants with the most rivalistic social value
orientation to be entrants in the second, main experiment. For 10 periods entrants
observe how two participants randomly selected from a pool with less extreme social
value orientation choose quantities in a duopoly market. We investigate whether the
behavior of incumbents, and market outcomes, differ according to the social value
orientation of the entrant.
Our main hypothesis is supported with a proviso. Conditional on local market
conditions, firms perform worse on average, and consumer welfare increases, if the
market entrant is classified as rivalistic. Yet local conditions matter. In particular,
rivalistic entrants do not make the market more competitive if competition was al-
ready fierce in the first place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 defines our contribu-
tion to the legal and economic literature. Section 3 presents the design of the experi-
ment and our hypotheses. Section 4 reports the results from the main experiment.
Section 5 concludes with discussion.
16.2 Mavericks in practice and in economics
The concept of mavericks has led to a rather rich case law. In United States vs.
ALCOA, government sued ALCOA for divestiture of the acquisition of Rome Cable
Corporation. The Supreme Court held that the acquisition constituted monopoliza-
tion, on the argument that “Rome was an aggressive competitor” (377 U.S. 271 [281]
(1964)). Likewise, in Mahle GmbH, the Federal Trade Commission forced Mahle
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GmbH to divest Metal Leve’s United States piston business on the argument that,
before the merger, Metal Leve was “an aggressive and innovative competitor” (62
Fed.Reg. 10,566 [10,567] (1997)). The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
opposed the acquisition by Alcan Aluminium Corp. of Pechiney Rolled Products,
LLC, since this would “remove a low cost, aggressive, and disruptive competitor in
the North American brazing sheet market” (Case No. 1:03CV02012, para. 21 (2003)).3
Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission opposed the proposed merger of Staples, Inc.
with Office Depot, Inc., on the argument that the merger would eliminate a “particularly
aggressive competitor in a highly concentrated market” (Case No. 1:97CV00701, sec. IV
A 2 (1997)). These decision are echoed by legal doctrine (Baker 2002; Kolasky 2002).
The European antitrust authorities have taken similar decisions. The European
Commission cleared the merger of T-Mobile Austria with tele.ring only after the parties
committed to selling major assets of tele.ring to an independent competitor. This under-
taking was requested, although the new merged unit would not be the largest supplier
in the Austrian market for the provision of mobile communication services to end cus-
tomers since, before the merger, “for the last three years, tele.ring has played by far the
most active role on the market in practising successfully a price aggressive strategy”
(case M.3916, O.J. L 88/2007, 44, para. 10). Likewise the Commission cleared the merger
of Linde with BOC only after both firms committed to selling a number of major supply
contracts concerning helium. This removed the Commission’s original concern that,
otherwise, Linde would stop “compet[ing] aggressively to expand its position on this
market” (case M.4141, IP/06/737 (2006)). An interesting case is Euler Hermes/OEKB.
Through the merger, the new unit reaches a share between 45 and 55% on the
Austrian market for delcredere insurance. The Commission nonetheless does not see
reason for concern, one counter argument being that an independent new entrant
Atradius “has assumed the role of a maverick by its aggressive pricing policy and its
increase of sales” (case M.4990, para. 29, 2008).4
There is also empirical data suggesting that mavericks exist, and that they can
substantially change market behavior. One study compares prices for retail gas in
the otherwise comparable metropolitan areas of Ottawa and Vancouver. In both re-
gions, tacit collusion would be equally feasible. Yet data from Internet price data
collection sites show that, in the Ottawa region, prices are much more dispersed
and volatile. This market outcome can be traced back to the presence of a maverick
(Eckert and West 2004a, b). Maverick behavior has also been identified in the
Australian mortgage market (Breunig and Menezes 2008). Another illustration is be-
havior in the Dutch spectrum auction in 2000 (Van Damme 2003, see also Klemperer
2004). There were five incumbents and five licenses for sale, but several potential en-
trants. As Van Damme (2003) emphasized, the Dutch telecom regulator “hinted at
3 http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f201300/201303.pdf.
4 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m4990_20080305_20310_de.pdf.
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the desirability to favor newcomers to the market in the auction”, and that “there are
several reasons why a new entrant might be a more aggressive player on the market”.
However, all but one potential entrant (Versatel) actually partnered with an incum-
bent bidder, removing them from the auction market. One of the incumbents (Telfort)
later, during the auction, accused Versatel of particularly aggressive bidding behav-
iors. As Van Damme (2003:285) reports: “Telfort claims that Versatel is bidding only
to raise its rivals’ costs or to get concessions from them.” (Cramton and Ockenfels
2017 make a related point in the context of Germany’s 4G auction.)
That said, there is a gap between the practice of dealing with mavericks in com-
petition policy and the economics of mavericks in theory. Simple economic explan-
ations of why some firms are more competitive than others would include that
mavericks have lower costs, are incentivized by sales volumes, or control more ca-
pacities than their competitors. All this would imply that mavericks have a rather
large market share. Yet, as Breunig and Menezes (2008) pointed out, competition
authorities often stress that mavericks are, in fact, likely to be small firms (which
seems to make it more plausible that personality traits of managers play a role in
the phenomenon of mavericks). This might follow from pronounced switching cost,
which forces entrants to be particularly aggressive (Farrell and Klemperer 2007),
from more pronounced discounting of future earnings by firms in financial distress
(Busse 2002), or from the fact that fixed cost is high in the industry (Scherer and
Ross 1990). Yet another, underexplored source of aggressive behavior is behavioral.
Some, but not all, decision makers like to be ahead, and dislike being behind. It is
this source we are studying in this paper.
Our approach resonates with the New Zealand Merger Guidelines. In their sec-
tion 7.2, the guidelines explicitly list “features associated with a maverick”. Most
features relate to a behavioral tendency to disrupt coordination and similar phe-
nomena, including the first feature (“a history of aggressive, independent pricing
behavior”) and the last feature (“a history of independent behavior generally”).5 In
the same spirit, Kwoka (1989) adds a firm specific degree of conjectural variation in
quantity choices to a fully symmetric Cournot model.
In the US the focus on “maverick” firms has come under attack. Antitrust au-
thorities have been urged to put less weight on the issue, mostly because there is so
little theoretical foundation in economics.6 However, in our view, the normative de-
bate of the role of mavericks would benefit if it were to adopt a more adequate con-
cept of competitive behavior. Individuals strongly differ with respect to social
behavior, including their competitiveness, willingness to cooperate or collude, and
5 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/assets/Imported-from-old-site/BusinessCompetition/
MergersAcquisitions/ClearanceProcessGuidelines/ContentFiles/Documents/Mergers-and-
AcquisitionsGuidelines-2003.pdf, accessed 1 January 2014.
6 Personal communication by the chief economist of the German Cartel Authority, Konrad Ost.
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ability to coordinate. In fact, individual heterogeneity in social and economic inter-
action is one of the most robust insights from behavioral economics and psychology
(e.g. Camerer 2003). Thus, heterogeneity of social preferences may be one important
missing link between antitrust practice and economic theory when it comes to un-
derstanding the presence of mavericks.7
There are many ways of modeling social preferences (for a survey see Cooper
and Kagel 2016). Many models include a concern about relative, not only absolute
payoff. Such models describe, for instance, inequity averse players (Fehr and
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) or rivalistic players, who are willing to
trade some absolute payoff against a sufficiently higher relative payoff (Fouraker
and Siegel 1963: chapter 9; Bolton 1991; Frank 1984; Bazerman, Loewenstein, and
White 1992; Messick and Thorngate 1967). These models resonate with an extended
literature in social psychology on the “desire to win” (for a summary see Malhotra
2010). There is pronounced heterogeneity with respect to this desire (De Dreu and
Boles 1998; Van Lange et al. 1997). The desire to win can lead to bidding more in an
auction than the item is worth (Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan 2005) and to engage
in costly litigation rather than settling a case (Malhotra, Ku, and Murnighan 2008).
Rivalistic behavior is also sometimes characterized as status seeking (Frank
1985; Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008) and backed by solid experimental evidence
(Ball and Eckel 1998; Huberman, Loch, and Önçüler 2004; Charness, Masclet, and
Villeval 2013) and evidence from the field (Solnick and Hemenway 1998; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Boes, Staub, and Winkelmann 2010). The concept of
status seeking has explicitly been extended to market behavior (Sobel 2009), en-
trepreneurial risk-taking (Clemens 2006) and managing a firm (Auriol and Renault
2008). Status seeking has been shown to affect behavior in experimental markets
(Ball et al. 2001) and experimental supply chains (Loch and Wu 2008). In the field,
status plays a strong role in motivating managers (Ockenfels, Sliwka, and Werner
2014; Grund and Martin 2017).
The only experimental study of “maverick” behavior we are aware of has been
conducted by Li and Plott (2009). The paper studies which interventions can break
tacit collusion in a laboratory market with 8 participants who hold exogenously
given, different valuations for 8 items. The first part of their experiment continues
until the group colludes perfectly. One of the interventions, which the authors re-
late to the anti-trust concept of a maverick, consists of confidentially changing the
valuations of 2 items for the duration of 2 periods. As desired, participants with
higher valuations, who have been induced to bid more aggressively, start bidding
for the item in question. Some other participants retaliate, which leads to a price
7 Of course, other areas of industrial organization have already been substantially influenced by
behavioral research; see, e.g., Engel (2007) for the insights from experimental economics for the
determinants of tacit collusion.
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war. Yet after a while, collusion is again established (Li and Plott 2009: 444). Our
approach complements their study in various important ways. We mention two
points here. First, we study the effects of aggressive quantity choices resulting from
personality. That is, our study does not induce aggressive behavior by confidentially
changing monetary incentives, but rather focuses on the potential of naturally oc-
curring heterogeneity in social motivation to capture maverick behavior. Indeed,
because in our context all payoff functions and market conditions are identical and
common knowledge across subjects, heterogeneous individual traits are the only
possible cause for treatment effects in our experiment. Second, we investigate the
effect of “maverick” behavior in markets that, endogenously, have produced differ-
ent degrees of competition. As we will see, our variables of interest matter: market
outcomes can be related to natural psychological traits of traders, and the impact of
maverick behavior interacts with idiosyncratically evolved market competitiveness.
Our paper also makes a contribution to the experimental literature on social di-
lemmas. To the best of our knowledge, no experiment has tried to explain outcomes
in oligopoly markets with the social preferences of participants (cf. the theory paper
by İriş and Santos-Pinto 2014). This is surprising given competition can be modelled
as a dilemma, and choices in dilemma games are routinely rationalized with the
social preferences of participants (for a survey see Chaudhuri 2011). We do not only
derive hypotheses from participants’ social preferences, but even build our treat-
ment manipulation on randomly composing markets conditional on participants’
social preferences.
16.3 Design of the experiment and hypotheses
In order to test the effect of heterogeneous preferences on competition we first clas-
sify participants according to their social value orientation in a pre-test, using the
standard procedure introduced by Liebrand and McClintock (1988). This test has
participants repeatedly choose between two different allocations of a sum to be dis-
tributed between an anonymous partner and themselves. They are, for instance,
asked whether they prefer 354 units for themselves and an anonymous counterpart
over 397 units for themselves and 304 units for the counterpart. Aggregating over
all 32 incentivized choices, for each individual one defines a score, which is custom-
arily called the “ringdegree” since the measure can be represented on a circle.
Participants with a score of 0 only care about their own payoff. Participants with a
positive score are willing to give up some payoff for themselves for the sake of giving
their anonymous partner a higher payoff. Such participants are averse against advan-
tageous inequity, consistent with Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000). We are particularly interested in participants with a negative score. They are
willing to give up some payoff for themselves in the interest of increasing the payoff
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difference between themselves and their partner. These participants are rivalistic.
They hold a positive willingness to pay for improving their status.
In the main experiment, we form fixed markets of three suppliers to interact in
a fully symmetric Cournot market over 20 rounds. In the first 10 rounds, only two
suppliers, the incumbents, are active. Every round, the passive supplier, the en-
trant, is informed about price and total quantity. This participant only enters the
market in round 11. This procedure allows the entrant to observe the market before
entering, which seems reasonable for any potential entrant. The social value orien-
tation of the entrant is our treatment variable. We have rivalistic entrants, selfish
entrants, and entrants who are averse against advantageous inequity. This design
reflects the fact that social value orientation, as a personality trait, is not open to ad
hoc manipulation. The trait can only be measured, and participants can be matched
by the trait. While we are not aware of experiments that have used this approach
for social value orientation, it is, for instance, common if one uses gender, age or
race as treatment variables (for references in dictator game experiments see, for ex-
ample, Engel 2011).
We emphasize that, with the design of the experiment, we do not identify the
effect of the presence or absence of a maverick on competition. What we measure is
the effect of a change in the structure of the market through the market entry of a
maverick. We are thus testing a dynamic, not a static effect (on this distinction see
Engel 2016), akin to the distinction between stocks and flows. We have chosen this
research question for reasons of external validity. Antitrust, and merger control in
particular, have been primarily interested in preserving the competition enhance-
ment resulting from such market entry.
The social value orientation test is run a couple of days before the market ex-
periment. Participants are invited on the understanding that a second experiment is
to follow, but are not informed about the nature of the second experiment. To make
matching in the main experiment possible, but preserve anonymity, we use the fol-
lowing procedure: at the end of the pre-test, participants themselves generate an
identification code. Participants write this code on a card, put this card into an en-
velope, seal the envelope and write their name on it. The closed envelopes go to the
lab manager. The manager opens them and writes a list that matches names and
codes. The experimenter prepares a list with groups to be invited for the main ex-
periment. In this list, participants are only identified by their code. The lab manager
does not learn any choices participants have made, neither in the pre-test nor,
later, in the main experiment. The lab manager only knows who shall be invited for
which session. The experimenter never sees the list that matches codes and names.
At the outset of the main experiment, participants identify themselves on the com-
puter screen by their code. The program checks whether the invited participants are
present.
Participants are completely informed about this procedure. They also know
that the experiment has two parts, and may therefore infer that information from
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the pre-test is used for inviting participants to one of the sessions of the main experi-
ment. Yet participants neither know the nature of the main experiment, nor which
information is used for matching (we run a battery of further personality tests the re-
sults of which are of no relevance for the main experiment; their only purpose is mak-
ing it difficult for participants to infer which personality trait is used for matching).8
In particular, subjects are neither informed about behavior in the first experiment nor
about social value scores of other participants; in the field, too, other firms usually
only observe their competitors’ behavior, not their preferences or decision making
process.
In the main experiment, participants interact in fixed groups of three. The main
experiment has two parts.9 At the outset, participants only receive instructions for
the first part. They are informed that more parts are to follow, and that new instruc-
tions will be distributed for the continuation. The first part of the main experiment
has 10 rounds. In this part of the experiment, two incumbents of each group have
the active role. The entrant has the passive role. Incumbents are not told that the
third participant will later enter the market. This design feature is meant to capture
the situation when maverick behavior is most important for antitrust: an outsider
observes whether aggressive market behavior is likely to be profitable. (We note,
however, that being worried about entry could have led to stronger competition
and thus reduce the effect of a maverick entrant.) Incumbents compete in a Cournot
market where the profit of incumbent i in period t is given by (16.1).
πit = 100− qit − qjt
 
qit (16:1)
We thus assume demand to be linear and normalize cost to zero. After each period,
incumbents learn the resulting price and their individual profit. Entrants learn total
quantity supplied and the price. After the end of period 10 there is a (surprise) re-
start of the market. Now entrants become active as well, so that the profit function
changes to (16.2).
πit = 100− qit − qjt − qkt
 
qit (16:2)
The second part of the experiment also lasts 10 periods.
8 In the pre-test, we had the following sequence of tests: social value orientation; risk preferences
(Holt/Laury); belief elicitation on 4 problems from the test for social value orientation; Big5 person-
ality inventory (short 10 item version); 4 unincentivized questions about trust taken from the
German socio-economic panel; basic demographic information.
9 Plus a third part meant to test a theoretical prediction that buyouts of the entrant will not occur,
which has been confirmed in our data. However, because this is only of secondary importance for
our results, we decided to drop this part altogether. We refer interested readers to the working
paper version of this article for more details.
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Based on the results of the pre-test, three groups of participants are selected to
have the entrant role in the main experiment: Those 9 participants with the most
negative social value orientation score have the entrant role in the Negative treat-
ment. These participants are rivalistic. We form two different comparison groups: 11
participants with a social value orientation score of zero have the entrant role in the
Zero treatment. These participants are selfish. Those 11 participants with the highest
positive social value orientation score have the entrant role in the Positive treat-
ment. The remaining participants are randomly assigned to have the incumbent
role in either treatment. Three of them have a mildly negative social value orienta-
tion score. 16 of them are selfish. 40 have a mildly positive social value orientation
score.10
We have 9 groups (27 participants) in the Negative treatment, and 11 groups (33
participants) in the remaining two treatments. Participants are invited using the
software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). 52% of participants are female. Average age is 25.45
years.11 Participants, most of whom are students, hold various majors. The experi-
ment is programmed using the software zTree (Fischbacher 2007). It is run in the
Bonn EconLab. In the pre-test, participants on average earn 13.20€ (16.05$ on the
days of the experiment). In the main experiment, they on average earn 9.36€.12
We can straightforwardly compute our null hypothesis under the standard as-
sumption that all suppliers maximize their individual payoffs. There is a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy for each phase of the experiment,13 condi-
tional on the number of suppliers in the market, which is given by qi = 100n+ 1, where n
is the number of suppliers. Plugging in the respective market size, we get our null
hypothesis
H0: Participants’ social preferences for competitiveness do not affect market outcomes; only
market size matters.
For our alternative hypothesis, assume that there is some heterogeneity of preferences.
In particular, assume that the entrant is a maverick, competing more aggressively than
10 The fact that three participants with a negative social value orientation score are incumbents
results from a mistake of the lab manager. Since the lab manager did not know their social value
orientation scores, these participants were randomly assigned to one of the groups. For five incum-
bents we do not know the social value orientation score. These subjects replaced invited partici-
pants who did not show up.
11 From the five replacement subjects, we do not have demographic information since the demo-
graphic questionnaire was part of the first experimental battery.
12 The tasks participants face in both parts of the experiment are unrelated, so that the difference
in earnings across parts is not meaningful.
13 This is because each base game has a unique equilibrium. In fact, if at the beginning of the first
phase, subjects had common knowledge about all aspects of the subsequent phase of the experi-
ment, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game could be computed, would also be
unique and correspond to the equilibrium in each phase of the experiment.
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standard theory would predict. Specifically, assume that the entrant not only cares
about absolute profit but also about earning more than the competitors, and that this
is common knowledge.14 Then, like commitment power favoring the Stackelberg
leader, the rivalistic supplier sells a larger quantity than in a standard analysis of
the Cournot market, and the incumbents – if only interested in own gains – sell a
smaller quantity. Total quantity and thereby consumer welfare is larger than if all
suppliers hold standard preferences.15 This leads to
H1: If the entrant is rivalistic, she sells higher quantities and the market outcome is more
competitive.
We mention that we can derive the same hypothesis if we allow incumbents to be
rivalistic, too, as long as they are less rivalistic than the entrant (see Appendix I).
16.4 Experiment results
Figure 16.1 informs about the distribution of social value orientation in our sample.
We have 12 (13.64%) rivalistic, 27 (30.68%) selfish, and 49 (55.68%) participants
with a more or less pronounced positive social value orientation.16 Figure 16.1 also
shows our matching. Participants at the lower end of the distribution are entrants
in the Negative treatment. These are the subjects with the supposedly most competi-
tive behavior in oligopoly markets, and they are thus the focus of our study on the
impact of mavericks. Participants at the upper end of the distribution are entrants
in the Positive treatment. 11 participants with a social value orientation score of
zero are entrants in the Zero treatment. The remaining participants are randomly
14 This is a common assumption not only in large parts of the social preferences literature, but
also in the economics literature that does not address social preferences. The assumption simplifies
theoretical derivations, although it seems incorrect in most applications. However, in our setting
any rivalistic motivation leads to more aggressive bidding, regardless of the extent to which com-
petitors are (believed to be) rivalistic. In this sense, the general insight that rivalry leads to larger
quantities is robust.
15 We focus on consumer welfare for two reasons. Enhancing consumer welfare is the primary
stated goal of antitrust policy (Crandall and Winston 2003). Moreover we model mavericks as
agents holding social preferences, so that the definition of supply side welfare is not obvious. By
focusing on the opposite market side, we are able to bracket this debate in normative economic
theory.
16 Social value orientation scores range from – 56.23 (strongly rivalistic) to 74.55 (strongly averse
to advantageous inequity). If a participant chooses the allocation that gives her a higher payoff on
all 32 problems, her score is 0. A participant with a score of 45 always chooses the equal split. A
participant with a score of 90 is perfectly altruistic. A participant with a score of – 45 is willing to
give up 1 unit of her absolute profit to increase the payoff gap between herself an her random part-
ner by 1 unit. For the procedure for aggregating the 32 choices see Liebrand and McClintock (1988).
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assigned to being incumbents in either treatment. To make sure that the 16 selfish
incumbents are equally distributed across treatments, randomization is separate for
participants with a social value orientation score of 0, and for the remaining
incumbents.
As Figure 16.2 shows, overall quantity choices are fairly close to the standard
Cournot predictions. In duopoly markets, average quantity is close to 33. In triopoly
markets, it is close to 25. We thus provisionally support our null hypothesis H0.
Looking at average quantities only, social value orientation is not a plausible candi-
date for identifying maverick behavior. As suggested by Figure 16.2 and Table 16.1, if
we work with averages, we do not find treatment effects, neither non-parametrically
nor parametrically.17
This also holds if we confine the analysis to the last period before and the first pe-
riod after entry. Actually, descriptively in the Negative and in the Positive treatments,
entrants on average even sell less than incumbents and consequently make a lower
profit.
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Figure 16.1: Social value orientation per treatment and role.
17 For non-parametric estimation, we use a Mann-Whitney test, for parametric estimation the regression
as specified in Table 16.2, but of course without controlling for the average quantity in periods 1–10.
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Yet, as Figure 16.3 illustrates, aggregates per treatment conceal a more complex
story. In this figure, each marker is the mean quantity set by the two incumbents or
the entrant in one group. There is quite some variation that is hidden by looking at
averages only. In phase 1 of the Cournot market, quantity choices have mean 33.57,
but standard deviation 10.34. Quantity choices in the second phase of the experiment
heavily depend on experiences from the first phase. Independent of treatment, what
the group has experienced while the market was a duopoly is a strong predictor of
quantity choices after the entrance of the new competitor. Suppliers only adjust
quantities to reflect greater competition: the trend line is close to 75% of the average
quantity in the first 10 periods (which would be the quantity ratio of a triopoly com-
pared to a duopoly, as predicted by standard theory). As the distribution of hollow
(incumbents) versus solid markers (entrants) shows, market history matters for old
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Figure 16.2: Aggregate quantity choices.
Table 16.1: Descriptive statistics.
Phase  Phase 
neg zero pos neg zero pos
incumbent .
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
entrant .
(.)
.
(.)
.
(.)
Note: standard deviations in parenthesis
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and new market participants. We note that this history effect is in line with the only
other experiment we are aware of that tests market entry (Goppelsroeder 2009).
Overall, we can conclude that while there is a lot of idiosyncrasy regarding market
competitiveness, Nash equilibrium goes a long way to predict average quantities and
average differences of competitive pressure in our duopoly and triopoly settings.
The visual impression that local market competitiveness in periods 1–10 mat-
ters is supported by statistical analysis (see Table 16.2).18
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Figure 16.3: Dependence on local conditions.
Notes: x-axis: mean quantity sold by the two members of the duopoly, in periods 1–10
y-axis: mean quantity sold in periods 11–20
separately for incumbents (hollow markers) and for entrants (solid markers)
trend: linear prediction
Nash ratio: 3/4 of first phase quantity
18 We revert to regression analysis since we want to show that choices in periods 11–20 are ex-
plained by the average quantity this group had chosen before the third supplier enters the market.
We have data from choices, nested in individuals, nested in groups. Dependence within individuals
is captured by the random effect. The additional source of dependence at the group level is captured
by clustering standard errors at this level. The fact that the Hausman test does not turn out significant
shows that we are justified in preferring the more efficient random effects model over a model with
individual fixed effects. The coefficient of the average quantity in phase 1 is smaller than 0.75 since
the model has a constant. If we estimate the same model (as a population averaged regression) with-
out a constant, the coefficient comes very close to the theoretical expectation and is 0.714.
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This gives us:
Result 1: If a new competitor enters a repeated Cournot duopoly market, higher
pre-entry quantity is associated with higher post-entry quantity.
Knowing that local market conditions matter, we revisit the effects of our manipu-
lation in Table 16.3.19 The constant of the regression in Model 1 predicts the amount a
firm would sell in the Positive treatment if the average amount sold in this group in the
first 10 periods had been 0. Of course, as Figure 16.3 shows, in the experiment there
has been no such market. The regression generalizes to the population of Cournot du-
opolies observed by entrants. If we plug in the average amount sold in the first 10 peri-
ods from all 11 markets where the entrant has a positive social value orientation score
(32.973, Table 16.1), the regression predicts that, in the Positive treatment, firms on av-
erage sell 24.02 units,20 which comes pretty close to the Nash quantity of 25 units.
From the significant positive main effects of treatments Negative and Zero we
learn that, overall, the market is more competitive if the entrant is rivalistic or self-
ish, compared with a market where the entrant has a preference to avoid payoff dif-
ferences. Yet this treatment effect is indeed conditional on the competitiveness
before market entry. The significant negative interactions show that the translation
effect is most pronounced if the entrant has a positive social value orientation
Table 16.2: Effect of local conditions.
average quantity in periods – .***
(.)
Cons .**
(.)
N 
p model .
R within 
R between .
R overall .
Notes: dependent variable: quantity, data from
periods 11–20 random effects, robust standard
errors clustered at the group level Hausman test
insignificant on mirror model with period as
additional regressor (to enable fixed effects
estimation) standard errors in parenthesis * = p < .05
19 The fact that “overall” all models seem to explain little variance is an artefact of the fact that, by
their design, these models only explain between, not within variance.
20 .638 + 32.973 * .709 = 24.02.
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Table 16.3: Treatment effects conditional on local conditions.
periods –
all participants
period 
entrants only
model  model  model  model  model 
neg .***
(.)
.+
(.)
.**
(.)
.*
(.)
.*
(.)
zero .*
(.)
.
(.)
.*
(.)
.
(.)
.*
(.)
entrant −.
(.)
−.
(.)
neg*entrant .+
(.)
.+
(.)
zero*entrant .**
(.)
.**
(.)
average quantity in period  .
(.)
average quantity in phase  .***
(.)
.***
(.)
.**
(.)
.*
(.)
entrant*average quantity in phase  .
(.)
.
(.)
neg*average quantity in period  −.*
(.)
zero*average quantity in period  −.
(.)
neg*average quantity in phase  −.***
(.)
−.*
(.)
−.**
(.)
−.*
(.)
zero*average quantity in phase  −.*
(.)
−.
(.)
−.*
(.)
−.*
(.)
entrant*neg*average quantity in phase  −.+
(.)
−.+
(.)
entrant*zero*average quantity in phase  −.**
(.)
−.**
(.)
entrant SVO .*
(.)
average quantity in phase *entrant SVO −.*
(.)
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score. The more the market was competitive pre-entry, the less it becomes even
more competitive through the entry of a new competitor with rivalistic or selfish
preferences. In fact, the pro-competitive effect of the entrant holding rivalistic pref-
erences only plays itself out if the average quantity pre-entry was at or below 31
units21; recall that the Nash quantity for the duopoly is 33 units. Likewise, if the en-
trant is selfish, entry only has a pro-competitive effect if the average quantity pre-
entry was at or below 36 units.22 Yet in both treatments, the pro-competitive effect
of entry is pronounced if the duopoly was perfectly collusive. The model predicts
that quantity is 3.752 units higher if a rivalistic firm enters a collusive market, and
3.839 units higher if a selfish firm enters.23
Model 2 splits the analysis by entrants and incumbents. The picture nicely
clears if, in model 3, we additionally control for the precise social value orientation
score of the entrant, and how it interacts with the competitiveness of the market
before she enters. The following discussion focuses on this model. The implications
are easiest to see in the marginal effect of the Negative and Zero treatments that are
reported in Figure 16.4. If we find a significantly positive effect of treatment, the
Table 16.3 (continued)
periods –
all participants
period 
entrants only
Cons .
(.)
.
(.)
−.*
(.)
−.
(.)
−.
(.)
N     
p model <. <. <. . .
R within   
R between . . .
R overall . . . . .
Notes: regression equations for all models in Appendix II dependent variable: quantity models 1–3:
data from periods 11–20, models 4–5: data from period 11 models 1–3: data from incumbents and
entrants, models 4–5: data from entrants only models 1–3: random effects, robust standard errors
clustered at the group level Hausman test insignificant on mirror models with period as additional
regressor (to enable fixed effects estimation) SVO: social value orientation, i.e. score from ring
measure test treatment: reference category: positive standard errors in parenthesis *** p < .001, **
p < .01, * = p < .05, + p < .1
21 19.427/.627 = 30.984.
22 12.664/.353 = 35.875.
23 19.427–25*.627 = 3.752; 12.664–25*.353 = 3.839.
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rivalistic or selfish personality of the entrant has a pro-competitive effect. This
holds true for both treatments and roles, but only if, pre-entry, the market was col-
lusive.24 With this qualification, we reject our null hypothesis H0 and infer that the
alternative hypothesis H1 captures the data. We also note that the asymmetric re-
sponse of selfish (Zero) and rivalistic (Negative) entrants to their observations from
the first 10 periods is well in line with their playing best responses, assuming that
incumbents will only adjust to the fact that one more supplier enters the market
(but not reach equilibrium choices themselves). In the Appendix I we show this
formally.25
To see whether the social preferences of entrants are indeed critical, we consider
period 11 in isolation, i.e. the first period after entry. Overall, and if we confine the
analysis to incumbents, we do not find any treatment effects, even if we interact
treatment with the average quantity chosen in the respective group in period 10 (i.e.
directly before entry), or during all of periods 1–10. But we do see a strong effect of
the Negative treatment if we separately analyze choices of entrants (Model 4 of
Table 16.3). We also see an effect of the Zero treatment if we replace average choices
in period 10 with average choices in periods 1–10 (Model 5 of Table 16.3). Recall that
incumbents had no information about the criterion for selecting entrants. Models 4
and 5 not only show that our manipulation worked. Together with Models 1–3 we
also see how a maverick changes the market: immediately after entry, she behaves
according to her preferences; in later periods, incumbents react to this experience.
Thus far our data suggest that a rivalistic and a selfish entrant have pretty
much the same effect on competitiveness. To see whether this is indeed true, we
use the following approach: individually for each incumbent we regress quantities
sold in the first phase on time. This procedure gives us for each individual incum-
bent the trend, had there not been entry. From these regressions, for each individ-
ual we derive an out of sample prediction for the remaining 10 periods. We adjust
the predicted quantity to the market entry of one more supplier by multiplying it by
the theoretically predicted ratio of ¾ (see above). Note that the prediction is flat if,
pre entry, the market had already reached equilibrium. However, inspecting the
raw data, it seems that most duopoly markets had not yet stabilized. Only 17 of 62
incumbents did not change the quantity over periods 6–10.
Figure 16.5 shows the difference, per treatment and period, between the mean
actual and predicted quantity. In the Positive treatment, actual quantities are much
higher than the prediction. In the Zero treatment, actual quantities exhibit more
variance, but have about the same level as the prediction. By contrast in the
Negative treatment, and only in this treatment, for all periods but the final actual
24 The marginal effects of Figure 16.4 also explain the seemingly contradictory descriptive finding
that, in the Negative treatment, entrants on average choose smaller quantities than incumbents,
Table 16.1: entrants only bid more than incumbents if the market had been collusive.
25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach.
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quantities are below the predicted trend.26 We conclude that, depending on the so-
cial preferences of the entrant, incumbents come under additional competitive pres-
sure and react by reducing the quantity they sell, as predicted by our model.
Overall, this gives us:
Result 2: Conditional on pre-entry local market competitiveness, a Cournot market
is more competitive if the entrant is rivalistic.
In the final step, we want to understand in which ways rivalistic entrants disci-
pline incumbents. To that end we take a closer look at dynamics in the Negative
treatment. The dependent variable is changes in incumbents’ choices from one pe-
riod to the next.
Model 1 of Table 16.4 shows that incumbents, on average, reduce their own con-
tributions in reaction to high contributions of the entrant (p = .088), as predicted by
our theory. The weakly significant interaction effect (p = .099) indicates that the ef-
fect is the more pronounced the more the market was collusive before the third sup-
plier entered. Model 2 and the marginal effects reported in Figure 16.6 show that
the effect requires some degree of discord among the incumbents though.27 If the
standard deviation of quantity choices in this group and every period of phase 1
was low on average (range [2.828, 7.778]), incumbents do not significantly reduce
their quantity in reaction to a high quantity sold by the entrant. This suggests that a
duopoly that has successfully established a common norm of behavior is more resil-
ient to attempts of a maverick to break up collusion; indeed, previous research has
shown that homogeneous cooperation across agents is less vulnerable to being de-
stabilized (e.g. Brosig, Weimann, and Ockenfels 2003).
16.5 Conclusion
Antitrust authorities are not only concerned with market power. They are also atten-
tive to firm-specific heterogeneity in market behavior. They are particularly pleased if
26 The visual impression is supported by statistical analysis. If we regress the difference between
the actual quantity and the out of sample prediction on treatment, and choose the Negative treat-
ment as reference category, the constant informs us about the treatment effect for this treatment. If
we use all 10 periods of the second phase, the constant is – 1.641, but not significantly different
from zero (p = .151). If we repeat the analysis for periods 11–19, however, the constant is – 2.392, p =
.002, which supports our claim. In neither regression, the net effect of constant + treatment Zero is
significantly different from zero (p = .9016 in the first and p = .8519 in the second regression). We
do, however, acknowledge that the treatment effect diminishes over time. If we repeat the regres-
sion, now interact treatment with period, and subsequently test the net effect of the constant + pe-
riod, the result is significantly different from zero for periods 11–16 only. The additional regressions
are available from the authors upon request.
27 Further controlling for the mean quantity sold individually by each incumbent, or replacing the
standard deviation with this measure, does not yield significant effects.
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they identify especially aggressive firms. In this paper we experimentally investigate
a cause for such “maverick” behavior that transcends pecuniary incentives: an indi-
vidual may derive utility from relative, not only from absolute payoff.
In our experiment, we do indeed find that market entry by a participant with a
particularly rivalistic attitude makes the market more competitive, improving con-
sumer welfare and hampering incumbents’ profits. Yet this result only holds condi-
tional on the level of competition pre-entry. The entry of a “maverick” is socially
most beneficial when it is most needed, i.e. when the market was collusive. This
suggests that mavericks can play an important role for entertaining competitive
markets, and so competition authorities may be indeed well-advised to appreciate
this role in their policies.28
We of course do not claim a one to one mapping of the behavior of students in
the lab (which we test) to the behavior of firms in markets. Firms are highly aggregate
Table 16.4: Reaction of incumbents to quantity choices of entrants in neg treatment.
model  model 
quantity sold by entrant in t- −.+
(.)
.+
(.)
quantity sold by entrant in t-*average quantity in phase  .+
(.)
−.+
(.)
quantity sold by entrant in t-*standard deviation of average
quantity in phase 
−.*
(.)
quantity sold by entrant in t-*average quantity in phase *standard
deviation of average quantity in phase 
.*
(.)
cons .
(.)
−.
(.)
N  
R within . .
R between . .
R overall . .
Notes: dv: quantity(t) – quantity(t-1) of incumbents data from neg treatment individual fixed
effects, since Hausman test turns out significant robust standard errors, clustered for groups, in
parenthesis *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * = p < .05, + p < .1
28 The fact that we do not have even stronger findings might also result from the composition of
our sample. In line with previous experimental results (Liebrand and McClintock 1988), only a mi-
nority of our participants is willing to give up some income for increasing the distance in payoff to
their favor. With one exception, even those who do are only mildly rivalistic.
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corporate actors (for a survey of the experimental research specifically addressing
such actors see Engel 2010), and decision making is rarely individual but rather
based on some aggregation of team preferences; suppliers in a real market of three
do not interact anonymously and underlying preferences of both, incumbents and
mavericks may be subject to selection effects; and markets are differently organized
and structured – to name only some obvious simplifications. But in line with a rich
literature on experimental oligopoly markets (see the meta-study by Engel 2015) we
believe that such evidence provides a useful starting point for analyzing the behavior
of firms. Eventually, individuals decide for firms. It is therefore not unlikely that be-
havioral traits of these individuals carry over to the behavior of the firms for whom
they act. Managers are not only selected for their competence and connections, but
also for their personalities. It is not unlikely that a firm selects particularly aggressive
individuals if it intends to act aggressively in the market. Moreover, firms as corpo-
rate entities may themselves, in different degrees, care about relative, not only about
absolute payoff. One reason is the embeddedness of some firms into financial mar-
kets, possibly also into a market for corporate control. In these markets, comparative
performance may be a very relevant signal, whereas in other markets that might be
less so.
That said, an experiment will not be able to settle the policy debate over mav-
ericks. Experiments are only tools for identifying potential effects. But we add an
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Figure 16.6: Reaction of incumbents to quantity choices of entrants in neg treatment.
Notes: marginal effects of 1 unit lagged increase in entrant’s quantity on change in incumbents’
quantity from model 2 of Table 16.4
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important argument to this policy debate. Maverick choices may be expected, they
may be sustainable, and they may affect market outcomes, even in the absence of a
pecuniary incentive to act aggressively. Anti-trust authorities have no reason to
stop searching for, or protecting, maverick behavior, even if it does not seem to be
grounded in sound profit incentives of the firm in question.
A second finding is of even greater importance for anti-trust policy: maverick
behavior is not to be expected irrespective of context. When they face tough compe-
tition, even individuals (firms) otherwise inclined to compete aggressively are likely
to hold back. We have of course only shown this for maverick behavior resulting
from rivalistic preferences. But one should a fortiori expect a disciplining effect of a
competitive environment on mavericks that have an incentive to outperform others
(for instance since their income is tied to market share): by definition, maverick be-
havior reduces absolute profit. For anti-trust, this insight matters in merger control.
Not so rarely, mergers between conglomerate firms reduce competition in one, but
increase competition in another market. In principle, it makes sense to balance out
these effects. But if the merger enables entry into a new market and competition in
this market is intense, the merger is unlikely to increase consumer welfare, even if
the entrant has an incentive to bid aggressively.
Appendix I: Model
In the general case of a Cournot market with linear demand, intercept m, and n sup-
pliers, all with marginal cost of zero, the Cournot-Nash quantity is given by:
qi =
m
n+ 1
We now assume that the utility of the rivalistic supplier e (given that the other two
suppliers make identical profits πi, which will be the case in equilibrium) is given
by ue = πe + n− 1ð Þγ πe − πið Þ
= 1+ 2γð Þ m− n− 1ð Þqi − qeð Þqe − 2γ m− n− 1ð Þqi − qeð Þqi
Profit for one of the incumbents is now given by
πi = m− qi − n− 2ð Þqj − qe
 
qi
Taking first order conditions, and solving the resulting system of equations, we get
qi = qj =
m 2γ+ 1ð Þ
2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ , qe =
m 4γ+ 1ð Þ
2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ
E.g., with the parameters of the experiment, and letting the entrant be mildly rival-
istic, i.e. with γ= 12, we get qi = qj = 22.22, qe = 33.33. The rivalistic player is better off
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the larger γ, that is the more she is rivalistic. If all sellers hold standard preferences,
in equilibrium they sell QN = nqi = nmn+ 1 units. If one seller is rivalistic, total quantity
is given by
QR = n− 1ð Þ m 2γ+ 1ð Þ2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ +
m 4γ+ 1ð Þ
2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ
which is larger than QN for any γ>0; with γ=0,QR =QN . Hence consumer welfare
increases if there is a rivalistic player.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained if we also allow incumbents to be ri-
valistic as shown below, if we keep the assumption that the entrant is more rivalis-
tic γe ≥ γi
 
.29 Specifically, let us assume that α= γi < γe = γ. Taking first order
conditions, and solving the resulting system of equations, we get
qi = qj =
m 4αγ+ 2α+ 2γ+ 1ð Þ
4αγn+ 2αn+ 2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ ,
qk =
m 4αγ+ α+ 4γ+ 1ð Þ
4αγn+ 2αn+ 2γn+ n+ 1+ 4γ
Similar to our previous results, each incumbent sells less than the entrant, and con-
sumer welfare increases both in α and γ.
Our hypotheses are based on the assumption that preferences are common
knowledge, and that all suppliers maximize utility. This is not what we find in the
experiment. Visibly many duopolies are out of equilibrium, and entrants react to
this. We therefore also report best responses of entrants, assuming that incumbents
will only adjust quantities to the entry of one more supplier (i.e. will choose
q3 = .75*q2, where numbers 2 and 3 stand for the number of suppliers). If the entrant
maximizes profit (is selfish), she will then choose the following best response
qe br =
1
2
m− n− 1ð Þ.75*q2ð Þ
or, with the parameters of the experiment, 50− .75*q2. Note that, if the duopoly was
in equilibrium, 75*q2 = 25, so that the best response is the equilibrium. Hence the
29 In fact, the result can be generalized by noting that our model is related to the model by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). The difference is that the Fehr-Schmidt model allows players to also suffer
from advantageous inequality. However, as long as the entrant is assumed to be more aggressive
than the incumbents, the incumbents will in equilibrium always fall behind the entrant and so
never experience advantageous inequality. Since the utility from the difference between one’s own
payoff and the payoff of a peer is not constrained to positive differences, our utility also captures
disutility from falling behind one’s peers. So, technically, this leads to a market of n players who all
hold preferences as we assume above.
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model predicts that entrants choose a larger quantity only if the duopoly was collu-
sive. This fits the data from the Zero treatment very well, Figure 16.4.
If entrants are rivalistic, the best response to the expectation that incumbents
will only adjust to the fact that one more supplier is in the market is given by maxi-
mizing the utility, assuming q3 = .75*q2. In generic notation the best response is
given by
qe br =
m+ n− 1ð Þ.75*q2 + n− 1ð Þγ m− n− 2ð Þ.75*q2ð Þ
2+ 2n− 2ð Þγ
With the parameters of the experiment, this simplifies to
qe br =
50− .75*q2 + 100− .75*q2ð Þγ
1+ 2γ
Note that this quantity is below the Nash quantity for large q2 and/or for small γ.
This fits the results from Figure 16.4 very well.
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Appendix III: Instructions
a) Instructions: First session
(1) General instructions
Thank you for taking part in our experiment. From your invitation you already
know that the experiment is in two parts. These instructions explain the first part of
the experiment, taking place today. We will pay you your earnings from today’s
part of the experiment at the end of today’s session. However, it is very important
for our experiment that you also participate in the second session.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of other participants. Your earnings will be paid to you
in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please switch off your mobile phone now, and please do not communicate any
longer with the other participants as of this moment. Should you have a question
about the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer
your query.
Today’s part of the experiment consists of different sections. In these instruc-
tions, we explain the first section. For the following sections, you will find your in-
structions on the screen in front of you.
In order for us to keep track of your performance in the second part of the ex-
periment, we would ask you please to generate an identification code at the end of
the experiment, and to enter this code on your computer screen. We will use this
identification code to connect your data from the first and second parts of the ex-
periment. At no time do we know your name or address. Only the laboratory admin-
istration has that information. However, the laboratory administration does not
know your decisions. This way we can ensure that anonymity is guaranteed at all
times. Please write down this number and bring it with you when you are invited
to the second experiment. At the beginning of the the second experiment, we will
ask you to enter this number on your computer screen. If you enter the wrong
number, you cannot take part in the second experiment. Therefore, please
check whether you have made a note of the correct number.
(2) First section
We are now going to ask you to make several decisions. For this to happen, you will
be randomly matched with another participant. You can allocate Taler to this par-
ticipant and to yourself in the course of several distribution decisions. In order to
do this, you will have to choose repeatedly between two distributions, X and Y
(e.g., distribution X: 10 Taler for yourself and 12 Taler for the other player; and dis-
tribution Y: 8 Taler for yourself and 20 Taler for the other player). The Taler you
allocate to yourself are paid out to you at the end of the experiment, at a rate of 100
Taler = 1 €. At the same time, you are also randomly matched with yet another exper-
iment participant who, in turn, can allocate Taler by way of distribution decisions.
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This participant is not the same as the one to whom you can allocate Taler. The
Taler allocated to you are also transferred to your account and paid out to you at the
end of the experiment, at a rate of 100 Taler = 1 €.
The individual decision tasks will look like this:
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[translation of screenshot
Period 1 of 1
Task
Please choose your preferred distribution of Taler.
Possibility A
Possibility B
Your Taler
The Taler of the participant matched with you]
b) Instructions: Second session
(1) General instructions
Welcome to the experiment! This is the second part of the experiment. The first part
took place a few days ago. We would like to thank you for showing up once again.
Please enter your identification number on your screen now. Let us remind you that
we will not connect this number with your name and your address. You will there-
fore remain anonymous for both today’s experiment and the earlier one. Your num-
ber will be used exclusively to relate your decisions from both experiments to you.
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you earn depends on your
decisions and the decisions of other participants.
Please switch off your mobile phone now, and please do not communicate any
longer with the other participants as of this moment. Should you have a question
about the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come to you and answer
your query.
This experiment is in three parts. You will find the instructions for the first part
below. The instructions for the following parts will be handed out to you after the
respective previous parts have been completed. As we will explain to you later on,
participants can take on different roles in the course of the experiment.
Each of these parts consists of several rounds. All rounds of all parts are payoff-
relevant. In this experiment, we use the Experimental Currency Unit ECU. All sums
in ECU are always rounded off to whole numbers. At the end of the experiment, the
sum of all ECU contributions is converted into Euro at a rate of 2000 ECU = 1 €.
The converted sum will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
You will remain in a group of three participants for the duration of the entire
experiment. The constellation of the group does not change.
All decisions in this experiment, as well as the payoffs at the end, remain anon-
ymous. Please do not discuss these with any of the other participants, even when
the experiment has ended.
(2) Instructions: First part
CAUTION: One-third of the participants pauses in this part of the experiment and
will not continue until the second part. However, these participants are also
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informed about what is happening. We will inform you at the beginning of the ex-
periment about the role you have in the first part.
This part of the experiment consists of 10 rounds. In each round, two partici-
pants are actors in a market. Both participants produce an identical product at no
production costs. At the beginning of each round, each producer chooses the
amount he or she wishes to produce. The market price (P), at which each unit is
sold on the market, depends on the total amount (Q) produced by both participants.
The market price is calculated as follows:
P = 100−Q false Q< 100
0 else

This means, first of all, that both producers receive the same market price for their
amounts. Secondly, the higher the total amount Q is that both producers sell, the
lower is the market price. As of a total amount of 100, the market price equals zero.
For each of the two producers, the payoff for the round is his or her chosen pro-
duction amount, multiplied by the market price. The total payoff for this part of the
experiment is the sum of all individual payoffs per round.
After each round, you will receive feedback on the amount the producers have
chosen in total, on the market price, and on your earnings.
(3) Instructions: Second part
This part of the experiment consists of a 10-round market, just like the first part.
The only difference now is that there is a further producer, in addition to the two
“older” producers. The “new producer” has paused in the first part of the experi-
ment, but received the same instructions as the two other producers, for the pur-
pose of information. In addition, this new producer has also been informed about
the market prices and amounts of the past ten rounds, concerning the group this
new producer has joined.
Apart from the fact that there are now three producers, nothing else changes.
As before, the market price is calculated for all three producers – the two old and
the new – using the same formula:
P = 100−Q if Q< 100
0 else

This means all three producers receive the same market price P for their amounts,
and that the market price that can be attained falls proportionally to the total
amount Q rising.
(4) Instructions: Third part
This part of the experiment consists of a further continuation of the market by an
additional ten rounds. However, both the two old producers who were active in the
first part and the new producer who joined the market in the second part have the
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opportunity to negotiate a possible departure of the new producer from the market.
Negotiations are conducted according to the following rules.
Independently of the second producer, each of the two old producers names a
maximum price figure, in ECU, which he or she would pay the new producer if this
producer were prepared, in return, to quit the game for the additional ten rounds.
However, the highest possible price that the two old producers can name is the fig-
ure you have earned in the first two parts of the experiment.
At the same time, the new producer names a figure B (in ECU), beginning with
which he or she is willing to forfeit participation in the additional ten market rounds.
Then, one of the two offers made by the old producers is chosen randomly, with
each offer having a 50-percent chance of being chosen. There are two possibilities:
– If the maximum offer A of the old producer who has been chosen is at least as
high as the new producer’s demand B, then the old producer who has been cho-
sen pays the new producer demand B. (Offer A hence describes the chosen old
producer’s maximum willingness to pay; usually, less is paid.) Then, the addi-
tional ten market rounds take place without the new producer – as in the first
part of the experiment.
– If the maximum offer A of the old producer who has been chosen is smaller than
the new producer’s demand B, then the additional ten market rounds take place
with the new producer – as in the second part of the experiment. In this case, there
is no exchange of any payment between the chosen old and the new producer.
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17 Cooperation, Reputation Effects, and
Network Dynamics: Experimental Evidence
Abstract: While social network structures are thought to promote cooperation
through reputation effects, as suggested by Raub and Weesie (1990), the option of
partner choice may undermine these reputation effects in networks. This article ap-
proaches this dilemma by comparing the effects of partner choice and reputation
diffusion in isolation as well as in combination in a controlled experimental setting.
While we do not find that cooperation rates in the absence of partner choice are
higher in the presence of reputation effects, we find that emerging cooperation lev-
els near the end of the game are higher when initial cooperation levels are higher.
This is more in line with predictions of models of cooperation that rely on learning
heuristics rather than forward-looking rationality (i.e., Corten and Cook, 2009).
Moreover, we find that the option of partner choice lowers cooperation rates in the
absence of reputation effects. However, we do not find a similar effect in the pres-
ence of reputation effects. We position these findings in the larger literature on the
conditions for cooperation in dynamic societies.
17.1 Introduction
Cooperation is a cornerstone of human societies (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 2013;
Pennisi 2005; Ostrom 1990). In many instances of social interaction, people join
forces to achieve something they could not have achieved alone. Achieving cooper-
ation, however, is often problematic: actors may face incentives to free-ride on the
efforts of others, with the result that cooperation never materializes and the payoff
to all actors involved is lower than it would have been, had they cooperated.
Consider, for example, two researchers who can collaborate on a project, but are
also tempted to let the other do most of the work and focus on their individual proj-
ects. This situation is formally captured for two actors in the famous Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD).1 The question as to under which conditions cooperation between ra-
tional, selfish actors becomes more likely is one of the major problems of the social
sciences, and is also known in sociology as the problem of social order (Parsons,
1937). A key finding in this line of research is that cooperation is possible if interac-
tions are repeated (Axelrod, 1981; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Taylor, 1977). Raub
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1 Many more examples of social dilemma problems and especially in the academic world have viv-
idly been illustrated by Raub in his farewell lecture (Raub 2017: 49–54).
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and Voss were among the first to formalize this dilemma game-theoretically within
sociology (e.g., Voss 1982; Raub and Voss 1986a) following Coleman’s (1964: 167)
advice to start from “an image of man as wholly free: unsocialized, entirely self-
interested, not constrained by norms of a system, but only rationally calculating to
further his own self-interest.” However, the assumptions under which this result
was initially obtained were rather restricted. Consequently, scholars have searched
for additional mechanisms that facilitate the emergence of cooperation.
A key assumption in the ‘baseline scenario’ of repeated interaction (in addition
to the rationality assumptions) is that interactions occur in social isolation. Actors in-
teract only with one partner at a time and have no information on interactions in
which they are not involved. In reality, however, cooperative relations are often em-
bedded in social networks, through which information on what happens in one inter-
action becomes known to third parties (Granovetter 1985). An intuitive and broadly
shared view among social scientists is that in such ‘embedded scenarios’ the emer-
gence of cooperation is more likely (Homans 1958; Coleman 1990; Raub and Voss
1986b; Voss, 2001), a view supported by much qualitative (Macaulay 1963; Greif 1989,
1994; Ellickson 1991; Uzzi 1996, 1997) and some quantitative evidence (e.g., Burt and
Knez 1995; Buskens 2002; Raub and Buskens 2013). In our example, cooperation in
common research projects would be more likely in departments with dense networks,
in which information about defections is easily shared among colleagues. This infor-
mation can impact cooperation in social dilemmas through reputation effects. Actors
embedded in networks may be more reluctant to defect because word regarding their
behavior will spread and lead to sanctions by third parties. In probably the first
paper modelling games on networks, Raub and Weesie (1990) show that such reputa-
tion effects indeed render conditional cooperation by selfish and rational actors more
likely. Moreover, actors may learn from previous experiences that cooperation with
certain partners is more profitable (Buskens and Raub 2002).
A second restrictive assumption in the ‘baseline scenario’ is that actors are forced
to stay in interactions with a given partner, that is, they do not have opportunities to
voluntarily enter and leave interactions. Theoretical studies show that in scenarios in
which actors do have such opportunities for partner choice, cooperation can be sus-
tained (Schuessler 1989), or may even increase as compared to the situation in which
actors are forced to play with a certain partner, because cooperative actors can avoid
defectors (Stanley et al. 1995; Hauk 2001). Experimental studies (Orbell and Dawes
1993; Boone and Macy 1999; Hauk and Nagel 2001) corroborate this claim. In our ex-
ample, this theory would predict that cooperation in common research projects is
more likely if researchers can freely choose their coauthors and can ostracize free-
riding colleagues.
A third restrictive assumption in the ‘baseline scenario’ is that actors cannot
impose formal arrangements or add other institutional arrangement to enforce co-
operation (e.g., include options of peer punishment as in Fehr and Gächter 2002).
We do not consider extensions along this third assumption in this paper.
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The above results on the impact of social embeddedness and partner choice are
important, but to some extent limited. Many social situations combine social networks
and partner choice. When interactions are embedded in a social network, actors often
have possibilities to (at least to some degree) choose their relationships in the network
and, conversely, situations in which actors can choose partner, are often embedded in
social networks. Our example above, in which both mechanisms are plausible, clearly
illustrates this point. We therefore propose a scenario in which interactions are embed-
ded in a social network in the sense that information about interactions is diffused
through the network of interactions, but actors also have opportunities to change the
network by choosing interaction partners. This scenario can be characterized as a dy-
namic social network. Although the effects of social networks and partner choice on
cooperation are relatively well understood, we know little about the combination in dy-
namic social networks. The proposed research aims to fill this gap by systematically
comparing the above scenarios in laboratory experiments.
Predicting the combined effects of partner choice and social networks is not
trivial (see Corten and Cook 2009; Raub, Buskens, and Frey 2013). Consider the fol-
lowing intuitive but contradictory hypotheses on these effects. On the one hand, we
may expect that the positive effects of embeddedness and partner choice on cooper-
ation simply add up to produce even higher levels of cooperation, or even reinforce
each other, as the diffusion of reputations leads to more effective partner choice.
On the other hand, one may argue that the effects of network reputation and
partner choice undermine each other, leading to lower levels of cooperation. First,
it is possible that the reputation effects that promote cooperation in social networks
are corroded by the possibility of partner choice: if actors can modify the network,
this might (unintentionally) break information channels necessary for reputation
building and learning. Second, reputation effects in networks might interfere with
partner choice in ways that are detrimental to cooperation. For instance, an actor
who somehow earned a bad reputation as defector may have difficulties finding
new interaction partners, even if she has changed her behavior to cooperation.
Conversely, actors may be reluctant to terminate interactions with partners who
earned a favorable reputation in the past, even if they start to defect.
This paper seeks to explore these competing mechanisms by deriving specific
hypotheses and testing these hypotheses empirically through laboratory experi-
ments. The experiments systematically compare effects on cooperation of four dif-
ferent treatments that correspond with the four scenarios sketched above:
1. No reputation effects and no partner choice (the ‘Baseline Treatment’);
2. Reputation effects without partner choice (the ‘Reputation Treatment’);
3. Partner choice without reputation effects (the ‘Partner Choice Treatment’);
4. Reputation effects with partner choice (the ‘Reputation-Partner Choice
Treatment’).
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Previous research suggests that cooperation levels in both the Reputation Treatment
as well as in the Partner Choice Treatment are higher than in the Baseline Treatment.
The intuitive arguments sketched above, however, show that it is far from clear
whether cooperation levels in the Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment are higher or
lower than in the Reputation or Partner Choice Treatment. Because the mechanisms
of reputation in networks and partner choice are likely to occur together in natural
social situations, it is difficult to disentangle the two in observational research in
field settings. Experiments, on the other hand, allow for studying the effects of repu-
tation and partner choice both in isolation and in combination because the availabil-
ity of the two mechanisms can be manipulated by the experimenter, while keeping
other conditions constant (Falk and Heckman 2009).
Similar experiments that combine social dilemmas with dynamic networks have
been conducted by Corbae and Duffy (2008) and Corten and Buskens (2009), who
study Coordination Games rather than PDs. Close to our experiment is the experimen-
tal work by Ule (2005), who studies N-person PD’s (i.e., subjects choose Cooperation
or Defect, but play the same behavior with all their neighbors) instead of networked 2-
person PD’s (i.e., subjects chooses Cooperation or Defect with each neighbor sepa-
rately), which changes the strategic decision problem considerably. Recently, theoreti-
cally as well as experimentally, the question of cooperation on networks has gained a
lot of attention also from physicists leading to a hose of simulation models and some
large-scale experiments. Casella et al. (2018; see also Sanchez 2018) provide a nice
and concise review of this literature. The overview shows that theoretically, the rela-
tion between cooperation and network structure largely depends on details of the
model. Experimental results suggest at best limited effects of network structure on co-
operation in static networks (e.g., Cassar, 2007; Corten et al. 2016; Gracia-Lázaro et al.
2012; Grujić et al. 2010; Kirchkamp and Nagel 2007; Rand et al. 2014; Sanchez 2018),
while dynamic networks seem to be more successful in sustaining cooperation (Rand
et al. 2011). Note that also in these experiments, subjects play N-person PD’s rather
than several 2-person PDs. Recently, Harrell et al. (2018) confirmed the positive effect
of reputation for the situation where participants interact in several 2-person PDs in a
partially static network where some of the ties in the network can be changed.
In this paper we present a systematic test comparing cooperative behavior in
the four treatments presented above in which subjects play 2-person PDs in (dy-
namic) networks. We start by formulating hypotheses on the expected differences
between the treatments. Although we advocate rigorous theory development (see
Raub and Buskens 2011; Raub 2017) and prefer formal derivation of hypotheses
using a micro-macro perspective (Raub and Voss 1981, 2016; Coleman 1986, 1990;
Raub et al. 2011), we defer to a more intuitive way of hypothesis formulation here
based on more formal arguments given elsewhere. Thereafter, we present our ex-
periment and the analysis of behavior. We end with conclusions and some reflec-
tions of the strengths and weaknesses of our study.
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17.2 Theory
17.2.1 Reputation effects in exogenous networks
The most straightforward prediction is that we expect reputation to promote coopera-
tion in the situation in which actors cannot choose their partners. This follows directly
from, among others, the game-theoretic model by Raub and Weesie (1990). They show
that in an infinitely repeated PD in which there is also information exchange between
actors in different games, the more extensive this information exchange is, the less re-
strictive the conditions become under which an equilibrium is possible in which actors
always cooperate. Under the interpretation that under information exchange the situa-
tion is more favorable for cooperation, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Cooperation is higher in the Reputation Treatment than in the Baseline Treatment.
Although this hypothesis seems intuitive and straightforward, we highlight some limi-
tations of the model by Raub and Weesie (1990). The equilibrium conditions are based
on the assumption that actors play trigger strategies, which presupposes that all actors
are perfectly rational and coordinate on the cooperative equilibrium if it exists. This
assumption is problematic because if actors would make mistakes and, e.g., defect
while cooperation would still be the equilibrium behavior, these mistakes are likely to
be more destructive if information exchange is more extensive. If others hear about the
defections, they will react with defections themselves and the cooperative equilibrium
collapses faster or more likely compared to the situation in which such reputation ef-
fect are not possible. Using a simulation model based on learning dynamics Cook and
Corten (2009; see also Corten 2014: Ch. 3) show that in the Reputation Treatment more
extreme levels (higher as well as lower) of cooperation are reached than in the Baseline
Treatment. Thus, they show that the average level of cooperation does not necessarily
increase. This might be a reason why many studies do not find a strong relation be-
tween possibilities for reputation building in networks and cooperation (see also
Corten et al. 2016 in which we analyze part of the experiment for which we do the full
analysis here, focusing on Hypothesis 1 in particular). Still, what Corten and Cook
(2009) also show is that the variation in levels of cooperation achieved over groups in-
creases with reputation and that this variation can be explained by initial tendencies to
behave cooperatively or not. This is also consistent with other empirical observations
related to network effects, for example, on trust (Burt and Knez 1995). These considera-
tions motivate the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2: Emerging cooperation levels are higher when initial cooperation levels are higher.
Hypothesis 3: The variance in cooperation is higher in the Reputation Treatment than in the
Baseline Treatment.
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17.2.2 Effects of partner choice without reputation
Under many conditions, it has been shown that adding an exit option to a PD, such
that actors can avoid uncooperative subjects, increases the possibilities for coopera-
tion (Schüssler 1989; Stanley et al. 1995; EDK-group 2000; Hauk 2001). However,
the extent to which it helps depends on the attractiveness of the outside option and
the way in which partnerships can be formed or partners can be avoided (e.g.,
Hauk and Nagel 2001; Hauk 2001). The extent to which partners can be punished
by excluding them depends on how attractive the outside option is (that is, what
the payoff is of not interacting with someone) and to what extent partners then
want to use that option for punishment. In our set-up, the outside option is actually
more attractive than mutual defection, while partners only play when they both are
willing to play with each other. This largely resembles the mutual agreement sce-
nario of Hauk and Nagel (2001) for which they find that defection rates are lower
conditional upon both actors entering the PD if the outside option indeed exists.
But also, the overall cooperation rate is lower in games with the outside option be-
cause there are quite some games in which actors end up in the outside option.
Strict game-theoretic predictions for the finitely repeated game with the attrac-
tive outside option would simply predict that actors play the outside option. In an
infinitely repeated game, adding the attractive outside option should reduce the
possibilities for cooperation because the sanction for uncooperative behavior be-
comes smaller. On the other hand, actors should only enter the game if they believe
that the other actor will cooperate and hence if both consider the sanction possibili-
ties within the PD strong enough for cooperation to be sustained. Based on these
arguments, we reach the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: Cooperation is higher in the Partner Choice Treatment than in the Baseline
Treatment given that two actors do enter in an interaction.
This is also consistent with a more recent experiment (Wilson and Wu 2017) that
finds that cooperation increases with an outside option, but the likelihood to stay
with a partner decreases with the attractiveness of the outside option. Given that
cooperation within interactions is higher, while there will also be pairs of actors
that do not interact, the difference between the Partner Choice Treatment and the
Baseline Treatment in terms of total cooperation is uncertain.
17.2.3 Effects of partner choice in combination with reputation
There are few straightforward theoretical predictions that can be used to predict dif-
ferences between the treatments with partner choice and reputation compared to the
other three treatments. An exception is the study by Corten and Cook (2009) who
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present a simulation in which the treaments of this experiment are combined (see
also Fu, Hauert, and Nowak 2008 for a model version in which actors can switch
partners but always keep the same number of interaction partners and can only
choose the same behavior towards all their partners). We discuss some related re-
search and experimental findings as a comparison. Riedl and Ule (2002) were among
the first to study cooperation in dynamic networks. Their set-up is crucially different
because they do not allow actors to differentiate behavior between partners. So actors
can only choose to cooperate or defect with everyone or no one at the same time.
This implies that cooperation is not determined at the dyadic level and observing co-
operation tells something about the actor rather than about a specific relation.
Therefore, their finding that cooperation is larger in dynamic than in fixed networks
cannot be directly related to our experiment. Some later papers (Fehl et al. 2011;
Rand et al. 2011) confirm the cooperation-promoting ability of dynamic networks in
settings in which subjects cannot differentiate between their partners.
Strict game-theoretic predictions on models with network dynamics and reputa-
tion possibilities are hard to find and also difficult to generalize to different as-
sumptions regarding incentives generated by the network (see Raub, Buskens and
Frey 2013). Moreover, the equilibria derived in these models are typically based on
trigger-strategy type of equilibrium analyses that are very sensitive to small devia-
tions in behavior, especially if the information on these deviations can spread
through the network. Although the conditions derived could still be interpreted in a
more lenient way, namely, as how difficult it is to sustain cooperation under certain
circumstances (see Raub and Buskens 2013: 125), we focus our predictions here on
simulation analyses done to resemble the experiment we discuss.
Related simulations can also be found, e.g., by Melamed and Simpson (2016),
which show that the emerging amount of cooperation might, in subtle ways, de-
pend on the starting network structure, the value of ties compared to the payoffs in
the games, and the speed of changing relations compared to the speed of adapta-
tion of behavior. Relations should be able to be changed fast enough such that ac-
tors do not change to defective behavior because they are hooked up too long with
other defectors. At the same time, relations should be stable enough to let coopera-
tion be established within these relations. Melamed and Simpson (2016) test their
model in an experiment in which participants play against pre-programmed oppo-
nents (while they are told that they play against real others). This, however implies
that the results to a large extent are driven by the programmed strategies of oppo-
nents and can hardly be considered as a test of what would happen if real subjects
interact. Later, in an M-Turk experiment the authors improved this set-up (Melamed
et al. 2018), and added a set-up similar to ours in which subjects could differentiate
their actions between others. They show that dynamic interaction dramatically in-
creases cooperation even if when reputation effects are excluded (although it
should be noted that Cuesta et al. 2018 claim that some reputation is still involved
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in their no-reputation treatment). Still, their results show almost perfect coopera-
tion levels in about all treatments with dynamic networks.
Considering the simulations of Corten and Cook (2009), which resemble our ex-
perimental set-up closely, the most salient observation is not that dynamics univo-
cally promote cooperation, but that this finding strongly depends on the tendency
to which actors start with the intention to cooperate or not. This is still consistent
with other findings in which high cooperation levels are found, because in many
subject pools cooperative tendencies are relatively high at the beginning of the ex-
periment. However, it also suggests that if starting conditions vary considerably re-
sults might change dramatically. Therefore, we include hypotheses 2 and 3
regarding the importance of starting levels of cooperative behavior and the variance
in cooperative behavior for dynamic networks.
Given earlier experimental evidence showing that starting levels of cooperative
behavior can be expected to be relatively high, we expect that also with dynamic
networks the effect of reputation will be positive overall. The simulations do not
provide predictions on interaction effects from reputation and dynamic networks
on levels of cooperation or on variations in cooperation.
17.2.4 Experimental setup
17.2.4.1 Treatments and the computer interface
The four treatments were implemented in a computer interface using z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007). Each experimental sessions consisted of 40 periods. We start
with explaining the Baseline Treatment. In the Baseline Treatment, subjects inter-
acted in groups of six. In each period, subjects were randomly matched with two
other subjects in their group. They played a game with every other subject (see
Figure 17.1). As Figure 17.1 shows, subjects received 30 points for every interaction
that was not matched in any given period. This implies that in every period, sub-
jects received 3 times 30 = 90 points, on top of the payoffs from matched interac-
tions, regardless of their choices. The payoff for non-matched interactions was
implemented for comparison with the two treatments in which subjects could
choose partners, as described below. Because these payoffs do not in any way de-
pend on the subjects’ choices, they are not expected to influence the results in the
treatments without partner choice.
Figure 17.2 shows the screen in which subjects made their decisions in the
Baseline Treatment. The left-hand side of the screen represents the current choice
situation. The yellow square represents the focal subject (Ego); the other subjects
are represented by circles. The thin black lines between subjects indicate neighbors,
i.e., all the relations that might be selected for an interaction in a given period in
this group (in the Baseline Treatment, these were all dyads in the group). The black
398 Rense Corten, Vincent Buskens and Stephanie Rosenkranz
circles represent the other subjects with whom Ego was matched for this period
(subjects 4 and 5, in the example). This is furthermore indicated by the thick grey
lines behind the thin black lines. By observing these thick grey lines, Ego can also
learn which other pairs were matched in this period (in the example, these are 2
and 6, 2 and 3, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6).
The choices of the subjects are represented in the interface by arrows: if Ego
chooses to play ORANGE (cooperation) against a partner, this is indicated by an or-
ange arrow from Ego to this partner. Ego can indicate her choice by clicking with
the cursor on the circles of the matched partners, which will change the color of the
arrow. If Ego interacted before with any of her matched partners, the choices that
were made in that previous interaction are already displayed on the screen and Ego
can update her choice as desired. The upper right-hand corner of the screen shows
the history of outcomes so far, which Ego can freely browse (using the ‘next’ and
‘previous’ buttons) for reference.
When Ego is satisfied with her choice, she clicks ‘OK’, which brings up the re-
sults screen shown in Figure 17.3. This screen shows the actions of Ego and her in-
teraction partners and reports Ego’s payoffs. In this example, Ego earned 40 points
from the interaction with subject 5, 60 from the interaction with subject 4, and
three times 30 for the other subjects with whom she did not interact, totaling 190
points. As in the choice screen, the upper right-hand corner of the screen provides
the history of previous outcomes for reference.
The three other treatments differed from the Baseline Treatment by the imple-
mentation of one or both of two additional mechanisms: reputation and partner
choice, which were implemented as follows.
In the treatments with reputation, subjects were informed not only about their
own interactions but also about all interactions of their neighbors, which are all the
other subjects with whom Ego could be matched (indicated by thin black lines on
the screen). In our implementation, these were all subjects in the network in the
BLUE ORANGE
No 
Interaction
Player 1
Player 2
BLUE 20,20 60,0 30,30
ORANGE 0,60 40,40 30,30
No 
Interaction
30,30 30,30 30,30
Figure 17.1: The experimental game.
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Reputation Treatment. In terms of information this implies that subjects were in-
formed not only about the outcomes of their own interactions, but also about the
outcomes of all other interactions. The interface of the Reputation Treatment dif-
fers from the Baseline Treatment only to the extent that outcomes of all other in-
teractions are also displayed, as illustrated by Figure 17.4, which shows the
results screen from the Reputation Treatment. Here, arrows are not only displayed
for Ego’s own interactions, but also for all other interactions that took place in
that period.
In the treatments with partner choice, subjects had a third choice for every
matched interaction besides ORANGE and BLUE, namely not to interact with this
specific partner. This implies that if a pair of subjects in the given tie had been
playing the PD in previous periods, each of them had the option to discontinue
the interaction, while if they were not playing the game before, each could de-
cide to start playing the PD. The subjects thus had the option to freely choose
interaction partners, although this choice was restricted to other subjects you
happened to be matched to for a potential interaction in a certain period. In this
treatment, subjects could cycle though ORANGE, BLUE and NO INTERACTION by
clicking on the circle representing the other subject. If one of the two subjects
involved in the interaction chose NO INTERACTION, they both received the no
interaction payoff of 30 (see Figure 17.1). In that case, they also were not consid-
ered neighbors, and had no thin black line between them in the interface. Still,
everyone could be matched to everyone to play again and choose between the
three choices. In that sense, the thin black lines have a slightly different mean-
ing in the treatments with partner choice compared to the treatments without
partner choice.
In combination, the reputation and partner choice mechanisms lead to three treat-
ments besides the Baseline Treatment. The Reputation Treatment implemented only
the reputation mechanism, without partner choice. The Partner Choice Treatment, im-
plemented the partner choice mechanism but not the reputation mechanism. Thus,
subjects could also choose NO INTERACTION with another subject, but were only in-
formed about what happened in their own interactions.
The Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment implements both the reputation
mechanism and the partner choice mechanism. Thus, subjects had the option not
to interact (and thus not to be neighbors with another subject), and were informed
not only about their own interactions but also about the interactions of their neigh-
bors. It is important to note that in this case, the information network (indicated by
the thin black lines in the interface) co-evolves with subjects’ behavior in the game:
when they choose not to interact with a given other subject, this also has the conse-
quence that they are not (or no longer) informed about the interactions of this other
subject. In order to keep this treatment comparable with the Reputation Treatment
in terms of information availability, we let subjects start in the complete network in
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this treatment and neighbors were only disconnected after someone choose NO
INTERACTION when they played.2
We like to emphasize that an important feature of our design is that all treat-
ments are mutually comparable, apart from the mechanism that we are interested in.
Thus, the Reputation Treatment differs from the Baseline Treatment only in the imple-
mentation of the reputation mechanism, while at the same time (and due to the fact
that the no interaction payoff is also implemented in the treatments without partner
choice), the Partner Choice Treatment also only differ from the Baseline Treatment in
the implementation of the partner choice mechanism. Likewise, in the Reputation-
Partner Choice Treatment, the implementation of the reputation- and partner choice
mechanism is exactly the same as in the corresponding treatments that do not feature
the alternate mechanism. Preserving this comparability is not trivial, and it is one of
the features that sets our study apart from most of the existing literature.
In all treatments, subjects were instructed about the details of the game and the
interface through a set of written instructions, which they had available throughout
the experiment for reference. Before the 40 periods of the experiment began, subjects
played five “practice periods” to familiarize themselves with the interface and the game.
After the 40th period, subjects were shown an overview of the total number of points
they had earned. For convenience, we summarize the main elements of the interface:
Thin black lines indicate that subjects both played ORANGE or BLUE the last
time they were matched, which implies that they are neighbors and it determines
what they observe in the treatments with reputation. The network of neighbors is
common knowledge. In the Baseline and Reputation Treatment (treatments without
partner choice), all subjects were neighbors.
Thick grey lines indicate that two subjects are matched, which implies that
they have the opportunity to choose ORANGE, BLUE or NO INTERACTION in (the
treatments with) these interactions. Matches are common knowledge.
Orange and blue arrows indicate choice in the game in the case two subjects
are matched, with orange referring to cooperation in the PD and blue to defection.
If one of the two subjects chose NO INTERACTION rather than BLUE or ORANGE in
the treatments with partner choice, they both received the No interaction payoff.
17.2.4.2 Practical implementation
The experiments were conducted at different moments in time and in two different labs,
located at Stanford University and UC Berkeley. Both labs maintain pools of potential
2 Many more example of social dilemma problems and especially in the academic world have viv-
idly been illustrated by Raub in his farewell lecture (Raub 2017: 49–54).
e Treatment in which there is no information exchange about neighbors’ interactions with
others than Ego. We return to this issue in the discussion.
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subjects consisting mostly of undergraduate students, from which subjects were invited
to participate. Table 17.1 shows the number of groups in each treatment per location.3
In each session, either six or twelve subjects participated simultaneously in the lab,
resulting in either one or two 6-person groups. The two locations differed substan-
tially with regard to the number of subjects per session: at the Stanford session it
happened only rarely that two groups (twelve subjects) were available, while at the
Berkeley sessions this was almost always the case. An important consequence of
having only one group in the lab was that the subject could not be reshuffled be-
tween the practice periods and the actual experiment.
17.3 Results
Figure 17.5 shows the development of average group cooperation rates in each of the
treatments. Based on this figure we can make a number of observations. First, we find
that the only treatment that clearly stands out is the Partner Choice Treatment (without
reputation effects), where cooperation rates are clearly lower than in the other three
treatments. Second, we find that in all treatments cooperation rates are fairly stable
until approximately period 35, after which we see a mild end-game effect.
The picture becomes somewhat different when we look at the results separately for
each of the locations (Figure 17.6). As compared to Figure 17.5, a number of differences
stand out. First, cooperation is clearly higher in the Stanford sessions than in the
Berkeley sessions. Second, while the Partner Choice Treatment remains the treatment
with lowest cooperation rates in both cases, the order of the other three treatments in
terms of cooperation rates seems to differ between the locations. In the Stanford ses-
sions, we see a divergence from period 25 onwards between the two treatments with
partner choice on the one hand and the two treatments without partner choice on the
other. In the Berkeley sessions, the Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment continues to
Table 17.1: Numbers of groups per treatment and location (N = 55).
Stanford Berkeley
No Partner Choice Partner Choice No Partner Choice Partner Choice
No Reputation    
Reputation    
3 In crosstabs such as Table 17.1, we use combinations of the labels “Reputation”/“No Reputation”
and “Partner Choice”/“No Partner Choice” to indicate the experimental treatments, where the cell
“No Reputation, No Partner Choice” refers to the Baseline Treatment, and so on.
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show higher cooperation rates than the Partner Choice Treatment. At the same time,
the Reputation Treatment shows consistently (but slightly) higher cooperation rates
than the Baseline Treatment. In sum, while we see that the effect of partner choice by
itself is consistently negative between the locations, the effect of reputation, both by
itself and in combination with partner choice, is less consistent between the locations.
Figure 17.6: Average cooperation rates per treatment, separate for the two locations.
Figure 17.5: Average cooperation per treatment.
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To test these results for statistical significance, we conduct t-tests on average coop-
eration per treatment, in which the unit of analysis is a group and in which we ex-
clude the final five periods because of the consistently visible endgame effect.4 We
conduct pairwise comparisons of the four treatments to test for effects of partner
choice and reputation. The corresponding averages and standard deviations are re-
ported in Tables 17.2 and 17.3.
When we pool the data for the two locations, we find that, as compared to the
Baseline Treatment, cooperation is significantly lower in the Partner Choice
Treatment (p = .01). The other differences between the treatments are not significant.5
Looking at the locations separately, we find that the Stanford data replicate the over-
all result: only the difference between the Baseline Treatment and the Partner Choice
Table 17.2: Cooperation in periods 1–35 per treatment. Averages
and standard deviations.
No Partner Choice Partner Choice
No Reputation . .
(.) (.)
Reputation . .
(.) (.)
Table 17.3: Cooperation in periods 1–35 per treatment and location
and session size. Averages and standard deviations.
Stanford No Partner Choice Partner Choice
No Reputation . .
(.) (.)
Reputation . .
(.) (.)
UC Berkeley No Partner choice Partner choice
No Reputation . .
(.) (.)
Reputation . .
(.) (.)
4 However, it turns out that the overall results depend very little on the precise choice of periods
included.
5 Non-parametric tests yield similar results.
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Treatment is significant (p = .02). For the Berkeley data, however, we find that this
difference is only significant at the α = .1 level (p = .07), while the difference between
the Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment and Partner Choice Treatment is also signif-
icant at this level (p = .08). We thus find no support for Hypothesis 1.
To test Hypothesis 2, we run a generalized linear regression model with a logit
link (because the depended variable is a proportion) using the implementation in
Stata 14. As predictors, we use dummy variables for the treatments (including an
interaction between reputation and partner choice), location, and behavior in the
first period. Consistent with the hypotheses, behavior in the first period has a strong
and significant positive effect on overall cooperation as can be seen in Table 17.4.
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we look at the variance between group cooperation lev-
els. If subjects play trigger strategies, we consider the hypothesized effect to show in
later rather than earlier periods of the game. As Table 17.5 shows, the variance in co-
operation in periods 30–35 between groups is larger in the Reputation Treatment
than in the Baseline Treatment as predicted, but this difference is not significant. The
same holds for the Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment and the Partner Choice
Treatment: the variance is larger with reputation, but not significantly so. Thus, we
Table 17.4: Generalized linear regression of the proportion cooperation
on treatments, location, and first period cooperation (N = 55).
Coeff. Std. Err. z
Reputation . . .
Partner Choice −.* . −.
Reputation * Partner Choice . . .
Berkeley −.* . −.
Cooperation Period  .** . .
Constant −.** . −.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
Table 17.5: Cooperation levels in periods 30–35 (means and standard
deviations).
No Partner choice Partner Choice
No Reputation . .
(.) (.)
Reputation . .
(.) (.)
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find no support for Hypothesis 3, and that conclusion does not change if we distin-
guish between locations (results not shown).
To test Hypothesis 4, we compare cooperation levels in periods 1–35 in estab-
lished ties, that is, interactions in which none of the subjects chose the NO
INTERACTION option, if available (see Table 17.6). We hypothesized cooperation in
such established ties should be higher in the Partner Choice Treatment than in the
Baseline Treatment. As Table 17.6 shows, this is indeed the case, but this difference
is not statistically significant (t = – 0.76, p = .45). We also observe that this differ-
ence is larger and significant (t = – 2.30, p = .03) if we compare the Reputation
Treatment and the Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment, although we did not hy-
pothesize this.
Finally, we briefly explore emerging network structure in the two partner choice
treatments by looking at the dynamics of network density, where the network is de-
fined as the network of interactions in which no subject in the pair chose exit. In
the two reputation treatments, this network determined the flow of information (see
“Experimental setup”). Figure 17.7 shows the development of network density for
each of the two treatments. Both treatments start in the complete network (although
in the treatment without reputation this network is not used to transfer informa-
tion)6 but in both cases network density quickly decreases until approximately pe-
riod 12, after which density only decreases slightly.7 In combination with our earlier
results on the dynamics of cooperation (Figure 17.5), which showed more constant
or even slightly increasing cooperation levels, the decrease in density indicates that
especially interactions involving defection disappear. After period 12, density in the
Table 17.6: Cooperation levels in periods 1–35 in established
ties, per treatment.
No Partner Choice Partner Choice
No Reputation . .
(.) (.)
Reputation . .
(.) (.)
6 Note that this does not necessarily imply that both subjects played C or D; in the earlier periods,
it is possible that subjects had not yet had an opportunity to change the tie, as they could only
change two ties per person in each period. For comparability between the treatments with and
without reputation, we treat these ties as present in the density calculation for Figure 17.7.
7 Because we measured the network density at the end of each period, the average densities in the
first period are not necessarily one, as subjects could already change the network during that
period.
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Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment appears slightly higher than in the Partner
Choice Treatment, but this difference is not statistically significant (taking period 35
as a benchmark, consistent with our earlier analyses of emerging cooperation levels).
17.4 Discussion and conclusion
The notion that cooperation is more like in more cohesive communities is almost a tru-
ism in sociological thinking. Nevertheless, providing a rigorous theoretical argument
for this claim is far from trivial, as Raub and Weesie (1990) showed in their landmark
paper. In this paper, we have extended their scenario of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas
in social networks with the option of partner choice. This option makes social network
structure effectively endogenous, and allows us to study the question whether the so-
cial network structures that are thought to promote cooperation (i.e., dense network
structures) are likely to remain or emerge as a result of actor’s choices, or whether the
option of partner choice undermines the reputation effects in networks theorized by
Raub and Weesie.
Characteristic for our experiment is that the experimental treatments are specif-
ically designed to 1) test the prediction from the Raub and Weesie (1990) model and
2) to study the effects of partner choice and reputation diffusion in isolation as well
as in combination. After all, previous research suggests that the option of partner
choice in itself affects cooperation rates, even in the absence of network effects
(e.g., Hauk 2001). Thus, our experimental treatments are constructed such that
Figure 17.7: Dynamics of network density for each of the partner choice treatments.
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both partner choice and network effects via reputation diffusion are varied indepen-
dently while keeping other parameters constant. This approach results in four ex-
perimental treatments: the Baseline Treatment without reputation effects or partner
choice, the Partner Choice Treatment with only partner choice, the Reputation
Treatment with only information exchange, and the combined Reputation-Partner
Choice Treatment. Another element that distinguishes our experiment from most
other experiments in which subjects play PDs on networks is that subjects can dif-
ferentiate their behavior between different others they play with. This reduces some
of the interdependencies between different interactions, but it is crucial for allow-
ing targeting punishment to specific individuals by defecting in the interactions
with these individuals and being able to cooperate with others.
Based on the work by Raub and Weesie (1990), we hypothesized in the first place
that cooperation rates should be higher in the Reputation Treatment than in the
Baseline Treatment (H1). As we already reported in an earlier paper (Corten et al. 2016),
we found no support for this prediction, whether we look at overall cooperation rates,
cooperation rates near the end of the game, or cooperation rates at the start of the
game (the last is arguably the most precise test of the hypothesis, see Corten et al.
2016). Alternative models of cooperation that rely on learning heuristics rather than for-
ward-looking rationality (i.e., Corten and Cook 2009) predict that emerging cooperation
levels (near the end of the game) should be higher when initial cooperation levels are
higher (H2). We do find support for this hypothesis, but we do not find support for the
additional hypothesis, predicted by the same models, that the variance in cooperation
is higher in the Reputation Treatment than in the Baseline Treatment (H3).
For the Partner Choice Treatment, we argued that the availability of a relatively
attractive outside option would reduce overall cooperation rates as it reduces the pos-
sibility to sanction defection effectively (cf. Hauk and Nagel 2001; Hauk 2001), while
increasing cooperation rates conditional on that both actors enter into the interaction
(H4), since actors should only engage in interaction if they believe that the other
actor will cooperate. While we do not find support for the latter, we do find that over-
all cooperation rates are lower in the Partner Choice Treatment than in the Baseline
Treatment, which is in fact the only treatment-level difference in cooperation rates
that is statistically significant. Thus, while we find that the option of partner choice
lowers cooperation rates in the absence of reputation effects, this is not the case in
the presence of reputation effects (that is, there are no significant differences in coop-
eration rates between the Reputation Treatment and the Reputation-Partner Choice
Treatment). Although it is tempting to interpret this finding as showing that the pres-
ence of reputation effects serves as “protection” against the detrimental effect of part-
ner choice, we note that there is no significant negative interaction effect between
the Partner Choice- and Reputation Treatments (as this interpretation would imply).
Looking at the emergence of network structure in the two treatments with partner
choice, we did not find clear differences in network structures between the treatments
with and without reputation: average densities converge to about .3, which is obviously
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considerably less dense than the complete network in the reputation treatment without
partner choice. What does this result tell us about the likelihood of the spontaneous
emergence of network structures that support cooperation? On the one hand, we do
not find that if subjects can endogenously change the network, this leads to high-
density networks, nor do we find that the mere availability of a reputation mechanism,
which could be interpreted as an incentive for striving for dense networks, clearly
leads to differences in density of emerging network structures. On the other hand, we
do also not find that reputation formation in dense networks, when determined exoge-
nously, leads to more cooperation in the first place, which renders the question of
emergence of cooperation-promoting network structure less relevant altogether, in the
context of our experiment. Similar to what is found in the context of trust games (Frey
et al. 2019), we cannot exclude that subjects do not stay in dense networks because
they do not anticipate the potential benefits or that they do not stay in these networks
because they do anticipate that the potential benefits will not materialize.
Our setup did not allow us to study the emergence of social networks (with in-
formation transmission) in the case where actors start completely isolated: in our
Reputation-Partner Choice Treatment, subjects already started in the completely
connected network to ensure comparability with the (static) Reputation Treatment.
On the one hand, studying such an extension (e.g., a version of the Reputation-
Partner Choice Treatment in which subjects start in the empty network) may pro-
vide novel insights in the types of network structures that emerge when subjects
are free to build the network structure “from scratch.” On the other hand, given our
current findings, there seems little reason to expect that this would lead to different
conclusions with regard to cooperation levels.
Before we move on to implications for further research, we also note that we ob-
served considerable differences, both in overall cooperation rates and in the effects of
the experimental treatments, between the two location where the experimental ses-
sions took place. Our data do not allow us to disentangle group size effects, differen-
ces in the compositions of the respective subject pools, or differences in the setup of
the labs underlying these discrepancies, but at the very least these findings illustrate
the sensitiveness of experimental results on cooperation issues, even in an incentiv-
ized, neutrally worded experiment using the exact same protocol in two locations in
the same geographical region. One explanation about these differences might be re-
lated to the different populations in the different locations. As Melamed et al. (2017)
show, cooperation is predominantly promoted through dynamic networks if the actors
involved are sufficiently pro-social or, alternatively, as is suggested by Buskens et al.
(2015), subjects differ in the extent to which they anticipate the future benefits of repu-
tation effects. Delving deeper into differences in effects of social structures on cooper-
ation depending on the individual differences between the actors involved is still an
important area for further research.
Clearly there are also other directions for extension that are theoretically and
empirically interesting. First, the role of noise in the observation of behavior is an
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important aspect that is also relevant in real-world context and might intervene in
the dynamics of networks of cooperation especially when reputation effects are im-
portant. Some work in this direction has been done (e.g. Perc 2006), but many path-
ways are also unexplored. Another interesting extension is a context in which some
relations are dynamic, but other relations cannot be changed. An interesting pio-
neering study for such a context shows that cooperative behavior in the two types
of ties can be interrelated (Harrell, Melamed, and Simpson 2018).
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18 Comparing Consequences of Carrots
and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated
Public Good Games
Abstract: Many sociologists and economists have maintained that costly sanctions are
able to sustain cooperation, but whether carrots or sticks are more successful in this
respect is still under dispute (e.g., Balliet, Mulder, and Van Lange 2011; Rand et al.
2009; Sefton, Schupp, and Walker 2007). Furthermore, while many studies investi-
gated the effects of sanctioning institution on cooperation, the long-term effects of
sanctions on group solidarity are largely unexplored. In this chapter, we discuss con-
trasting hypotheses concerning the effects of positive and negative sanctions on coop-
eration in Public Good Games and solidarity among the group members. Subsequently,
we test these hypotheses by means of a laboratory experiment. Our results show that
while carrots do increase cooperation, sticks turn out to be more effective. Concerning
group solidarity, we do not find differences in group solidarity depending on the type
of sanctions available to the group members. However, we find that actors who receive
rewards show higher solidarity towards the group.
18.1 Introduction
In many practical instances, individual interests are partly conflicting with collec-
tive interests. For example, everyone prefers to receive public services from the
state, but, at the same time, everyone would prefer not to pay taxes that allow the
state to provide those services. As it is individually rational to avoid paying taxes,
but collectively detrimental if everyone does so, we call this a social dilemma
(Raub, Buskens, and Corten 2015). Real-life situations with this kind of incentive
structure are modelled using public good games (PGG hereafter). The typical setup
of a PGG is as follows. People interact in small groups. Each individual receives an
initial endowment and can decide how much of this endowment he or she wants to
invest into a ‘group account,’ and how much he or she wants to keep for him- or
herself. In a PGG, the amount contributed by all group members to the group ac-
count grows by a certain rate and – thereafter – is equally distributed among all the
group members, regardless of their contribution to the public good. The growth rate
of the public good is always lower than the number of people in the group. This
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implies that, for every unit an actor invests in the public good, he or she receives
only a fraction in return. Therefore, it is individually rational not to invest in the
group account.
Although standard game-theoretical rationality assumptions dictate that no-
body should cooperate in public good games, some cooperation is always observed
when subjects play public good games in experimental laboratories (see Chauduri
2011 and Ledyard 1995 for reviews). Several mechanisms accounting for the emer-
gence of cooperation have been proposed, such as kin selection (Hamilton 1963),
direct reciprocity (Trivers 1971), social embeddedness (Buskens and Raub 2013;
Raub and Weesie 1990), indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998), group se-
lection (Traulsen and Nowak 2006), status (Willer 2009). See Nowak (2006) for an
overview. In the context of cooperation in PGGs, a large body of literature focused
on the role of institutions. Analyzing the problem of social order, Hobbes (1651) de-
scribed an authority who enforces rules for the society by establishing a contract.
Social order obtains because violations of this contract are punished by the central
authority (the “Leviathan” in Hobbes’s terms). More generally, institutional solu-
tions to public good problems include all forms of sanctions that can be positive
(i.e., rewards or carrots) or negative (i.e., punishments or sticks).1 If actors are given
the possibility to use sanctions, they typically use them as selective incentives to
promote cooperation (Olson 1965). The idea that sanctions are an effective means to
protect cooperation from free-riders is widely known and has been largely debated
(Balliet, Mulder, and van Lange 2011; Barclay 2006; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr
and Gintis 2007; Gächter 2013; Yamagishi 1986). While Balliet, Mulder, and Van
Lange (2011) convincingly show – using an extensive meta-analysis – that both
sticks and carrots can promote cooperation and that the two effects do not seem too
much different, the number of studies with costly rewards in PGGs is limited. In ad-
dition, the consequences of using sanctions, particularly punishment, have been
considered only in terms of their ability to promote cooperation. Yet, the fact that
Hobbes (1651) used a biblical monster, the leviathan, as a metaphor for the central
authority responsible of maintaining social order, suggests that order imposed by
force is not necessarily always pleasant. In fact, some scholars have addressed pos-
sible side-effects of punitive sanctions concerning solidarity among the groups
members (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Irwin, Mulder, and Simpson 2014; Mulder
et al. 2006; Nowak et al. 2008; Oliver 1980). In this chapter, we focus on two ques-
tions: first, whether carrots or sticks are a more effective way to obtain cooperation
in a public good problem, and second, what are the consequences of positive and
negative sanctions on how much solidarity individuals feel towards their fellow
group members. In the remainder, after briefly discussing the existing relevant liter-
ature, we present a series of hypotheses concerning effects of positive and negative
1 See Calvert (1995) on modeling institutions as exogenous constraints.
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sanctions on both cooperation and solidarity. Subsequently, we present an experi-
ment in which these hypotheses are empirically tested.
18.2 Theory and hypotheses
18.2.1 Theory: Human cooperation and selective incentives
Before discussing the theoretical arguments related to the use of positive versus
negative sanctions, we formally introduce the PGG. In a PGG, groups consist of N
(with N > 2) persons. Each group member is endowed with a specific amount (Y) of
points. The amount of points is the same for every person. Each member can invest
a certain amount X (0 ≤ X ≤ Y) of these points into a group account representing the
public good. Every point invested in the group account is multiplied by a factor M
(which exceeds 1 but is smaller than N, 1 < M < N). After all group members have
made their contribution to the group account and the total amount of points has
been multiplied by M, the resulting amount of points is equally distributed among
the group members. Because M < N, the individual return of the investment is nega-
tive, i.e. X > X × M/N. Therefore, choosing X = 0 is a dominant strategy for every
player. Thus, assuming that actors are purely interested in maximizing their own
wealth, they should not contribute anything to the public good. However, if all
group members invest their entire endowment Y, each individual earns N × Y × M/N =
X × Y > Y. This situation is Pareto-superior to the situation in which no one invests any-
thing (Fehr and Gintis 2007; Gächter 2013). In a one-shot PGG, if standard economic
rationality is assumed (that is, everyone tries to maximize his expected payoff with no
concern for what happens to the other group members), all actors should play the
dominant strategy and choose to contribute nothing to the public good. However, this
hypothesis is typically not supported by experimental results. In the laboratory there
are always some persons who cooperate: in one-shot PGGs, the average contribution
level is usually around 50% of the total endowment.
If the PGG is played repeatedly, simple reciprocity (Hamilton 1963; Trivers 1971)
signaling (Spence 1973; Zahavi 1995) or reputation (Axelrod 1984; Kreps et al. 1982;
Raub and Weesie 1990) become possible mechanisms supporting contribution to the
public good. Nevertheless, repeated PGGs typically show a pattern of decreasing con-
tribution over time empirically. In experimental treatments in which the group com-
position is kept constant (partner treatment), the mean contribution is higher than
when participants are shuffled after every round (stranger treatment), but in both
cases contribution declines as the game proceeds further (e.g., Andreoni 1988; Keser
and Van Winden 2000). These empirical results imply that reciprocity, reputation
and costly signaling are not sufficient to reach a cooperative equilibrium in a re-
peated PGG. The pattern of declining cooperation is reversed and higher cooperation
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levels are achieved and sustained when sanctions are allowed (Fehr and Gächter
2002) – even if participants are shuffled and re-matching is excluded by design. Fehr
and Gachter’s (2002) study on altruistic punishment shows that 1) a significant pro-
portion of actors has not purely selfish preferences, 2) these actors typically contrib-
ute significantly to the public good and punish defectors, 3) as defectors anticipate
that they will be punished, they raise their cooperation levels, and, consequently, co-
operation is ensured. The existence of (partly) altruistic preferences poses an evolu-
tionary puzzle because selfish actors gain a competitive advantage in interactions
with these altruists. Therefore, altruistic preferences should have been driven extinct
by natural selection.
Some scholars have argued that these preferences are a form of maladaption
(e.g., Johnson, Stopka, and Knights 2003). The argument goes as follows: in the ances-
tral environment where most of our evolution took place – sometimes referred to as
“environment of evolutionary adaptiveness”, EEA (e.g., Fehr and Henrich 2003) – in-
teractions were typically repeated rather than one-shot, because most of the relevant
social activities occurred within small groups. In such settings, reputation-building
makes cooperation profitable, because defection might lead to retaliation and conflict,
thus making defectors worse off in the long run. As one-shot interactions are assumed
to have been rare in EEA, human subjects interacting anonymously in the laboratory
fail to recognize the irrelevance of reputation building in one-shot interactions and
erroneously apply behavioral rules evolved and adapted to repeated interactions.
However, this argument is problematic because one-shot interactions were in fact
not so rare in EEA and, moreover, experimental subjects do show the ability to differ-
entiate their behavior depending on whether interactions are repeated or one-shot
(Fehr and Henrich, 2003). To solve this puzzle, scholars have developed culture-gene
coevolution models that provide evolutionary foundations for altruistic preferences
(e.g., Boyd et al. 2003). In such models actors face cooperation problems within groups
and, simultaneously, competition for scarce resources between groups. Consequently,
selection favors defectors within groups, but groups where defectors thrive underper-
form in intergroup competition and risk extinction. In this environment, groups devel-
oped some form of institutional solution – such as punishment or reward – to prevent
defectors to exploit cooperators thereby producing a reduction of the group collective
fitness, ultimately leading to extinction of the group. Thus, these models typically in-
clude some form of group selection, but they assume that group selection operates pre-
dominantly on cultural rather than genetic variation (Richerson, Boyd and Henrich
2003). Accordingly, altruistic preferences evolved in the EEA lead to the development
of various institutions, which in turn are transmitted to subsequent generations
through processes like conformist social learning and moralistic enforcement of norms
(Richerson, Boyd and Henrich 2003). However, if institutions are assumed to be trans-
mitted via conformist social learning, group solidarity and individual commitment to
the group must be important determinants of a group’s capacity to survive and
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reproduce itself. Yet, the relation between sanctioning institutions and group solidarity
has been largely ignored.
In this chapter we study a setting in which both positive and negative sanctions
are allowed and we focus on a repeated game with the same partners because ear-
lier results revealed that, in these conditions, a strong effect of sanctioning institu-
tions is to be expected (Balliet, Mulder, and van Lange 2011; Rand et al. 2009;
Sefton, Schupp, and Walker 2007). Also, we focus on groups that remain stable
over time, because we are interested in possible side-effects of sanctions, particu-
larly with respect to group solidarity, which only make sense if the group members
experience more than just one interaction with each other.
18.2.2 Punishment and rewards
While reciprocity can produce cooperation in two-person games (Axelrod 1984), when
the social dilemma involves a group of actors, as in the PGG, reciprocity alone is insuf-
ficient, because the individual actions are not selective. That is, when the payoff of an
actor is affected by more than one person, it is not possible to apply direct reciprocity.
In a PGG, either one cooperates with all other group members or with none. Therefore,
cooperation is unstable, even in repeated games with the same partners (Andreoni
1988; Keser and Van Winden 2000). The option to impose sanctions, whether in the
form of carrots (rewards) or sticks (punishments) addresses precisely this problem of
selecting incentives to discriminate cooperators from free-riders. By being able to ad-
dress only the defectors with sticks, or only the contributors with carrots, cooperation
can possibly be sustained (Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund 2003; Barclay 2006;
Fehr and Gächter 2002; Masclet et al. 2003; Rand et al. 2009; Sefton, Schupp, and
Walker 2007; Stoop, Van Soest, and Vyrastekova 2018; Yamagishi 1986).
Sanctions are common in everyday life: even just looking at someone angrily or
smiling at someone in response to some action could be seen as a stick or carrot,
respectively (cf. Masclet et al. 2003; Pan and Houser 2017; Takacs and Janky 2007).
In experimental settings, punitive monetary sanctions are often implemented by al-
lowing everyone to impose a (costly) fine on anyone else. For example, each mem-
ber of a specific group can decrease or increase each other group members’ payoffs
by paying a small amount from their own earnings. Similarly, rewards can be im-
plemented by allowing everyone to increase the payoff of anybody else, paying a
small cost.
According to standard game theoretical assumptions, selective sanctioning insti-
tutions imply an additional problem as they likewise require cooperation to be pro-
duced. This problem is commonly known as the second-order free-rider dilemma
(Yamagishi 1986). Although theoretically rational self-interested actors should not use
costly sanctions, many experiments have shown that, when given the opportunity, a
considerable proportion of actors invest resources to punish defectors or reward
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cooperators. In order to account for this empirical evidence, alternative assumptions
concerning the preferences of the actors have been proposed. e.g., strong reciprocity
(Fehr and Gintis 2007; Gintis 2000). Individuals are assumed to be motivated by
strong reciprocity if they cooperate when they expect others to cooperate, reciprocate
when they are rewarded and punish violations of the cooperative norm (Fehr and
Gintis 2007; Keser and Van Winden 2000). Most commonly, cooperators (people who
invest) punish defectors (people who do not invest into the group account) and re-
ward other cooperators (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Gächter 2013; Sefton, Schupp, and
Walker 2007).2 Consequently, as defectors anticipate that they will be punished or
that they will not receive any reward, they raise their contribution levels (Fehr and
Gächter 2002). Accordingly, the classical model of economic rationality – homo eco-
nomicus – does not accurately account for human behavior in real life. An alternative
model, incorporating assumptions of strong reciprocity, is commonly referred to as
the PBC-model (Preferences, Beliefs and Constraints- model) (Fehr and Gintis 2007;
Gächter 2013). This model considers Preferences, Beliefs and Constraints, on the basis
of which actors make their decisions. “Preferences describe how an individual ranks
the available alternatives according to his or her subjective tastes” (Gächter 2013: 34)
and these can include more aspects than just his or her own money. That is, partly
altruistic preferences are also possible. Beliefs refer to what actors think the preferences
of other actors might be or how these preferences are distributed. Finally, Constraints
“describe the set of alternatives that are available to an individual” (Gächter 2013: 34).
The PBC-model assumes that individuals choose their utility-maximizing option, an op-
tion that satisfies their preferences best, while considering their beliefs and constraints.
18.2.3 Hypotheses on contributions to the public good
In order to derive hypotheses on the effects of monetary sanctions (carrots and
sticks) on cooperation in public good type of settings, we assume that actors make
their decisions as postulated by the PBC-model. The PBC-model can accommodate
various types of preferences, including inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999)
or fairness (Rabin 1993). Although distinguishing between these alternative non-
standard utility models exceeds the scope of our chapter, preferences for fairness
and equality are important motivational forces behind the phenomenon of strong
reciprocity (Fehr and Gintis 2007; Gächter 2013; Keser and Van Winden 2000).
Consistent with the PBC-model, we distinguish two types of individuals: selfish indi-
viduals (that correspond to the homo economicus) and conditional cooperators
2 Antisocial punishment, i.e., punishment directed at high contributors, has been observed espe-
cially in cross-cultural experiments (Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter 2008). However, antisocial pun-
ishers seem relatively rare.
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(Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001).3 Selfish individuals act according to the
standard game theoretical prediction and always try to maximize their own wealth,
without any concern for the payoff obtained by others. Conditional cooperators act
according to the scheme of strong reciprocity. Assuming a population with hetero-
geneous preferences solves the second-order free-rider problem, because it can be
expected that, in every group, there will be some conditional cooperators whose
preference is to punish free-riders and to reward contributors. When sanctions are
not allowed, selfish players succeed in driving cooperation down: as conditional co-
operators face some defectors, their willingness to contribute declines and finally
stops, since defection is the only available means to retaliate against defectors. By
contrast, when sanctions are allowed, they are commonly used by conditional coop-
erators to force selfish actors to contribute (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Fehr and
Gintis 2007). A symmetric argument can be made for rewards: they will typically be
offered by conditional cooperators to high contributors. However, enticed by the
possibility to gain rewards, selfish actors will then raise their contribution level,
too. Therefore, on the macro level, we state the following hypothesis:
H1: Cooperation levels are higher when sanctions (carrots, sticks, or both) can be used than
when they are not allowed (baseline).
When carrots and sticks have to be compared, it is less clear what happens as con-
trasting arguments can be made favoring both sticks and carrots. Therefore, after
summarizing the arguments we will present contrasting hypotheses for the effects
of carrots versus sticks on cooperation. The effects of sticks are relevant especially
for selfish actors, since they are normally used by conditional cooperators against
free-riders. Conditional cooperators are unlikely to be punished, by definition.
Conversely, selfish actors are likely to get punished for attempting to free-ride. As
defectors get punished, the benefit earned by free-riding is eroded. Therefore, con-
tributing becomes the payoff-maximizing choice. Sticks have thus the effect of in-
creasing contribution of selfish individuals in future rounds of the PGG. On the
other hand, carrots are likely to be given especially to conditional cooperators, as
they should be the highest contributors. However, carrots affect both conditional
cooperators and selfish actors. The former have two motives to contribute: first,
they act according to strong reciprocity. Thus, if others cooperate they should coop-
erate as well. In addition, they may cooperate because they expect to receive re-
wards for high contributions. As for the selfish actors, carrots create economic
advantages: if they are used extensively, they might produce higher payoffs (Rand
et al. 2009). Thus, selfish individuals are only motivated to cooperate by the second
3 Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) conducted a study specifically designed to elicit individual
preferences. They found that 50% of their participants were conditional cooperators and 30% were
selfish types. The remaining 20% displayed other less easily interpretable behavioral patterns.
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reason. That is, they will cooperate in order to receive monetary rewards and im-
prove their payoff, if the probability of getting rewarded is high enough.
In addition to the economic argument, there is also a psychological argument
favoring the efficacy of carrots over sticks. There is extensive evidence that, next to
the positive effect of raising contribution, punitive sanctions produce some perni-
cious effects: they reduce mutual trust and trustworthiness within groups (Fehr and
Rockenbach 2003; Mulder et al. 2006), they increase selfishness and hostility
(Nikiforakis 2008), and they crowd out intrinsic motivation (Bohnet and Baytelman
2007). These arguments lead us to present the following hypothesis:
H2a: Cooperation levels are higher when only carrots can be used, compared to when only sticks
can be used.
Next to the perspectives that predict advantages of carrots, there are also arguments
for advantages of sticks. Dari Mattiacci and De Geest (2009) argue that punishment
produces a “multiplication effect”: while the sheer opportunity to punish is enough
to sustain cooperation, punishment may never need to be actually used. In other
words, assuming that sticks function as credible threats, if everybody cooperates –
whether because they are cooperators, or because they are selfish but fear punish-
ment – sticks never need to be applied. An effective stick can provide incentives for
the same individual in different periods or for several individuals simultaneously,
without anybody ever having to pay its costs. By contrast, carrots need to be used
(and paid) each time a subject cooperates. Thus, carrots provide a more expensive
means to sustain cooperation.
In addition to this economic argument, there are also psychological arguments fa-
voring sticks over carrots. Individual’s utility does not only depend on material bene-
fits: people do not only avoid punishment and seek rewards for financial reasons, but
also for the intrinsic benefit that receiving rewards and avoiding punishment provide.
According to Lindenberg (2001) and Stigler and Becker (1977), individuals’ universal
goals include social approval, status, and affection. In particular, as they strive for so-
cial approval, people are sensitive to negative and positive sanctions. They strive to
receive positive social reactions and avoid negative ones. However, social psycholo-
gists have shown that the desire to avoid negative feedbacks is typically stronger than
the desire to receive positive feedbacks and this negative asymmetry, due to which
“bad is stronger than good” is present across a broad range of phenomena (Baumeister
et al. 2001). These arguments lead us to present the following hypothesis:
H2b: Cooperation levels are higher when only sticks can be used, compared to when only carrots
can be used.
Since we have no clear prediction on the contribution level when both kinds of
sanctions are allowed simultaneously, we turn to the results of Sefton, Schupp, and
Walker (2007) and Rand et al. (2009) for comparison. These two studies compared
costly rewards and costly punishment and yielded contrasting results, due to
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crucial differences in the experimental design. In Sefton, Schupp, and Walker
(2007) subjects played series of ten PGGs in groups of four. Each PGG was followed
by a second stage in which they received extra points that they could use to punish,
reward, and punish or reward (depending on the experimental treatment) the other
group members. The ratio between cost and effect of the sanction was 1:1, i.e., one
point spent on punishment decreased the income of the person punished of one
point and one point spent on reward increased the income of the person rewarded
of one point. Because of this feature, in Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007) rewards
consisted in pure zero-sum horizontal transfer of points, without efficiency gain. In
Rand et al.’s (2009) setup the game sequence was the same, but the total number of
PGGs to be played was unknown to subjects. In addition, Rand et al. (2009) did not
provide the subjects with extra money for the sanctioning part, but sanctions had
to be paid from the money earned in the previous PGG. The cost to effect ratio of
sanctions was 4:12, i.e., subjects could spend four points on punishment/reward to
cause a decrease/increase of twelve points to the target. Finally, unlike in Sefton,
Schupp, and Walker (2007), not only the group composition but also the subjects’
IDs were held fixed throughout the experiment. Thus, mutual exchange of punish-
ment or rewards – even unrelated to the behavior in the contribution stage of the
game – was possible in Rand et al. (2009).
In Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007) the treatment in which both sticks and car-
rots were allowed yielded slightly higher contribution levels than any carrots and
sticks separately, while the treatments with rewards only and punishment only pro-
duce similar levels of contribution to the public good. By contrast, in Rand et al.
(2009) the contribution level was similar in the three treatments, but final payoffs
were significantly higher in the two treatments where rewards were possible (i.e., one
with only rewards and one with both rewards and punishments) than in the treatment
where only punishment was possible. The high efficiency of the treatments with re-
wards is clearly due to the fact that, as personal IDs of the players were fixed in Rand
et al. (2009), actors could exchange rewards mutually and these exchanges were
highly productive due to the 4:12 cost to effect ratio. However, the possibility for mu-
tual exchange of rewards effectively transforms the sanctioning stage of the game in a
repeated prisoner’s dilemma, for which mutual cooperation is a possible equilibrium,
irrespectively of what happens in the PGG (Milinski and Rockenbach 2012). In addi-
tion, others have shown that, under certain conditions, the possibility of mutual ex-
changes of rewards could even be detrimental for the production of collective goods,
because actors might increase each other’s payoffs by exchanging gifts and stop con-
tributing to the public good (Flache 2002).
As detailed in the experimental design section, we adopted Sefton, Schupp, and
Walker’s (2007) setup, with two modifications: first in order to strengthen the effect of
sanctions we increased the magnitude of sticks and carrots by making the cost to ef-
fect ratio 1:2 instead of 1:1. Thus, in our study one point spent on sanctions increased
or decreased the payoff of the target of two points. Second, we made the series of
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rounds longer, in order to allow more time for the effects of sanctions to build up, but
we turned the game into an indefinitely repeated game by making the end uncertain
for the subjects. Note that we kept the group composition constant throughout the
rounds but, unlike Rand et al. (2009), we did only inform subjects about the total
number of points all others together used to sanction them, while we did not reveal
the identities of these others. In this way, we make mutual exchanges of rewards (or
mutual punishment) impossible. Given that our setup largely resembles the one
adopted by Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007), except for increasing the potential ef-
ficacy of sanctions by modifying the cost to effect ratio, we expect to replicate the ef-
fect found in their study. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: If carrots and sticks are allowed simultaneously, the cooperation levels are higher than when
only either of the two is allowed.
18.2.4 Hypotheses on group solidarity
While previous research has focused primarily on the necessity of sanctioning institu-
tions to promote cooperation in public goods, possible negative side-effects of these
institutions have received considerably less attention. However, Tenbrunsel and
Messick (1999) argued that the use of monetary sanctions can have perverse effects
on group solidarity because it imposes an economic frame, which may crowd out in-
trinsic motivation and lead subjects to cooperate only to avoid financial losses. The
consequences of using carrots and sticks in terms of solidarity among group members
have not yet been sufficiently investigated. However, the existence of important side-
effects, potentially affecting group solidarity, has been noted by several researchers
(Oliver 1980; Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Mulder et al. 2006, Irwin, Mulder, and
Simpson 2014). The existing literature suggests that carrots can promote solidarity
and emotional attachment to the group (Markovsky and Lawler 1994; Friedkin 2004).
Sticks, on the other hand, may succeed in controlling defection of group members,
but could have detrimental side effects on solidarity due to the negative emotional
responses they evoke (Oliver 1980; Friedkin 2004). These side effects can range from
unhappiness to tension and hostility within the group (Oliver 1980). In general, pun-
ishers are disliked while rewarders are liked (Friedkin 2004). Moreover, sticks may
crowd out the intrinsic motivation to help the other group members, and damage or
undermine mutual trust (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Mulder et al. 2006). More spe-
cifically, being punished by another group member decreases trust and willingness
to cooperate with the punisher (Oliver 1980; Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Mulder
et al. 2006).
As stated above, gene-culture coevolution models of altruistic preferences attri-
bute an important role to cultural group selection in the process leading to the evolu-
tion of complex sanctioning institutions. Therefore, intrinsic motivation to support
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the group as well as mutual trust and solidarity between group members are very im-
portant factors in the competition between groups. Low levels of mutual trust and
solidarity might lead groups to perform poorly in competition with other groups.
Demotivated group members might be tempted to leave the group. Ultimately, in the
long-term a group characterized by an unpopular sanctioning institution might be
defeated by other groups or simply dissolve.
The same argument holds for modern groups whose members stay the same for a
long time, as it is the case for many small groups (e.g. clubs and organizations). If the
members do not feel attached to the group or dislike each other, they will ultimately
be less willing to contribute, because feelings have the ability to weaken or strengthen
the bonds between group members (Markovsky and Lawler 1994). Although investi-
gating long-term effects in the artificial setting of a computer-mediated laboratory ex-
periment is certainly difficult, our experiment aims at comparing whether carrots or
sticks lead to more cooperation in longer sequences of games than normally studied.
In addition, we investigate whether carrots lead to more group solidarity by letting
subjects play an additional one-shot “person-to-group” Dictator Game (DG), after the
repeated PGGs. This one-shot DG – explained in details in the experimental design
section – constitutes our individual measurement of group solidarity. Therefore, as-
suming that actors’ attachment and solidarity to the group is affected by the sanctions
that they receive, we postulate the following hypotheses:
H4: Individuals show lower solidarity towards other group members, the more they have been
punished.
H5: Individual show higher solidarity towards other group members, the more they have been
rewarded.
18.3 The experimental design
To test the hypotheses a series of computerized experiments was conducted with z-
Tree (Fischbacher 2007) in the Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics
of a large Dutch University. Eight sessions took place at the end of 2009 with a total
of 152 subjects. The subjects were students from various faculties, recruited via the
online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
Like in Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007), the PGG was played as a repeated
game. This characteristic allows for reciprocity in the sense that subjects can react to
their fellow group members’ investments either directly by sanctioning (punishing or
rewarding, depending on the treatment), or indirectly, by adjusting their own invest-
ments accordingly in the next round. Furthermore, to simulate cooperation problems
in groups as realistically as possible, the subjects did not know in advance when the
game would end, since the end of a repeated interaction is generally unknown in real
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life situations. The interactions were anonymous and, unlike in Rand et al. (2009),
upon receiving a sanction subjects could not identify who had sanctioned them, so
that mutual rewarding (or punishing) between rounds was impossible.
Each of the eight experimental sessions lasted between 45 and 75 minutes, de-
pending on the treatment. Each session consisted of two series of repeated PGGs
(thus, two super-games), played in the same experimental treatment. At the beginning
of each session, subjects played two trial rounds to get acquainted with the proce-
dures of the game. In these trial rounds, which had no influence on the subjects’ earn-
ings, the behaviors of the others in each group were pre-programmed. In the first trial
round, the subject was informed that the other (virtual) group members had invested
four points each, in the second trial round six points each. The pre-programming took
place to guarantee that all subjects started the experimental rounds with the same ex-
perience. The lowest and highest possible investments, such as zero or ten points,
were avoided to prevent any suggestions for extreme actions. When all individuals
had completed the trial rounds, they were randomly matched into groups of four and
the second part of the experiment began. The first of two super-games was played,
which consisted of between 20 and 30 rounds of PGGs. After round 21 the game
stopped with a probability of 10%, after round 22 with a probability of 20%, and so on
until the game would stop with certainty in round 30.
Each round consisted of two parts, a PGG stage, followed by a sanctioning stage,
except for the control treatment that had no sanctioning stage. At the beginning of
the PGG stage, the subjects received an initial endowment of ten points and they
could decide how much of this endowment to invest into a group account. Whatever
the subjects did not invest into the group account was stored directly into the sub-
ject’s individual account to be paid eventually at the end of the experiment. The
amount collected in the group account was multiplied by three and then equally dis-
tributed between the four group members. In the sanctioning stage, the subjects re-
ceived five additional points, which they could use, at a cost to effect ratio of 1:2, to
punish and/or reward the other group members. That is, if a subject spent, for exam-
ple, one point of his/her five points on punishing/rewarding someone else, two
points were subtracted from/added to the target’s payoff. All points that were not
spent in sanctions were added to the subject’s individual account. This manipulation
of the sanctioning option is similar to the one adopted by Sefton, Schupp, and
Walker (2007). However, we made sanctions more cost-effective, by adding/subtract-
ing two points, instead of one, per every point spent on reward/punishment. This
modification was implemented in order to better test our hypothesis concerning the
advantage of carrots over sticks (Hypothesis 2a), because the main argument support-
ing that hypothesis is that rewards can increment earnings. However, as stated
above, in Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007) rewards were simply a zero-sum transfer
of points between players and, therefore, they were not economically attractive.
The experiment had four treatments and we conducted two sessions per treatment.
The first treatment was the Baseline Treatment, which had no options to sanction.
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The second was the Sticks Treatment, in which, in the sanctioning stage, subjects
could spend any of their five points available for sanctions on punishments only. In
the third treatment (Carrots Treatment) all group members could spend any of their
five points available for sanctions on rewards only. In the fourth treatment both pun-
ishment and rewards were possible (Sticks & Carrots Treatment). However, the endow-
ment at disposal remained at five points in total for both kinds of sanctions. Each
subject could not spend more than the five points provided for punishing and/or re-
warding. The individuals could not use their own earnings to sanction others because
otherwise, subjects who earned more in the PGG might have been more willing to
spend points on punishing and/or rewarding others than subjects who earned little.
Thus, the measure of how willing people are to punish defectors and reward coopera-
tors would have been biased by the amount earned in the PGG. After finishing the first
super-game, all subjects were randomly re-matched in different four-person groups
and the second super-game started. Throughout each super-game, the subjects were
informed about the individual investments of the other members of their group by a
table located at the lower part of the computer screen. Thus, subjects could make their
sanctioning decisions contingent on the contributions of their fellows groups members.
Furthermore, the subjects were informed about the amount that they had invested to
inflict sanctions on others in each round, and about the losses and gains that were in-
flicted on them by punishments and rewards received from the other group members
(if applicable).
Twenty subjects took part in each session, except for two sessions which had
only 16 subjects (one in the Baseline and one the Carrots Treatment). Therefore, five
(or four) groups of four persons were formed in each session. Each subject was
seated in front of a computer station, which was visually separated from the others.
As a start, the instructions about the procedures of the experiment were handed
out, the subjects could choose between English and Dutch.4 Of the 152 subjects 104
(68.4%) chose the Dutch instructions and 48 (31.6%) the English version.
Each of the two super-games per session was directly followed by a person-to-
group DG which serves as our behavioral measure of a subject’s solidarity towards
the group. The person-to-group DG works as follows: each subject receives an en-
dowment of 40 points. Then, he or she can decide to give some of these 40 points to
the group. The amount chosen is equally distributed between all three remaining
group members, without being multiplied by any number beforehand. The subjects
may choose to give zero points to their fellow group members, in which case the 40
points are added to their own earnings. We used the amount given as an individual
measure of solidarity towards one’s own group. Finally, the experiment ended with
a questionnaire asking for demographic characteristics (such as gender, age, na-
tionality, field of studies, amount of money at disposal each month).
4 Instructions can be obtained contacting the authors.
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The earnings of each subject were determined by the contributions accumu-
lated in the group account – in every round of the PGG – divided by four (all group
members) plus the rest of the endowments (from the PGG and the sanctioning part
of each round) that subjects did not invest in the PGG or in sanctions, plus the
points received as rewards and minus the points lost due to punishment. In addi-
tion, the points kept as well as the points received by fellow group members in the
DG were likewise added to the individual account. At the end of the experiment, the
subjects were paid in Euros at an exchange rate of 125 points = 1 Euro.
Of the 152 subjects who participated, 36 played in the Baseline Treatment, 40 in
the Sticks Treatment, 36 in the Carrots Treatment, and 40 in the Sticks & Carrots
Treatment. In total, 7568 decisions were recorded; 304 of these in the trial rounds.
Thus, we recorded 7264 decisions that had influence on the subjects’ earnings.
Between 21 and 27, on average 23.9 rounds, were played in all super-games. The sub-
jects earned between 5.5 and 16.5 Euros, the lowest earnings were received in the
Baseline Treatment. The average profit was 12.60 Euros.5
18.4 Methods
For the hypotheses on cooperation, the average of the contributions per group
serves as the dependent variable. The four different treatments serve as indepen-
dent variables. For the analysis, we estimated a panel regression to account for the
repeated observations within subject over time. We only used the first 20 rounds of
the super-games to discard possible endgame effects. We did alternative analyses
such as (1) including the final rounds, (2) using an interval regression model to take
into account that groups could not contribute less than 0 or more than 40, and (3)
only analyzing the first super-game. In all these analyses the pattern of results
shown below is robust.
The dependent variable solidarity is measured by the individual contributions
to the group in the DGs, following every super-game. The four different treatments
serve as independent variables. The other independent variables are: the extent to
which individuals contributed to the public good on average, the individual aver-
age received punishments, and individual average received rewards. To test the hy-
potheses on group solidarity we estimated a non-hierarchical mixed effects model,
which includes random effects for groups and subjects. This mixed effects model is
cross-classified because most subjects are involved in two different groups. The
model allows us to control for possible effects of individual differences and group
differences.
5 Due to a programming error, rematching was unsuccessful in two sessions. Therefore, the second
super-game in these two sessions had to be excluded from the analyses presented below.
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18.5 Results
18.5.1 Descriptive results
Over all treaments the contribution level was on average quite high: 8.2 points out
of ten possible. Looking at the contribution levels in the different treaments, it is
clear that cooperation was higher in the treatments in which sanctions were possi-
ble compared to the Baseline Treatment. The Carrots Treatment had the lowest aver-
age contribution level among the treatments with sanctions. In the two treatments
with punishment, subjects assigned on average 0.35 and 0.38 punishment points to
the three other subjects. Actually, in 87% of the rounds in which they could punish,
subjects did not punish at all. Rewards were more frequently given, namely in 66%
of the rounds in which subjects could give rewards. The average amount of points
that subjects used for sanctions was 2.37 points in the Carrots Treatment and 2.03
points in the Sticks & Carrots Treatment. In the DG, the amount given to the other
group members was on average 11.6 of 40 possible points, which is relatively low,
compared to the percentages invested in the PGG. Table 18.1 summarizes the de-
scriptive statistics.
Table 18.1: Descriptive statistics.
Range Mean S.D. Number of obs.
Number of rounds played – . . 
Contribution level in groups (overall) – . . 
Individual contributions (overall) – . . 
Contribution in Baseline – . . 
Contribution in Sticks – . . 
Contribution in Carrots – . . 
Contribution in Sticks & Carrots – . . 
Punishment given in Sticks – . . 
Punishment given in Sticks & Carrots – . . 
Punishment received in Sticks – . . 
Punishment received in Sticks & Carrots – . . 
Rewards given in Carrots – . . 
Rewards given in Sticks & Carrots – . . 
Rewards received in Carrots – . . 
Rewards received in Sticks & Carrots – . . 
Contributions in Dictator Game – . . 
Age – . . 
Earnings .–. . . 
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As an overview, the contribution levels in each treatment are shown in Figure 18.1.
This figure shows the average contribution level in each round of the 68 groups of four
subjects who participated in the study. Figure 18.1 makes evident that contributions
are the highest in the treatments that include sticks. Overall, the contributions in this
experiment are considerably larger than in other public good experiments. This might
be due to the large number of rounds subjects played. As mentioned in the description
of the experiment, the super-games ended at random between 20 and 30 rounds.
Therefore, the dots corresponding to rounds after the 20th represent fewer observa-
tions. For descriptive purposes we still show these rounds. They show that there are no
endgame effects at all for the treatments that include sticks, while the contributions
seem to decline after round 20 in the other two treatments. Furthermore, Figure 18.1
shows that the subjects in all treatments started with relatively high contributions com-
pared to earlier experiments and even rose thereafter. However, only in the Sticks and
Sticks & Carrots Treatments very high contribution levels, up to full cooperation, were
maintained until the end. In the Carrots Treatment the cooperation levels were lower,
and in the Baseline Treatment the contributions fell, after an initial rise, even below
the starting level of cooperation.
If we analyze the two super-games separately, we find that in the second super-game the
subjects start in all treatments with higher contributions than in the first super-game.
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Figure 18.1: Contribution levels in the groups by treatment.
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Moreover, in the second super-game almost perfect cooperation is reached quicker in the
Sticks and Sticks & Carrots Treatments and is stable (from round 5 onwards). The contri-
bution levels in the Carrots and the Baseline Treatments are likewise higher than in the
first super-game, but still lower than in the treatments where punishment is possible.
Summarizing, the few changes that we implemented compared to the setup used by
Sefton, Schupp, andWalker (2007), namely increasing the cost to effect ratio of sanctions
from 1:1 to 1:2, letting subjects play more rounds, and making the end of the game proba-
bilistic, apparently made the reputation argument in repeated games more salient, driv-
ing up contribution levels.
18.5.2 Explanatory results
18.5.2.1 Contribution to the public good
The panel regression on cooperation levels shows that contributions were significantly
higher in the two treatments in which punishment was allowed (sticks and sticks & car-
rots) compared to the baseline where no sanction was allowed (see Table 18.2, Model
1). This effect is not significant for the Carrots Treatment, although the coefficient is
Table 18.2: Two-level regression on contribution with clustering on groups.
Model  Model 
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient† s.e.
Baseline (reference)
Sticks .** . .** .
Carrots . . . .
Sticks & Carrots .** . .** .
Round (Baseline) −.** .
Round (Sticks) .** .
Round (Carrots) .** .
Round (Carrots & Sticks) .** .
Constant .** . .** .
Random part
Group level (st. dev.) . .
Obs. level (st. dev.) . .
R within groups . .
R between groups . .
R overall . .
N (groups)  
N (observations)  
Notes: * p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-sided)
† Main effects of conditions calculated for round 10
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positive. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is only partly supported: cooperation levels are higher if
negative sanctions can be used, but not if only positive sanctions can be used. If we
include the time trends for each treatment (Model 2), we see that the differences be-
tween treatments are mainly due to increased contributions in the treatments with
sanction opportunities and most strongly in treatments with sticks, while contributions
decreased in the Baseline Treatment. Including other control variables, such as age
and gender, does not change much in the model, but it only slightly reduces the effect
sizes of the dummies for sticks and sticks & carrots and of the round variables. Thus,
the model including the controls is not shown here.
Concerning Hypotheses 2a and 2b, about the comparison of contribution levels
between sticks and carrots, the former is rejected and the latter is supported. That
is, contribution levels are significantly higher when only punishments can be used,
compared to when only rewards can be used. Finally, there are no significant differ-
ences in the contribution level between the Sticks Treatment and the Sticks &
Carrots Treatment. However, the difference between the Carrots Treatment and the
Sticks & Carrots Treatment is significant (p = 0.0310). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is only
partly confirmed: if punishments and rewards are allowed simultaneously the con-
tribution level is significantly higher than when only rewards are allowed, but it is
not different from the contribution achieved when only punishment is available.
Thus, the final message is clearly that sticks are more effective than carrots at sus-
taining cooperation and when sticks are available, the contribution level does not
change, whether carrots are also available as well or not.
18.5.2.2 Solidarity
The amount given in the person-to-group DGs is used to operationalize solidarity.
In Table 18.3, Model 1 shows no significant differences between any of the treat-
ments. In Model 2, though, we can see that subjects gave significantly less to the
group in the DG if they played the previous super-game in the Carrots Treatment
and they did not receive any rewards. However, if individuals did receive rewards,
they significantly gave more to the other group members in the DG. These two ef-
fects cancel out each other, because there is no main effect of carrots on solidarity.
Apparently, subjects expect to receive rewards if rewards are possible. If they do
not obtain carrots when they could, their solidarity towards the group diminishes.
To compensate for this, subjects should receive 2.12 (= −7.47/3.52) points of reward-
ing per round. From Table 18.1 we know that subjects indeed on average gave a lit-
tle more than 2 units in rewards per round. This explains why the main effect is
indeed about zero. We did some additional analyses to see whether the experiences
in the latest rounds might have had a relatively large effect on the behavior in the
DG. Therefore, we distinguished between the experiences in the first 20 rounds with
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the experiences in the last couple of rounds. There were no significant differences
between these effects.
Therefore, we conclude that Hypothesis 4 cannot be confirmed, since the results
on the Sticks Treatments are not significant. Punishments do not lead to a negative
attitude towards the group and there is not less solidarity in the punishments treat-
ments. One explanation for this is that punishments were hardly used and, in line with
the “multiplication effect” argument (Dari Mattiacci and De Geest 2009), cooperation
was very high in both treatments with punishment. Thus, punishment worked as a
credible threat. Conversely, Hypothesis 5 is partly supported: the individual solidarity
towards the group is heightened by actual received rewards. It appears that the sheer
possibility of receiving rewards leads to the expectation that one should receive re-
wards. If this expectation is not fulfilled, cooperation even decreases in the treatment
with rewards.
18.6 Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to investigate whether positive or negative sanctions in
public good type of situations are more effective at promoting cooperation. Moreover,
Table 18.3: Mixed effects regression on contribution in Dictator Game.
Model  Model 
Coefficient s.e. Coefficient s.e.
Baseline (reference)
Sticks . . . .
Carrots . . −.* .
Sticks & Carrots . . −. .
Average contribution . .
Average received punishments . .
Average received rewards .** .
Constant .** . . .
Random effects
Group level (st. dev.) . .
Subject level (st. dev.) . .
Obs. Level . .
Log restricted-likelihood −. −.
N (groups)  
N (individuals)  
N (observations)  
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01 (two-sided)
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We looked at the consequences that positive and negative sanctions produce in
terms of group solidarity. We addressed these two research problems by conducting
a computerized experiment. Our main findings show that cooperation levels are gen-
erally higher if sticks or sticks and carrots are allowed (Hypothesis 1). We also found
that average contribution levels were rather high in our study. Moreover, contribution
levels were higher in the condition in which only sticks were allowed than in the con-
dition in which only carrots were allowed (Hypothesis 2b). When both sanctions were
allowed simultaneously (Hypothesis 3), the contribution levels were significantly
higher than in the condition with rewards only, but similar to the condition with pun-
ishments only.
The results on group solidarity do not lend support to the hypothesis that indi-
viduals care less about their group after they are punished (Hypothesis 4). However,
if the subjects receive rewards they indeed display a higher group solidarity, as they
give more to the group in the DG (Hypothesis 5). By contrast, the mere possibility to
use sanctions, whether positive or negative, does not have an effect on group solidar-
ity. Surprisingly, receiving punishment does not affect group solidarity. However,
this result might be due to the low amount of actual punishment observed in our ex-
periment. Thus, our results do not allow a strong test of the potentially demotivating
effects of implemented punishments. Conversely, rewards were used more often and,
as expected, produced the effect of increasing group solidarity. In addition, subjects
who did not receive rewards in the condition where rewards were possible exhibited
lower solidarity to the group than subjects in other conditions. Consequently, our
data do not support the argument that carrots can sustain cooperation in social di-
lemmas (Rand et al. 2009), nor the argument that sticks have detrimental side effects
in terms of group solidarity (cf. Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Mulder et al. 2006).
However, the finding that receiving rewards increases group solidarity gives some in-
dication that cultural norms based on rewards may benefit the group in the long
term, if we assume that higher group solidarity makes groups more resilient in the
context of intergroup competition (cf. Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich 2003).
Our experimental setup was designed to simultaneously address some limita-
tions of the designs used by Rand et al. (2009) and Sefton, Schupp, and Walker
(2007). Our results are consistent with the idea that the high payoffs in a PGG with
rewards found in Rand et al. (2009) could be due to the mutual exchange of highly
efficient rewards, rather than being a pure effect of rewards on cooperation (Milinski
and Rockenback 2012). By contrast, as we made the (monetary) consequences of
sanctions bigger than in Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007), rewards were used more
often than punishment by our subjects while punishment was used more often in
Sefton, Schupp, and Walker (2007). Yet, we found higher contribution levels in the
punishments only treatment than in the rewards only treatment, suggesting that
sticks function as credible threats, i.e., they support cooperation without needing to
be used (cf. Dari Mattiacci and De Geest 2009). Our experimental design also imple-
mented a higher number of within group interactions than did Sefton, Schupp, and
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Walker (2007), coupled with an uncertain end of the super-game. As a result, we ob-
tained relatively high levels of cooperation, even in the treatment without sanctions.
Consequently, our subjects provided more room for the use of positive than negative
reinforcers. Due to the 1:2 cost to effect ratio, in our rewards condition, Pareto-
superior outcomes could be reached if everyone gave rewards to everyone all the
time. Perhaps some of our subjects realized this and others did not. If the actors who
did realize this expected that indeed everyone exchanged rewards, they may have
been disappointed when others did not conform to this expectation, because they
lost points from providing rewards that they did not receive back from others. This
last point is clearly related to the costs of rewards. The actors who provided rewards
would not have been so much bothered if the rewards were for free. This implies that
the cost argument of Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2009) is relevant in this context.
The threat of sticks is effective and cheap, while the costs of continuously providing
carrots make them less effective.
Our results also imply that more theoretical work about group solidarity is
needed. For example, the negative effect of sticks, e.g., reduced group solidarity,
might not be generated by the possibilities of punishments alone, but it might re-
quire a context in which punishment is necessarily applied. This could be modeled
as a public good with uncertainty, i.e., a setting in which the contribution to the
public good is not always perfectly visible and sometimes actors do not seem to
contribute, while they actually do. Finally, the weak results concerning the effects
of sanctions on solidarity might also be due to our measurement of group solidarity
as a one-shot person-to-group DG. The behavior in the DG can be determined by
many subtle cues in the PGGs. In future studies, it would be advisable to comple-
ment the findings with more detailed measurements of solidarity and attachments
to the group, for example, using some attitudinal scales, next to behavioral meas-
ures such as the DG.
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Part III: Field Studies
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19 A Sociological View on Hierarchical
Failure: The Effect of Organizational Rules
on Exchange Performance in Buyer-
Supplier Transactions
Abstract: The classic Transaction Cost Economics view is that a key reason for firms
to exist is that they offer a way to overcome problematic market transactions. If it is
too complicated, expensive, or risky to buy a good on the market, consider hiring
employees to make it in-house – especially if it is a good that you (and others)
might need often. The implicit argument is that, for this reason, firms are a poten-
tially rational response to less advantageous markets. However, firms are rational
responses only when they themselves are organized in a way that is efficient
enough to outperform the market. We consider firms’ hierarchical efficiency by ana-
lyzing the existence and consequences of rules and procedures, effectively testing
two competing arguments. On the one hand, rules and procedures are one way in
which firms can achieve efficiency, through specialization and formalization of
what a firm has learned. On the other hand, rules can be imprecise and rigid, a nui-
sance to deal with, and just coincidental traces of what has gone wrong in the past.
Using a database of more than 800 transactions in which German small and
medium sized businesses buy ICT products and services, we consider the role of
rules and procedures in a large-scale quantitative way. It turns out that rules show
a pyramid-like structure where some firms have less and others have more codified
rules. Our results furthermore suggest that rules might not be the clotted efficiency
they have been argued to be. A high rule-density goes with increased investments
in contracting (“thicker contracts”) and not with decreased ex post transaction
problems, questioning the benefits of rules as a way to favor firms over markets.
19.1 Introduction
Research into the management of inter firm exchange has, both theoretically and em-
pirically, been dominated by transaction cost theory. The fundamental question ad-
dressed by transaction cost theory is why business firms exist (Williamson 1985;
Coase 1937). Transaction cost theory proposes that in some cases markets fail to orga-
nize transactions efficiently, for instance when contractual hazards associated with
transactions are too high. In such cases, instead of relying on the market to exchange
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goods and services, a hierarchy of contractual employee relations is the more effective
and efficient option (in-house production). This “make-or-buy” decision is at the heart
of the transaction cost theory paradigm, and extensions of this principle, that relate to
the extent to which a firm should invest in managing the products or services that they
decide to buy, have found their way into economics, sociology, and neighboring disci-
plines (cf. Batenburg et al. 2003; Raub et al. 2007; Rooks et al. 2000; Rooks et al. 2006;
Buskens and Raub 2013; Wynstra et al. 2018). While transaction cost theory’s predictions
have received some empirical support, many questions remain (cf. Rindfleisch and
Heide 1997; David and Han 2004; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006). One funda-
mental unexplored area is the structure and content of the hierarchy itself. A hierarchy
can be defined as a governance mode that “by means of an authority structure, provides
one exchange partner with the ability to develop rules, give instructions, and in effect
impose decisions on the others.” (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006: 525).
Under which conditions firms develop rules, and how exchange performance is
affected by these rules, are questions that have received comparatively little atten-
tion. They are important questions though, since more insight in the costs and bene-
fits of the use of rules will allow researchers to better assess when hierarchies
outperform other governance modes such as markets and hybrid governance forms
that include relational elements (March et al., 2000). Although formal organizational
rules have since long been an important ingredient in theories about bureaucratiza-
tion of organizations and societies as a whole (Gouldner 1954; Weber 1947), we know
surprisingly little about their effects in general (Beck and Kieser, 2003), and their ef-
fects on contractual planning in particular. Williamson has stressed on several occa-
sions (Swedberg 1990; Williamson 1996), that the strengths and weaknesses of
hierarchy need to be better understood. In his words, economists “are greatly in need
of a more adequate theory of bureaucracy”, thereby urging sociologists “to call these
issues to our attention, lay out their significance, and impress upon us to be respon-
sive” (Swedberg 1990: 124). He also stressed that “in comparison with the study of
market failure, the study of hierarchical failure is seriously underdeveloped. If, how-
ever, each generic mode of governance enjoys distinctive strengths and weaknesses,
then that disparity should be redressed. Chief among the issues that warrant study in
this connection is that of bureaucracy” (Williamson 1996: 17).
The aim of our study is to extend the literature and empirically investigate what the
effects of organizational rules are. We explicate and test how (formal) organizational
rules – in our case internal organizational rules on procurement – affect the contractual
planning of a purchasing transaction. The contractual planning of a transaction is a
complex set of activities that comprises negotiating and writing contracts, as well as en-
forcing contracts. Additionally, we test whether rules affect exchange performance,
which we define operationally as the number of problems that occur in the ex post
phase of a transaction, and a more subjective measure, namely the satisfaction of the
buyer with the product and supplier. We make use of a comprehensive data set contain-
ing detailed information about 832 purchasing transactions in Germany.
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19.2 Theory and hypotheses
Organizational rules provide procedures for problem solving (Beck and Kieser
2003). We are interested in rules that specify which actions have to be taken by em-
ployees or departments given a certain type of transaction. More specifically, we
focus on the set of rules developed to deal with issues in the area of procurement
and consider how the ‘density’ of internal organizational procurement rules affects
ex ante management of a purchase transaction. Following Schulz (1998: 849) we
define rule density as “the number of rules in a given organizational rule popula-
tion at a given time”. Essentially, rule density thus refers to the number of specified
rules in a given problem area (as a percentage of the total number of possible
rules). In our case the population of rules consists of all potential internal procure-
ment rules. Although it is not obvious that existing rules will necessarily be fol-
lowed (cf. Borry et al. 2018), we do not consider this issue and assume that, by and
large, organizational rules are followed (or at least that the more rules there are,
the more rules are followed).
19.2.1 Rules as rational adaptations or irrational coincidences
One of the earliest and most prominent scholars to focus on organizational rules was
Max Weber, who explained that the economic advantages of specialization through a
division of work can only be realized on the basis of formal rules. Rules and rule-
following are an essential element of bureaucracy, which, according to Weber, is a
superior form of organization. Formalization increases standardization, precision, and
the speed of organizational processes. Formal rules also restrict the organizational mem-
bers’ room for egoistic maneuvers and arbitrary decisions. Moreover, formal rules con-
trol and coordinate organizational processes and increase their predictability (Weber
1947). In Weber’s view, organizational rules are efficient. One of the reasons for this is
that organizational rules store knowledge (Beck and Kieser 2003; Hage 1965; Schulz
1998). Collective experience is transferred to individual and new members through rules
‘that reflect but do not reproduce the experiences on which they are based’ (March, as
cited in Beck and Kieser 2003). The idea that rules are efficient is shared by rational
action theories that explain the existence of rules as an efficient way to coordinate ac-
tion, ‘‘a conception of historical efficiency underlies many speculations about rules’’
(March et al. 2000: 4). Rules are expected to represent what an organization has learned
about dealing with matters, both within the organization itself and in relation to other
organizations (Williamson 1996).
A more or less opposing view proposes that organizational rules may be inefficient
as well. Although it is acknowledged that rules can achieve coordination, in this view
rules are often rigid and imprecise means to achieve coordination of activities as well.
Blau (1957: 68) expressed this view as follows “. . . effective administration is
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contingent on uniform adherence to regulations as well as on adaptability to a variety
of specific situations, but bureaucratic pressures compelling strict conformity to rules
also give rise to rigidities that interfere with the adaptability needed to handle special
cases”.
Schultz (1998) distinguished two mechanisms that inhibit or eliminate the ef-
fectiveness of rules as organizational learning devices: ‘codification traps’ and ‘sort-
ing’. Codification traps can occur when old rules are applied to new problems: a
new situation or problem does not really match a rule, but is used nevertheless. The
rule is often ‘stretched’ or extended to apply better to the problem. Such codifica-
tion traps are inhibiting organizational learning and lead to inefficiencies because
old, inadequate rules might be needlessly reinforced, and the perceived need to cre-
ate new better rules is decreased. Another inefficiency can be the result of what
Schulz calls ‘sorting’. Sorting is shorthand for the phenomenon that the most recur-
ring and important problems are encoded into solutions and rules first, while less
recurrent and less important problems are encountered and encoded later, or they
are not encoded in rules at all. Because of this temporal sequence, rules that are
created in response to recurrent problems are likely to be based on relatively old
and obsolete knowledge, leading to inefficiencies.
Over time, the discussion on organizational rules has led to literature on closely
related concepts such as organizational formalization (the extent to which rules,
procedures, instructions, and communications are written), organizational routines
(informal rules that came about in an informal way), ‘red tape’ (rules and routines
that do not make sense any more), organizational learning and ecology, and many
other, related but subtly different concepts. Whereas theoretical papers about the
concepts are plentiful, field studies on organizational rules are relatively rare and
often based on archival research (cf. Bozemann and Feeney 2014; Kaufmann and
van Witteloostuijn 2018).
19.2.2 Rules and ex ante management
Although there are contradicting ideas about the relationship between organizational
rules and contracting, there has been remarkably little large-scale empirical research
on effects of rules (Bozemann and Feeney 2014). Above we discussed two arguments
that point to the potential inefficiency of organizational rules. In this section we dis-
cuss the effects of organizational rules of the buyer on the ex-ante management of a
transaction. We focus on the buyer, since this is the empirical focus of the paper. We
distinguish two dimension of ex ante management: the content and the effort in-
volved. The content of ex ante management in our case refers to the extensiveness of
the contract between buyer and supplier. Second, we discuss effects of organizational
rules on the effort involved in the ex-ante management, more specifically, we focus
on the cost of contracting, which is measured as the number of full-time equivalent
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days spent negotiating and drafting the initial contract. We hypothesize that organi-
zational rules are not necessarily efficient. Organizational rules often lead to more
safeguards and higher ex ante transaction costs, than would be necessary on the
basis of the relevant characteristics of a transaction by itself.
The first reason is that rules are often founded as a response to crises and serious
problems with the aim to prevent that same problem in the future (Zhou 1993), “the
stable door is locked after the horse has bolted”. Rules are then created to prevent cer-
tain problems to reoccur. In situations that resemble the previously problematic situa-
tion, preventive measures will now have to be taken because the rules prescribe those
preventive actions. Since new situations might well be qualitatively substantially differ-
ent from the previous problematic situations, the application of the rule is often unnec-
essary (Schulz 1998). So, rules are applied to prevent problems, and are calibrated (if at
all) in such a way that they will be executed also in cases where they would not have
been necessary, which obviously leads to higher transaction costs compared to the
cases where no or less rules are at play. Rules tend to give descriptions of what to do
extra, not what to do less. The latter point also suggests the second argument: as rules
typically require additional things to do, there are higher costs involved in terms of
time and effort when there are more rules that have to be applied (Ouchi 1979).
Furthermore, evidence also suggests that rules are not regularly refreshed or revoked:
“[the increase in the number of rules] reflects the creation of many new rules [. . .]
without the repeal of rules” (Jakobsen and Mortensen 2016: 302).1
Hypothesis 1: The larger the rule-density in a buyer’s organization is, the more extensive the
contract between the buyer and the supplier will be.
Hypothesis 2:The larger the rule-density in a buyer’s organization is, the higher the cost of con-
tracting associated with a transaction will be.
19.2.3 Rules and exchange performance: The tradeoff between
flexibility and efficiency
In the classical Weberian view, formalization is thought to increase standardization,
precision, and the speed of organizational processes. Formal rules also restrict the
organizational members’ room for egoistic maneuvers and arbitrary decisions, and
control and coordinate organizational processes and increase their predictability
(Weber 1947). In Weber’s view, organizational rules are associated with better
1 A recent paper has also shown that because of the rigor of most rules, employees commonly men-
tion rules as one of the key constraints that they experience in their work (Pindek et al. 2019).
Contradicting arguments in the area of organization routines (not rules) can be found in for in-
stance Feldman and Pentland (2003), who argue that routines do not necessarily create inertia and
rigor.
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performance, and fewer errors. One reason is that organizational rules store
knowledge. Formalization codifies best-practice routines to stabilize and diffuse
new organizational capabilities (Nelson and Winter 1982). Collective experience is
transferred to individual and new members through rules ‘that reflect but do not
reproduce the experiences on which they are based’ (March, as cited in Beck and
Kiesler 2003). So, rules are associated with bureaucratic forms of organizations
with high levels of standardization, specialization, and ultimately, efficiency.
Formal rules have a downside as well. Too much organizational structure implies
that organizations become rigid and inflexible (Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch 2006).
Highly standardized routines make organizations resistant to change (Hannan and
Freeman 1984). Rules lock organizations into inflexible patterns of action (Gersick and
Hackman 1990). So, according to the literature, structure can have an up and down-
side. Rules can lead to efficiency and reliability, but also to rigidity and inertia. In line
with earlier research, we consider whether there is a tradeoff between efficiency and
flexibility (Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine 1999). Too little structure does not guide the
required behavior enough, and does not facilitate coordination enough, but too much
structure leads to a lack of flexibility and overly cautious interactions. This argument is
consistent with the findings in the simulation study by Davis, Eisenhard, and Bingham
(2009): organizations with a low or high amount of rules perform worse than those
with moderate structure. This leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Rule density has an inverted U-shaped relationship with exchange performance.
19.2.4 Rule density, environmental dynamism, and exchange
performance
There is a long-standing literature that argues that effects of organizational structure
on performance depend on the dynamism of the environment of that organization, and
the extent to which the rules and routines can keep up with changing circumstances.
Contingency theory is the most prominent theory that studies this relation (Galbraith
1973; Schoonhoven 1981). It maintains that there is no one best way of organizing. The
effectiveness of a certain organizational form will depend on the degree of task uncer-
tainty. Organizations should adopt a more efficient mechanistic form if the task is sim-
ple and stable, while it should adopt a more flexible organic form if the task is complex
and changing (Burns and Stalker 1961). A basic assumption that the theory makes is
that under conditions of greater uncertainty, more information must be processed to
achieve a certain level of performance (Galbraith 1973: 4). As a consequence, organiza-
tions are less able to plan ahead or to make decisions under conditions of greater un-
certainty, and consequently performance will be worse under such conditions.
In dynamic environments transactions will be more often non-routine tasks.
Whereas rules help to efficiently deal with routine purchasing tasks, they are not well
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suited for the non-routine purchasing tasks. One way to deal with non-routine tasks is
to apply ‘old’ rules to new circumstances: a new situation or problem does not really
match a rule, but is used nevertheless. If rules are applied in completely inappropriate
situations, then the contract performance will deteriorate (Schoonhoven 1981). This ar-
gument is similar to the “codification traps” idea of Schulz (1998), which also discusses
the dangers of applying old rules to new problems. The rule is often stretched or ex-
tended to apply better to the problem. Such codification traps lead to inefficiencies,
and inhibit organizational learning because old, inadequate rules are reinforced, and
the perceived need to create new and better rules is reduced.
A second possible inefficiency because of environmental dynamism can be the
result of ‘sorting’ (Schultz 1998). Sorting refers to the phenomenon that the most re-
curring problems are encoded into solutions and rules first, while less recurrent prob-
lems are encoded later, if at all. Sorting is thus related to the decay of routines and
rules as described by Hannan and Freeman (1984). Organizations remember by doing
(Nelson and Winter 1982), and hence organizational rules and routines that are not
used often, decay. Because of this temporal sequence in sorting, rules that are cre-
ated in response to recurrent problems are likely to be based on relatively old obso-
lete knowledge, leading to inefficiencies. Sorting is related to ‘routine rigidity’, which
is a failure to change organizational processes. Routine rigidity may result from the
fact that some routines are very tightly aligned with one certain environment, since
they are so adapted to this one environment, they are difficult to change because ef-
fective and self-reinforcing, and not built to adapt to discontinuities (Gilbert 2005).
Although the argument that environmental dynamism influences the relation
between organizational rules and performance is plausible and supported by some
empirical results, it has been criticized as being imprecise, since environmental dy-
namism is a multi-dimensional construct (Davis et al. 2009; Dess and Beard 1984).
In their simulation study into the relation between organizational rules and perfor-
mance Davis et al. (2009) distinguish four dimensions: unpredictability, ambiguity,
complexity, and velocity. Velocity and unpredictability refer to global characteris-
tics of opportunities and threats in the environment that are less relevant at the
transactional level. Since we focus on the environment of the exchange, and not
the organization as a whole, we focus here on performance ambiguity and task
complexity. Performance ambiguity refers to a lack of clarity in the exchange be-
cause the buyer lacks experience or knowledge to evaluate the partner’s perfor-
mance; task complexity refers to the number of sub-task and the interrelatedness
between those sub-tasks.
Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between rule-density and exchange performance is moderated by
performance ambiguity. Rules work better when there is less ambiguity.
Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between rule-density and exchange performance is moderated by
task complexity. Rules work better when there is less task complexity.
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19.2.5 Control Variables: Organizational Capabilities
and Transaction Characteristics
More recently, scholars have also recognized that organizational capabilities influence
governance decisions (Argyris 1996; Leiblein and Miller 2003; Mayer and Salomon
2006; Mayer 2006; Nickerson and Silverman 2003). Designing a contract has been
claimed to be a firm capability that influences contractual planning and, exchange per-
formance in interorganizational relationships. Contract design capabilities reside in the
rule within a firm, but also in managers, engineers, and lawyers (Argyris and Mayer
2007). In this paper we control for possible confounding effects of organizational capa-
bilities by including in our models the existence of separate departments with special-
ized tasks (a legal department, a purchase department, an IT-department, and/or a
finance department). These specialized departments form an indication for both gover-
nance capabilities and technical capabilities of the firm. Given these capabilities, it
seems likely that the ex-ante governance of transactions can take place with higher ex-
pertise and lower transaction costs. Although these arguments make it sound as if we
assume that the existence of a specialized department is necessarily efficient, many of
the considerations about inefficiencies mentioned above with respect to the use of or-
ganizational rules may hold for organizational capabilities as well. For example, sup-
pose that the rule is that for large or frequent transactions the legal department should
(always) be involved, even if the other contractual hazards (e.g. asset specificity, uncer-
tainty, complexity and/or a lack of competition in the market) are quite low. In such a
case, the use of the internal legal specialists is likely to be overkill. However, as with
rules, having specialized departments is likely to increase contract density, even with-
out assuming optimal efficient use of the department capabilities.
Other control variables are based on transaction cost theory. Transaction cost
theory had its starting point with the seminal article of Coase (1937) ‘The Nature of
the Firm’. Later, Williamson operationalized the theory by defining particular trans-
action characteristics that determine governance choices. The most prominent set of
transaction characteristics are specific investments (e.g., Williamson 1985). If transac-
tions require investments that cannot be redeployed to alternative uses without loss
of productive value, then contractual hazards due to dependency arise. Transaction
partners can profit opportunistically from this dependency, given that circumstances
permit this.
The second transaction characteristic that plays a prominent role in the theory
is uncertainty, which relates to the inability to predict changes in the environment
and partners’ behavior. Uncertainty is assumed to vary, meanwhile being always
present to at least some extent. Due to uncertainty, combined with bounded ratio-
nality, contracting is always costly, and complete contracting not feasible.
A third transaction characteristic that is identified in the theory, although it has
received less attention in empirical TCE research (David and Han 2004) is the fre-
quency of transactions. Frequency is relevant in two respects: reputation effects and
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setup costs (Williamson, 2008: 8). According to Williamson (Williamson 1985: 60)
higher levels of transaction frequency provide an incentive for a firm to employ hi-
erarchical governance because “the cost of specialized governance structures will
be easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring kind”.
Transaction cost theory maintains that there are rational economic reasons for
choosing the means of governing transactions. If market transactions become too
costly, transactions will be vertically integrated: the firm will choose to arrange
matters in-house. In the transaction cost view, an organization exists because it can
manage transactions with contractual hazards at lower costs than the market can.
Empirically, transaction costs theory has received a fair amount of support, though
not always that consistently (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997; David and Han 2004;
Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006).
Following Milgrom and Roberts (1992) two other characteristics of the transac-
tion are taken into account as well, namely task complexity and (lack of) competi-
tion. Task complexity precipitates transaction costs by introducing ambiguity about
the cause of transaction failure, which in turn makes it difficult to apportion blame
between the transacting partners. Moreover, complexity creates a need for coordi-
nation among transaction partners. A lack of competition in the supplier’s product
market may increase the buyer’s dependency, and therefore the intensity of compe-
tition can be seen as a force that reduces transaction hazards.
19.3 Methods
To test the hypotheses, we make use of a database resulting from a comprehensive sur-
vey of IT-purchases by German small and medium sized business (Berger, Kropp, and
Voss 2000). This multi-purpose survey was part of a wider Dutch-German cooperative
project; the survey was based on an earlier pilot study (Tazelaar, Vaessen, Blumberg,
and Raub 1995), as well as on earlier large-scale surveys that were conducted in a re-
lated research project in the Netherlands (Batenburg 1997).
The questionnaire contained six major parts, concerning (a) the product and/or
service, (b) product and supplier selection, (c) the relationship between the buyer
and the supplier, (d) the agreement and contracting, (e) the performance of the sup-
plier, problems, and problem management, and (f) the buyer and his or her relation
to the supplier. In total, per transaction more than 300 items were scored. In the
survey buyers of information technology in two regions, Halle/Leipzig and Munich,
in (then East and West) Germany were sampled. At the time of the survey both re-
gions (Halle/Leipzig and Munich) were economically prosperous regions.
In order for a transaction from a given firm to be included in the survey, the firm
had to meet the following requirements: 1) it should be a small or medium sized firm
with 4 to 500 employees; 2) it had managed the purchase itself, the decisions about
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the product and supplier had been taken by the firm instead of a mother company; 2)
an employee of the firm was willing and able to give detailed information about the
transaction; 3) the transaction was completed not too long ago – if possible not lon-
ger than three years; 4) the transaction should involve only one supplier. To compile
the sampling frame the yellow pages were used (‘Gelben Seiten für Deutschland.
Frühjahr 1999’).
The data collection was conducted in two stages. First, a member of the re-
search team contacted the firm in the sample by phone to determine whether the
firm met the requirements to be part of the survey, and if this was the case, whether
the firm was willing to cooperate in the survey. If a firm agreed to cooperate with
the survey, and met the requirements, then a knowledgeable contact person who
had been responsible for purchases of information technology was selected and an
appointment was made for a face-to-face interview (if firms refused a face-to-face
interview a questionnaire was mailed to them).
The telephone interviews started in March 1999 and were concluded in August
1999 (Berger, Kropp and Voss 2002). All firms that agreed to cooperate were sent a let-
ter of confirmation immediately after the telephonic interview. In this letter the selected
transaction and the date and time of the appointment were named again. Shortly be-
fore the agreed face-to-face interview a member of the research team phoned the firm
once more to confirm the appointment. If possible, the respondent was asked after the
interview whether he or she was willing to fill out a second (written) questionnaire.
As a result of the high care intensity and the personal assistance in filling out the
questionnaires, the response rates to the face-to-face interview were high. The survey
team realized 84.2% of all the promised interviews. Additionally, 24.5% of the re-
spondents filled out a second questionnaire. The response to the mail questionnaire
was substantially lower (36.4%). The overall response rate was 49%, which is high
compared to the standard response rates in organization research (see Kalleberg
et al. 1996). The response rate in the region of Halle/Leipzig was higher than in the
region of Munich: 57% versus 44% (Rooks, Tazelaar, and Snijders 2010).
The data set that was collected contains detailed information about 1,019 IT-
transactions from 832 buying firms. From these 832 buying firms, 645 (= 78%) provided
data on a single IT-transaction and 187 (= 22%) provided data on a second IT-transaction
as well.
19.4 Measurements
As mentioned before in the data section, the survey was based on a number of earlier
large-scale surveys that were conducted in a related research projects in the
Netherlands. Many of the measurement items used in this article were tested and cal-
ibrated in earlier studies using other data-sets (Rooks and Snijders 2001; Batenburg
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et al. 2003; Rooks et al. 2006). Besides our main variables of interest: rule density,
firm specialization, contract extensiveness, and ex post performance, we control for
several TCE-characteristics and other contextual characteristics.
19.4.1 Organizational characteristics
19.4.1.1 Rule density
To measure rule density, we constructed an instrument that consisted of six items
that covered procurement rules. More specifically, the six items were about the man-
agement of six essential purchasing tasks, such as the search and selection of suppli-
ers. The items were tested in two small scale survey studies. Every item involved a
certain broader problem area, such as which departments or which functions are to
be involved in the search, screening, and selection of suppliers. Respondents could
indicate whether there were written rules (documents) that covered the problem
area. The items and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 19.1.
Table 19.1: Rules and regulations, ordered from most used to least used.
Nr of obervations Proportion that has rule Mokken’s H item score
 Type of agreement /
contract that has to be
used (an order / standard
contract / tailor made
contract)
 . .
 Tendering / collecting and
judging tenders or offers
 . .
 Departments and/or
capabilities that are to be
involved in search,
screening and selection of
buyers
 . .
 Departments and/or
capabilities that are to be
involved in negotiating,
designing and concluding
contacts
 . .
 Departments and / or
capabilities that are to be
involved in conflict
resolution, arbitration,
litigation etc.
 . .
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Rules are often codified in a temporal order. First, the most severe and recurrent
problems are codified, whereas less recurrent problems will be codified later (Schulz
1998). To investigate patterns in organizational rules and the scalability of our items
we performed a nonparametric item response analysis, the so-called Mokken model
(Mokken 1971). This model can be viewed as a probabilistic version of Guttman scale
analysis for dichotomous items. An advantage of this nonparametric model compared
to parametric versions of item response models such as the well-known Rasch model
is that it is more flexible, and sometimes avoids misleading results obtained by
parametric models (Junker and Sijtsma 2001; Meijer and Baneke 2004). We used the
MSP5 program (Molenaar and Sijtsma 2000) to estimate the model. The results are
shown in Table 19.1. According to (Mokken 1971: 185) for practical test construction
purposes H values lower than .3 are not scalable, .3 ≤ H ≤ .4 denote a weak scale, .4 ≤
H ≤ .5 denote a medium scale, while H-values above .5 denote a strong scale.
According to the criteria, the items form a very strong scale (Mokken’s H-
coefficient = 0.68). The reliability of the scale is comparable to Cronbach’s alpha
and in our case is adequate (Rho = .82). The sum of all eight the items form the vari-
able rule density. The finding that the items constitute a Mokken scale is interesting.
Apparently, there is an order in the kinds of rules that a firm uses. There obviously
exist more frequently used rules, such as rules with respect to the type of agreement
that is supposed to be used, and less frequent ones, such as rules about supplier
audits. The key finding is that there is a hierarchy in this set of rules, where firms
typically tend to implement rules in a bottom-to-top step-by-step way: firms differ
in the extent to which they are formalized not only by the number of rules they
have, but they differ in how far up the rules-pyramid they are.
19.4.1.2 Organizational capabilities
We measure organizational capabilities using information that the survey respondents
provided about the departments in the organization. Purchasing is a dummy variable
indicating whether or not there was a purchase department present in the firm (18% of
Table 19.1 (continued)
Nr of obervations Proportion that has rule Mokken’s H item score
 Evaluating suppliers
performance
 . .
 Benchmarking / periodical
supplier evaluations
 . .
 Supplier audits and
product presentations by
suppliers
 . .
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the SMEs had a purchasing department). Automation is a dummy variable indicating
whether or not there was a automation department (17% of the SMEs had an automa-
tion department). Legal is a dummy variable indicating whether or not there was a
legal department (only 4% of the SMEs had a legal department). Finance is a dummy
variable indicating whether or not a financial department was present in the firm (21%
of the SMEs had a financial department).
19.4.1.3 Firm size
According to Nooteboom, Zwart, and Bijmolt (1992) smaller firms are (more) bounded
in their rationality. It is more difficult for smaller firms compared to larger firms to
monitor suppliers’ performance for instance. In other words, Nooteboom et al. (1992:
144) argue that transaction costs are systematically higher for smaller firms. “Costs of
governance schemes to reduce transaction costs are often relatively higher for small
firms: transactions may be too small to be worth the bother of such a scheme.”. The
arguments about firm size related to well-known argument about differentiation and
firm size (Blau 1970). We use the number of employees of the buyer at the time of the
transaction as an indicator for firm size. The variable firm size is the logarithm of the
number of employees, with 30 cases (2.94%) imputed using information about sales
volume. Likewise, the firm size of the supplier, size partner, is the logarithm of the
number of employees of the supplier at the time of the transaction; 17 cases (1.67%)
were imputed using information about the type of supplier.
19.4.2 Transaction characteristics
19.4.2.1 Asset specificity
Asset specificity reflects the possible exposure to ex post opportunistic holdup caused by
specific investments in physical and/or human assets that have little or no value outside
of the transaction. We measure asset specificity using four survey questions about
switching costs. Switching costs are the expected costs should the supplier be replaced
with another supplier. The first question relates to the tendering costs, the costs of
searching, screening and selecting a new supplier for a new product. The second ques-
tion involves the loss in terms of time and money associated (re)training and instruction
of personnel. The third question relates to the costs of (renewed) data entry. The fourth
question is about the loss in terms of time and money associated with idle production.
Together, these four items form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82).
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19.4.2.2 Uncertainty
We measure uncertainty using two survey questions as indicators. The first ques-
tion relates to the difficulty of assessing a supplier’s quality at the time of delivery.
The second question is in an historical reference frame; respondents were asked to
recall the period of time when the contract was initially signed. The question relates
to difficulties in comparing offers between suppliers. The reliability coefficient of
this 2-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73).
19.4.2.3 Transaction size
Transaction frequency is a transaction characteristic that has received scant atten-
tion in transaction cost theory, this in sharp contrast to asset specificity and uncer-
tainty. According to Williamson (1985: 60) higher levels of transaction frequency
provide an incentive for firm to employ hierarchical governance because “the cost
of specialized governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions
of a recurring kind.”. The nature of transactions that we study is such that transac-
tions are unlikely to be repeated in substance for any pair of transaction partners.
Nonetheless, large projects are more significant determinants of current and future
profits of both partners, and hence governance will be more beneficial. We use as a
single indicator for transaction size the approximate price (in German Marks). We
imputed 46 cases (4.51%) using information about the perceived importance and
durability of the product or service. Since the distribution of this variable is highly
skewed with many outliers a logarithmic transformation is applied.
19.4.2.4 Task complexity
Task complexity creates a need for coordination between transacting firms. Transactions
that involve many different parts, software and hardware that interact in unpredictable
way to produce services or products are more complex. We use a measure that was
based on two indicators. The first indicator measures the scope of the products and serv-
ices covered by the transaction. It is a count of the number of products and services cov-
ered by the transaction (the questionnaire contained a checklist of 18 components).
A second indicator is a categorization of technological complexity developed by
Anderson and Dekker (2005) that represents increasing demands for communication
and coordination between the buyer and supplier. The correlation between the two
indicators is high (r = 0.61). The two indicators form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.69).
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19.4.2.5 Competition
Market forces are thought to reduce transaction hazards. Two questions are used to
measure competition. The first question asks about the size of the pool of potential
suppliers that were identified when the firm searched for suitable transaction part-
ners. The second question asks for the number of different products, i.e. alternatives
that could have met the buyer’s needs at the time of purchase. The two question cor-
relate highly (r = 0.77) and constitute a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87).
19.4.3 Dependent variables
19.4.3.1 Contract extensiveness
The questionnaire contained a list of 22 financial, legal, and operational issues that
can be included in a written (ICT) contract. The respondents were asked to indicate
which of the items were included in the written contract. Following Anderson and
Dekker (2005), we measure contract extensiveness as the number of items included
in the written contract.
19.4.3.2 Cost of contracting
We measure the cost of contracting as the number of full-time equivalent days
spent negotiating and drafting the initial contract. A log-transformation is applied
to the skewed raw variable (ranges from less than one day to 60). Although the
measure has some limitations, for instance it only takes into account costs of con-
tracting that are directly related to labor, it is an improvement over earlier measures
(Anderson and Dekker 2005).
19.4.3.3 Ex post transaction problems
A separate section of the questionnaire contained questions about the ex post phase
of the transaction. Questions were asked about 11 typical problematic issues that are
often associated with IT-transactions (Riesewijk and Warmerdam 1988). Respondents
could indicate for each issue to what extent it had occurred and how serious the
problem had been. The eleven issues are measured on a five-point scale (ranging
from ‘not whatsoever’ to ‘very severe’). The variable ex post problems is derived as a
scale score on these eleven issues (Cronbach’s α = 0.92; higher represent more and/
or more serious problems). The average score was 14.7. For 282 transactions of the
878 in the sample (32%) a modest or severe problem (3–4) occurred. Most correlations
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between the different types of problems are rather high (lowest r = 0.35, highest
r = 0.77), hence problems often appear simultaneously.
19.4.3.4 Exchange performance: Satisfaction buyer
We asked the respondents to give two marks to indicate their satisfaction with the
supplier and the product. The respondent could indicate on a scale from 1 (“very
good”) to 6 (“unsatisfactory”). A third indicator was a question whether the respon-
dent would recommend the supplier “Would you and your employees recommend
the supplier to other firms as a result of the delivery of this product, or would you not
recommend supplier?” The answer scale ranged from 1 “definitely not recommend”
to 5 “definitely recommend”. Based on these three questions we constructed a vari-
able Performance (Cronbach’s α = 0.83; higher score represents better performance).
19.5 Results
We estimate our models using ordinary multiple regression analysis, using robust
standard errors to account for potential heteroscedasticity, and the partially nested
structure of the data (182 firms provided information about two transactions).
Looking at Table 19.2 from a distance, we note several interesting observations.
First, transaction characteristics have a strong influence on both contracting charac-
teristics and ex post problems. Higher asset specificity, higher uncertainty, higher
complexity, and higher task complexity go with more extensive and more costly con-
tracts. Moreover, contract extensiveness indeed decreases ex post problems (cutting
away about half the effect of transaction size, for instance), but even after controlling
for contract extensiveness, more complicated transactions (uncertain, large, and
complex) are associated with more ex post problems. Another interesting finding is
that the only characteristics that seem to matter for exchange performance are uncer-
tainty and rule density (and their interaction).
Focusing on our hypotheses, we see that contracts get more extensive, the more
written procedures there exist in the focal firm. This is in concordance with Hypothesis
1. Rules and procedures indeed tend to be associated with more extensive contracts.
The data hence support the idea that rules and procedures are of the kind “make sure
to perform A and B”, and not of the kind “under such and such conditions, you need
not worry about C and D”. Holding constant transaction characteristics, the more writ-
ten rules there exist in the focal firm, the higher the cost of contracting. This is in con-
cordance with Hypothesis 2. That is, transactions with a higher ‘problem potential’
receive more transaction management.
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We do not find that there is an optimal number of rules that balances flexibility
and efficiency. The quadratic effect of rules finds no support, and alternative ways
to test for the inverse U-shape, such as breaking up the analysis in two separate
parts (not reported here), also do not show any evidence to support Hypothesis 3.
By and large, rules lead to more transaction management, but not to a decrease in
problems or an increase in performance. Hypothesis 3 is therefore not supported.
We do see that rules are even less effective when there is more performance ambi-
guity, which supports Hypothesis 3a, albeit in the sense that rules are less bad
when there is low performance ambiguity. However, this effect is not found for
more complex transactions. Hypothesis 3b is not supported.
19.6 Discussion and conclusion
In this study we tested how formal organizational rules affect the contracting costs,
contract extensiveness, and exchange performance, namely the number of problems
that occur in the ex post phase of a transaction, and overall satisfaction of the buyer.
The picture that emerges from our results is one of hierarchical failure. The more or-
ganizational rules, the more extensive contracts and contracting costs. The extra
management effort that is taken because of existence of rules is not compensated for
by better exchange performance, however. To the best of our knowledge this study is
the first large scale study into effects of bureaucratization on transaction costs.
Our results have important theoretical implications. A main implication is that
the costs of ex ante management and ex-post exchange performance are affected by
the level of bureaucracy, especially when a firm is confronted with uncertainty.
Bureaucratic costs have been recognized as a factor Williamson (1991: 279) “One ad-
vantage of hierarchy over the hybrid with respect to bilateral adaptation is that in-
ternal contracts can be more incomplete. [. . .] The advantages of hierarchy over
hybrid in adaptation C respects are not, however, realized without cost. Weaker in-
centive intensity (greater bureaucratic costs) attend the move from hybrid to hierar-
chy, ceteris paribus.” Our results suggest that those bureaucratic costs should be
taken into account when studying comparative economic organization. Including
bureaucratic costs in the calculus of economic governance of governance, may ex-
plain why hybrid organizations are so common.
A second implication is that our findings may offer at least a partial answer to
the question that was raised in the meta-analysis of Geyskens, Steenkamp and
Kumar (2006). The effect of relational governance on exchange performance was
found to be substantially larger than that of hierarchical governance. As an explana-
tion the researchers point to the strength of relational governance, such as flexibility
and superior information sharing, but ignore potential weaknesses of hierarchical
governance forms. Our results suggest that when hierarchical governance is too
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bureaucratic (consists of mainly if-then rules), hierarchies will fail, and hybrid forms
of governance are more likely to outperform bureaucratic governance structures.
It is an open question why and when the existence of rules and regulations
lead to additional problems. One reason might be that they tend to add detrimental
content to a contract. Or, perhaps the rules are such that they lead to other behavior
that does not find its way in the contract, but nevertheless leads to more problems
than one would expect without the rules. On the other hand, it seems that similar
arguments cannot (or need not) be made about purchasing departments: when they
are around the contracts get more extensive and that helps preventing problems.
However, one might still wonder whether the benefits outweigh the costs in this
case. Is a purchasing department worth the money? Our data cannot provide any
definitive test on this issue as it needs (even) more detailed measurement.
A second issue that we left untouched is the fact that it might make quite a differ-
ence whether the contract itself was made by the buyer or the supplier. The argument
for that dates back to at least Macaulay’s “battle of the forms”: the party who can write
down the rules is usually better off. In fact, our data do allow a more thorough test of
the importance of who the designer of the contract is, which we leave to a future paper.
A third issue that we did not consider in this study is the genesis of organizational
purchasing rules. Under which conditions do firms develop rules? One possibility is sug-
gested by transaction cost theory itself. Empirically, the transaction characteristics asset
specificity and uncertainty have received the bulk of research attention. The transaction
cost theoretical framework includes a third characteristic, “transaction frequency”.
Transaction frequency refers to the extent to which transactions recur (Williamson
1985). Williamson suggests that transaction frequency will affect hierarchical gover-
nance: “The cost of specialized [i.e., hierarchical] governance structures will be easier to
recover for large transactions of a recurring kind. Hence the frequency of transactions is
a relevant dimension. Where frequency is low but the needs for nuanced governance
are great, the possibility of aggregating the demands of similar but independent trans-
actions is suggested.” (Williamson 1985: 60) Then again, one might wonder to what ex-
tent rules indeed are such rational adaptations, given that our results suggest that they
might be less optimal than one would expect. Perhaps the explanation lies in humans’
systematic irrational responses to rational demands instead.
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20 Organizational Innovativeness Through
Inter-Organizational Ties
Abstract: In order to be innovative, organizations can benefit from having inter-orga-
nizational relations. Through these external relations, organizations get access to
valuable resources and they have the possibility to learn from other organizations. At
the same time, these ties need to be managed to overcome cooperation problems.
Prior studies revealed that inter-organizational relations can contribute to an organi-
zation’s innovativeness in terms of developing new products and services. This chap-
ter addresses three questions that received little attention to date, namely (1) Does
collaborating with other organizations on human resource management (HRM) issues
contribute to organizational innovation?; (2) Which of these external ties in the HRM
domain matter most for organizational innovation?; and (3) Does the quality of these
ties explain organizational innovation?
This chapter aims to shed light on these three questions by analyzing data gathered
among 732 private firms from the Netherlands. The analyses show that inter-organiza-
tional collaborations in the human resource domain contribute to the innovativeness of
organizations (both in terms of innovation performance and innovative human resource
management). Furthermore, not all HR collaborations contribute to organizational inno-
vation; organizations having ties with business partners and universities and knowl-
edge centers report the highest levels of innovativeness. And, finally, organizational
innovation is higher among organizations that indicate that their HR collaborations con-
tribute to the goals of the organization.
20.1 Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that organizations depend on their environment to produce
goods and services (Scott and Davis 2007). This general notion is central to theories as
diverse as contingency theory, transaction cost economics, and network theories of
inter-organizational relations. These theories focus on the question how organizational
structures, strategies, and outcomes are affected by characteristics of the environment in
which these organizations operate. This means that they belong to the branch of theories
that regard organizations as open systems, as opposed to closed system approaches
which do not take the organizational environment into account (Scott and Davis 2007).
These open system theories dominate the field of organization studies. The dominance
of this view is also illustrated by Baum and Rowley (2002: 3) when they state that:
“Although historically, rational, natural and open systems definitions have been
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associated with distinct research programs, each with its own conceptual frameworks,
guiding assumptions, and empirical approaches, contemporary perspectives built on
these foundations invariably take an open systems view, and combine it with either a
rational or a natural systems orientation”. In other words, all modern theories of organ-
izations belong to the open systems perspective (Scott and Davis 2007).
Network theories focus on a specific part of organizational environments, namely
the relationships that organizations have with other actors (organizations, govern-
ment bodies, customers, and so forth). Research in this field generated insights con-
cerning the conditions under which these relationships are established and how they
are sustained (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Rooks et al. 2000). Furthermore, research
lead to in-depth knowledge of configurations of inter-organizational relations
(Pittaway et al. 2004), while other research focused on understanding the structure of
inter-organizational networks and aimed at investigating how these ties affect organi-
zational outputs such as financial and innovation performance (e.g. Ahuja 2000;
Oerlemans, Meeus, and Boekema 1998; Schilling and Phelps 2007).
Nevertheless, several issues received little attention to date, while the literature
suggests that they may matter to understand organizational innovativeness. First,
while there is plenty of research concerning how network structures and network po-
sitions affect organizational innovation and several studies show that access to exter-
nal resources explains the degree of organizational innovativeness (Faems, Van
Looy, and Debackere 2005), far less is known about which actors matter most for the
innovation performance of organizations. This calls for research focused on the type
of actors with which organizations interact and whether this relates to their innova-
tiveness. In addition to that, research focuses on collaborations between organiza-
tions on issues such as product development and production of good and services,
but not on collaborations in the domain of human resource management. This latter
type of collaboration gained attention with the growing interest in organizational
eco-systems (Von Krogh and Geilinger 2014), but how this relates to organizational
innovation is unknown. Hence, more should be known about whether human re-
source collaboration matters for organizational innovation. Thirdly, most innovation
research focuses on a specific kind of innovation, namely improvements regarding
the production of new goods and services (Pouwels and Koster 2017). Some studies
also investigate changes in organizational structures and processes, which are also
part of the innovation performance of organizations (Maine, Lubik and Garnsey
2012). But, the impact of inter-organizational relations on the innovativeness of the
human resource management of organizations has not been investigated to date.
Instead, explanations of innovative human resource management focused mainly on
intra-organizational characteristics and overlooked inter-organizational relations. At
the same time, a large body of the human resource management literature argues
that external fit – the alignment of human resource practices to the organizational
environment – is an essential part of the effective management of people (e.g. Ulrich
and Dulebohn 2015). What is more, most of these studies focus on best practices that
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are supposed to contribute to a higher performance of organizations (Huselid 1995),
whereas innovation of human resource practices is a matter of adoption. Hence, the
theoretical notion of fit has a strong foothold in this literature, but is not often empiri-
cally investigated. This calls for research connecting the innovativeness of human re-
source practices of organizations to their external ties.
Based on these observations concerning the current state of research, this study
has the following aims, namely (1) to assess whether human resource collaboration
matters for organizational innovativeness in general; and (2) to investigate which of
these inter-organizational ties matter most for organizational innovativeness. In this
study, the focus is on organizational innovativeness in the broad sense, meaning that
both the innovation performance as well as innovations in the human resource prac-
tices that organizations apply are investigated. Data from a recently conducted sur-
vey among 732 organizations in the Netherlands are analyzed to generate insights
about the role of resources for innovation performance and innovative human re-
source management.
20.2 Two types of innovation
Innovation refers both to “creating new things” and “doing things differently” (Maine,
Lubik, and Garnsey 2012). While the first conception of innovation received much at-
tention in the literature, the second approach to innovation is far less investigated. As
a result, much is known about the creation of novel outcomes by organizations.
However, there are good reasons to assume that innovation reflects a broader strategy
of organizations that also includes exploring new markets, renewing organizational
processes, and so forth (Crossan and Apaydin 2010; Pouwels and Koster 2017). While
innovation research emphasizes that organizations can improve organizational pro-
cesses in different domains, this literature remains largely separated from the literature
on innovativeness with regard to functional fields, in particular with regard to the in-
troduction of new ways of managing employees. In other words, innovation studies
and human resource studies have not informed each other. Reviewing the literature on
innovative human resource management (HRM), Koster (2019) shows that there are
least three different approaches to innovative HRM, namely studies examining the in-
novativeness of human resource practices and policies, HRM innovativeness in re-
sponse to external developments, and studies linking HRM policies and practices to
the innovation performance of organizations. Following this threefold distinction, the
present study fits the second strand of the literature in which HRM innovativeness is
linked to the external environment.
While several authors state that having ties with other organizations, granting ac-
cess to their resources and knowledge, is a key ingredient for organizational innovation,
research mostly focuses on intra-organizational explanations of innovativeness. In an
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extensive overview of the literature, Crossan and Apaydin (2010) show that most re-
search investigates the role of micro level factors such as individual creativity and team
structures and organizational factors such as organizational structure, complexity, and
slack. At the macro level, the focus is on industry structures and innovation systems
(Crossan and Apaydin 2010). Hence, compared to other explanations of innovation, the
number of studies investigating the impact of resources accessed through external net-
works – the meso level – remains a field to be developed. Based on the premise that
organizational learning and information sharing are vital to knowledge economies
(Adler 2001), such external ties can contribute to organizational innovation.
20.3 Sources contributing to innovation
There are contrasting predictions about the relationship between inter-organizational
ties and organizational innovation. One the one hand, there are theories emphasizing
the risks of cooperation. These risks result from a loss of control (Gnyawali and Park
2009), the occurrence of opportunistic behavior (Van Haverbeeke, Duysters, and
Hagedoorn 2002), and difficulties relating to the transfer of knowledge between or-
ganizations (Lam 1997). Based on these risks of cooperation, it is argued that inter-
organizational collaboration hinders organizational innovation. However, in a recent
study, Pouwels and Koster (2017) show that these risks do not dominate inter-
organizational collaborations aimed at creating innovations, as they find that the two
are positively linked across a sample of European companies. Hence, their results
empirically support theories emphasizing the benefits of cooperation. These theories
emphasize the importance of having access to external sources contributing to orga-
nizational innovation (Nooteboom 1994), risk reducing strategies to enhance cooper-
ation (Hagendoorn 2002), and the transfer of knowledge between organizations
(Ahuja 2000). The kinds of collaboration investigated in the present study also reflect
such contributions to organizational innovation.
One of the reasons for this finding lies in the management of these external collab-
orations. First, organizations that manage to create cooperative relations with others,
for example because they interact repeatedly and have a sufficiently long shadow of
the future to solve trust problems (Buskens and Raub 2002), may thus benefit terms of
organizational innovativeness. And, secondly, organizations may be less likely to stay
in unproductive or risky collaborations. This is of course not to say that the collabora-
tions are completely free from the risk of cooperation, but at least there seems to be
some logic in the argument that they be disbanded as soon as these risks dominate the
relation, unless they are forced to collaborate or if organizations their choice in collabo-
ration partners is extremely limited, for example because there are no alternative part-
ners. But again, especially in the latter case, organizations are likely to withdraw from
these collaborations. If there is a lack of alternatives, this implies that they will not
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collaborate with other organizations. This latter strategy – limiting the dependence on
other organizations – can be means of dealing with this problem.
Organizations that manage to create collaborative ties with other organizations
can benefit from the advantages that collaborating with others may have in terms of
learning and resources being shared among these organizations. Having access to
these resources and being able to learn from the experiences of other organizations
in turn are condition for organizational innovation (Crossan and Apaydin 2010).
Hence, it is expected that in general, collaborating with other organizations contrib-
utes to the innovativeness of organizations, as was found in earlier research for orga-
nizational collaboration in domains such as product development and marketing
(Pouwels and Koster 2017). Here it is argued that the impact of external collaboration
can be extended to collaboration on issues related to the human resource manage-
ment of organization as it offers a means of solving challenges collectively. For exam-
ple, an organization that needs to train workers may not have the means to do this
individually, while it is possible to develop training programs in collaboration with
others. Based on these considerations, the first hypothesis is formulated.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between organizational innovativeness and HR
cooperation.
This first hypothesis states that having ties with other organizations contributes to the
innovativeness of organizations. It may, however, be the case that the contributions de-
pend on the type of collaboration partner. Several mechanisms may be at work, depend-
ing on the kind of collaboration partner. Collaborating with peers and similar
organizations may add less to the organization than ties with dissimilar organizations,
because these actors possess little extra knowledge and information from which the or-
ganizations can benefit. However, collaborating with dissimilar organizations may be
far riskier than having ties with similar organizations, for example because it is more
difficult to estimate whether the other organization actually puts in the effort and re-
sources as promised. Next to the argument that novelty of information and access to
unique resources can contribute to organizational innovativeness, it can be argued that
similar organizations are actually interesting cooperation partners. The argument is that
even though both partners may have access to similar information, they can learn from
each other’s experiences much more easily than dissimilar organizations. It can be as-
sumed that the issues that one organization within a sector or that produces particular
goods or services will also be encountered by other organizations in that sector or that
produces similar goods and services. As a result, there is added value in having ties
with similar organizations. This means that ties with similar organizations are more eas-
ily managed, but add less new information and that organizations face more costs to
manage ties with dissimilar organizations, while they may also lead to higher returns
(Hoffmann and Schlosser 2001; Tansky and Heneman 2003; Van Gils and Zwart 2004).
Since similarity is a matter of degree and the relative importance of novelty of the inno-
vation and the costs of managing the external tie are difficult to estimate beforehand, it
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is not evident which partner adds the most to the innovativeness of organizations.
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of HR cooperation on organizational innovativeness differs across HR
cooperation partners.
The previous hypotheses are based on the existence of a tie with the HR cooperation
partners. This part of the analysis does not inform us about the quality of these rela-
tionships. While the second hypothesis is based on the assumption that the costs
and benefits of ties with other organizations may vary, it does not yet test whether
this is the case. More specifically, it is expected that both the costs and benefits of
these ties increase if the partner organization is more dissimilar. The costs and ben-
efits translate into the extent to which having a tie with other organizations contrib-
ute to the goals of the organizations, the extent to which these ties add value to the
organization, the level of complexity associated with having these ties and the un-
certainty involved (Bachmann 2003; Beugré and Acar 2008).
Hypothesis 3: Organizational innovativeness is higher if the HR collaborations is viewed as more
beneficial and lower if these collaborations are viewed as costly.
20.4 Data and method
20.4.1 Data
Data from the Innovative HRM Survey (Koster et al. 2017) are analyzed to investi-
gate the relationship between resources and organizational innovation. These
data were collected among a random sample of Dutch firms using an online ques-
tionnaire. The survey includes several characteristics of organizations – such as
the composition of the workforce and inter-organizational relations – as well as
their level of innovativeness in different domains. The data were collected by
Kantar Public using their panel with private organizations (NIPObase Business).
This panel consists of 15,000 representatives (owners and human resource managers)
from Dutch firms. From this panel, a random selection of 3,000 organizations was
drawn. In total 752 firms responded (a response rate of 25 percent). Some variables
are not available for all organizations. The final data set consists of 732 organizations.
These organizations operate in different economic sectors and differ in size. The data-
set includes a large number of small organizations. About 90 percent of the responses
are from organizations with 1 to 9 employees and 6 percent of the organizations in
the dataset have 10–50 employees. Hence, the dataset takes into account that most
organizations in the Netherlands have less than 10 employees (about 96 percent ac-
cording to Statistics Netherlands) and that about 3 percent of the organizations have
10–50 employees.
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20.4.2 Measures
20.4.2.1 Dependent variables: Innovation performance and innovative HRM
Innovation performance
To get a broad measure of innovation performance (one that goes beyond single item
measures of product and service innovation) it is asked whether the organization (1)
Developed goods or services that are new for his organization (but already available
on the market); (2) Introduced goods or services that were not on the market yet; (3)
Strongly improved existing goods and services; (4) Introduced new ways of market-
ing goods and services; and (5) Introduced new organizational processes. Together,
these items reflect several aspects of organizational innovation, which were already
discussed by Schumpeter in 1934 who argued that organizational innovation involves
the introduction of new goods and services, as well as finding new markets and the
need to adapt organizational processes. This measure relies on earlier operationaliza-
tions, such as the Community Innovation Survey, with the specific aim to get an over-
all indication of a firm’s innovativeness (Armbruster et al. 2008).
Innovative HRM
To assess the extent to which the organizations engage in innovative HRM, a scale
was developed based on research on innovative HRM. Innovative HRM is measured
with a scale consisting of four questions about whether the organization renewed
their human resource function. The exact wording is: “Has your organization re-
newed . . . .” followed by four statements about the human resource functions,
namely “hiring personnel”, “outplacement of personnel”, “internal mobility of per-
sonnel”, and “workforce composition”. Respondents were asked to indicate how
much this applied to their organization on a 5-point scale (running from 1 = does not
apply at all to 5 = applies completely). This measure captures the idea of organiza-
tional innovation to the domain of human resource management. It closely follows
the approach of Agarwala (2003), but with an important difference. While in that
study, managers were asked to rate the innovativeness of a list of human resource
practices, the present study asks about renewal, which is more in line with studies of
innovation performance (Koster and Benda 2020).
A principal component analysis was performed to investigate the structure of
the two dependent variables. The results are reported in Table 20.1. We can con-
clude that the scales measuring innovation performance and innovative HRM in-
deed differ from each other. The items measuring innovative performance belong to
one dimension and the items related to changes in human resource practices of or-
ganizations belong to a different dimension. Both scales are internally consistent:
the Cronbach’s alpha of innovation performance is 0.855 and the Cronbach’s alpha
of innovative HRM is 0.936.
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20.4.2.2 Independent variables: HR cooperation and HR cooperation partners
To measure whether organizations collaborate with other organizations, respond-
ents were asked to indicate whether they collaborated with others on four issues
related to the management of human resources (such as hiring personnel and the
outflow of personnel). It was asked whether they collaborate with the following
others: (1) Competitors; (2) Business association partners; (2) Competitors; (3)
Suppliers; (4) Buyers; (5) Universities and knowledge centers; and (6) Public organ-
izations. This variable has the value “0” if the answer is “no” and “1” if the organi-
zation did collaborate with that partner. As a result, information is available about
a specific kind of inter-organizational tie (namely collaboration in the area of
human resource management), instead of an overall indication of the ties with
other organizations. The downside of having this very specific indicator is that it
cannot be ruled out that the organizations collaborate on other issues.
Two independent variables are constructed using these measures. The variable
HR cooperation is constructed by summing the responses to the six questions. This
indicates the number of HR cooperation partners the organization has. The variable
HR cooperation partners consists of the separate dummy variables.
Tie quality is measured by asking respondents to rate the ties with other or-
ganizations regarding the extent to which these ties contribute to the goals of the
Table 20.1: Principle component analysis of innovation performance and innovative HRM.
Item  
Innovation performance
Products and services: new for his organization . .
Strongly improved existing products and services . .
Products and services: new for the market . .
New ways of marketing products and services . .
Introducing new organizational processes . .
Innovative human resource practices
Innovations in . . .
. . . hiring personnel . .
. . . outflow of personnel . .
. . . workforce composition . .
. . . internal mobility of personnel . .
Eigen value . .
% explained variance . .
Cronbach’s alpha . .
Notes: N = 732 organizations
Varimax rotation. Factor loadings > 0.30 in bold
Source: Innovative HRM Survey
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organization, adds value, are complex, and how much uncertainty there is surround-
ing these ties. This resulted in four dummy variables indicating these aspects of the
external ties.
20.4.2.3 Control variables
The following control variables are included in the analyses. Organization size is
measured by asking respondents to indicate the number of employees that the orga-
nization has. Prior studies show that the relation between organization size and or-
ganizational innovation is curvilinear (an inverted U-shape) (Nitin and Gulati 1996;
Heunk 1998; Koster 2018). In line with these prior studies, the quadratic term of or-
ganization size is also added to the models. Sector was measured by asking respond-
ents in what economic sector the organization operated. The variable permanent
employees was measured by asking respondents to indicate to what extent the orga-
nization consists of employees with a permanent contract (measured on a 5-point
scale). The variable highly educated was measured with a 5-point scale indicating to
what extent the organization employs highly educated employees. The variable firm
specific knowledge was measured with a 5-point scale indicating to what extent firm
specific knowledge and skills are important for organizational performance.
Table 20.2 provides an overview of the variables included in the analyses.
Table 20.2: Descriptive statistics of the measured included in the analyses.
Min/Max Mean Standard deviation Percentage
Innovation performance / . .
Innovative HRM / . .
Organization size / . .
Organization size (categories)
– / .
– / .
– / .
– / .
 or more / .
Sector
Industry and production / .
Construction / .
Retail – food / .
Retail – nonfood / .
Whole sale / .
Cars and repair / .
Catering / .
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20.4.3 Method
OLS regression analyses are performed with innovation performance and innovative
HRM as the dependent variables. For these two dependent variables, three models are
estimated. Each model includes the control variables and the variables measuring
whether the organization collaborates with the different partners. In the first model,
HR collaboration is added to the models. The second model includes the separate HR
collaboration partners. And, in de final model, the quality of the ties with the HR part-
ners is added.
20.5 Results
20.5.1 Descriptive results
Focusing on the variables of interest, Table 20.2 shows the following. First, on aver-
age, organizations have a higher score on innovation performance than on innovative
Table 20.2 (continued)
Min/Max Mean Standard deviation Percentage
Transport and communication / .
Business services / .
Other services / .
Information technology / .
Financial institutions / .
Permanent employees / . .
Higher educated / . .
Firm specific knowledge / . .
HR cooperation partners
Competitors / .
Business association partners / .
Suppliers / .
Buyers / .
Universities and knowledge centers / .
Public organizations / .
Tie quality
Goals / .
Added value / .
Complexity / .
Uncertainty / .
Notes: N = 732 organizations
Source: Innovative HRM Survey
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HRM. Secondly, looking at the HR cooperation partners of organizations, it turns out
that organizations most often collaborate with organizations belonging to the same
business association (18.6 percent of the organizations have such partners) and that
public organization are less commonly chosen as HR cooperation partners (7.8 per-
cent of organizations have these partners). This is also shown in Figure 20.1.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the majority of organizations (64 percent) does
not collaborate with one of these partners. That 36 percent of the organizations col-
laborates on HR issues can be considered low, compared to other kinds of collabora-
tion. Data from the European Company Survey show that in the Netherlands,
68 percent of the organizations collaborate to design goods and services, 66 percent
collaborates to produce goods and services, and 62 percent collaborates with other
organizations to sell goods and services (Koster 2015). Most of the organizations that
do have HR cooperation partners, only cooperate with one of these partners (17 per-
cent). Of the 732 organizations investigated here, there are 5 that report that they col-
laborate with all 6 partners on HR issues.
20.5.2 Regression analysis
The results of the regression analyses are reported in Table 20.3 (innovation perfor-
mance) and Table 20.4 (innovative HRM). While there are some notable differences
between the models with regard to the control variables (for example, firm-
specificity matter for innovation performance but not for innovative HRM), the pat-
terns of the hypotheses are largely the same. Hypothesis 1 is supported: the more
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Figure 20.1: HR cooperation partners (% of organizations).
Note: N = 732 organizations
Source: Innovative HRM Survey
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an organization collaborates with other organizations in the HR domain, the more
innovative the organization is. This holds for innovation performance and innova-
tive HRM. As expected in hypothesis 2, some of the HR collaborations add more in
terms of organizational innovation than others. More specifically, organization col-
laboration in the HR domain with business association partners, universities and
Table 20.3: Regression analysis on innovation performance.
() () ()
Intercept . * . . ** . . * .
Number of employees . ** . . ** . . ** .
Number of employees ^ −. ** . −. * . −. ** .
Sector
Industry and production −. . −. . −. .
Construction −. . −. . −. .
Retail – food . . . . . .
Retail – nonfood −. . −. . −. .
Wholesale . ** . . ** . . ** .
Cars and repair −. . −. . −. .
Catering . . . . . .
Transport and communication −. * . −. . −. * .
Other services . . . . . .
Information technology . . . . . .
Financial institutions −. . −. . −. .
Business services (reference)
Permanent employees . * . . * . . * .
Higher educated . ** . . * . . ** .
Firm specific knowledge . *** . . *** . . *** .
HR cooperation . *** .
HR cooperation partners
Competitors . .
Business association partners . ** .
Suppliers . .
Buyers . * .
Universities and knowledge centers . ** .
Public organizations . .
Tie quality
Goals . * .
Value . .
Complexity . .
Uncertainty . .
Adjusted R . *** . *** . ***
R change . *** . *** . ***
Notes: N = 732 organizations
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Source: Innovative HRM Survey
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knowledge centers, and to some extent those working with buyers report higher lev-
els of innovation performance and innovative HRM. Having ties with competitors,
suppliers, and public organization turn out not to matter for organizational innova-
tion. Finally, with regard to the quality of the ties with these partners, only 1 aspects
seems to matter, namely the extent to which these HR collaborations contribute to
Table 20.4: Regression analysis on innovative HRM.
() () ()
Intercept −. . −. . −. .
Number of employees . *** . . *** . . *** .
Number of employees ^ −. *** . −. *** . −. *** .
Sector
Industry and production . . . . . .
Construction . . . . . .
Retail – food . * . . * . . * .
Retail – nonfood . . . . . .
Wholesale . ** . . ** . . * .
Cars and repair . *** . . *** . . *** .
Catering . *** . . *** . . *** .
Transport and communication . . . . . .
Other services −. . −. . −. .
Information technology . . . . . .
Financial institutions . . . . . .
Business services (reference)
Permanent employees . *** . . *** . . *** .
Higher educated . . . . . .
Firm specific knowledge . . . . . .
HR cooperation . *** .
HR cooperation partners
Competitors . .
Business association partners . *** .
Suppliers . .
Buyers . * .
Universities and knowledge centers . *** .
Public organizations −. .
Tie quality
Goals . ** .
Value . .
Complexity . .
Uncertainty −. .
Adjusted R . *** . *** . ***
R change . *** . *** . ***
Notes: N = 732 organizations
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Source: Innovative HRM Survey
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organizational goals is positively related to organizational innovation. These mod-
els also show that costly collaborations (in the sense that they are viewed as com-
plex or uncertain) do not undermine organizational innovativeness. Hence,
hypothesis 3 is only partly supported.
20.6 Conclusions
The analyses presented here show that HR collaborations contribute to the innova-
tiveness of organizations, both in terms of innovation performance and innovative
HRM. Furthermore, the results show that the added value of having ties with collabora-
tion partners in terms of organizational innovation differs. In particular, ties with busi-
ness association partners and universities and knowledge centers contribute to
organizational innovativeness. And, finally, the outcomes suggest that HR collabora-
tion partners are relevant for organizational innovativeness if they contribute to the
goals of the organization.
Whereas prior studies have focused on the link between inter-organizational re-
lationships and innovation, this study provides several new insights, by extending
the scope of the analysis. The insight that organizations collaborating with organi-
zations that belong to the same business association and those collaborating with
universities and knowledge centers are more innovative. Whereas previous studies
have focused on network structures and diversity in resources, this suggests that it
also matters with whom an organization collaborates and what the other side has
to offer. It makes sense to make a distinction regarding the basis of the connection
between the organizations. Whereas prior studies mainly focused on whether there
are ties between organizations or use measures of technical dimensions of collabo-
ration (e.g. whether organizations cooperate on issues such as design and product
development), the present study focuses on collaboration on personnel-related is-
sues. By having two indicators of organizational innovation, namely innovation
performance and innovative HRM, it is possible to compare the outcomes for these
indicators. Overall, the patterns are similar, but since the outcomes are somewhat
more pronounced for innovative HRM, seems to suggest that innovations in one do-
main (in this case renewal of human resource management policies and practices)
relate to external ties in the same domain (collaboration on human resource man-
agement related issues).
It turns out that ties with public organizations do not matter for organizations,
but that collaborating with universities and knowledge centers is related to organiza-
tional innovation. As already noted, this may be explained by governance issues that
seem to be more complicated if a private organization collaborates with public organ-
izations than with universities and knowledge centers. In times in which there is de-
bate about the added value of institutions such as universities and there is greater
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emphasis on generating knowledge applicable knowledge, this outcome shows that
these institutions perform this task quite well already.
Finally, this study sheds light on an issue that received little attention in the
literature to date, namely HR collaboration. Some of the work that has been con-
ducted in this area remained theoretical in nature and empirical tests are scarce
(for example, a theoretical article by Gardner from 2005 on the topic of human re-
source alliances is still largely untested). With regard to the outcomes of such col-
laborations, even less is known. The analyses presented here make a case for
further investigating the connection between collaborating on HR issues and orga-
nizational innovation.
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21 A Transaction Cost Approach to Informal
Care
Abstract: Research on cooperation and care has largely overlooked the informal care
for adults. Informal care is the care for those who experience (mental or physical)
health issues. In this contribution we aim to explain the provision of informal care
from a transaction cost approach. We do so by investigating the role of coordination
problems and trust problems in the supply of informal care from the perspective of the
care giver. We also investigate the role of the social embeddedness of the relationship
between the care giver and receiver. Using information from 7,166 care givers and
non-care givers collected by the Dutch Institute for Social Research and the Central
Bureau of Statistics, multivariate analyses are used to test our hypotheses. Results
show that less hours of informal care are provided when the complexity of needs is
higher. However, unexpectedly, those with more general skills spend less rather than
more time of informal care. Our results also suggest that care givers prefer to give in-
formal care to the ones they know and have a close relationship with. Although the
findings are mixed, we conclude that informal care provided by the care giver can be
viewed upon as a transaction, and give suggestions for further research.
21.1 Introduction
Cooperation and conflict arise in many different contexts and the family domain is
one of these. There is an extensive body of literature that has studied how partners
in a household divide and negotiate paid and unpaid work (Blood Jr and Wolfe
1960; Hook and Wolfe 2011; Becker 1981; Becker and Moen 1999; Poortman and Van
der Lippe 2009), and how organizations coordinate how parents can spend time on
their children (Roeters 2010). The unpaid work activities that are studied are usually
limited to household work and child care (Bianchi and Milkie 2010; Bianchi et al.
2012), and studies tend to focus on the relationship between heterosexual partners.
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By focusing on these activities and relationships, research on cooperation and care
has largely overlooked the informal care for adults. Informal care is the care for
those who experience (mental or physical) health issues. This can concern the care
for an ageing parent, but also applies to the care for a sibling or neighbor with a
disability. The Dutch term for this type of care – ‘mantelzorg’ translates as ‘cloak
care’, indicating that the person who is taken care of is taken under the wings of
the person providing the care. The lack of attention for informal care is a missed
opportunity, both from a scientific and a societal point of view.
First, it is a missed opportunity for research studying interdependencies and co-
operation (Raub and Weesie 2000). When informal care is provided (or withheld),
multiple “negotiations” have taken place, implicitly or explicitly. When a person is in
need of care it is not self-evident who provides this care. When household and child-
care tasks are involved it is usually evident that both partners share this responsibil-
ity. The division of responsibilities is less evident when it comes to informal care.
Partner, parents, siblings, neighbors, and friends are all potential informal care giv-
ers. In informal care, personal relationships are intertwined with caring tasks. This
may provide benefits because there is trust, but it may also be considered a risk be-
cause it may have (negative) consequences for the personal relationship. Informal care
creates social obligations, and the care receiver is strongly dependent on the care giver
(the obligation has to be “paid” to the same person). Thus, there are similarities with
outsourcing childcare where the care that is received is also dependent on the care
giver (De Ruijter 2005). Moreover, formal care is often an attractive alternative (more so
than usually is the case for child care; see Portegijs, Boer, and Merens 2015). A large
proportion of the Dutch considers the government to carry the main responsibility for
the care of those in need (van den Broek, Dykstra, and van der Veen 2015). The provi-
sion of informal care does not only require coordination between those who are receiv-
ing and providing this care. When there are multiple care givers (e.g., a neighbor and a
child, or a partner and a nurse) they have to coordinate their activities. Naturally, the
person who is in need of care has an important say in how this care is arranged, but at
the same time he or she is dependent on the availability and willingness of others.
Second, informal care is increasingly important from a societal perspective. Like
other western societies, the Dutch population is aging. Currently, 19% of the Dutch
population is older than 65 years and the Dutch Bureau of Statistics expects this per-
centage to increase to 26% in 2040 (Stoeldraijer, Van Duin, and Huisman 2017). But
not only older people are in need of care. Physical and mental health impairments can
arise at a much earlier age. The average ‘healthy life expectancy’ (the estimated num-
ber of years during with people live in good health) currently varies between 57,2 for
lower educated and 71,5 for higher educated (estimates for individuals born in 2017,
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Statline) 2018).Thus it is not surprising that infor-
mal care is increasingly common. In the Netherlands, the number of informal care giv-
ers is estimated at 5 million people. This equals one third of those aged 16 or older
(De Klerk et al. 2017). In the coming decades this percentage is expected to increase
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(Van den Broek et al. 2016). The expected increase in informal care is not only driven
by demographic changes. Public health policy in the Netherlands is increasingly
stimulating informal care. In order to do so, access to formal care is restricted and
care professionals and public servants are required to discuss the possibilities for in-
formal care with the family members of those who are in need of care (Broek 2013).
Although there is an increasing body of literature on informal care for adults
with health issues, the effects of coordination and trust problems have not yet been
addressed. We argue that trust plays a key role in the supply of informal care. Our
hypotheses are informed by two theoretical approaches: the transaction cost approach
(Coase 1952; Williamson 1981, 1985) and new economic sociology (Granovetter 1985;
Smelser and Swedberg 1994). Both approaches can help us to assess the influence of
trust problems on informal care giving. The transaction cost approach describes the
influence of trust problems or “opportunism problems” on decision-making by firms.
The transaction cost approach has been applied to the family before, usually in combi-
nation with insights from new home economics. Although this research has not yet
focused on informal care it does focus on issues concerning contracting and financial
arrangements in intimate relationships or the outsourcing of household and caring
tasks (Ben-Porath 1980; De Ruijter, Van der Lippe, and Raub 2003; Giesen 1999;
Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2000; Pollak 1985; Treas 1991, 1993; Treas and Widmer 2000).
These studies suggest that the exchange of support can be hindered by trust issues.
New economic sociology complements this approach by arguing that trust inspired by
social embeddedness reduces risks associated with the exchange of support.
The current study aims to explain the provision of informal care from a transac-
tion cost approach. We do so by investigating the role of coordination problems and
trust problems in the supply of informal care from the perspective of the care giver.
We also investigate the role of the social embeddedness of the relationship between
the care giver and receiver. The dataset that is used to test our hypotheses provides
information about the characteristics of the potential care giver (general characteris-
tics as well as characteristics that relate to the ability and willingness to provide
care), the care receiver and the relationship between the two. Therefore the data en-
able us to study the specifics of the context in which care is provided or withheld.
21.2 Theoretical framework
The basic idea of the transaction cost approach is that that governance structures are
chosen in such a way that the anticipated costs for reaching and enforcing agree-
ments during transactions are minimized (Coase 1952; Williamson 1981, 1985). Firms
can protect themselves from problems by choosing a certain governance structure,
such as the detailed contractual planning of a transaction, or by looking for a reliable
partner, which involves transaction costs. The properties of a transaction determine
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which governance structure is the least costly (Coase 1952; Williamson 1981, 1985). If a
firm is more likely to encounter problems when entering a transaction on the market
and the damage it can suffer is higher, the firm will incur higher transaction costs to
prevent problems. Coordination problems within firms may also encourage market ex-
change and prevent internalization of certain activities (e.g. Baron and Kreps 1999).
Regarding informal care, the supply of care requires investments in transaction
costs. The likelihood and potential consequences of coordination and trust problems
both influence the supply of informal care. In the literature, these two elements of
trust problems are described as the problem potential of a transaction (Batenburg
et al. 2003). The higher the problem potential, the more costs are needed to prevent
problems (e.g. low-quality care, negative effects of informal care on the quality of the
personal relationship). As a consequence, care givers may refrain from supplying in-
formal care due to the high expected costs associated with the exchange. Therefore,
we expect that a higher problem potential has a negative effect on the supply of infor-
mal care and the investments made by the care giver in the informal care relation.
Trust problems in informal care relate to the competence, values and opportun-
ism. We focus on the perspective of the care giver. If suppliers feel that they are not
competent enough, they may experience feelings of stress because they feel unable
to supply the required care. Regarding values, a care giver can perform a task un-
satisfactory due to different standards of hygiene or cleanliness of the care giver
and care receiver. This may increase costs from the perspective of the care giver.
Also, a care receiver may behave opportunistically, for instance by taking advan-
tage of the care giver (e.g. increasingly claiming time). These types of problems may
also exist from the perspective of the care receiver. However, we focus in this study
on the problem potential experienced by the care giver. The higher the problem po-
tential, the higher the expected costs for the care giver to prevent problems and the
less inclined the supplier is to provide the informal care.
Coordination problems arise from difficulties related to combining work, home and
care, and the extent to which care givers need to adjust their activities to others (Treas
1993). Transaction costs are incurred to “reduce day-to-day hassles of negotiating and
coordinating exchanges (i.e. to avoid distasteful haggling, minimize unpleasant dis-
putes, eliminate awkward misunderstandings, cut down the time wasted policing the
performance of others)” (Treas 1993: 724). The transaction costs of informal care are
higher when there are bigger coordination problems to deal with. Coordination prob-
lems are more likely to arise when multiple roles at work and in the family have to be
synchronized (e.g. Voydanoff 1987, 1988). For example, a demanding job with long
working hours and little flexibility, may make it difficult to attend doctors appointments
or provide other types of support and care. The more coordination problems associated
with the informal care, the less likely the care giver is to provide informal care.
The new economic sociology addresses the effect of the embeddedness of the rela-
tionship between the buyer and supplier in transactions (Granovetter 1985; Smelser
and Swedberg 1994). This embeddedness argument emphasizes “the role of concrete
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personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust
and discouraging malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985: 490). Informal care involves risks
that can be mitigated by the social embeddedness of transactions. The social embedd-
edness of the informal care relation induces trust and reduces the required transaction
costs. A greater embeddedness of care supply in social relations provides information,
for instance about values, skills or expectations regarding the informal care. It also al-
lows for effective non-legal rewards and sanctions, for instance if something goes
wrong or if the care receiver takes advantage of the care giver. Therefore, a greater em-
beddedness reduces the required investments in transaction costs to prevent problems.
The social embeddedness of transactions has a dyadic and a network aspect
(Granovetter 1985; Raub and Weesie 1990). The dyadic embeddedness of a transaction
refers to the ongoing character of a dyadic relationship. Network embeddedness is the
extent to which actors are linked to third parties in a social network (Raub and Weesie
1990). Both types of embeddedness provide the care giver information (“learning”) as
well as possibilities for sanctioning (“control”) (Buskens 2002, Buskens and Raub 2002).
Based on the literature, we expect that a higher problem potential has a nega-
tive effect on the supply of informal care. Therefore, factors that increase the prob-
lem potential are expected to reduce the frequency of care activities and amount of
time spent providing care. Table 21.1 provides an overview of the specific character-
istics of the ‘care situation’ that are expected to impact the problem potential and
provision of care. First, the complexity of the care needed is expected to increase
the problem potential and decrease the supply and investments, because there is a
higher risk of things going wrong and the consequences for the care giver are more
severe. Second, we expect higher skills of the care giver to reduce the problem po-
tential because fewer investments are needed to provide the informal care and the
care giver will experience less stress in providing the care. Third, time demands of
the care giver are expected to increase coordination problems and therefore have a
negative effect on the hours of informal care and investments in the care relation.
Fourth, the social embeddedness and closeness of the relationship of the care giver
and care receiver are expected to generate trust and decrease the problem potential
and therefore increases the supplied hours of informal care and the investments
made in the care relation.
Table 21.1: Expected relations between explanatory variables and hours of informal care.
Explanatory variables Effect on problem
potential
Effect on providing
care
Complexity of care needs and situation + −
Skills of the care giver − +
Time demands of the care giver + −
Closeness of relationship care giver and care
receiver
− +
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Drawing on the transaction cost approach, one would expect that the associa-
tion between the care situation and the problem potential and provision of care are
conditional on governance structures. However, informal care is not a service that
can be the subject of a formal contract or arrangement. It always depends on the
willingness of both parties to provide and receive care. One could consider alterna-
tive governance structures such as informal agreements between multiple care giv-
ers or informal agreements between the care giver and care receiver. For example,
decisions regarding the care can be made ad hoc, but they can also be the result of
extensive negations. And agreements can be implicit or they can be made explicit
and written down as a list of tasks and responsibilities. Unfortunately the data do
not allow us to study such variations.
21.3 Methods
21.3.1 Data
The analyses were based on the “Informele Zorg” data that were collected by the
Dutch Institute for Social Research and the Central Bureau of Statistics. The sample
size was 18,882 persons (Janssen 2017; Klerk et al. 2017). The sample was stratified
by region. Because data collection was aimed at informal care (including volunteer-
ing) a lower threshold was set for the number of ‘active carers’ (informal carers and
volunteers in the care sector). A minimum of 2,800 carers were required to respond.
Field work took place between September and December 2016. Respondents re-
ceived a letter that invited them to fill out a web-survey. Those who had not responded
after two reminder-letters and with an available telephone number, were approached
by telephone. When the respondent was contacted and willing to participate, a tele-
phone interview was held. The overall response rate was 38%. A total of 7,166 individu-
als responded; 2,852 of them qualified as ‘active carers’. The data collection takes the
perspective of the care giver as starting point, and implies that we can only test our
hypotheses for the group of care givers and are not able to compare this with the group
who does not provide any care at all (see for more information analytical strategy).
We have extensive information about the care giver and the one who receives
care. However, for those who indicated that they do not provide informal care, we
have much less information. We have information about their socio-economic back-
ground characteristics and attitudes towards care, but we do not know if they have
someone in their social network who is in need of care. This implies that we can
only test hypotheses on the role of transaction costs for the intensity of care. That
is, we can compare informal carers with varying levels of time investments in infor-
mal care, but we cannot compare informal carers with those who do not provide
any care at all. Because it is possible that those who provide informal care are a
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selective group, our analyses briefly investigate how the background characteristics
of informal carers differ from those who do not provide informal care.
21.3.2 Measures
Independent variables. The complexity of care needs was measured with two indica-
tors. First, we included a dummy-variable indicating whether the care receiver
could be left alone for more than 30-minutes (1 = always, 0 = often, sometimes, sel-
dom or never). Second, we created a count-variable measuring the number of condi-
tions that were relevant for the care receiver’s care needs. The respondents were
able to select one or multiple conditions from a list of nine conditions (temporary
physical disability, chronic physical disability, terminal illness, dementia and re-
lated diseases, mental disorder, psycho-social problems, mental disabilities and
others). Assuming that providing care is more complex when multiple conditions
co-occur, we counted the total number of conditions.
Three variables measure the level of knowledge and skills of the care giver. First,
the questionnaire included the question “Have you ever worked in health care or
social work and given assistance or help to clients or patients?”. We assume that
those with experience in this sector will find it easier to provide care because they
have been trained to do so. The second and third variable measure the self-perceived
skills and knowledge. Respondents were asked four specific and three more general
questions. The four specific items are “I remain calm when I encounter difficulties
while providing care”, “I generally handle unexpected events during care giving
well”, “If things do not work out when I’m providing help, I find ways to do what
is necessary”, and “I know where to turn to when I have questions or experience
problems with regard to care giving”, with answer categories on a Likert scale.
The three general questions are: “Do you consider yourself capable, to help the
person you provide care for?”, “Do you believe you lack knowledge to help the
person you provide care for?”, and “Do you believe you have the necessary skills
to help the person you provide care for?” The yes and no-answers to these items
were combined into two separate scales (taking the mean score). The items were
coded in such a way that higher scores reflect more skills and knowledge.
The time demands on the care giver are assumed to be higher if he or she is in
paid employment (0 = no; 1 = yes), works longer hours (an interval variable measur-
ing the number of hours per week excluding overtime), and lives with a dependent
child (0 = no; 1 = yes). Moreover, we measure the level of subjective time pressure.
Respondents are asked “Can you indicate – on a scale from 1 to 10 – to what extent
you feel like you are under time pressure in your daily life? A 1 means that you expe-
rience ‘very little time pressure’ and a 10 that you experience ‘a lot of time pressure’.”
Our indicator of social embeddedness distinguishes between two levels of close-
ness (0 = distant; 1 = close). The relationship is assumed to be close if the care
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receiver is the care giver’s partner or close family member (i.e. parent, child, sibling).
The relationship is assumed to be more distant for distant family members (e.g. uncle)
and non-kin (e.g. neighbor, friend).
Finally, we control for gender and attitudes towards informal care. Gender is
measured with a simple dummy-variable (0 = men; 1 = women). The scale measuring
attitudes towards informal care is based on four statements. “When parents need a lot
of help, they should be able to live with their children”; Neighbors have the duty to
help other neighbors when they are in need of help; Family members should help
other family members when they have health problems or impairments; Friends
should help other family members when they have health problems or impairments
(answer categories range from 1 = completely agree to 5 = completely disagree). The
alpha is 0.74. The items were reverse-coded and combined into one scale. On the
new scale (ranging from 1 to 5) higher values reflect more positive attitudes towards
providing informal care.
Dependent variables. In the first step, we analyze the difference between the re-
spondents who do and do not provide informal care. Respondents are identified as
informal carers if three conditions are satisfied: whether (i) they have provided in-
formal care in the last 12 months, (ii) they currently provide informal care and (iii)
the main person they provide care for is 18 years or older. Because people do not
always recognize that they provide informal care, the question that identifies infor-
mal care has an elaborate introduction: “The following questions concern the provi-
sion of help to social contacts with health impairments. For example, consider your
partner, family, friend or neighbor who needs help because of physical or mental
impairments or his or her age. Examples are household tasks, help with personal
hygiene, keeping the him or her company, transportation or manual jobs. Help as
part of your job or volunteering does not count.” Respondents are considered as in-
formal carers if they answer “yes” to this question. After this introduction the re-
spondent is first asked whether he or she had provided this type of help in de
preceding 12 months. Because the care for children has a different dynamic and not
even 5% provided this type of care we decided to focus on informal care to adults.
Thus we excluded 78 respondents who provided informal care to someone under
the age of 18, setting their scores to missing. After this selection 2,066 respondents
(27.6%) were labeled as carers and the remaining 5,350 (71.4%) respondents were
labeled as non-carers.
After investigating the differences between those who do and do not provide
informal care, we test our hypotheses predicting the level of investments in the infor-
mal care relationship. Two outcome measures are considered: The care giver is
asked to estimate the frequency of care (rarely, monthly, weekly, daily) and the
number of hours per week. On average the care givers spend 7.7 hours per week
providing care. Figure 21.1 shows how frequent the care givers provide care. Care on
a weekly basis is most common.
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21.3.3 Analytical strategy
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing whether those who do not provide care,
have a family member or neighbor who is in need of care. Nor do we have informa-
tion about the relationship, complexity of care needs, and knowledge and skills of
the potential carers. This implies that we are largely restricted to studying varia-
tions within the group who provides care. Because this is likely to be a selective
group, the first step of our analyses compares the background characteristics of the
informal carers and the respondents who did not provide informal care.
In the second step we explain the intensity of care. We do so by investigating
the role of the complexity of care, the level of skills and knowledge of the care
giver, and the social embeddedness. We apply each of these explanations to each of
the four outcome measures. Because the outcome measures have different scales,
we use different analytical models: (i) The model explaining the frequency of care
are ordered logit regression models; (ii) the model explaining the number of hours
of care is an OLS-model.
21.4 Results
21.4.1 A comparison between background characteristics
of care givers and non-care givers
Are care givers a selective group? Table 21.2 shows that this is not the case with re-
spect to background characteristics such as the labor market situation and attitudes
towards informal care. However, it also becomes clear that care givers are more likely
to have work experience in the care sector, that they are more likely to have a
3%
15%
55%
27%
Rarely Monthly Weekly Daily
Figure 21.1: Investments in informal care by care giver in frequency.
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dependent child and to be female. Moreover, they report higher levels of time pres-
sure than those who do not provide informal care. These descriptive findings are in
contrast with the transaction cost theory, where we would expect that labor market
situation and attitudes matter for informal care. We should be careful drawing con-
clusions based on these descriptive results, because we do not take into account the
amount of caregiving in Table 21.2. People may in fact be inclined to provide limited
care due to social expectations even when a large problem potential is involved,
while reducing the amount of care depending on the problem potential. This may re-
duce the differences when we only compare caregivers and non-caregivers.
21.4.2 Explanatory analyses
Table 21.3 provides the results for the Ordinary Least Squares Regression analysis to
explain hours of informal care and Ordinal Logistic Regression to explain the frequency
of care provided. We start with the hours of informal care. The results show that, as
expected, less hours of informal care are provided when the complexity of care needs
is higher: the number of conditions relates negatively to hours of informal care.
Table 21.2: Descriptive results and the comparison of background characteristics for care givers
and non-care givers.
R. does not provide
informal care
R. provides
informal care
p-valuea
Complexity of care needs and situation
Number of conditions .
Care receiver can always be left alone
for >mins (ref = the care
receiver cannot)
.%
Knowledge and skills of the care giver
Work experience in care .% .% .
Scale specific skills and knowledge .
Scale general skills and knowledge .
Time demands of the care giver
R is employed .% .% .
Working hours . . .
Care giver lives with a dependent child .% .% .
Time pressure . . .
Individual characteristics
Female .% .% .
Positive attitudes towards informal care
(–)
. . .
Note: a Estimated on the basis of a logistic regression model explaining the likelihood that the
respondent provides informal care (controlling for the other background characteristics).
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However, the results also show that when the care receiver can be left alone, less care
is provided. Furthermore, if the care giver perceives that he or she has more general
skills, unexpectedly less time is spent on informal care. This seems to indicate that
skills are less important for hours spent on informal care. Perhaps this could be due to
efficiency benefits: skilled caregivers may need less time to provide the care than non-
skilled caregivers. Another explanation could be that non-skilled caregivers overesti-
mate their general caring skills. Perhaps differences arise only when focusing on spe-
cialized rather than general skills. When the care giver is employed, an indicator of
time demands, the results show that less time is spent on providing informal care.
Social embeddedness matters with respect to the closeness of the relationship: if the
care receiver is partner or close family, more time is spent on informal care.
If we then turn to the frequency of care, it becomes clear that the number of
conditions does not matter. Moreover, if the care receiver can be left alone, this
leads again to less informal care. Furthermore, for frequency skills do matter, more
specific skills imply more care, which is as we would expect. Also time demands,
Table 21.3: Explanatory analyses to explain the estimated hoursa and frequencyb of informal care,
informal carers (unstandardized coefficients, weighted analyses).
Hours Frequency
Complexity of care needs and situation
Number of conditions −.** −.
Care receiver can always be left alone for >mins (ref = the care receiver
cannot)
−.* −.***
Knowledge and skills of the care giver
Work experience in care (ref = no experience) . .
Scale specific skills and knowledge . .*
Scale general skills and knowledge −.** .
Time demands of the care giver
R is employed (ref = nonemployed) −.** −.**
Working hours . −.
Care giver lives with a dependent child (ref. = no child) −. .
Time pressure −. .
Social embeddedness
Care receiver is partner or close family (ref = distant) .* .***
R is female (ref = male) . .
Positive attitudes towards informal care (–) −. −.
Constant .**
Constant cut  −.
Constant cut  .***
R-squared . –
Number of cases , ,
Notes: ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
aOLS regression.
bOrdered logistic regression.
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indicated by employment of the care giver is negatively associated with frequency
of care. This result was also found for hours of informal care. Social embeddedness
matters as well: if the care receiver is a partner or close family, as expected, more
informal care is provided.
21.5 Conclusion
This study investigated the relevance of a transaction costs approach to informal
care. Using insights from this approach together with social embeddedness argu-
ments, we were able to formulate hypotheses on hours and frequency of informal
care. Capitalizing on rich data on care givers in the Netherlands, we were able to
test our hypotheses.
Our main conclusion is that informal care provided by the care giver can be
viewed upon as a transaction. When there are more coordination problems in organiz-
ing and providing informal care, the problem potential is higher, and this will have a
negative relation with the supply of informal care. We therefore fully embrace the
idea of informal care as a transaction, because it gives more insight in the decision to
provide informal care. Also, our empirical findings partly confirm the idea of informal
care as a transaction, at least in the way we have hypothesized about the transaction
costs involved in informal care.
Our findings are in line with the idea that when the complexity of care is
higher, and when there are more time demands, coordination is more difficult and
less informal care will be provided. However, when the care receiver cannot be left
alone, typically an indicator of complex needs, more care is provided as well. This
result might not be so surprising, since these people are more in need of informal
care, but according to the problem potential argument, we expected less informal
care. For skills, results are partly as expected. Specific skills matter for frequency of
informal care. Nevertheless, those with more general skills spend less rather than
more time of informal care. Possible explanations could be that skilled caregivers
experience efficiency benefits, non-skilled caregivers overestimate their skills or
that differences only become apparent when looking at specialized caring skills.
Our results also suggest social embeddedness is relevant in understanding the
transaction between the care giver and the care receiver. When the care receiver is
partner or close family, more time is spent on informal care and the frequency is
higher as well. Thus, social embeddedness makes a difference in informal care ex-
changes as well as intra-household exchanges (De Ruijter 2005). Care givers prefer
to give informal care to the ones they know and have a close relationship with. The
dyadic relation they have inspires trust, and the risks associated with informal care
are mitigated by the social embeddedness of the transaction.
494 Anne Roeters, Esther de Ruijter and Tanja van der Lippe
All in all, our study provides a promising avenue for further research. We have
three suggestions thereby. In this study we were not able to focus on the content of
care provided, but we suggest other researchers to delve into this topic, because it
might be helpful to explain some of the unexpected findings. It probably matters
whether care receivers need complex help (e.g. wound care, administering medicine),
involving a high problem potential, compared to simple caring tasks such as help
with personal hygiene. In more complex caring situations we would expect larger ef-
fects of the problem potential on caregiving, because the consequences of problems
are more severe. Furthermore, in this chapter we focused on temporal measures of in-
vestments (the frequency of care and hours of care) but care givers can invest in the
care relationship also in other ways. Therefore, we advise in new research to take in-
vestments in the informal care relationship into account, such as moving house in
order to be closer to the care receiver, to make arrangements with the employer or to
take up responsibilities that are time-extensive, such as helping with filing taxes once
per year. Finally, although we used unique data, it would even be better to have lon-
gitudinal data to study the process of informal care, and the transactions that are
made over a longer time span. This would enable us to understand the causality of
the relation between trust and coordination problems and caregiving. It would also
help us to understand how skills can develop over time and thereby may mitigate
trust problems. For example, when caregivers start with simple caregiving tasks they
may become more competent and confident over time, thereby reducing the problem
potential when more complex caring demands arise. It could be that caregivers are
more inclined to give more care when the care demand grows gradually compared to
a sudden complex care demand (e.g. as a consequence of an accident or an acute seri-
ous illness).
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Beate Volker
22 Trust is Good – Or is Control Better?
Trust and Informal Control in Dutch
Neighborhoods – Their Association
and Consequences
Abstract: The idea of collective efficacy – the degree to which residents engage in
collective good production and protection – has been established as key for the un-
derstanding why neighborhoods sometimes fail in establishing social and physical
order. Theoretically, a basic assumption is that collective efficacy rests in the close
association between informal social control and trust. This paper argues that this
alleged link between control and trust is not always present and even not always
plausible. Different possible relationships between trust and control are discussed
and empirically explored by multilevel models of behavior in neighborhoods, and it
is examined to which degree control and trust go with important neighborhood con-
sequences such as networks among neighbors, collective action with neighbors,
and general satisfaction with the neighborhood. Data from the SSND (Survey of the
Social Networks of the Dutch 2014, n = 1067, in 165 neighborhoods) are used.
Findings show that trust and informal control are only modestly associated with
each other. Furthermore, effects of control are not robust in the statistical models,
while trust effects are. Finally, control and trust alignment in different neighbor-
hoods is explored and it is argued that the wider neighborhood context such as
type of houses, degree of urbanization and neighborhood history influence the de-
gree to which control goes together with trust.
22.1 Introduction: Collective efficacy
and trust-control alignment
Trust is good, but control is better.1
In their seminal paper on the explanation of neighborhood crime and disorder
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) argued that collective efficacy is the key for
the understanding of how neighbors safeguard collective good production such as
Beate Volker, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Utrecht University
1 This phrase is ascribed to Vladimir Lenin, although there is no source proving that it has been
literally forwarded by him. It comes close to a popular Russian saying “Dowjerjaj, no prowjerjaj” –
which means ‘be trusting, but verify’. Probably, Lenin used that saying too.
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safety, cleanness, and livability of a neighborhood in general. They demonstrated
empirically that in neighborhoods where collective efficacy is high, incidents such as
registered violence and rates of homicides as well as ratings of perceived violence are
lower than in neighborhoods with low collective efficacy. Ever since then, the idea of
a lack of collective efficacy – the shared norm that collective goods are protected by
interventions of local residents – is used to explain the functioning (or the malfunc-
tioning) of neighborhoods.
The core parts of ‘collective efficacy’ are social cohesion and perceptions of
trustworthiness together with informal control. Collective efficacy is conceived as a
composite of trust and informal control, and both are seen as depending on each
other. For example, Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls (1999: 919) argue that high trust
and cohesion in neighborhoods provides the most “fertile contexts for the realiza-
tion of informal control”. The measurement of collective efficacy is usually straight-
forwardly based on indicators of trust or cohesion2 and combined in one scale,
together with items measuring informal control. In most studies on neighborhoods,
informal control and trust perceptions are considered to be closely intertwined.
However, the extent to which trust and (informal) control are associated with
each other is also debated, in particular in the organizational literature (see for exam-
ple Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa, 2005; Vlaar, Van den Bosch and Volberda 2007). If
trust is understood as the expectation that ‘actions of others will be beneficial rather
than detrimental’ (Gambetta 1988) and control as actively monitoring behavior of
others (Janowitz 1991), control and monitoring are not necessary in trustful relation-
ships. On the contrary, in a situation where many trustful relations are present, ex-
plicit control can be interpreted as a signal of low trust.3 In other words, if control is
carried out actively, it can actually be a substitute of trust. In cases where trust is
high, control4 is not necessary. The opposite also holds: when trust is low, collective
good production cannot be warranted without control. Situations where control sub-
stitutes trust are quite common and part of rationalization in society. Think for in-
stance of the detailed registrations of employee activities in occupational sectors
such as health or education. In fact, control is also an important part of many state
2 In this contribution, the difference between ‘trust’ and ‘social cohesion’ is not considered rele-
vant. ‘Trust’ as used in this chapter refers to dyadic relationships, while ‘social cohesion’ is a char-
acteristic of a group. However, highly cohesive networks usually consist of trustful and trustworthy
relationships and, perhaps more important, most scales on neighborhood cohesion measure trust
among neighbors and aggregate the average scores to the level of the neighborhood.
3 I am aware that the situation is more complex, though. On a second level of the interaction, con-
trol does play a role. For example, it has to be controlled whether the behavior was indeed in con-
formation with the agreed norms. Still, however, the argument holds that trust and control cannot
be seen as closely related by default.
4 For reasons of brevity I refer to ‘control’ although my empirical focus as well as my arguments
are on ‘informal’ control. Formal rules and mechanisms are not considered here, since my empirical
case, that of neighborhoods lacks these regulations.
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systems as in politics, incentives to abuse power are often large and the consequen-
ces of such an abuse undesirable. As Warren (1999) puts it: “An important democratic
innovation was the recognition that in many relationships trust is misplaced or inap-
propriate, suppressing real conflicts of interest” (Warren 1999: 1). In short, the above-
mentioned Russian saying (footnote 1) has been taken seriously in modern western
societies.
However, trust and control can also be related in another way. Control mecha-
nisms can increase trust because the rules of the situation are, with the control mecha-
nisms in place, clear as well as the assessment and evaluation formats. If control is
understood as the possibility to sanction (and not as the monitoring of the sanction
itself), trust and control are no antagonists anymore. From a game-theoretical perspec-
tive, if there is the possibility to sanction (control), in equilibrium, there is no need to
carry out the sanction. Hence, in such a situation, control promotes trust (see, for ex-
ample Coleman 1990, Buskens and Raub 2002). In addition, also for the reversed rela-
tionship, that trust promotes control, arguments are provided (see above, Sampson,
Moreno and Earls 1999).
Last but not least, it can also be argued that control and trust are two condi-
tions in social situations that operate independently of each other, they might sim-
ply be not related in one and the same interaction situation.5 Whether control or
trust is important for neighborhood social order might depend on the neighborhood
matter in question, the organization of a barbeque might be only related to trust in
the neighbor networks, while the arrangement on noise, littering, and car parking
might be subject to control.
Given these considerations it is actually puzzling that the literature on collec-
tive efficacy in neighborhoods does not at all problematize the relationship between
control and trust. Instead, it is usually implied that they are equally important and
at play at the very same moment. The established conceptualization and the mea-
surement of collective efficacy assume a coincidence of both, trust and control.
Hence, while the link between neighborhood disorganization and neighborhood
crime is understood in particular through the mediating effect of collective efficacy
(Sampson et al. 1999; Sampson 2006), it remains unclear how the constituents of
collective efficacy are related to each other. They might be each other’s substitute,
supplement (and even reinforce each other’s effect), or be unrelated.
Knowledge about the relationship between the elements of collective efficacy is
important if we want to understand how neighborhoods function and what condi-
tions promote social order. Do people sense and initiate monitoring or do they just
trust, without further ‘back-up’? Furthermore, does this equally hold for different
5 The situation might be even more complex, though. It might be that in a given situation an initial
amount of trust determines the amount of control exercised.
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aspects of neighborhood social order, for instance for actual relationships as well
as for actions towards collective good production?
This paper aims to contribute to the disentanglement of the relationship be-
tween (informal) control and trust, while studying their consequences for a number
of different outcomes: actual neighborhood relations, collective action in neighbor-
hoods, and the general satisfaction with the neighborhood. I focus on the alleged
constituents of collective efficacy – trust and control – examine how they are re-
lated with each other, and how they contribute to different aspects of neighborhood
functioning. In addition, I explore some cases where control and trust are both
high, where they are both low, as well as where they do not align. Hence, the re-
search question of this paper is ‘what is the association between informal control
and trust in neighborhoods, and to what degree do they explain neighbor networks,
collective activities, and neighborhood satisfaction?’ Data from the 3rd wave of the
SSND (Social Survey of the Networks of the Dutch) are used in combination with
key-figures of neighborhoods provided by Statistics Netherlands.
22.2 Collective efficacy, trust, and
control – arguments and expectations
22.2.1 Collective efficacy
The idea of collective efficacy and its consequences for a variety of socially desirable
outcomes is based on Bandura’s psychological theory of individual-level ‘personal ef-
ficacy’ or ‘self’-efficacy. This type of efficacy is the belief of individuals that they can
attain goals through their own actions – in other words, one’s own actions are con-
sidered effective for goal attainment (Bandura 1997/2000). Bandura acknowledged
that there is also an efficacy belief on a group level: the shared belief in collective
power to attain a desired goal. The idea of collective efficacy has been extensively
elaborated and applied in sports competitions, but also in educational research
(Goddard et al. 2004; Goddard 2001).
In sociology, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) applied the idea of col-
lective efficacy to the study of (dis)functioning neighborhoods, while building upon
social disorganization theory. Since the 1970s, social disorganization has been per-
ceived as a community’s inability to realize common values and maintain social
control (Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942). The theory also pointed
at three aspects of neighborhood social composition that are expected to enhance
disorganization: (ethnic) heterogeneity, residential fluctuation, and disadvantages
such as poverty, but also broken families. Consequently, many studies on neighbor-
hood functioning included these three structural neighborhood characteristics in
their theoretical and empirical analysis. However, social disorganization theory was
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criticized for being a macro level theory and not connected to human actions (Bursik
1988). What people do in order to establish a well-functioning neighborhood re-
mained an open spot in the theory. Sampson’s studies (starting with the above-
mentioned study by Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997) build upon that criticism
of social disorganization theory and argued that the mechanism through which the
three compositional characteristics actually work can be found within people’s rela-
tionships and neighborhood networks. Trust as well as informal control are located in
such social networks and they constitute the very base for neighborhood social order.
Indeed, both, trust and the shared belief that neighbors will intervene on behalf of the
common good – that is, collective efficacy – are associated with low rates of crime,
ranging from burglaries to violent offenses and even murder. Sampson et al. (1997)
showed that collective efficacy substantially mediates the relationship of cumulated
disadvantages, fluctuation, and ethnic heterogeneity in neighborhoods, with neigh-
borhood crime rates and violence acts. Hence, collective efficacy hampers the occur-
rence of collective bads.6
The notion of collective efficacy also met with criticism. It has been questioned
whether trust and cohesion are really the constituents of collective efficacy in all
circumstances (cf. St. Jean 2007, see also Warner and Rountree 1997). The shared
belief that people will intervene on behalf of the common good might be sufficient
to enhance neighborhood functioning and the degree to which this shared belief
requires trust and cohesive networks can be debated.
In addition, arguments have been brought forward concerning the relationship
between trust and control: do they really belong to the same phenomenon? For ex-
ample, Bursik (1999) argues that social control is an outcome of networks – dense
networks produce social control as a collective good and, consequently, in such
neighborhoods crime rates are low. However, and as mentioned above, if control is
the consequence of trust (or vice versa), research should take into account the chro-
nology in the emergence of trust and control, rather than putting them together in
one scale and assume that they are present at the same moment. Last but not least,
some researchers showed empirically that the items related to trustful relationships
among neighbors did not improve the scale of collective efficacy (see Gau 2014;
Volker et al. 2015).
In short, there seem to be inconsistencies in the theoretical arguments on which
collective efficacy is based upon as well as in the findings acquired from empirical
studies. First, the idea of collective efficacy is explicitly based on trust and control –
allegedly at play in densely connected, trustful networks. These are networks of stron-
ger ties – and not of weaker ties, given that weaker ties are perceived as less trustful.
6 Volker et al. (2015) showed that collective efficacy also mattered for collective goods: in their study
on lost letters in Dutch neighborhoods, letters found in neighborhoods with high collective efficacy
were more often returned than the letters found in neighborhoods with low collective efficacy.
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However, it has been shown that strong ties can also hamper control efforts (Bellair
and Browning, 2010; Browning, Dietz and Feinberg 2004; Flache 1996) because
friends – strong relationships – do not easily take action in case of one’s criminal or
antisocial behavior. They do not intend to put their relationships at risk. Likewise, it
has been shown that dense networks of relationships can hamper collective good pro-
duction rather than enforce it (Wilson 1996; Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush
2001). Second, it has been shown repeatedly that network relationships in a neighbor-
hood are – on average – weak rather than strong (see Volker, Flap and Lindenberg
2006; Marsden 1987), at least when one considers network relationships as the degree
of closeness among the interaction partners. Neighbors are not the relationships peo-
ple talk with about their personal matters and people do not ask their neighbors for
advice in important decisions or when they have problems in their relationships.
Hence, densely connected networks can have opposite effects than the argument sug-
gests, and the argument does not hold for weakly connected networks – such as the
networks commonly found in neighborhoods that are nevertheless functioning quite
well. In other words, collective efficacy assumptions might not apply in neighbor-
hoods, nor might they apply in networks of strong ties in general. If that is true, trust
and control cannot be the mechanisms that explain neighborhood social order.
22.2.2 Trust and control
Although taken for granted in the literature on collective efficacy, the relationship be-
tween trust and control is intensely discussed in various fields of the social sciences.
In particular the literature on organizational studies and rational choice theory has
focused on the connection between trust and control (see Bijlsma-Frankema and Cost,
2005, for an overview). In organizational studies, the relationship between trust and
control is studied in relation to governance questions and of growing organizations,
with more lateral and less hierarchical relationships. Here, trust and control are often
seen as possible antagonists (Deepak and Murnighan 2002) and many authors argue
that trust and control are negatively related, (Handy 1993; Ring and Van de Ven 1994;
Inkpen and Curral 1997; Cummings and Bromiley 1996; Guseca and Rona-Tas 2001).
In that literature, trust is considered as related to risk taking, the risk that one takes
while knowing that there is no control that safeguards cooperative behavior. One ex-
pects, but cannot be sure, that the actions of other persons are beneficial (Gambetta
1988). Trust and control are considered as substitutes or even negatively related: if
one exists, the other is not necessary any more to produce a collective good, or even
stronger, one undermines the effect of the other.
While trust can hardly be understood otherwise than as a state of mind, where
one has positive expectations towards the actions of others, understanding informal
control is more difficult. On the one hand, informal control is a sign of interest and
involvement. Think of the teacher, who reads assignments of students and
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comments on them in order to help – while doing this s/he also controls the efforts
students have put into the assignment. On the other hand, as already mentioned
above, in game theory and rational choice theory, control is understood as the possi-
bility to sanction behavior (cf. Buskens and Raub 2002). In that literature, trust is pro-
moted by control, for instance through sanction possibilities, (but see Mulder et al.
2003). The prominent example is given by Coleman (1988: 98) on the wholesale dia-
mond market, which functions without any written contracts or other guarantees just
because of the huge sanction possibilities of the members of the community.
Consequently, control (next to learning) is seen as essential for the understanding of
trust (see Buskens 1999) and, as argued, control is seen as promoting trust. The idea
behind ‘control’ here takes into account that in many situations there is a short-term
incentive to abuse trust, but that this might have undesirable consequences in the
future. In situations where the shadow of the future is long and abuse of trust can be
sanctioned, individual actions are controlled in the sense that they are remembered
and there is a chance of revenge for uncooperative behavior. Reciprocity is conceived
as the mechanism underlying this type of control (Blau 1964). Furthermore, the litera-
ture on neighborhood and social disorder refers to social control as the “capacity of a
group to regulate its members according to desired principles to realize collective
[. . .] goals” (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, op cit: 918).
Taking together, two perspectives on the relationship between control and trust
can be distinguished: the perspective of substitution, and the perspective of supple-
mentation or reinforcement. If one argues from the perspective of substitution, one
expects a negative relationship in the sense that high trust does not go together
with higher control and vice versa. Even more, trust effects on all kind of outcomes
might be weaker in the presence of control. High trust requires only low control
and vice versa, in order to secure the collective good (see Dekker 2004; Willamson
1975). Arguing from the perspective of supplementation implies that trust and con-
trol are positively related and that the effects of one condition are stronger when
the other is present. In other words, trust and control effects reinforce each other.
Last but not least, a third perspective can be added: it might depend on the compo-
sition of the social setting and on the issue in question how trust and control are
related. They both can have independent effects on important outcomes, and the
strength of these effects depends on the outcome in question. For example, for feel-
ing safely at night when walking through the neighborhood, it is good to know that
neighbors control and monitor what is happening, no matter whether one is trust-
ing anyone. On the other hand, if one has asked his or her neighbors to water the
plants during one’s holiday, one needs to trust them, whether or not one assumes
that they control what is going on in the neighborhood. In summary, I examine
three possible relationships between trust and control, that of substitution, of rein-
forcement and of context dependency.
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22.2.3 Does it matter? Consequences of collective efficacy
Collective efficacy has been shown to matter for neighborhood social order. All kinds
of incidents such as burglaries or perceived and actual reported violence are lower in
neighborhoods where collective efficacy is high (Sampson, Morenoff and Earls 1997,
1999, 2001). In line with the idea of collective efficacy, outcomes for wellbeing and
health have also been examined (Sampson 2003; Salanova 2003) – though less often.
Mostly, the focus has been on the absence of undesirable outcomes rather than on
the presence of desirable ones.
As mentioned, this paper focusses on a number of outcomes that are related to
the production of collective goods in neighborhoods. Firstly, and basically, I will
consider the number of neighbors in the personal network of residents. Having a
vital network in the neighborhood where one lives indicates that one interacts face
to face, is present in the neighborhood and possibly involved in all kind of social
matters. Secondly, the consequences of trust and control will be examined for col-
lective activities among neighbors. Here I distinguish between (i) social activities
such as having coffee together or barbequing in the summer, (ii) activities to keep
the neighborhood clean or enhance physical order in the neighborhood, and (iii)
activities towards institutions in order maintain neighborhood functioning, such as
writing petitions to the municipality etc. Finally, the general satisfaction of resi-
dents with their neighborhood is considered as an outcome of collective efficacy –
trust and control.
These three outcomes indicate behavioral as well as cognitive aspects of how
people engage in their neighborhoods. They can be seen as micro-effects of collec-
tive efficacy. Studying these different types of outcomes contributes to the under-
standing of the differential effects of collective efficacy.
22.2.4 Expectations
Straightforwardly, trust and control can be related as follows: They might correlate
positively – as it is usually assumed – and contribute both to the outcome under
consideration. Given the arguments provided above, they might even reinforce each
other. Furthermore, they can be substitutes for each other, implying a negative in-
teraction or, at least that a high coefficient in one condition requires only a low co-
efficient in the other one for the same outcome. In such a case, their relationship
will be antagonistic. As argued above, they might also have independent effects,
depending on the outcome in question and do not interact. The third perspective is
that of context dependency of the relation between trust and control.
This paper is explorative and there are no theoretical arguments derived for the
existence of one or the other relationship presented here. However, I do expect that
the relation between trust and control is not a universal one but varies among
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neighborhoods and across the outcomes considered. More precisely contextual and
compositional neighborhood conditions are expected to matter for the relation be-
tween trust and control. For example, in a neighborhood where most residents work
full time, building up trustful relationships might be more important than exercising
control in case one wants to initiate collective action. Likewise, in a neighborhood
with houses built in a way that residents see each other leaving and entering their
homes establishing building trust might deserve special attention while control is al-
most automatically given because of the design of the built environment. Furthermore,
it is plausible to expect that the relationship between trust and control is not the same
for the phenomena under study: it can be argued that control is more important for
collective action – where freeriding behavior is plausible (‘if others do it, why should
I?’) – and that trust is more important for establishing personal relationships or net-
works in the neighborhood. Neighborhood satisfaction might depend on both control
and trust: in a neighborhood where everyone is satisfied people have trustful relation-
ships and those who are not trusted might be controlled.
22.2.5 A note on reversed causality
Given the dynamic nature of trust and control (Buskens 1999) as well as the dynamic
nature of neighborhood activities, it is obvious that collective efficacy stimulates net-
works as much as it depends on neighbor interaction. Also, collective actions will en-
hance collective efficacy, in particular if they are successful, and those who are
satisfied with their neighborhood in general probably have higher beliefs of collective
efficacy. It has been referred to these phenomena as reciprocal feedback (Sampson
and Raudenbush 1999: 630). Here, the scope of my argument is not on these recipro-
cal relationships, but I consider only one side of the loop: neighborhood outcomes
depending on collective efficacy, trust and control, respectively.
22.3 Data, measurements, and analytical strategy
Data from the Survey of the Social Network of the Dutch (SSND 2014) were em-
ployed for this study. The SSND is a larger research project that started in 1999 and
consists of 4 waves of interviews with neighborhood residents. The 2014 wave is the
third wave and consists of 1067 respondents of which 578 already participated in
2008 and/or in 1999, and 489 respondents belonged to a refreshment sample in the
same neighborhoods plus respondents from a number of newly selected neighbor-
hoods. Neighborhoods were delineated on a 5-position zip code basis, which re-
sulted in 161 relatively small neighborhoods in the sample. Interviewer effects as
well as selection in attrition have been examined and indications for neither of
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these have been found. The original sample is a neighborhood sample, drawn from
the 545 municipalities in the Netherlands, while taking density of the population in
the different regions into account. For more information about the sample and the
neighborhood delineation, see, for instance, Volker et al. (2015).
22.3.1 Dependent variables
As mentioned above, three kinds of dependent variables have been considered. The
number of neighbors in the personal network has been established as follows: net-
works were delineated based on the exchange method (see Fischer 1987). Respondents
were confronted with a relatively large number of name-generating questions, such as
whom they ask for help with odd jobs in and around the house, with whom they talk
about important matters, work with, whom they visit and the like. In total 11 of such
questions have been asked. In every question 5 new persons could be mentioned. This
way, a list of names is generated and in a second step information about the character-
istics of theses alters as well as of their relationships with the respondent (ego) have
been gathered. One of these questions was the role relationship between respondent
and network member, of which ‘neighbor’ was one. Furthermore, because we ex-
pected that neighbors are not prominent in many daily activities, we asked whether
respondents knew their neighbors. In other words, there were two possibilities for
neighbors to enter the network, as a reaction of a name generating question and via a
straightforward question after direct neighbors. In this study, both ‘types’ of neighbors
are considered as the number of neighbors in the network.
Activities, collective actions with neighbors have been measured as follows:
Respondents have been asked whether they have undertaken one of the following
activities with their neighbors during the last few months: social activities, activi-
ties towards a more livable neighborhood, and activities towards institutions.
For the measurement of social activities, respondents were asked whether they
had i) coffee, ii) a barbeque or a party together. For the measurement of activities
towards a better neighborhood they were asked whether they had undertaken activ-
ities that made the neighborhood i) more safe, ii) more clean, or ii) whether they
had established any rules or arrangement with each other about parking the cars.
Lastly, for the measurement of activities towards institutions – the government or
the municipality – respondents were asked whether they had undertaken activities
like i) calling the police (together), for example because of adolescents hanging
around, ii) writing a petition because facilities were removed of the neighborhood
or iii) writing a letter of protest to the municipality.
Satisfaction with the neighborhood was measured with the question ‘How satis-
fied are you in general with your neighborhood?’ Respondents answered in a 7-point
Likert-scale.
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22.3.2 Independent variables
Independent variables are informal control and trust in neighborhoods. These have
been measured in a similar way as the original items of collective efficacy (Sampson,
Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). Neighborhood trust/cohesion was established with the
following items:
– people in this neighborhood have good contact with each other,
– if someone needs help, (s)he can count in the neighbors,
– I would not like to have comparable house in another neighborhood, I like it
here,
– if there is something to be done, everyone participates,
– I really belong to this neighborhood,
– if I see someone walking in the street I usually know in which house (s)he
lives,
– I trust the people in my neighborhood,
– people in this neighborhood trust each other,
– this is a close neighborhood.
Respondents could agree with these items on a 5-point-Likert scale. The items con-
stitute a scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.88.
Informal control is measured as expected interventions, similar as in other
scales on collective efficacy. People are asked whether they expect that somebody
from the neighborhood would intervene in case
– children hang around skipping lessons
– adolescents spray graffiti
– people in the street have a noisy argument
– they observe an attempt of a burglary
– they observe someone breaking in a car
– children fighting in the street
– the municipality intents to open a center for drug addicted in this neighbor-
hood
– the municipality will take away some benches and a playing ground.
Again, answers could be given in a 5-point-Likertscale. The items constitute a scale
with an alpha of 0.89.
22.3.3 Control variables
In all analyses the following individual characteristics were used as controls: sex
(women = 0, men = 1), age (on years), country of birth (0= outside of the Netherlands,
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1 = Netherlands) and highest education (8 categories). In the analyses of the number
of neighbors in the network the total network size is also a control variable.
Furthermore, neighborhood composition with regard to age and ethnic back-
ground is a control variable. In addition, it is controlled for poverty, a lack of re-
sources and for residential stability: via the percentage of houses for rent, the
percentage of divorces, the percentage of people getting unemployment benefit.
Urbanization is also controlled for and measured in categories of population den-
sity in a squared kilometer. There are 5 classes of urbanism, more than 2500 ad-
dresses per km2 (1), between 1500–2500 addresses (2), 1000–1500 addresses (3),
500–100 (4) and less than 500 addresses per km2 (5). All neighborhood control var-
iables were provided by Statistics Netherlands (Statistics Netherlands 2013/2014).
Table 22.1 provides descriptive statistics of key variables in the analyses. Network
size is on average 10.7 persons. It can be seen that people differ considerably in their
number of neighbors in the network and that the number in general is not high.
Table 22.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables in the analyses.
% mean sd min max N
Individual level control variables
Sex (female)  
Age . .   
Education (–) 
Only primary school and lower vocational training .
Only secondary school (Mavo, Havo) .
Higher secondary school/vocational training .
Higher vocational training .
University/postgraduation .
Migration background (yes) . 
Network size . .   
Dependent variables
N of neighbors in network . .   
Social activities with neighbors (count) . .   
Activities to enhance the neighborhood (count) . .   
Political activities (count) . .   
Neighborhood satisfaction (–) . .   
Independent variables
Cohesion (scale/n of items) . .   
Informal control expectations (scale/ n of items) . .   
Neighborhood level control variables
% above  years of age % % % 
% non-western foreigners % % % 
% divorced % % % 
% unemployment benefit .% .% % 
% houses for rent % 
Degree of urbanism (–, = highest urban areas) . .   
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Neighbors make for about 20% of the network. Furthermore, social activities are
highest and activities towards enhancing the neighborhood are relatively rare.
Neighborhood satisfaction is high: on average 5.8 out of 7 points.
22.3.4 Analytical strategy
The interest in this paper is not the correlation of trust and control within individuals,
but within neighborhoods. This means that individual level measures have to be ag-
gregated to the neighborhood. A straightforward procedure of aggregation, such as a
sum-score or a multiplication, however, would also aggregate the measurement error
and would not take into account that there are differences between measuring individ-
ual level characteristics and collective ones. Individual level measurements obviously
depend on characteristics of the individual. For example, older people might score sys-
tematically higher on trust (which they in fact do) or younger people might systemati-
cally rate a neighborhood as not close (which they also in fact do). In these cases,
neighborhood composition determines answer patterns which ideally need to be fil-
tered out in order to establish the ‘true’ level of control and trust. Furthermore, the
items that measure control or trust are not independent of each other – just like resi-
dents in neighborhoods, these items are nested in respondents. To overcome these ob-
stacles a procedure called ‘ecometrics’ has been established by Raudenbush and
Sampson (1999, see also Mujahid et al. 2007; Raudenbush 2008). Ecometrics broadens
the traditional psychometric assessment of individual traits, which usually distin-
guishes between levels – scale items nested within individuals – by adding a third
level, the neighborhood. The goal is to establish a measurement of the aggregated
level of the neighborhood. The procedure accounts for individual differences in re-
sponses to the given items and for the interdependency of these items. In a first step, a
three-level model is estimated: neighborhoods, individuals, and individual level items
measuring control and trust, respectively, and it is estimated how the different items
contribute to the score on control and trust. Individual scores on neighborhood trust/
control are estimated while controlling for characteristics that determine response pat-
terns such as age, sex, migration background and education into account. Then, the
residuals of that measurement, the parts that cannot be attributed to individual re-
sponse patterns, constitute the measurement of trust/control at the aggregated level
and it is used as the independent variable in the final analysis. Reliability (rho) of the
ecometric based neighborhood measurements was .71 and .70 for control and trust,
respectively. Pearson correlation between the simple aggregation of the values and the
ecometric-based measure was .88 (control) and .87 (trust).
The final analyses comprise two levels and two kinds of models. For the num-
ber of neighbors in a network and the score for neighborhood satisfaction multi-
level regression analyses (Snijders and Bosker 1999) were applied; the analysis for
the actions with neighbors was a Poisson regression analysis (since values were
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count data). Negative binomial models were also estimated, and they did not alter
the conclusions (not reported here). All analyses started with the estimation of the
effect of informal control expectations and then added the indicator of trust to the
model. In all models, main effects and interaction effects of cohesion/trust and in-
formal control are estimated.
22.4 Results
22.4.1 Control and trust
As described in the introduction to this paper, the scale for collective efficacy in the
literature by Sampson and colleagues consists of cohesion/trust and informal control
expectations. In their study, correlation between the scales for cohesion and control
was .80, which justified to collapse them into one new scale, while arguing that the
scales obviously were tapping into the same construct (Sampson, Raudenbush, and
Earls 1997: 920). However, in the SSND, correlation between both scales is only .51,
which is commonly considered to be only a moderate connection. Note that the high
correlation between the scales is not always replicated though commonly assumed;
see Reisig and Cancino (2004) who suggested that the high correlation is likely to
exist in large cities (such as, in their case, Chicago).
22.4.2 Number of neighbors in network
Table 22.2 summarizes the multilevel regression estimating number of neighbors in
the network.
Table 22.2: Multilevel regression on number of neighbors in network.
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Informal Control . . . . . . . . .
Cohesion – – – . . . . . .
Control*Cohesion – – – – – – −. . .
Individual control
variables
Sex −. . . −. . . −. . .
Age . . . . . . . . .
Education . . . . . . . . .
Background: native . . . . . . . . .
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Model 1 shows that informal social control is affecting the number of neighbors
in the network: more control is associated with larger neighbor networks. Next to
this, we found that from the individual level control variables age and education
are associated with larger networks in the neighborhood. From the variables on the
neighborhood level, a higher percentage of unemployed seems to stimulate many
contacts in the neighborhood. Model 2 includes trust in the model and shows that
the effect of informal control disappears if cohesion is included. More trust in the
neighborhood residents is positively associated with the size of networks in the
neighborhood. The interaction term in model 3 is not significant.
22.4.3 Activities with neighbors
Tables 22.3a-c summarize the analyses on different types of collective action: social ac-
tivities, action towards improving the neighborhood and political action. In Table 22.3a
we find again that the influence of informal control disappears if trust is added to the
model. In addition, the interaction term between control and trust is significant: The
association between trust and social activities in the neighborhood is weaker in the
presence of control. In Table 22.3b, concerning the regression on collective action to-
wards neighborhood improvement, both trust and control are significantly related with
Table 22.2 (continued)
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Total network size . . . . . . . . .
Neighborhood
control variables
% above  years of
age
−. . . −. . . −. . .
% non-western
foreigners
−. . . −. . . −. . .
% on unemployment
benefit
. . . . . . . . .
% divorced . . . . . . . . .
% houses for rent −. . . −. . . −. . .
Population density . . . . . . . . .
Intercept . . . . . . . . .
Var (cons) . . . . . .
Var (res) . . . . . .
LL −. −. −.
Wald (chi) . . . . . .
Note: n = 973 respondents in 161 neighborhoods, variables are standardized. ICC = 3.5-4-5%.
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Table 22.3a: Multilevel poisson regression on social activities in neighborhoods.
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Informal Control . . . . . . . . .
Cohesion – – – . . . . . .
Control*cohesion – – – – – −. . .
Individual control variables
Sex . . . . . . . . .
Age −. . . −. . . −. . .
Education −. . . −. . . −. . .
Background: native −. . . −. . . −. . .
Neighborhood control variables
% above  years of age . . . . . . . . .
% non-western foreigners −. . . −. . . . . .
% on unempl.benefit . . . . . . −. . .
% divorced −. . . −. . . −. . .
% houses for rent . . . −. . . . . .
Pop. density . . . −. . . −. . .
Intercept −. . . −. . . −. . .
Var (cons) . . . . . .
LL −. −. −.
Wald (chi) . . . . . .
Note: n = 973 respondents in 161 neighborhoods, variables are standardized. ICC = 3.5-4-5%.
Table 22.3b: Multilevel poisson regression on neighborhood related collective action.
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE P Coef. SE p
Informal Control . . . . . . . . .
Cohesion – – – . . . . . .
Control*Cohesion – – – – – – −. . .
Individual Control variables
Sex . . . . . . . . .
Age −. . . −. . . −. . .
Education . . . . . . . . .
Background: native . . . . . . . . .
Neighborhood control variables
% above  years of age . . . . . . . . .
% non-western foreigners . . . . . . . . .
% on unemployment benefit −. . . −. . . −. . .
% divorced . . . . . . . . .
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the outcome. The coefficient of control decreases, though, once trust is added to the
model. There is no interaction effect. Table 22.3c shows, like the models in Table 22.3a,
that the coefficient of informal control is not significant anymore in the presence of
trust. In addition, the interaction between trust and control is negative: influence of
cohesion is weakened by control.
Table 22.3b (continued)
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE P Coef. SE p
% houses for rent −. . . −. . . −. . .
Population density . . . . . . . . .
Intercept −. . . −. . . −. . .
Var (cons) . . . . . .
LL −. −. −.
Wald (chi) . . . . . . .
Note: n = 973 respondents in 161 neighborhoods, variables are standardized. ICC = 3.5-4-5%.
Table 22.3c: Multilevel poisson regression on political collective action in neighborhoods.
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef SE p
Informal Control . . . . . . . . .
Cohesion – – – . . . . . .
Control*Cohesion – – – – – – −. . .
Individual control variables
Sex −. . . −. . . −. . .
Age . . . . . . . . .
Education . . . . . . . . .
Background: native . . . . . . . . .
Neighborhood control variables
% above  years of age . . . . . . . . .
% non-western foreigners . . . . . . . . .
% on unempl. benefit . . . . . . . . .
% divorced −. . . −. . . −. . .
% houses for rent . . . . . . . . .
Pop. density . . . . . . . . .
Intercept −. . . −. . . −. . .
Var (cons) . . . . . .
LL −. −. −.
Wald (chi) . . . . . .
Note: n = 973 respondents in 161 neighborhoods, variables are standardized. ICC = 3.5-4-5%.
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22.4.4 Satisfaction with the neighborhood
Finally, Table 22.4 shows that both informal control and trust contribute to the sat-
isfaction with the neighborhood (see model 2), although the coefficient of control
decreases once trust is added to the model. In addition, the interaction between
trust and control is found to be negative: the influence of trust is weakened in the
presence of control.
22.5 Intermezzo: Neighborhoods where control
and trust coincide – or diverge
In a last step, the neighborhoods that score either high on one characteristic but
low on the other or high/low on both are selected and via Google maps pictures are
taken to explore and compare these neighborhoods. A low/high score is assigned if
a neighborhood scores on control/trust at least one standard deviation lower/higher
than the average. In 20% of the neighborhoods both the score of control as well as
Table 22.4: Multilevel regression on neighborhood satisfaction.
M M M
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Informal Control . . . . . . . . .
Cohesion – – – . . . . . .
Control*Cohesion – – – – – – −. . .
Individual control variables
Sex −. . . −. . . −. . .
Age . . . . . . −. . .
Education . . . . . . . . .
Background: native . . . . . . −. . .
Neighborhood control variables
% above  years of age . . . −. . . . . .
% non-western foreigners −. . . −. . . −. . .
% on unemployment benefit . . . . . . . . .
% divorced −. . . −. . . −. . .
% houses for rent . . . . . . . . .
Population density −. . . −. . . −. . .
Intercept . . . . . . . . .
Var (cons) . . . . . .
Var (res) . . . .
LL −. −. −.
Wald (chi) . . . . . .
Note: n = 973 respondents in 161 neighborhoods, variables are standardized. ICC = 3.5-4-5%.
516 Beate Volker
of trust was relatively low. In 30% trust was low but control was high and in 15%
the opposite held. In 35% of the neighborhoods, both trust and control were rated
high. These 4 ‘types’ of neighborhoods were examined and compared via google
maps. Using this information, together with the information provided by Statistics
Netherlands, I inductively searched for neighborhoods that represent their respec-
tive type. A typical neighborhood where both trust as well as informal control were
found to be high is in small town, St Annaparochie in the Frisian part of the coun-
try. St Annaparochie lies close to the city of Leeuwarden and was founded in the
18th century in the course of the draining of the country and creating the polders.
Many people who worked in the draining industry lived there and after the draining
ended, they stayed in the new village. In addition, although it is very small – it has
less than 5000 residents -, the village has good facilities, such as schools, sport cen-
ters and shops. An illustration for this neighborhood can be found here (https://ti
nyurl.com/y3uwyyhs).7 The picture shows a neighborhood with detached single-
family houses, seemingly built in the same time period, with gardens in front and
probably also behind the houses. They look well-maintained and affluent, but at the
same time not extraordinary rich. The streets seem quiet and there is much space and
a lot of green.
A typical neighborhood where trust and control are both low is found in a street
in Heemskerk in the neighborhood ‘Oosterwijk’, illustrated here (https://tinyurl.
com/y2nv77oa). Heemskerk is located in the province North Holland, and belongs
to a small municipality. Like St Annaparochie, it has been a rather rural area until
in the sixties a rapid industrialization took place and the city became dominated by
a big steal fabric (Hoogovens). Oosterwijk is precisely in between two municipali-
ties, Heemskerk and Beverwijk. It is relatively homogeneous in terms of ethnic
background – about 15% of the residents have a migration background. Incomes
are relatively low, and the percentage of social housing relatively high. Note that
the municipalities Heemskerk and Beverwijk differ in their social policies, which
might constitute problems for the inhabitants of Oosterwijk. The picture shows a
street with flat buildings, parking lots and a grocery shop. Buildings are probably
from the 60s and there are many parking lots. Again, there is much space in the
area, but houses are no single-family houses but flats for multiple households.
There are no greenspaces and many of the small balconies are covered with a can-
vas sail, probably against the sun and heat. Last but not least there are signs of
graffiti and there is an abandoned shopping car, probably belonging to the grocery
but stalled around the corner.
7 Google maps permits links to street views, but no offline pictures, see the permissions (https://www.
google.com/permissions/geoguidelines/) concerning geographic material. Hence, changes made by
google may be reflected in the pictures. The advantage however is that the reader can use the links
provided and examine the neighborhoods.
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Where do control and trust not go together? A neighborhood were residents
perceive high trust but low control has been found in Leiden (https://tinyurl.com/
y5uqfqwa). Leiden is a relatively small town, close to the coast and surrounded by
many tulip farms. Many houses are built in the 19th century or earlier, in medieval
times. Leiden hosts the oldest and one of the bigger universities of the country,
whereas it has only about 120,000 residents. Almost from the beginning, Leiden
has been a city with a cleavage between the higher and lower educated and accord-
ingly segregated neighborhoods. The picture shows a small alley, a bystreet typical
for the inner city, with small low-rise houses, probably rented by students. The
street is in the center of the city and there are backdoors from a shop or a restau-
rant, small signs of graffiti and not very well-maintained walls. Some windows are
blinded, and many bikes are stalled the street is far too small for cars to pass.
Finally, a typical example of a neighborhood where trust is low, but control is
high has been found in Den Haag, Mariahoeve, in the neighborhood ‘Burgen en
Horsten’. The neighborhood is close to ‘Marlot’, a neighborhood consisting of villa’s
and luxury apartments. Before its foundation in 1958, a train rode through the quite
green area. The first houses that were built back then were small and meant for hous-
ing of blue-collar workers. In present days, about 50% of the residents is non-native
and incomes are below the national average. The neighborhood consists in total of
about 15,000 residents and is still a comparatively green neighborhood. Houses are
often apartments for multiple households, often almost hidden behind trees. The il-
lustration (https://tinyurl.com/yxzjsyqc) shows such a street with well-maintained
garden in front of the houses. Windows are small for Dutch standards and the trees
and green spaces seem to hide houses and people.
In terms of the traditional neighborhood characteristics, the four neighborhoods
do not much differ in income and wealth. Leiden is the most expensive neighborhood;
the housing price in the other three is below the national average (250.000 euro in
2019 according to Statistics Netherlands). Also, with the exception of the neighbor-
hood in Leiden (8%), the percentage of elderly is between 21 and 25%. In Oosterwijk
and Burgen en Horsten the percentage of migrants is relatively high (between 25 and
30 %), while it is low in the other two neighborhoods (between 1 and 10%).
This inductive exercise shows that describing the neighborhoods provides and
intuitive understanding that the correlation between trust and control is area de-
pendent. Importantly, we need more information and take more conditions into ac-
count when studying neighborhoods and their effects. History and embeddedness
of the neighborhood itself seem at least as important as composition and wealth.
Green spaces can indicate openness and invite for a chat, but they can also hide
people and their housings from each other.
518 Beate Volker
22.6 Conclusion and discussion
The analyses of the association of control and trust lead to a number of conclusions.
First, control and trust are only moderately correlated in the Netherlands. This is an
interesting finding that adds to the few studies that question the association between
control and trust. Second, for the prediction of neighborhood functioning on an indi-
vidual level, such as the number of neighbors in a network, collective actions with
neighbors, and general satisfaction with the neighborhood, (perceived) trust is clearly
much more important than control. Note that control has been measured as the expec-
tation that residents will intervene and protect collective goods, if necessary. When
included in the analysis, control at first seems to have an impact, but once trust is
added to the model, effects of control become insignificant in all cases; only in the
analysis of neighborhood satisfaction control remained having a (positive) influence.
None of the analyses confirmed the idea that control and trust reinforce each other.
However, interaction effects between control and trust turned out to be negative in
the case of social activities and neighborhood satisfaction, indicating a substitution
effect of trust. In the case of neighborhood collective action trust and control both
have a positive main effect, so both contribute to actions towards neighborhood col-
lective good production. This outcome is probably most in line with previous studies
on collective efficacy.
It is important to note that neighborhood effects in the analyses were smaller
than what is commonly found. The intraclass coefficients did not exceed 5%. This can
be due to inappropriate neighborhood delineation but might also indicate that cluster-
ing in general is low. It is an important question for more comparative research to
explain why the Dutch case seems to be so different from the American one.
When looking at the examples of neighborhoods where trust and control posi-
tively and negatively correlate a couple of interesting conclusions can be drawn – al-
though this is material for further investigation, and, thus far, more illustrative or even
anecdotical than established knowledge. Hopefully, future research will provide more
arguments on this control-trust alignment by digging more systematically and theory
driven than I did in this first account. First of all, it seems that trust and control are
more likely to correlate positively in rural regions. In the case of St Annaparochie, it is
a very small town, with a history of ‘pioneering’ residents. In the opposite example, in
Heemskerk/Oosterwijk, where both control and trust have been found to be low, part
of the explanation might be that industrialization has rapidly taken place, but also
rural remnants remained. In a city such as Leiden and in a street, where obviously
many young and highly educated people live, high trust but low control is reported. It
seems that everyone is trusting, but monitoring is low and in situations where things
have to be done and arranged, not-participation is not sanctioned. Finally, the case of
Mariahoeve (Burgen en Horsten), an area built in the 60s for the working population is
a case of a low income neighborhood where trust is not established, although one can
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argue that all ingredients are present: the neighborhood is relatively green and houses
are not too close to each other; they are even often detached.
The study has a number of limitations. First, the number of respondents per
neighborhood varied between 2 and 24, which limits the reliability of the constructed
measurements at the neighborhood level. Second, neighborhood satisfaction was in
general quite high (5.8 on a scale from 1–7) and the standard deviation was with 1.1
quite low. Third, as already mentioned, we cannot draw causal conclusions from
these analyses; the causality between for instance trust and the number of neighbors
in the network can run in both directions (see also Lanfear, Matsueda, and Beach,
2020, for a critical assessment of causality in collective efficacy studies). Fourth, an-
other limitation of this study is that I did not inquire into neighborhood variation in
the models, random slopes for neighborhoods were not included.
Despite of these limitations, the study showed that control and trust can operate
independently of each other. This finding is in line with earlier empirical (see Reisig
and Cancino 2004, Volker et al 2015) as well as theoretical accounts (see Cook, Hardin
and Levi 2005) and indicates that more theorizing is needed in order to understand
under which conditions control and trust correlate or not. In addition, the series of
exemplary photographs showed that neighborhoods – at least in the Netherlands –
could not be grasped by common dimensions that neighborhood researchers use such
as residential fluctuation, poverty, and the number of foreigners. ‘Classical’ composi-
tional indicators as well as indicators of the built environment seem to tell a limited
story. Green spaces can integrate people as well as separate them. A middle-class
neighborhood can show low trust and cohesion, although all the ingredients for high
trust are present. Likewise, a neighborhood where many students and academics live,
can be cohesive and trustful, but nobody would step forward and take action neces-
sary for collective good creation. Future research might gain by focusing more on
these empirical anomalies, not yet predicted by established theoretical arguments.
Last but not least, the history of a neighborhood – rapid industrialization, pio-
neers who drained land from the water, or a newly built neighborhood for people,
who are at the lower end of the income ladder, all matter for trust and control.
Neighborhoods have a ‘memory’ – in the sense that people do not move out alto-
gether. They were built with a purpose, which probably keeps influencing neigh-
borhood affairs. As such, knowledge about history and architecture/land-use can
help to develop a better understanding of neighborhoods in the Netherlands.
To conclude, in the Netherlands, trust and control in neighborhoods do not go
systematically together when explaining neighborhood matters. Outcomes seem
more driven by trust and its aggregate, social cohesion, than by informal control.
However, the relationship between trust and control in neighborhoods varies a lot
and future research has to establish more systematically the contextual conditions
under which control and trust align or substitute each other when explaining
neighborhood collective action and networks.
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23 Religious Diversity and Social Cohesion
in German Classrooms: A Micro-Macro
Study Based on Empirical Simulations
Abstract: The micro-macro transition is a core problem of sociological theory build-
ing. Micro-intentions and micro-behavior do not straightforwardly translate into
corresponding phenomena on the macro level, due to potentially existing rival
mechanisms and the dynamics and complexity of social interactions. This chapter
proposes an integrated statistical approach to studying the micro-macro transition
by combining a random coefficient multilevel approach with the Stochastic Actor-
Oriented Model. This is elaborated for the substantively interesting and topical
question whether the growing ethnic and religious diversity in our societies, along
with the well-known tendency for homophily, necessarily lead to a decline in social
cohesion. The German part of the CILS4EU data is used to tackle this empirically.
We investigate how religious homophily plays out differently depending on the
context defined by the composition of the classroom, and explore the potential of
simulation methods to explain this macro-level phenomenon from micro-level net-
work dynamics. The empirical puzzle as stated is answered by a model representing
homophily in a straightforward way, taking account of the variability between
classrooms and the uncertainty about the parameter values; but a closer analysis
reveals a further puzzle, which we leave for future research.
23.1 Introduction
The growing diversity of Western societies, especially in ethnic and religious terms,
has become a topic of major interest in social research. The seminal paper of Putnam
(2007) has been especially influential, arguing that diversity is challenging the cohe-
sion of modern societies. This hypothesis has stimulated an enormous, rapidly grow-
ing number of empirical papers speaking for or against this general claim (van der
Meer and Tolsma 2014). The vast majority of the underlying analyses rely on standard
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survey data, i.e., data sets with respondents as individual cases. As a rule, an individ-
ual-level variable, such as generalized trust, support for the welfare state, civic en-
gagement, etc., is chosen as an indicator for social cohesion, and some variant of the
regression approach is applied to estimate whether diversity as a context-level vari-
able, often measured by the Herfindahl index, has an effect on the individual outcome
variable controlling for other independent variables.
This research paradigm has certainly led to many helpful insights, the most ob-
vious being that results are mixed, thus showing that the general claim is condi-
tional and that careful differentiations are needed. Nevertheless, the dominance of
the survey-based regression approach is somewhat surprising: social cohesion is a
macro-level phenomenon, and applying regressions in the sketched way implicitly
assumes that the macro phenomenon can simply be derived as a statistical aggre-
gate of the individual outcomes. However, it has long been emphasized that the
micro-macro transition is a core challenge in sociological theory building, and is
often far from trivial. The keyword in this context is ‘emergence’. Micro-intentions
and micro-behaviors do not straightforwardly translate to phenomena at the macro-
level, due to the dynamics and complexity of social interactions. This has been
widely stressed by sociologists (among many others, Raub 1984; Hedström and
Swedberg 1998; Raub et al. 2011; Kalter and Kroneberg 2014).
Two classes of tools are especially suited to express social dynamics in the empir-
ical micro-macro transition. On the one hand, network-analytical tools explicitly rep-
resent the dynamics of social interactions (e.g., Snijders 2001; Stokman and Vieth
2004). Macro-level characteristics of social networks can directly capture the idea of
social cohesion (Moody 2001; Kalter 2016; Kalter and Kruse 2014). Network analysis
allows to model diverse mechanisms of social interaction producing macro-level phe-
nomena, and to test the validity of these mechanisms empirically. Next to this, agent-
based modelling has become a major workhorse in dealing with phenomena of emer-
gence. An agent-based model (ABM) is a model of individual actors interacting with
each other and with environmental constraints over time (Epstein 2006). ABMs are
programmed in computer language and analysed inductively: by iterating the as-
sumed agent behaviour in the context of many other agents dynamically over time,
ABMs allow to investigate the macro-level consequences of this interaction (Macy
and Willer 2002; Manzo 2010).
Stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOM) for network dynamics (Snijders 2001;
Steglich et al. 2010; Snijders and Steglich 2015) combine both of these tools. Basically,
they are agent-based models that make assumptions about the behavior of actors, fore-
most their choices of building ties to other actors. In addition, they incorporate elements
of generalized linear statistical models and confront the assumptions with empirical
data. Correspondence with observed network-level descriptives allows to assess the
goodness of fit of model assumptions, and to estimate parameters determining the be-
havior of actors from empirical data.
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In this paper we use the SAOM as implemented in the SIENA software (Ripley
et al. 2020) in an integrated empirical approach to the micro-macro transition. We
study the impact of religious diversity on social integration in classrooms of adoles-
cents, relying on the network data contained in the first two waves of the German
part of the CILS4EU data (Kalter et al. 2013). We describe the general pattern of the
relation between religious diversity and social cohesion and then employ simula-
tion methods to figure out in how far they may be explained by various network
formation mechanisms.
23.2 Theory and past research
‘Social cohesion’ is a key term in the social sciences, and as is the case for many
key terms, it has been used in inconsistent and often vague ways. In empirical re-
search it has been operationalized by trust, civic engagement, attitudes towards the
welfare state, and many other concepts (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer
2013). In a straightforward understanding, however, it refers to the social ties be-
tween the members of a community or society, and network analysis provides a lot
of measures to give it a precise meaning (e.g., Scott and Carrington 2011). Whatever
the precise measure, this view emphasizes that social cohesion is a macro-level re-
sult of individual-level processes of tie formation.
When asking why diversity in general, and religious diversity specifically, could
have an impact on social cohesion in these terms, the most obvious reason certainly
is homophily. One of the most robust findings in the social sciences is that people
tend to have more ties to others who are similar to themselves (McPherson et al.
2001), and religious homophily is a well-known manifestation (e.g., Windzio and
Wingens 2014; Cook et al. 2017). While the tendency to relate to similar others is
partly a matter of the opportunity structure (Blau 1977), which has also been called
‘baseline homophily’ (McPherson et al. 2001, p. 419), empirical network analysis has
shown that this tendency is strong also net of the mere availability of contacts. This
is sometimes referred to as ‘inbreeding homophily’ and holds for quite a range of
characteristics, e.g., age, sex, occupation, education, ethnicity (Moody 2001; Mouw
and Entwisle 2006; Wimmer and Lewis 2010), and in the USA it has proved to hold
also, and especially strongly, for religion (Cheadle and Schwadel 2012).
The mechanisms behind ‘inbreeding homophily’ are less clear and it is chal-
lenging to disentangle them in empirical analyses. The most obvious starting point
to explain homophily is to trace them back to individual preferences.
Sharing characteristics reduces the cognitive and physical costs of communi-
cating, anticipating and evaluating behavior, building mutual expectations, devel-
oping trust, etc. (Kossinets and Watts 2009). There is also support for the idea that
similar others are found to be more attractive in appearance (e.g., Byrne 1971;
23 Religious Diversity and Social Cohesion in German Classrooms 527
Huston and Levinger 1978). While religion is not a visible characteristic per se,
wearing religious symbols – such as cross necklaces or headscarves – might be sig-
nals in the process leading to the creation of ties; most importantly, however, shar-
ing religious world views seems, like psychological factors in general, particularly
relevant for the costs and utilities of maintaining already existing ties (Felmlee
et al. 1990). Religions may even contain explicit norms to prefer fellow believers.
Note that religion, in given contexts, is usually empirically correlated with other
characteristics that may also foster a preference for similar people, most importantly
ethnicity which also encompasses linguistic and other cultural elements, but also
socio-economic class. Thus, preferences for social status, the same language, or other
cultural aspects in the choice of social ties, can lead to religious homogeneity, and it
will be empirically challenging to disentangle the true reasons (McPherson et al.
2001; Moody 2001). Note also that even within a given clear-defined opportunity
structure, such as a classroom, the choice of friends may depend on reasons that are
related to other, unrelated opportunity structures. Most obviously, in our case, stu-
dents within the same classroom might also meet in their leisure time in religious
places, like churches or mosques, and their friendship might predominantly arise
from the time spent around these events. In contrast to ‘availability effects’ that arise
from the opportunities in the context under investigation (i.e., the classroom), these
kinds of additional opportunities arising in further organizational contexts have been
called ‘propinquity’ effects (Wimmer and Lewis 2010).
Whatever the more detailed mechanism behind religious homophily, its exis-
tence would suggest that – net of additional mechanisms and in a straightforward
aggregation of individual choices – social cohesion, vaguely defined for the mo-
ment, would decrease with religious diversity. Higher diversity, by definition,
means a lower likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals share a characteris-
tic; therefore, if this characteristic is associated with homophilous preferences,
higher diversity is associated with a lower likelihood that they form a social tie.
However, the pattern of ties is not a mere aggregation of individual homophilous
preferences, and there are a series of additional mechanisms determining tie forma-
tion. Some of these mechanisms might amplify the effects of homophily, others might
counteract. The most prominent, and empirically most firmly established of these
mechanisms are reciprocity (an early reference, in a German school context, is
Delitsch 1900) and transitive closure (e.g., Davis 1970). Reciprocity means that the like-
lihood to choose someone as a friend is increased, if this person in turn has chosen
oneself as a friend. To understand the deeper mechanism behind this tendency, Social
Exchange Theory (Emerson 1976) is a fruitful starting point (also see Block 2015).
Friendship is basically regarded as an investment, and mutuality helps to increase the
expected rewards in relation to the costs. Transitivity denotes, loosely speaking, the
phenomenon that a person is more likely to choose another as a friend, if there is a
common third friend. Here standard explanations build on opportunity structure argu-
ments, following classical ideas of Simmel (1950) or Granovetter (1973), on the one
528 Tom A.B. Snijders and Frank Kalter
hand, and on the more attitudinal mechanisms of classical Balance Theory (Heider
1948), on the other hand (again, see Block 2015). A first major attempt to figure out
empirically how these more general network formation mechanisms influence the
macro-micro-macro relation between diversity and social cohesion is formed by the
analyses of Kalter and Kruse (2014). They use the first wave of the CILS4EU data, for
all included countries. They study the consequences of ethnic diversity, as expressed
by the Herfindahl index, on social cohesion measured in several ways: the density of
the friendship network, the reachability (defined as average reciprocal geodesic dis-
tance) in the friendship network, and estimated coefficients for Exponential Random
Graph Models. Basically, they find that, despite a clear and strong tendency for ethnic
homophily, there is hardly any relation between ethnic diversity and social cohesion.
23.3 Data
We study the consequences of religious heterogeneity on social cohesion, using longi-
tudinal network data from the German part of the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal
Study in Four European Countries (CILS4EU) (Kalter et al. 2017). This comparative
panel study was started in late 2010, interviewing adolescents that were about 14 years
of age in wave 1. In the first step of the sampling process, schools were drawn from a
nationwide list of schools that enroll students at this age; depending on the expected
share of children of immigrants, schools were classified into four different strata and
disproportionate stratified random sampling was applied, oversampling schools with
higher proportions. In the second step, as a rule, two classrooms were randomly cho-
sen within each school. In the third step, all students within this classroom were se-
lected. The German sample of the wave-1 data comprises 144 schools, 271 classrooms
and 5,013 students (Kruse and Jacob 2016). A sociometric module could successfully be
administered in 267 of these German classrooms. It contains, among others, the nomi-
nation of the up to five best friends within the classroom. In wave 2, a year later, the
same module could be applied again in 203 of these classrooms (Kruse et al. 2016). Our
analysis is based on waves 1 and 2. We selected all classrooms where at least 10 stu-
dents participated in wave 1, and likewise for wave 2. These were 140 classrooms.
23.4 Classroom cohesion
In our micro-macro study, the micro level is defined by the individual student, and the
macro level by the classroom. We consider diversity with respect to religion, focusing
on the main minority religion in Germany, Islam, and following a binary approach
where the minority is defined by the Muslim students and the majority by all non-
Muslim students. (Thus, we are imputing a common religion to all non-Muslims . . .)
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We study how religious heterogeneity of the classroom affects social cohesion. The het-
erogeneity is reflected by the proportion of Muslim students in the classroom, denoted
by p.
As mentioned above, network theory provides a rich variety of measures for so-
cial cohesion differentially emphasizing its various sub-aspects. Moody and White
(2003) give a very sophisticated treatment. For the purposes of this paper we de-
cided to work with a straightforward structural measure that is simple and easy to
interpret. It is based on the reciprocated degree, defined as the number of recipro-
cated friendships of an individual. Because of our focus on majority and minority
processes, we employ two measures of social cohesion in a classroom: the class-
room average of the reciprocated degrees of its majority (non-Muslim) students,
and the same average for its minority (Muslim) students. This ranges in the data
from 0 to 5, and the majority as well as the minority have a mean of 2.3. This pays
no attention to issues of integration and connectedness, but may be considered a
basic measure that may be considered in future work together with other measures
of structural cohesion such as studied in Moody and White (2003) and Kalter and
Kruse (2014).
Figure 23.1 shows the scatter plot of the average number of reciprocal friendships
per classroom in wave 2, for each religious category separately, in dependence on the
proportion p of Muslims in the classroom, with a smooth approximation. The plot
shows decreasing curves, not far from linear, for p up to 0.5. Perhaps they are in-
creasing for greater proportions; but the number of classrooms there is low, and it is
not clear from the plot whether this conclusion is warranted.
To further assess this relationship we conducted a bivariate regression with
classrooms as cases, and as the two dependent variables the average reciprocated
degrees for the two religious categories in wave 2. The independent variables were
p and, as a control variable, the total number of students used in the analysis for
this classroom – this was the maximum possible number of reciprocated friend-
ships; its mean is 20.9. The analysis was done for the 111 classrooms with p<0.5 and
having at least 10 respondents in both waves. The plot shows that in this range, the
effect of p is approximately linear. The regression coefficients did not differ signifi-
cantly between the two dependent variables. The bivariate regression was calcu-
lated using function gls in package nlme of the statistical system R.
Table 23.1 shows that there clearly is a decreasing effect of p in the range
0≤p<0.5 (the interaction between p and religion was not significant). The expected
average number of reciprocal ties in a classroom without any Muslims (p=0), and
an average size of 20.9, is equal to 2.1. For p=0.5 this drops to 1.6 (and 1.5 for the
Muslims in such a class). The drop from 2.1 to 1.6 is considerable.
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Figure 23.1: Average number of friendship nominations per classroom in wave 2, as a function of
the proportion of Muslim students in the classroom, for majority and minority students.
Table 23.1: Bivariate regression of the average reciprocated degree, for minority and
majority students, on the proportion minority students; N(classrooms) = 111.
Effect par. (s.e.)
Fixed part
Intercept . (.)
Religion −. (.)
Proportion minority (p) −. (.)
Number of students with available data . (.)
Random part
Variance majority .
Variance minority .
Correlation .
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23.5 The empirical puzzle
Given that there is homophily to some extent with two groups, one being the majority
and the other the minority, a straightforward expectation about the proportions in
which the network is divided would be that, when the proportion of one group be-
comes larger, the average number of friends will become larger for this group and
smaller for the other group, as a consequence of the availability of potential friends
in the own group. This means that qualitatively and in a first approximation, we un-
derstand that in Figure 23.1 the curve for the majority is declining for minority propor-
tions from 0 to 0.5, but not that for the minority, Muslims, it also is declining.
The empirical question therefore is twofold.
1. Why is the average number of within-classroom reciprocated friendships for non-
Muslim students declining as a function of the proportion of Muslims, for propor-
tions less than 0.5? Can we understand the numerical value of this decline?
2. Why is the average number of within-classroom reciprocated friendships for
Muslim students declining as a function of the proportion of Muslims, for propor-
tions less than 0.5? Can we understand the numerical value of this decline?
For the students in the majority group, our intuitive reasoning already seems to pro-
vide an answer to the first question; but we would like to back up this intuition
with a formal empirical model, and study numerically the size of this decline. This
is done in the next section. For this we use the Stochastic Actor-oriented Model, a
model making the macro-micro-macro connection explicit. This will also serve as
the starting point for studying the second question.
To express our two questions, we use two coefficients: the regression coefficient
of the average reciprocated degree on p, controlling for the number of participating
students in the classroom, where averaging is across the majority students; and this
regression coefficient where averaging is across the minority students. We used
only the 111 classrooms with at least 10 respondents in wave 1 and also in wave 2,
and with less than 50% Muslim students, to avoid ambiguity about the definition of
the minority. For this set of classrooms, the regression coefficient for the minority
students is −1.23; for the majority it is −0.94. The question now is whether we can
find satisfactory micro-level models to explain these numbers.
23.6 Multilevel network analysis
A model that represents the dynamics of network choices by students, given the
context composed of the classroom, the attributes of all its students, and the cur-
rent state of the network, is the Stochastic Actor-oriented Model (‘SAOM’), proposed
in Snijders (2001) and further explained in Snijders et al. (2010) and Snijders (2017).
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It is implemented in the RSiena package (Ripley et al. 2020). The ‘macro’ here is the
small environment consisting of the classroom, the ‘micro’ is the student who makes
friendship choices. In the SAOM as applied to this case the set of actors is composed
of the students in one classroom and the network is the structure of all friendship ties
between them. It is assumed that the actors have control over their friendship choices,
i.e., their outgoing friendship ties. The model takes the first observation of the net-
work (wave 1) as given, and the dependent variable is the network at the second ob-
servation, i.e., wave 2. It assumes that the change from one network observation to
the next is the result of a large number of sequential small changes, so-called micro-
steps. In a micro-step one of the actors makes a choice in which the options are to
create one new friendship tie, to withdraw one existing friendship tie, or to leave the
network unchanged. The ‘current network’ changes gradually as a result of the micro-
steps, from the first observed network to the second observed network. The choice in
the micro-step is made with probabilities according to a generalized linear model in
which the explanatory variables, called ‘effects’, are functions of the current network
structure and the attributes of the actors. These probabilities can be derived from a
myopic stochastic optimization principle, in which each actor optimizes a linear com-
bination of the effects, called the ‘evaluation function’, to which random disturbances
are added; the optimization considers only the direct result of this choice, without fur-
ther strategic considerations. Detailed specifications are in Snijders et al. (2010). The
choice of the effects, just like any model statistical specification, depends on theoreti-
cal considerations and empirical fit. The SAOM is applied here to the network dynam-
ics from wave 1 to wave 2 of the CILS4EU data.
Figure 23.2 is Coleman’s diagram (Coleman 1990; Raub et al. 2011) for the case
of our study: on the basis of the classroom composition we wish to explain social
cohesion as measured by the average reciprocated degree.
The stochastic agent-based model at the core of the SAOM (Snijders et al. 2010;
Snijders and Steglich 2015) is the basis of our macro-micro-macro approach. The
bridge assumptions are represented by the specification of the SAOM, and how this
depends on ethnicity and classroom composition; the assumptions about individual
behavior are the probabilities of tie changes in the SAOM, which can be summarized
Classroom composition
Students Friendship choices
Average reciprocated degree
Figure 23.2: Coleman’s scheme for this study.
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as myopic context-dependent goal-oriented behavior; and the transformation rule is
the sequence of small changes (micro-steps) that takes the network from one ob-
served wave to the next observed wave, each change also implying a change in the
network context for all actors. The macro-level measure is a simple average of the
actor-level reciprocated degrees, but it is only the end point of this quite complex
transformation rule, and not a direct aggregate of individual choices.
We have quite a large set of German classrooms in the CILS4EU data, giving us
ample variation in macro-level conditions. To handle the large number of class-
rooms, we need a multilevel version of the SAOM. Multilevel network analysis is
discussed in Snijders (2016, p. 31–36). A multilevel SAOM is a combination of
SAOMs, one for each classroom, all with the same model specification, but with
possibly different parameters. To define the multilevel SAOM we have to specify
how the parameters of the various classrooms are related, and how they are esti-
mated. The simplest specification is the multi-group option (Ripley et al. 2020,
Section 11.1), which assumes that all groups have the same parameter value. Even
though this is quite a drastic assumption, it provides an illuminating first step in
our micro-macro approach. A more reasonable approach is to assume that the pa-
rameters of the groups vary freely, and are estimated for each group separately.
This approach resembles meta-analysis (Snijders and Baerveldt 2003). It was ap-
plied, e.g., in Knecht et al. (2010), where this approach posed some computational
problems, because many of the school classes were too small to allow sound esti-
mation by the methods implemented in RSiena; this was managed by a drastic re-
duction in the number of usable classrooms. The second step in this chapter
follows a different approach: the integrated hierarchical multilevel approach devel-
oped in Koskinen and Snijders (2020), of which the implementation is described in
Ripley et al. (2020, Section 11.3), as explained below.
23.6.1 First step: Multi-group approach
As a first step we try to answer our two questions while postulating that in each
classroom the friendship network develops according to a Stochastic Actor-oriented
Model with identical parameters across classrooms, but taking into account the dif-
ferent classroom compositions. As discussed above, we expect intuitively that the
average reciprocated degree for students from the majority declines as a function of
p, and increases for the minority. Therefore we do not expect that this initial model
will provide the answer to both of our questions; but it is a check on the correspon-
dence between our intuitive arguments and the Stochastic Actor-oriented Model.
The model specification was chosen parsimoniously and according to the cur-
rent best practice. The effects included are explained in Snijders et al. (2010) and
Ripley et al. (2020). The outdegree effect is like an intercept in other statistical mod-
els, and represents the balance between creating and dropping ties. Given that the
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network is sparse, so potentially many more ties can be created than can be dropped,
it usually has a negative parameter. Reciprocity and transitivity are basic features of
network dynamics, represented by the reciprocity and transitive triplets effects. The
‘transitive reciprocated triplets’ is an interaction between reciprocity and transitivity,
expected to be negative (Block 2015). Differential centrality of nodes is represented by
the indegree-popularity, outdegree-activity, and outdegree-popularity effects; these
reflect, respectively, variance of indegrees, variance of outdegrees, and the covari-
ance between these. The ‘reciprocal degree-activity’ is the effect of the focal actor’s
reciprocated degree on tie creation and maintenance. This represents a ‘saturation
effect’: an actor with a higher reciprocated degree is expected to have less value for
additional ties, so that the parameter for this effect is expected to be negative. Sex
homophily is usual in secondary school friendship networks, and represented by the
‘different sex’ effect. For religion, used here as a binary variable, the three basic ef-
fects are included, viz., the ‘different religion’ effect, the religion of the receiver
(alter), and the religion of the sender (ego) of the friendship tie. The ‘different reli-
gion’ effect is expected to be negative, which represents the basic assumption in our
micro-macro model, that being of a different religion has a negative effect on friend-
ship creation and maintenance.
For the multi-group analysis, to achieve good convergence of the estimation al-
gorithm, we included classrooms according to a somewhat more stringent criterion
than above. To the requirements that both waves should have at least 10 respond-
ents and the proportion Muslims should be less than 0.5, we added the criterion
that there are at least 12 students for whom the reciprocal degree in wave 2 is non-
missing, and that these are more than 60% of the total number in their classroom.
This left 101 classrooms from the 111 selected in the previous section. For this data
set, the regression coefficient of the average reciprocal degree on the proportion of
Muslim students in the classroom is −1.16 for the minority students, and −0.74 for
the majority.
Estimating this model under the assumption of equal parameters across groups
led to the parameter estimates in Table 23.2. The estimated parameter values are in
line with what is usually found for friendship networks in secondary schools. In
particular, we see clear evidence for homophily with respect to sex and religion.
To see the implications of this model for the macro level, we simulated 1,000 data
sets for the combined 101 schools according to the model of Table 23.2. For each simu-
lated data set we computed the two regression coefficients of interest, i.e., the effect of
the proportion of Muslim students on the average reciprocated degree for minority and
majority students separately. This procedure is similar to the goodness-of-fit procedure
usual for SAOMs (Lospinoso and Snijders 2019), but now applied to the multi-group
situation. Figure 23.3 shows the distributions of these regression coefficients in violin
plots.
For the minority students most of the distribution is in the positive range, for
the majority students most is in the negative range. This is in correspondence to
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our intuitive ideas that the availability of more potential friends in the own group
will result in more reciprocated friendships; although the probabilities of these ex-
pected patterns are not very high. But we also see that the observed values are situ-
ated very low in the distributions; for the majority it is at percentile 0.10, for the
minority at 0.01. The correspondence between the model predictions and the ob-
served regression coefficient for the majority is a confirmation of our intuitive rea-
soning. However, this multi-group model does not correspond satisfactorily to our
data with respect to the minority. Concluding, this model is sufficient to answer our
first empirical question, but not the second.
Table 23.2: Parameter estimates and standard errors for the multi-group
estimation of the Stochastic Actor-oriented Model, N = 101 schools.
Effect estimate (s.e.)
outdegree (density) −. (.)
reciprocity . (.)
transitive triplets . (.)
transitive reciprocated triplets −. (.)
indegree – popularity −. (.)
outdegree – popularity −. (.)
outdegree – activity −. (.)
reciprocated degree – activity −. (.)
different sex −. (.)
different religion −. (.)
religion Muslim alter −. (.)
religion Muslim ego −. (.)
Notes: Convergence t ratios all < 0.06.
Overall maximum convergence ratio 0.14.
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Figure 23.3: Distributions of regression coefficients
of average reciprocated degrees on p for
multigroup model. Horizontal lines denote
quantiles at 0.01, 0.05, 0.50, 0.95, and 0.99;
diamonds represent observed values.
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23.6.2 Second step: Integrated multilevel approach
Could our questions then be answered, still by assuming that the model specifica-
tion is identical between the classrooms, but the parameter values vary? This is
more realistic than the previous approach. This is not expected to give systemati-
cally different average values for our regression coefficients, but there may be more
random variability in a realistic way, which could imply that the data are not really
as extreme as they seem to be in Figure 23.3.
The random coefficient multilevel version of the SAOM is developed in Koskinen
and Snijders (2020). It extends the multilevel approach of Snijders and Baerveldt
(2003) by assuming that the network in each classroom evolves according to a SAOM
with the same specification, but different parameter vectors, these classroom-level pa-
rameter vectors having a multivariate normal distribution. This is similar to the
Hierarchical Linear Model of multilevel analysis (Snijders and Bosker 2012), but now
for longitudinal network data. A Bayesian estimation procedure for this model is imple-
mented in the function sienaBayes of the R package RSienaTest (Ripley et al. 2020).
Convergence of the estimation posed some problems, and it was necessary to
drop one classroom, because in attempts to estimate the model for the set of 101
classrooms it was an outlier, differing too strongly from the other classrooms. On
inspection this classroom appeared to be composed of only majority students, with
the highest average degree of all classrooms, 4.5. The regression coefficient of the
average reciprocal degree on the proportion of Muslim students in the remaining
set of 100 classrooms for the majority is −0.73. The conclusion for the multi-group
approach for this set of 100 classrooms is the same as for the 101 classrooms ana-
lyzed above.
All SAOM parameters were assumed to vary randomly between classrooms. The
macro-level parameters of the multilevel SAOM are the expected values and the be-
tween-classroom variances of the classroom-level parameters. Their estimates are
presented in Table 23.3. Most of the estimates are similar to those in Table 23.2; the
effects that are significant in both models, which are most, have the same sign. To
the extent that there are differences, clearly the results from Table 23.3 are more
credible, being based on more plausible model assumptions.
For this model, since it is Bayesian, we can use the so-called posterior predictive
distribution (see, e.g., Jackman 2009) to check the implications and the model fit. In
this case, this is the distribution where the set of 101 schools is fixed, as well as the
composition of the classrooms and the friendship networks at wave 1, but the probabil-
ity distributions are random: ‘a sample from what the SAOM parameters possibly could
have been’; and the networks at wave 2 also are random: ‘a sample of what could have
occurred in these schools given the sampled parameters’. The posterior predictive dis-
tribution reflect this double stochasticity. The posterior predictive distribution of our
two regression coefficients, for the model of Table 23.3, are presented in Figure 23.4
again by violin plots.
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As expected, the difference with Figure 23.3 is mainly that the distribution in
Figure 23.4 is more spread out (note the scale difference on the vertical axis). For the
majority students the observed value is quite in the middle of the distribution (at per-
centile 0.47), and for the minority students it is still on the low side but not exceptional
(at percentile 0.08). This means that for the majority as well as for the minority stu-
dents, in the light of the variability between classrooms and the regular friendship net-
work processes, there is nothing surprising about the observed negative regression
coefficients. We may consider that both our questions can be answered by the SAOM,
assuming parameter values to vary between the classrooms, and given the uncertainty
that we have about their distribution.
Table 23.3: Posterior means and standard deviations for multilevel SAOM analysis for N = 100
classrooms.
Effect par. (psd) betw. sd
outdegree (density) −. (.) .
Reciprocity . (.) .
transitive triplets . (.) .
transitive reciprocated triplets −. (.) .
indegree – popularity . (.) .
outdegree – popularity −. (.) .
outdegree – activity −. (.) .
reciprocated degree – activity −. (.) .
different sex −. (.) .
different religion −. (.) .
religion Muslim alter . (.) .
religion Muslim ego . (.) .
Notes: par = posterior mean; psd = posterior standard deviation;
betw. sd = posterior between-groups stand. deviation.
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Figure 23.4: Distributions of regression coefficients of
average reciprocated degrees on p for random
coefficient model. Horizontal lines denote quantiles at
0.01, 0.05, 0.50, 0.95, and 0.99; diamonds represent
observed values.
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23.6.3 And yet . . .
Our empirical puzzle focused on the regression coefficients for the average recipro-
cated degree on the proportion of minority students, and we answered it by consid-
ering posterior predictive checks for our macro-micro-macro statistical model. It
should be noted, however, that such model checks are not an overall test of good-
ness of fit for the model. Posterior checks for statistics that are chosen for their de-
scriptive interest may be rather forgiving, because such statistics may include a lot
of variability that is not of diagnostic interest for the model. For example, the re-
gression coefficients used depend also on the standard deviations of the average
reciprocated degrees.
Therefore, for the purpose of model checking, we also consider the fit for a statis-
tic that borrows less variability from elements of the model that are not of primary
interest. Such a statistic is the partial correlation between the average reciprocated
degree and the minority proportion, controlling for the number of cases and for the
average reciprocated degree in the first wave. This partial correlation in our data set
is –0.55 for the minority students, and –0.03 for the majority students. Figure 23.5
shows that this value is far from being reproduced by the random coefficient model
of Table 23.3 for the minority students, although it is totally in line with respect to the
majority students. If we had formulated our empirical puzzle in terms of this partial
correlation coefficient, this random coefficient model would not have solved it.
23.7 Summary and conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to contribute to studying a key sociological question with
an explicit notion of the micro-macro challenges involved. The macro-level consisted
of the classroom (still small for macro), and there were a large number of macro-level
cases. The micro-level consisted of the students. The research was about the dynamics
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Figure 23.5: Distributions of partial correlations of
average reciprocated degrees with p for random
coefficient model. Horizontal lines denote quantiles
at 0.01, 0.05, 0.50, 0.95, and 0.99; diamonds
represent observed values.
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of friendship networks between the students measured at two waves, using the
CILS4EU data. We have built on Knecht, Snijders, Baerveldt, Steglich and Raub (2010)
where a similar multilevel network study was conducted, but without the explicit
micro-macro focus; on Kalter and Kruse (2014) where a micro-macro study using the
CILS4EU data was done, but without explicitly using network dynamics for the micro-
level model; on Snijders and Steglich (2015), a micro-macro study using the SIENA
framework, but not guided by a clear empirical puzzle; and on Koskinen and Snijders
(2020), a multilevel network model.
Taking the relation between religious diversity and social cohesion as the sub-
stantive example, we used fundamental assumptions about network dynamics as the
micro-level mechanisms, and tested to which extent these are sufficient to understand
a particular macro-level characteristic. For the empirical test, we used rich multi-level
longitudinal network data and recent elaborations of the Stochastic Actor-oriented
Model. This enabled us to pursue an integrated approach to the macro-micro-macro
question. An empirical puzzle, challenging common theoretical intuitions, served as
the guideline in successively increasing the level of detail in the theoretical argumen-
tation and the statistical implementation.
The puzzle consisted of two parts. We found that the regression coefficient of the
classroom average reciprocated degree on the proportion of minority students is neg-
ative for the majority; and that it is also negative for the minority. Given a tendency
to homophily, the first empirical result agreed with our intuitive expectations, and
we expected no problems to confirm the empirical finding that this coefficient is neg-
ative. The second, however, was more puzzling. When the own group (minority) is
larger and there is homophily, one would expect that the number of reciprocated
friendships will be larger.
We approached these questions by applying a Stochastic Actor-oriented Model,
specified in the usual way, assuming homophily. We focused not only on the signs,
but wanted to find models giving a good correspondence with the values of the re-
gression coefficients. When the assumption was that the parameters of the network
model are identical across all classrooms, the regression coefficient found for the
majority was well explained; but not so for the minority. However, after relaxing
this auxiliary assumption by assuming that the classroom-level parameters are a
sample from a multivariate normal distribution, also the coefficient for the minority
was not unexpected at all; although, confirming our intuition, the estimated proba-
bility of a positive coefficient in our model was still larger than 0.5.
Therefore, one might say the puzzle is solved. However, the puzzle reappeared
when we considered a less forgiving statistic: the partial correlation between aver-
age reciprocated degree and minority proportion, controlling for the average recip-
rocated degree at the earlier wave, is for the minority much lower than what could
be reproduced by our Stochastic Actor-oriented Model with varying parameters.
Our puzzle was solved but the solution revealed a new puzzle, on which we
hope to work in future. However, we did make substantive progress, and we hope
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to continue with further theoretical and statistical enrichments. We do not regard
this paper as the last tale on the substantive issues. Rather we understand it as a
demonstration of the general fruitfulness of this approach, which comprises the col-
lection of rich and demanding data and sophisticated elaborations of statistical
modelling to detect theoretical desiderata, and which we hope will improve our un-
derstanding of micro-macro phenomena in the social world.
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